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ABSTRACT 
 
The development of an energy role for the European Union has been a divisive area of EU 
policy. The competing interests and differing perspectives of member states, EU 
institutions and commercial energy players have hampered the development of 
downstream European internal energy markets, obstructed the construction of mid-stream 
transportation routes that would diversify European energy supplies and hindered the 
EU’s ability to ‘speak with one voice’ towards major suppliers. However, despite 
widespread scholarly coverage of EU energy issues, the tri-lateral upstream interaction 
between European institutions, member states and energy companies in the countries 
where oil and gas are produced has received less academic attention. This thesis seeks to 
address this lacuna in the literature through an examination of upstream intra-EU 
cooperation in the Caspian region. This study finds that the EU’s upstream oil and gas 
policy in the Caspian is, relatively speaking, more coherent than many other areas of 
European energy policy. In the Caspian, European convergence forms, in particular, 
around the EU’s collective political risk mitigation and market facilitation role. Employing 
an interdisciplinary International Political Economy approach, the thesis examines how 
the EU’s model of European energy supply entails dependence on the commercial sector 
which compels political actors to support companies in strategic regions through milieu-
shaping energy governance and commercial (energy) diplomacy. The thesis demonstrates 
how European actors share similar upstream risk perceptions, promote overlapping 
security and market-based policy perspectives and how both member states and 
companies increasingly encourage an EU foreign policy role in meeting these upstream 
challenges. In doing so, this research examines the EU’s risk-mitigating external energy 
governance, the EU’s diplomatic practice in upstream energy and the dynamics of 
European politico-commercial interaction in the Caspian - core aspects of an under-
researched, but ultimately increasingly cooperative, part of EU external energy policy. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
EUROPEAN UPSTREAM OIL AND GAS COOPERATION IN 
THE CASPIAN: RESEARCH AIMS AND CONTEXT 
 
 
The energy resources of the Caspian region have been the focus of much strategic 
attention since the end of the Cold War (Manning & Jaffe, 1998; Karasac, 2002; Kalicki, 
2001; Barylski, 1995). Indeed, the Caspian is frequently presented as the epicentre of a 
“new great game” where today’s protagonists Russia, the USA, China and the EU are 
thought to vie for influence and power in Eurasia just as Britain and Russia did in the 19th 
century (Menon, 2003; Kleveman, 2004; Zabortseva, 2012). In line with this narrative of 
contestation, much of the discussion of the Caspian in the literature on European energy 
politics focuses on the region’s role in global competition over energy supplies (Denison, 
2009; Pardo Sierra, 2010; Lussac, 2010a). From an EU perspective, the post-Soviet littoral 
states of the Caspian Sea (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan1) are seen to possess 
the energy resources needed for the prospective pipeline routes of the ‘Southern Corridor’ 
that would, in transporting energy to Europe via the Caucasus and Turkey, reduce reliance 
on Russian energy supplies and infrastructures (EU, 2011, p.5; EC, 2010b, p.11). Indeed, 
accessing Caspian energy is an integral part of EU plans to diversify European oil and gas 
supplies and an important feature of the EU’s wider attempts to build a common EU 
energy policy (Socor, 2007, p.117; Roberts, 2010; Baran, 2007).  
However, the development of a common EU energy policy - including the Southern 
Corridor - has been fraught with difficulty. Much of the academic analysis of energy 
                                                          
1 Russia is of course also a post-Soviet Caspian littoral state, but due to its size and broader 
significance not ordinarily considered as a ‘Caspian’ country.  
2 
 
politics in Europe highlights the sense of discord and incoherence that is often thought to 
characterise the EU’s attempts to establish a common energy policy (Youngs, 2007; 2009; 
Kovaĉovská, 2007; Schmidt-Felzmann, 2008; 2011; Braghiroli & Carta, 2009). The EU has 
faced successive difficulties in reaching agreement on energy policy in a number of areas, 
most prominently downstream internal energy market liberalisation, mid-stream energy 
supply diversification and the formulation of a common position towards core energy 
suppliers, notably Russia (Buchan, 2009; Leonard & Popescu, 2007; Gros, 2008; Swieboda, 
2008; Baran, 2007; Schmidt-Felzmann, 2008; 2011). Discussion of the economic, 
commercial and political divisions that have mired the EU’s energy policy efforts is one of 
the dominant themes in the literature on EU foreign energy policy. Indeed, the challenge of 
overcoming European disunity in energy policy often seems to mirror the well-
documented difficulties that the EU has experienced in formulating a wider Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Hill, 1993; Toje, 2008; Wood, 2011).  
However, alongside these down and mid-stream attempts to develop a common energy 
policy, the EU has for a number of years also sought to promote a series of upstream oil 
and gas policy objectives – i.e. energy policy goals within the countries where oil and gas is 
actually produced (EU, 2004; 2009b; EC, 2006b). Nonetheless, comparatively less research 
has focused on this aspect of EU energy policy.  
The European Union has been active in the Caspian region since the early 1990s. 
Following the fall of the Iron Curtain, EU regional reconstruction packages, such as 
Technical Assistance to the CIS (TACIS) that targeted the natural resources sector were 
quickly adopted by European member states in an effort to help support the weak 
economies of the Newly Independent States (NIS), including those in the Caspian 
(Hadfield, 2008b, p.325). In particular, the INOGATE energy programme (Interstate Oil and 
Gas Transport to Europe), itself part of TACIS, sought to provide technical assistance to 
ageing Soviet infrastructures, increase regional energy integration between the EU and 
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markets in Eurasia and ultimately to secure the flow of energy resources to the European 
Union (Hadfield, 2008b, p.325). Nevertheless, despite technical programmes such as these 
and the presence of Caspian countries in the Energy Charter process, during the 1990s and 
the first half of the 2000s the Caspian Sea region did not feature especially prominently on 
the European Union’s foreign policy agenda, remaining a “forgotten region” of presumed 
Russian influence (Zabortseva, 2012, p.168-9; Lussac, 2010a, p.609) and the recipient of 
only low-level technical assistance despite the growing involvement of Western and 
European companies in the region (such as BP, Shell, Total and ENI).  
Indeed, it was not until the mid-2000s (and 2006-8 in particular) that the EU stepped up 
its focus on the Caspian region (Denison, 2009, p.5). In 2004, the EU included the countries 
of the South Caucasus and Central Asia in the Baku Initiative, a regional energy 
programme designed to facilitate energy cooperation between Black and Caspian Sea 
littoral countries and the EU (EU, 2006a). In 2006, at the second Ministerial Conference of 
the Baku Initiative, the programme was up-scaled with the signing of a detailed energy 
cooperation ‘road map’ (the so-called Astana Road Map). Likewise in 2006, the EU signed 
memoranda of understanding (MOU) on energy with Azerbaijan and another, later in the 
same year, with Kazakhstan (EU, 2006a; 2006b). In 2007, the EU launched its flagship 
Central Asia Strategy with energy and transport as one of the seven core areas of 
cooperation and with other areas of the strategy, such as trade and investment and the 
rule of law, overlapping with energy policy concerns (EU, 2009b, p.21-23). In 2008, a MOU 
was signed with Turkmenistan as part of the closer, but still tentative, cooperation 
between Brussels and Ashgabat (EU, 2008). On the European side of the Caspian, 
Azerbaijan was included in both the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004 and 
the Eastern Partnership (EaP) announced in 2008 - both seeking, inter alia, to facilitate 
cooperation on energy policy.  
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This change of focus in EU Caspian energy policy was primarily caused by factors 
exogenous to the region. The Russia-Ukraine gas crisis of 2006 (and subsequent crises 
with Belarus in 2007 and Ukraine again in 2009) added to the already tense atmosphere of 
heightened global demand and rapidly increasing energy prices (Lussac, 2010a, p.619; 
Schmidt-Felzmann, 2011, p.575). The 2006 and 2009 gas crises fundamentally challenged 
core European assumptions about the security of external energy supplies and, in 
particular, significantly damaged EU member states’ perception of Russia and Ukraine as 
reliable energy suppliers (Umbach, 2010, p.1230). The more or less simultaneous timing 
of the EU’s increased attention to energy security concerns and its increasing focus on the 
Caspian region is of course no coincidence. Unsurprisingly, given its natural resource 
wealth, proximity to the EU and potential source of diversification for both oil and gas, the 
Caspian region loomed into focus for EU foreign and energy policy makers as a potential 
source of additional energy supplies (Youngs, 2009a, p.101). The geographical proximity 
of the Caspian and the ability to transit supplies to Europe via Turkey, rather than Russia 
and Ukraine, make the Caspian a geopolitically advantageous source of energy resources.  
However, in addition to the importance of the Ukraine-Russia gas crisis in shaping the EU’s 
engagement with the states of the Caspian region, the desires of European companies 
already active in the Caspian region for greater EU-level engagement (and support for 
alternative non-Russian pipeline routes) should also be factored in as an additional 
explanation for increased EU engagement in the region (BG Group, 2006, p.7-8; Statoil2, 
2006, p.9). Likewise, by 2006 some member states, notably the UK, were starting to call 
for greater EU involvement in the Caspian upstream (UK Government, 2006, p.28) 
(discussed further in chapter six). 
 
                                                          
2 Statoil is of course not an ‘EU’ company but one that nonetheless has an important supply 
relationship with EU firms and states. 
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Thesis focus  
 
Despite the increased salience that Central Asian and Caspian energy developments have 
attracted since the mid-2000s, little research has explicitly investigated the EU’s upstream 
energy policy practice in the Caspian region (as elsewhere in the upstream) or the EU’s 
evolving upstream relations with commercial energy actors. Indeed, as Padgett (2011, p.2) 
notes, there has been “little research into the institutions that the EU has created in the 
attempt to consolidate its relations with strategically important energy partners in the 
wider Europe”. Likewise, Bosse and Schmidt-Felzmann (2011, p.481) assert that “in the 
current academic literature on foreign relations of European states and the EU with the 
wider neighbourhood, research on the increasingly important developments in the Union’s 
external energy policy still are rather scarce” [emphasis added]. As described later in this 
chapter, the literature on politico-commercial relations in EU foreign energy policy has 
received even less attention. 
This thesis addresses this lacuna in the research by focusing on EU upstream energy (oil 
and gas) cooperation3 between political and commercial actors in the Caspian region. 
Ultimately, this study finds that, while not in perfect alignment, the major externally-
operating European energy actors - the European Commission and the European External 
Action Service (EEAS), member states and European-supplying oil and gas companies - 
demonstrate more cooperation and coherence in the Caspian upstream than is generally 
observed in other areas of energy policy. Furthermore, this cooperation appears to be 
increasing and is centred, in particular, on a series of EU policies and practices aimed at 
the mitigation of political risk.  
                                                          
3 While processes of convergence and interaction between European actors and the 
supranationalisation of certain diplomatic functions are discussed in the following chapters, the 
investigation here is at the ‘ontological’ or integration/cooperation stage of the European policy 
process (Radaelli, 2003, p.33) rather than a study of ‘Europeanisation’ (internal or external). 
Indeed, this study is concerned with why European states (and non-state actors) cooperate and is 
thus not, to continue Radaelli’s expression, at the ‘post-ontological’ stage i.e. involving investigation 
of the Europeanising impact of established EU institutions or processes on the actors operating 
within and in conjunction with them (Radaelli, 2003, p.33). 
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The research question for this thesis is thus:  
How cooperative are relations between the externally-operating EU institutions, EU 
member states and European commercial energy actors in the Caspian upstream? 
Investigation of this cooperation centres on two dimensions of EU upstream policy that 
affect all European political and commercial energy actors operating in the Caspian: 1) the 
promotion of energy governance pertaining to the oil and gas industry; and 2) the practice 
of EU energy diplomacy - particularly a) protective “problem-solving” commercial  
diplomacy (Kostecki & Naray, 2007, p.10) that supports companies in foreign markets - 
and b) EU “catalytic diplomacy” referring to the broader interdependent diplomatic 
interaction between non-state, EU and member state actors in European diplomatic 
practice (Hocking, 2004a, p.100). These governance and diplomatic policy areas, as will be 
shown below, are deeply entwined. Indeed, EU upstream oil and gas governance refers to 
policies that seek to affect the rules, practices and norms by which energy production, 
trade and investment are managed while energy diplomacy (at least in this context) refers 
to both the EU’s diplomatic efforts to support these governance initiatives and manage the 
impact of politics on energy production, trade and investment. 
This thesis focuses specifically on upstream governance and energy diplomacy in oil and 
gas (the primary sources of EU energy supply). In doing so it examines two of the most 
significant policy areas for EU-commercial relations that exhibit potential for both 
cooperation and tension between EU member states, energy companies and the 
externally-operating EU institutions. It is important to note that the interaction between 
European actors discussed in the thesis is not harmonisation - that is to say the propitious 
alignment of interests - but rather cooperation (Keohane, 1984, p.51). Indeed, this thesis 
documents cooperation between actors who “adjust their behaviour to the actual or 
anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination” (Keohane, 
1984, p.51). While there is a commonality of certain overlapping interests between these 
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actors, as outlined in the following chapters, they also regularly engage in forms of policy 
coordination that are sometimes formalised, but also at times informal and ad-hoc. In 
concentrating on cooperation in oil and gas upstream policy, this thesis does not attempt 
to survey the totality of EU’s wider energy cooperation in or with Caspian states (which is 
beyond the focus of this thesis). There is no attention here, for example, to nuclear energy 
cooperation and only attention to climate change and renewables when directly relevant 
to oil and gas matters.  
The rest of this introductory chapter sets the scene for this study. It begins by specifying 
more precisely the argument presented and theoretical approaches adopted. Secondly, it 
outlines the research aims and questions addressed in the thesis and sets out the chapter 
running order. The third part of the chapter then presents a review of relevant themes in 
the literature, highlighting a number of the challenges the EU has faced in developing a 
common external energy policy and setting out some of the major energy-related 
dynamics that confront the EU in the Caspian. This section concludes with a review of the 
surprisingly limited literatures on EU upstream energy policy and commercial-political 
relations in energy to which this thesis will contribute.  
THE ARGUMENT: ENERGY SECURITY RISK, POLITICAL RISK AND POLITICO-
ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN UPSTREAM ENERGY 
 
This thesis argues that EU oil and gas policy in the Caspian upstream presents a broadly 
overlooked and largely more internally convergent sphere of EU external energy policy 
than might be expected when considering the generally discordant nature of EU external 
energy relations. In particular, while encapsulating a range of issues, the EU’s upstream oil 
and gas cooperation in the Caspian is relatively cohesive because it revolves around a core 
set of policies and practices concerned with the mitigation of risk, and political risk in 
particular, that serve both European commercial and energy security objectives.   
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Political risk refers to the “probability of disruption of the operations of multinational 
enterprises by political forces or events” (Multilateral Guarantee Investment Agency, 2010, 
p.28) and represents a core concern for commercial energy actors. However, despite calls 
for more attention to risk and risk management in the study of European energy politics 
(Güllner, 2008, p.150), questions of political risk feature relatively little in academic 
discussions of EU external energy policy4. However, political risk, and the EU’s response to 
it, is central to understanding the cooperation between European actors in the Caspian 
upstream. This is for several reasons, discussed throughout this thesis and outlined below.  
Firstly, as described in chapter four, the EU’s model of energy supply, which relies on 
commercial companies for investment in and delivery of energy, means that political risks 
to companies overlap with energy security risks for member states and the European 
Union more broadly. In turn, the link between energy security risk and political risk 
creates a strong overlap between EU energy diplomacy and EU commercial diplomacy 
(especially reactive ‘problem-solving’ diplomacy). This diplomacy in turn also highlights 
the overlap between a number of the EU’s different foreign policy roles, most notably in 
trade and market promotion, security promotion and diplomacy5 (Smith, 2012a, p.705-
10). As Smith has argued (2012, p.701-3), the politics of European external relations has 
often revolved around efforts to integrate and accommodate these (sometimes conflicting) 
EU foreign policy roles and structures. The overlap between these areas in energy policy is 
particularly pertinent at an EU level following the boosting of European competence for 
security of energy supply and foreign investment in the Lisbon Treaty.  
Secondly, as will be described further in chapter four, there is a broad overlap in 
perceptions of the security challenges of the Caspian context (and the risks therein) 
                                                          
4 A fact that is surprising given the attention placed on energy risks in other parts of the energy 
policy literature (Kennedy & Nurmakov, 2010; Domjan & Stone, 2010; Bremmer & Johnston, 2009).  
5 Indeed, the ‘good governance’ and environmental elements of the EU’s action in the Caspian 
(discussed in chapter five) also highlight an element of the normative in EU upstream energy policy 
(Smith, 2012a, p.210). 
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between commercial, member state and EU institutional actors that underpins EU 
cooperation in upstream oil and gas policy in the Caspian. 
Third, the EU’s upstream oil and gas policies are in large part (albeit by no means 
exclusively) designed to effect structural changes in the wider European milieu so as to 
mitigate market distortions and upstream political risk. EU policy does this both in a 
proactive sense, seeking to promote governance and policies that offset risks before they 
happen, and in a reactive sense, responding diplomatically to extant risks as they occur. 
Indeed, this risk mitigation objective is one of the core factors linking the promotion of 
governance (broadly proactive) and energy diplomacy (both proactive and reactive). In 
addition, this wider risk-mitigating milieu-shaping function (discussed below) links 
together both the EU’s strategic diplomacy, designed to position the EU favourably in the 
international arena, and the EU’s structural foreign policy (and structural diplomacy 
within that) that seeks to shape the governance structures and processes of third party 
states (Hocking & Smith, 2011, p.38-40; Keukeleire, 2003).    
Fourth, a combination of the EU liberal model of energy supply and the high level of 
political risk in the Caspian means that the EU and commercial actors are interdependent 
and mutually reliant on each other’s resources in the Caspian region. This is especially the 
case given the strategic nature of the Caspian and the highly technically complex operating 
environment that the region presents.  
Fifth, the EU is seen as an advantageous level for energy diplomacy in the region by both 
companies and member states. Member states support a strong energy diplomacy role for 
the EU in the Caspian as they see EU cooperation as a way to enact great political influence 
in a politically-challenging region. Likewise, companies support a strong EU role as they 
see EU actors as an alternative source of political support that can be more effective than 
member state support alone. Furthermore, for both companies and member states, the EU 
is seen to be a more ‘neutral’ actor in the region (compared with individual member 
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states), useful when member states want to deliver a politically difficult message or when 
association with a member state can be politically disadvantageous for a company.  
Sixth, in the Caspian upstream, fear of Russian and Chinese regional aspirations spur 
Caspian states to pursue multi-vector foreign policies that provide structural openings for 
European actors. In turn, common upstream challenges, similar perceptions of risk and the 
nature of the upstream industry in the Caspian foster the kind of intra-European unity that 
allows the EU to overcome differences and perform its upstream energy role in the region.   
Taken together, these factors support a higher level of intra-EU energy cooperation and 
convergence than is typically witnessed in EU foreign energy policy. 
Theoretical approach  
  
In addition to the empirical arguments outlined above, this thesis aims to make a 
theoretical contribution to the EU external energy literature. At present, the literature on 
EU foreign energy policy cooperation is, relatively speaking, under-theorised. Indeed, most 
of the conceptual analysis of EU external energy policy explains failures of policy (i.e. an 
absence of cooperation) and does not present the forms of politico-economic analysis 
needed for the type of investigation conducted in this thesis. There are two major reasons 
for these theoretical gaps in the existing literature.  
Firstly, the literature on EU energy policy has largely focused on explaining areas of intra-
EU discord rather than cooperation (Schmidt-Felzmann, 2008; 2011; Bozhilova & 
Hashimoto, 2010; Westphal, 2006; McGowan, 2008; Youngs, 2007; 2009). As such this 
literature mirrors wider discussions on the diversity of interests held by EU member 
states and the challenges this presents in developing a common EU foreign policy (Hill, 
1998). While this is unsurprising given the tensions witnessed in EU foreign energy policy, 
it means that the theorisation of occasions when EU institutions, member states and 
energy companies do interact cooperatively has been somewhat overlooked.  
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Secondly, parts of the conceptual EU external energy relations literature have mirrored 
wider divisions in energy policy studies between pessimistic-realist and rational-liberal 
analysis and, as a result, have tended not to focus on the interaction between commercial 
and political actors (see for example, Luft & Korin, 2009, Chester, 2010; Grant, 2008; 
Taylor & Van Doren, 2008; Noël, 2008). Indeed, as Keating, Kuzemko, Belyi and Golthau 
(2012, p.2) have argued “contemporary analysis on energy and energy governance rarely 
departs from traditional realist/geo-political or liberal/neo-liberal approaches”. As 
discussed in chapter two, these approaches tend to represent an ontological reification of 
the respective effects of the political inter-state system and transnational markets in the 
analysis of energy. These approaches see either inter-state or economic structures/actors 
as causally predominant in determining energy outcomes, rather than conceptualising 
their interaction. Significant sections of the literature on EU foreign energy policy have 
either explicitly or implicitly reflected this realist-liberal divide (Youngs, 2009; Westphal, 
2006; Finon & Locatelli, 2008; Correljé & van der Linde, 2006). As a result, they fail to fully 
“explore the potential interrelationships [between political and economic structures and 
actors] that are in fact crucial for understanding the dynamics of energy governance” 
(Keating et al, 2012, p.3). Theoretical models capable of analysing the EU’s various 
security, market and diplomatic roles in external energy policy are thus lacking in the 
conceptual literature.  
Indeed, as Watson (2012, p.viii) and Keating et al (2012, p.2-3) have argued, the wider 
energy policy literature has been slow to build on the extensive analysis of politico-
economic interaction in International Political Economy (IPE). As such, they call for a 
systematic breaking down of the barriers between economic and political analysis in 
energy (Watson, 2012, p.viii; Keating et al, 2012, p.2-3). This thesis seeks to build on these 
observations and draw on the IPE (as well as other IR, EU foreign policy and public policy) 
literature to develop coherent politico-economic theoretical frameworks useful for the 
analysis of European upstream politico-commercial cooperation in the Caspian.  
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An eclectic IPE approach  
As White (2004, p.23) and Ginsberg (2001, p.21) have noted, European foreign policy 
(EFP) rarely lends itself well to analysis through a single theory. Indeed, despite the 
limitations of interparadigmatic research in terms of theoretical parsimony, White (2004, 
p.23) suggests that an eclectic approach to European foreign policy theory-building “is 
positively desirable”. Likewise, as mentioned above, a number of scholars have identified 
the inherent conceptual complexity involved in studying energy policy and the consequent 
need for theoretical eclecticism to comprehend its economic, commercial and political 
dimensions (Strange, 1988; Keating et al, 2012). 
Correspondingly, this thesis employs an eclectic mix of heuristic theoretical models 
derived from the literatures on IPE/IR (Strange, 1988; Goel, 2004, Cox, 1986; Wolfers, 
1962) European foreign policy/external relations (Smith 2004; Hocking, 2004a; 2004b; 
Hyde-Price, 2008; Keukeleire, 2003; Hill, 1998) and Public Policy (Eising, 2009; Bouwen, 
2002). The incorporation of these various theoretical ideas is designed to aid explanation 
of:  
1) The structural operating conditions facing EU actors in the Caspian;  
2) The EU’s upstream energy objectives and role; and. 
3) The cooperation between EU institutions, member states and private commercial 
energy actors. 
The three models, detailed further in chapter two, are outlined briefly here: 
1) The structural operating conditions of the Caspian: Territorial non-coincidence, 
heterogeneity and energy interdependence. This first model employs a number of concepts 
to help explain the structural upstream energy challenges facing European actors in the 
Caspian. One of the major challenges for political and commercial actors operating in 
foreign markets is what Murray (1971, p.85) has referred to as “territorial non-
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coincidence”. Territorial non-coincidence refers to the heterogeneous differences in 
regulation, commercial rights, norms and governance practices found across state 
boundaries (Murray, 1971, p.85). Transnationally-operating European energy actors, on 
which the EU collectively relies for energy supply, are negatively impacted by forms of 
energy governance that challenge their business operations. However, territorial 
(governance) non-coincidence across regions is underpinned and shaped by the broader 
politico-economic differences between states and the nature of their interdependence.  
Indeed, the states of the Caspian region exhibit very different politico-economic structures 
to those found in Europe and these different state structures in turn necessitate alternate 
energy regulatory models and practices (Kaveshnikov, 2010, p.598). In this context, the 
European Commission argues (2008a, p.7) that the “widely-varying interests of countries 
in the energy field, in a context of increasing energy interdependence, point to the need for 
more robust international legal frameworks based on a balance of commitments and 
benefits”. However, interdependence can induce discord as well as cooperation (Keohane, 
1984, p.5-6; Keohane & Nye, 1989, p.10). As will be discussed further in chapter two, 
rather than foster collaboration, the nature of energy interdependence between Europe 
and the states of the former Soviet Union (based on westward flows of natural resources 
and eastward flows of capital) can serve to further and deepen this heterogeneity of 
politico-economic and regulatory structures. Indeed, it does so by stimulating the kind of 
resource development (and resource curse effects in particular), that underpin Caspian 
states’ authoritarian and centralised state structures and corresponding regulatory 
models in oil and gas (the pre-eminent domestic economic sectors) that serve these 
structures. The EU has a clear interest in reducing this heterogeneity (at both the state and 
the regulatory level) and the risks it presents, but at the same time, this involves seeking 
to challenge fundamental politico-economic structures in Caspian states and the 
regulatory structures they underpin. As Zielonka (2006, p.105-112) argues EU external 
relations are designed to respond to this form of “cross-border interdependence 
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challenge” through the promotion and outward extension of EU governance (see also 
Lavenex, 2004). However doing so can cause tensions, especially as Caspian states are 
increasingly keen to use their new found sovereignty and economic wealth to strengthen 
such structures (see chapters four and seven). 
2) The EU’s upstream energy objectives and role: Milieu-shaping. This second model seeks 
to conceptualise the EU’s upstream role and objectives in the Caspian. It is suggested that, 
in the context of the territorial non-coincidence and precipitant risk discussed above, the 
EU’s upstream oil and gas policy efforts represent a case of EU milieu-shaping in line with 
both European energy security and commercial energy prerogatives (Hyde-Price, 2008, 
p.32; Wolfers, 1962; Smith, 2004; Keukeleire, 2003, p.47). As Hyde-Price (2008, p.31) 
argues, regional powers have “an  interest  in  shaping  a  benign  international 
environment  favourable  to  their  first-order  interests  (primarily  associated  with their 
security and prosperity)”. Hyde-Price notes that the EU presents an instrument for the 
collective promotion of member states’ economic and security interests in the global 
economy and, more specifically in the context of this thesis, serves “as an instrument for 
collectively shaping the regional milieu” in line with these security and economic 
objectives (Hyde-Price, 2008, p.31). Similarly, Keukeleire (2003, p.47) argues that the EU 
operates a form of “structural foreign policy” (and within that structural diplomacy) 
whereby it seeks to promote “a more favourable international environment by pursuing 
and supporting long-term structural changes, both in the internal situation of the country 
concerned and the interstate relations and general situation of the region”.  
However, this analysis of milieu-shaping and structural foreign policy are complemented 
in the context of EU external oil and gas policy and political risk mitigation by neo-
marxist/structuralist notions of “making the world safe for capital”, especially in terms of 
the promotion of “state economic functions” (SEF) - such as market opening, market-
facilitating regulation and the international safeguarding of property rights – all essential 
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to the effective operations of the oil and gas industry on which the EU relies (Smith, 2004, 
p.81; Murray, 1971). While this promotion of state economic functions in the EU context is 
usually carried out by member state governments, as Smith (2004, p.80) points out, they 
can be also performed by other political authorities such as the EU.  
3) European upstream energy cooperation: Politico-commercial bargains, catalytic 
diplomacy and resource interdependence. This third model seeks to help conceptualise the 
interaction between European political and commercial actors in the Caspian upstream. 
To do so it employs Strange’s (1988; see also Goel, 2004) notion of a politico-commercial 
“bargain” alongside the concepts of resource dependency (Eising, 2009) and catalytic 
diplomacy (Hocking, 2004a; 2004b). Strange (1988, p.42) argues that one of the core 
purposes of enquiry in IPE is to “find the balance of interest and power that allows a 
working set of bargains to be hammered out and observed [emphasis added]”. The 
international oil and gas business, she argues, is a “particularly complex cat’s cradle of 
interlocking bargains” (Strange, 1988, p.41). Such a view is concordant with Hocking’s 
(2004a, p. 100) notion of “catalytic diplomacy” where state and non-state actors’ 
“interlinked autonomy and resource dilemmas” sees them seeking to “maximise their 
freedom for action in the pursuit of policy goals whilst devising strategies [with other 
actors] to compensate for resource deficiencies” (see also Hocking & Smith, 2011). It is 
suggested that this particular interlocking politico-commercial bargain and the catalytic 
diplomacy it presents can be analysed effectively through an examination of resource 
(inter)dependency (Eising, 2009) and the respective political, financial, production and 
knowledge-based resource contributions each actor provides in Caspian states. European 
political and commercial actors all possess certain resources that they deploy in the 
Caspian. No actor or set of actors can achieve all of their respective objectives without 
benefitting from the resources that others possess (Hocking, 2004b, p.151). Examining the 
relative resource contributions that each set of actors brings to the Caspian upstream 
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context allows one to understand the nature of the interdependence between European 
actors in the region.  
RESEARCH AIMS AND QUESTIONS  
 
The overall objective of this study is to contribute to knowledge of European upstream 
energy policy and cooperation in the Caspian Sea region.  
To recapitulate, the overall research question for this research is:  
How cooperative are relations between the externally-operating EU institutions, EU member 
states and European commercial energy actors in the Caspian upstream? 
Specifically, the research has three major aims: 
1. To examine the EU’s broader foreign energy policy role, governance objectives and 
diplomatic practices in the Caspian upstream and to evaluate how these actions fit 
within the EU’s wider foreign oil and gas strategy; 
2. To analyse cooperation and interaction between externally-operating EU 
institutions, member states and companies on Caspian upstream oil and gas policy; 
and 
3. To develop/merge a set of theoretical frameworks capable of explaining both the 
EU’s upstream objectives and role and intra-EU cooperation in the Caspian.  
These aims lead to the following research questions: 
1. What is the EU’s energy role in the Caspian upstream? 
2. How much do EU institution, member state and energy company perspectives of 
energy risk in the upstream overlap (and why)? 
3. What are the objectives of EU upstream oil and gas policy in the Caspian? 
4. How much do EU institution, member state and energy company perspectives of 
upstream energy policy overlap (and why)? 
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5. What role do the externally-operating EU institutions (Commission and EEAS) play 
in energy diplomacy in the Caspian? 
6. How does the resource interdependence between European actors in the Caspian 
upstream contribute to cooperation? 
7. Which theoretical concepts from the political science literature can be 
employed/merged/developed to help explain European cooperation in the 
Caspian upstream? 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW  
 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters and a concluding chapter. The remaining 
sections of this first, introductory chapter present a research background to the study. 
Chapter two is the core theoretical chapter. It sets out the shortcomings of current 
conceptual approaches to understanding cooperation in European energy politics and 
outlines an alternative politico-economic ontology. Having done so, this chapter then 
outlines the conceptual models described above in greater depth. The third chapter details 
the research methods used in the thesis discussing internal validity and the transferability 
of the research, as well as the research collection and data analysis methods.  
Chapters four and five analyse the EU’s risk-mitigating role and specific objectives in the 
Caspian. Specifically, chapter four places the EU’s upstream oil and gas policies within the 
context of the EU’s broader external energy risk mitigation strategy and that of political 
risk mitigation in particular. It highlights the dependence of the EU on the commercial 
energy sector and suggests how, through both energy governance and diplomacy, the EU 
seeks to shape the regional milieu so as to facilitate the commercial actions of 
European/Western energy businesses as a whole. Chapter five outlines the character and 
specific risk-mitigating objectives of the EU’s energy governance policy in the Caspian 
highlighting its promotion of risk-mitigating liberal state economic functions, as opposed 
to proprietorial state economic functions promoted by Caspian states (Mommer, 2000). 
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This chapter outlines in detail the specific institutional and normative elements of EU 
policy and the risk-reducing state economic functions that the EU seeks to ensure in the 
region.  
Chapter six focuses on the EU’s risk-mitigating energy diplomacy in the Caspian. It 
discusses the link between energy diplomacy and commercial diplomacy, highlights EU 
diplomatic practice in the Caspian and examines energy company and member state 
perspectives of this EU diplomatic role. Likewise, this chapter also discusses some of the 
tensions that exist between the different roles of the EEAS and Commission in the 
prevision of energy diplomacy and some of the tensions between companies’ promotion of 
their specific interests and the EU’s desires to support the general European interest in 
energy.  
Chapter seven, the final empirical chapter, focuses predominantly on Kazakhstan. As a 
major energy exporter with one of the highest regional levels of foreign investment in the 
oil and gas sector (and having experienced a greater level of major power involvement 
than any other country in the Caspian region), Kazakhstan represents an ideal case to 
examine the cooperation between European actors in the Caspian upstream. This chapter 
traces the different challenges facing European actors in Kazakhstan (as well as other 
Caspian states) and outlines the different politico-security, financial, productive and 
knowledge-based resources that different actors are able to employ to counter these 
challenges. It stresses how European political and commercial actors rely on, and benefit 
from, resources under the control of other European actors and how none of these actors 
are able to fully achieve their respective objectives alone. In doing so, this chapter sets out 
the degree of resource interdependence between European actors in the Caspian and 
highlights how this underpins intra-European cooperation in the region. Chapter eight will 
conclude with a discussion of the major research contributions offered and present some 
critical reflections on the thesis.  
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RESEARCH CONTEXT: A REVIEW OF RELEVANT THEMES IN THE LITERATURE 
 
To set the context for the research to follow, this section presents a review of relevant 
themes in the energy policy and post-Soviet studies literatures. Firstly, the difficulties the 
EU has encountered in its attempts to formulate a common foreign energy policy are 
examined. The second section turns attention to the Caspian, outlining three energy 
related phenomena - rentierism, resource nationalism, and regional energy competition - 
that feature in the political economies of Caspian producer states and shape the structural 
conditions for European actors who operate there. The third section considers the current 
literature on upstream EU energy policy in the Caspian noting that, while this literature 
highlights a number of important issues, it is largely prospective, presenting little detailed 
empirical analysis of upstream dynamics. Finally, this review discusses politico-
commercial relations in foreign energy policy in both the US and Europe, noting how the 
literature on these relationships in the context of European energy policy is 
underdeveloped at present.  
The persistent difficulties of forming a coherent EU energy policy: A hesitance to cede 
sovereignty in a strategic area  
 
Despite the greater salience of energy relations on the European foreign policy agenda 
since the mid-2000s, the development of an EU level energy policy has been a difficult 
process (Buchan, 2009; Schmidt-Felzmann, 2011; Youngs, 2009). One of the major themes 
of the literature on EU foreign energy policy is the incoherence between member states 
and institutions and the consequent failure to ‘speak with one voice’ on energy matters, 
particularly in the context of EU-Russia relations. In general this literature is animated by 
a paradox – why when the EU faces so many external energy challenges (most notably 
relating to energy dependence on Russia) have member states not managed to formulate a 
cooperative response? 
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These difficulties mirror a much broader trend in EU foreign policy where the EU is seen 
to be unable to fully coordinate its foreign policy despite the apparent rational benefits of 
doing so – especially towards Russia. Braghiroli and Carta (2009, p.2) describe EU-Russia 
energy relations as “emblematic case that puts into question the EU's foreign policy 
coherence and normative distinctiveness”. Likewise, Claes (2009, p.58) exemplifies the 
EU’s predicament when he stresses that the EU would be in “a stronger and better position 
if the member states subsume to a unified strategy. This is so far not the case towards its 
most important external energy supplier at the moment - Russia”. Schmidt-Felzmann 
(2008, p.170) cites former EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandleson as noting “the 
incoherence of European policy towards Russia over much of the past decade has been 
frankly alarming”.  
EU member states, it is argued, “oscillate between neo-institutionalist and neorealist 
temptations in their relations with Russia” with national capitals simultaneously seeking 
to engage Russia in regional, rules-based institutions whilst attempting to pursue their 
national interests bilaterally (Braghiroli & Carta, 2009, p.2). While the EU had less 
difficulty formulating a common position towards Russia in the 1990s, coalescing around a 
strategy of democratisation and Westernisation in a weakened Russia, this plan, it is 
argued, is no longer viable (Leonard & Popescu, 2007, p.1; Barysch, 2007, p.4). Schmidt-
Felzmann (2008, p.172) suggests that European countries attempt to ‘upload’ their own 
strategic policy preferences and bilateral disputes with Russia to the European level when 
it is in their interests to do so, whilst at the same time those that can (predominantly the 
larger member states) also pursue their relations with Russia bilaterally, outside of EU 
forums. While ‘uploads’ are often couched in the language of the European interest, 
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Schmidt-Felzmann (2008, p.172) argues there is “no real indication that a concern for the 
‘common EU good’ is driving their national foreign policies”6.  
Scholars have highlighted divisions between ‘new’ and ‘old’ member states with regards to 
Russia (Braghiroli & Carta, 2009; Leonard & Popescu, 2007). Old member states tend to 
perceive of their energy dependence on Russia in relative terms, seeing energy trade 
dependence on Russia as a positive part of mutual interdependence (Braghiroli & Carta, 
2009, p.6). By contrast, Braghiroli and Carta argue that “new [member states] still 
perceive the absolute dependence on the exchanges with Russia as a form of ‘dominance’ 
(further complicated by the claim that Moscow pursues a form of unilateral coercive 
politics)” (Braghiroli & Carta, 2009, p.6).  
In the downstream, divisions have also been manifest in member states’ approaches to the 
European Commission’s energy market liberalisation agenda that seeks to open European 
markets to competition and break-up large incumbent ‘national champion’ companies 
(McGowan, 2008, p.90; Youngs, 2009, p.33). As McGowan asserts, for “defenders of the 
status-quo … maintaining powerful integrated [energy company] incumbents provides, 
amongst other things, the best basis for negotiations with third party countries and for 
ensuring secure supply” (2008, p.90). Youngs (2009, p.34) refers to three different 
positions that member states have adopted on this issue. One set, exemplified by Germany, 
is reluctant to cede sovereignty and sees bilateral deals as the best way to secure its 
energy interests. Another set, exemplified by the UK, argues that free markets at home and 
market liberalisation abroad are the most suitable approach to manage energy security – 
concurring broadly with the European Commission. A third strand, approximating to the 
French position, argues against both of these approaches, asserting that political issues 
                                                          
6 Barysch notes how (former) European leaders such as President Berlusconi, President Chirac and 
Chancellor Shröder were happy to forego common EU positions in favour of preferential bilateral 
deals with Russia (2007, p.2). Despite a more pragmatic approach to Russia and greater 
consultation with Central and Eastern European member states, Barysch argues that Angela Merkel 
maintains very close relations with Russia and has continued with the Nord Stream pipeline (see 
below) against the wishes of a number of other member states (2007, p.2).  
22 
 
should be taken into account but, for that reason, energy security should be handled at a 
European level (but not necessarily liberalised along Commission lines) (Youngs, 2009, 
p.34)7.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly given the divisions noted above, member states have frequently 
undermined the Commission’s efforts at internal energy liberalisation. Member states 
have resisted the Commission’s efforts to break-up national monopolies. In the case of a 
merger between French companies Suez and Gaz de France, former President Sarkozy 
supported unification of the two companies, helping to create rather than dismantle a 
‘national champion’ (Youngs, 2009, p.35; Buchan, 2007, p.38). Both the Spanish and 
French governments have protected national companies from foreign take over (by 
French and Italian companies respectively) (Buchan, 2007, p.38-42). Member states also 
differed on the place of reciprocity in relations with foreign suppliers. A number of 
member states (predominantly those with ‘national champions’ i.e. France, Italy and 
Germany) have argued that access to European markets should only be given to foreign 
companies when access was equally granted upstream to European companies. Others 
such as the UK argued this was “a protectionist pretext” and that it was in the EU’s interest 
to permit downstream investment by energy suppliers as this would deepen dependence 
and strengthen energy security (Youngs, 2007, p.41).  
In the mid-stream, divisions between member states have also been evident over the 
various pipeline routes (actual and potential) that bring energy supplies to Europe (Götz, 
2008; Schmidt-Felzmann, 2011; Feklyunina, 2008; Braghiroli & Carta, 2009). Three major 
pipeline projects have triggered most of the controversy. Nord Stream and South Stream 
(both supported by Russia with partnership from a number of EU member states) and 
Nabucco, (supported by the EU institutions and, at least rhetorically, by member states) 
have served to highlight EU energy policy divisions at perhaps their most strident (see fig. 
                                                          
7 As well as a useful typology of member state positions, this analysis by Youngs also draws 
attention to the divisions between ‘the big three’ member states.  
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1 below) (Schmidt-Felzmann, 2011, p.585). The Nord Stream pipeline, backed by Russia 
and Germany (but also with the participation of France and Denmark), brings gas from 
Russia via the Baltic Sea to Germany (and on to France, Denmark and the UK amongst 
others). Nord Stream is viewed by some Central and Eastern European states (particularly 
Poland and Estonia) as a means for Russia to be able to increase pressure on them without 
damaging its main consumer base in Europe8 (Schmidt-Felzmann, 2011b, p.585). Götz 
(2008, p.94) argues that Nord Steam (and South Stream) follows an emerging Russian 
strategic logic (supported by France and Germany) of avoiding difficult transit states, most 
notably Ukraine. While some Eastern member states argue that Russian pipeline routes 
are designed to circumvent their territory, Moscow in turn accuses the EU of trying to 
build pipelines, such as Nabucco, that avoid Russia (Götz, 2008, p.93). Part of the problem 
lies in the fact that dependency on Russia is higher in Eastern than Western Europe. 
Indeed, in Western and Southern EU states, such as Italy and France, dependence on 
Russia is not a major preoccupation as levels are low. For them, increasing reliance on 
Russia in fact reduces dependence on other (perhaps riskier) suppliers such as Algeria or 
Libya. 
 
Fig. 1: Pipeline routes in north and south-east Europe. Source: BBC (2011) 
                                                          
8 Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski even referred to the agreement between Russia and Germany to 
build Nord Stream as a “new Molotov-Ribbentrop pact” (Schmidt-Felzmann, 2011, p.587). 
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However aside from political complaints, Poland and other EU transit countries also have 
economic motivations for opposing Nord Stream. The construction of Nord Stream entails 
lower volumes of gas crossing Poland, costing the country valuable transit fees. In 
addition, future expansion of transit capacity through these countries, including 
extensions to the Yamal pipeline from Russia, is now unlikely to be built9 (Schmidt-
Felzmann, 2011, p.587). It appears that economic motives and political relations with 
Russia underline decisions of both proponents and opponents of the pipeline. As Schmidt-
Felzmann, argues (2011, p.589) “all interested parties appear to be predominantly focused 
on securing their national interests, with little or no regard for other member states’ 
economic, political and security situation”. 
In the south-east of Europe, several pipeline projects have been locked in (seeming) 
competition for several years (see fig 1 above). Firstly, the Russian-backed South Stream 
would, if built, bring Central Asian and Russian gas across the Black Sea from Russia into 
Bulgaria (Alexeev, 2013). Further south, a number of pipelines including the EU-backed 
Nabucco ‘west’, the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), White Stream and the Interconnector-
Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI) have competed to bring gas from the Caspian (and potentially 
Central Asia and the Middle East) to Europe. The Trans-Adriatic Pipeline appears to have 
recently beaten main rival Nabucco in competition for access to the Azeri gas essential for 
the project (Bryza & Koranyi, 2013). Again as with Nord Stream, member states’ support 
for various pipelines routes appear conditioned by perceptions of relations with Moscow, 
whether they are located on the pipeline route and the involvement of national 
companies10 (Schmidt-Felzmann, 2011, p.587).  
Indeed, participation of a national company often precipitates support for pipelines. 
Denmark granted approval for Nord Stream following announcement of Danish energy 
                                                          
9
 Likewise, an ‘amber pipeline’ set to go from Russia to Poland via the Baltic States and Kaliningrad 
is now also unlikely to be constructed (Schmidt-Felzmann, 2011, p.587). 
10
 However, a number of countries (Austria, Bulgaria and Hungary) have at different times offered 
support for both projects, hedging their risks in case only one is built. 
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company DONG’s agreement to double contracted supplies through the pipeline (Schmidt-
Felzmann, 2011, p.588). Similarly, the French Government announced the sale of four 
French assault warships to Russia in conjunction with Gas de France’s signing of a bilateral 
energy agreement with Russia and the acquisition of a nine percent share in the Nord 
Stream consortium (Schmidt-Felzmann, 2011, p.588). 
Many claim that it is only by adopting a ‘spirit of solidarity’ that the EU can overcome the 
cooperation problems discussed above (Gros, 2008; Swieboda, 2008). Swieboda (2008, 
p.40) argues that member states’ “Sinatra strategy” of “do it my way” is at the root of 
“today’s inability to build a strong and coherent European energy policy”. Without 
correcting this situation, he stresses “Europe will never be able to bargain with Russia 
from a position of strength” (Swieboda, 2008, p.40). The answer, Swieboda contends, lies 
in greater EU-level investment on strategic infrastructures (Swieboda, 2008, p.40). Gros 
(2008, p.80) concurs, highlighting that the benefits of new infrastructures are likely to be 
unevenly distributed amongst EU member states and therefore no single commercial gas 
distributor would build them, as they would be unlikely to reap all the benefits from doing 
so. This, he stresses, is a classic case for EU intervention to overcome this barrier to 
commercial cooperation11 (Gros, 2008, p.80).  
Bartuska (2008, p.57) argues that it is more responsibility, rather than solidarity, that is 
needed on the part of the Russia-dependent Eastern-European states. Bartuska stresses 
that when “someone tells you Europe can achieve its energy security primarily through 
solidarity, beware” (2008, p.57). He suggests that a number of Eastern and Central 
European countries have not done enough to reduce their dependence on Russia since the 
collapse of the USSR. Bartuska argues that these countries only realised their dependence 
                                                          
11 There is to a certain extent a circular argument to Gros (2008) and Swieboda’s (2008) cases. Both 
argue that EU level action could overcome member state cooperation issues, build necessary 
infrastructures and thus develop intra-EU solidarity in energy. Yet member state solidarity is 
necessary to get agreement on the funding and building of these infrastructures and it is lack of this 
solidarity that is cited as being responsible for the failure to develop them so far (Swieboda, 2008, 
p.40). 
26 
 
after the gas crisis of 2006 and that calling for EU solidarity represented the cheapest and 
fastest option of remedying their vulnerability (Bartuska, 2008, p.57). Schmidt-Felzmann 
(2011, p.593-4) argues that the notion of solidarity furthers the interests of the European 
Commission in its efforts to gain further competences in EU external energy policy, with 
‘solidarity’ serving as a justification for greater cooperation and coordination at an EU 
level, including the transfer of additional responsibilities to the Commission (Schmidt-
Felzmann, 2011, p.593-4).  
Similarly, Youngs (2009, p.40) draws attention to tensions inside EU institutions. He notes 
that the European Council and Commission have regularly been in conflict over the 
contours of the EU’s foreign energy policy. Youngs suggests (2009, p.40) that Former High 
Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana’s public rhetoric on energy 
policy was far more political than his Commission colleagues and highlights the fact that 
senior figures in the Council Secretariat had misgivings about the Commission’s 
liberalisation agenda in energy. Youngs also highlights (2009, p.41) how some argue the 
European Commission instrumentally promotes a liberal approach to energy because 
doing so fits with policy areas where the Commission already has competences (for 
example, competition, internal market, trade). Youngs notes that while some policy 
makers across the EU felt that energy policy making had dangerously slipped into the 
hands of “national security strategists” others opined that the Commission (and 
Directorate General Transport and Energy in particular – now DG Energy) was an “‘energy 
technocracy’, whose market-based recipes were blind to geo-political realities” (Youngs, 
2009, p.41). It seems that similar arguments over whether foreign affairs ministries or 
energy/economic ministries should control energy policy were also held within member 
states (Youngs, 2009, p.39).  
Overall, the literature on EU energy policy presents a generally discordant picture of EU 
energy cooperation. EU member states have found it very difficult to form an agreement 
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on the multiple policy areas needed to establish a common energy policy. Competing 
commercial interests, different relations with Russia, different approaches to internal 
liberalisation and pipeline routes and a failure to achieve solidarity between member 
states have all played a role in challenging the development of a common European-level 
energy policy.  
Having outlined the intra-EU difficulties that the EU has faced in energy policy, attention is 
now turned to the multiple politico-economic challenges that the Caspian region presents 
as an area of energy interest for the EU. This next section prepares the ground for the 
analysis of EU upstream policy in the Caspian to come by reviewing the literature on the 
structural conditions that European actors face in the region and the role that energy plays 
in shaping them. 
The multiple challenges of the Caspian: Post-Soviet rentierism, resource nationalism 
and regional competition  
 
The countries of the Caspian region are home to considerable hydrocarbon wealth. 
Kazakhstan is the second biggest oil producer in the former Soviet Union (FSU) after 
Russia with oil reserves of 30 billion barrels and gas reserves of 85 trillion cubic feet (EIA, 
2012a). Azerbaijan has more modest, yet nonetheless sizeable, reserves estimated at 
seven billion barrels of oil and 30 trillion cubic feet of gas (EIA, 2012b). Turkmenistan has 
the sixth largest gas reserves in the world at 265 trillion cubic feet (EIA, 2012c). However, 
despite this energy promise, the countries of the Caspian region are afflicted by a number 
of energy-related phenomena that shape their regime dynamics and political behaviour 
and present challenges for the European actors who operate there. These include the 
resource curse and neo-patrimonial rentierism (Franke, Gawrich & Alakbarov, 2009; 
Ostrowski, 2011; Meissner, 2010; Gawrich, Melnykovska, & Schweickert, 2010; Kendall-
Taylor, 2012), varying degrees of resource nationalism (Domjan & Stone, 2010; Kennedy, 
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2011; Hug, 2010) and regional competition over energy resources (Mehdiyeva, 2011; 
Overland, Torjesen & Kjaernet, 2010).  
This section examines literatures associated with each of these issues. Central to all of 
these literatures is the relationship between these countries’ resource abundance and 
their political context. As Overland, Kendall-Taylor & Kjaernet (2010, p.3) assert, the 
energy producer states of the Caspian region are heavily dependent on the income from oil 
and gas and their “political systems are formed by this dependence” (Overland, Kendall-
Taylor & Kjaernet, 2010, p.3). Indeed, scholars assert that the key to understanding the 
regimes in the regions lies in recognising the interaction between resource incomes, 
resource policies, elite structures and political institutions (Franke et al, 2009, p.109). 
Ostrowski (2011, p.2) argues that hydrocarbon revenues impact heavily on core aspects of 
Caspian statehood ranging from their domestic political structures, relations with foreign 
powers to Caspian states’ sovereignty itself.  
The resource curse and rentierism 
 
One of the dominant themes in the literature on Caspian regimes focuses on the resource 
curse (Meissner, 2010). Generally speaking, the resource curse refers to the paradox of 
why resource abundance often does not translate into socio-political and economic 
development in resource-rich countries (Arzeki & Nabli, 2012; Sachs & Warner, 1995; 
Ross, 2001; 2012; Collier, 2010; Basedau & Lay, 2011). Despite being often seen as a 
‘blessing’, if poorly managed, resource wealth can have a number of negative effects 
including the stunting of economic growth, especially inclusive economic growth (Arzeki & 
Nabli, 2012) and economic output (Collier, 2010, p.41) as well as the impedance of 
democratic transition, political stability and the development of well-governed institutions 
(Meissner, 2010). The resource curse is widely thought to afflict the three Caspian 
countries under investigation here (Franke et al, 2009; Meissner, 2010; Ostrowski, 2011). 
However, two additional variables of the resource curse - rentierism and neo-
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patrimonialism - are thought to create a particular form of post-Soviet resource curse in 
the Caspian region. Franke et al (2009) encapsulate these notions in the concept of the 
“post-Soviet rentier state” (PSRS12) that captures the intersection of both rentierism and 
the post-Soviet legacy of neo-patrimonialism.  
The concept of rentierism, long-applied to countries in the Middle East and North Africa, is 
an important part of the broader explanation of the resource curse (Meissner, 2010, p.9). 
It refers to the fact that elites in resource rich states often rely politically on rents from the 
export of valuable commodities such as oil and gas (Gawrich et al, 2010, p.4). This 
situation is thought to have a number of negative effects. Firstly, capturing rents in this 
manner gives regimes a high degree of autonomy from their societies and means that they 
face less pressure to consider the demands of their citizens than would be the case in 
states that rely on tax for revenue (Gawrich et al, 2010). Secondly, elites in rentier states 
are endowed with a great degree of power as the means of productive economic capacity 
and consequent resource rents accrue directly to them and they decide how they are 
distributed. Karl (1997, p.197) notes that all rentier states demonstrate the same pattern 
of “maximising the external extraction of rents for subsequent distribution through public 
spending according to a political logic”. Thirdly, the nature of resource distribution 
provides much room for cronyism and rentier states are correspondingly often 
characterised by patron-client structures, high levels of corruption and nepotism (Gawrich 
et al, 2010, p.5). Legitimacy and mass support are ‘bought’ from populations at large 
through wide-spread public spending (and often large state sectors). Indeed, while 
Caspian producer states have a high degree of autonomy from society, their 
authoritarianism means that they are ultimately dependent on economic revenues from 
                                                          
12 Franke et al (2009) argue that PSRS exhibit a number of characteristics that correspond to the 
different rentier and neo-patrimonial aspects of the PSRS model outlined below: 1) elite power in 
oil and gas contract conclusions (concentrated around the president); 2) permanent, corrupt and 
rent-seeking elites; 3) legitimacy and support purchased through rent allocation by the elite; 4) 
deficits in the regulation of (formal political and) economic structures; 5) lack of transparency; and 
6) medium levels of public legitimacy in relation to resource policy (Franke et al, 2009, p.133). 
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energy for popular legitimacy as well as the maintenance of elite patronage – the key tools 
(along with repressive institutions) of domestic control (Kendall-Taylor, 2012; Gawrich et 
al, 2010, p.5).   
The importance of control over hydrocarbon rents for state sovereignty, regime stability 
and relations with foreign actors is stressed by scholars (see for example Ostrowski, 2011; 
Hienrich, 2010). Ostrowski (2011, p.12) argues that the “main preoccupation” of elites has 
been to maintain guaranteed access to rents so as to ensure state sovereignty and regime 
consolidation. He argues that “whoever guarantees a steady flow of rent is also seen as a 
strategic partner and the best guarantor of country’s sovereignty” (as will be discussed in 
chapter seven this can include foreign companies) (Ostrowski, 2011, p.12). Control over 
the determination of property rights, a factor of considerable importance for foreign 
investors, is of core significance in this context as such rights determine who has and who 
controls access to resources and thus directly affects the determination of the role of the 
state in energy policy, the distribution of benefits from natural resources and the 
character of foreign investor involvement (Hienrich, 2010, p.7). As will be discussed in 
chapter four, property rights are deeply entwined with the notion of political risk and the 
EU’s responses to it.  
In addition to rentierism, Gawrich et al (2010) argue that Caspian states can be defined as 
neo-patrimonial. Neo-patrimonialism refers to a mix of both formal and informal political 
structures in the maintenance of political control. Neo-patrimonial regimes rule through a 
combination of family, kinship and clan ties interwoven with more rational, business-
based networks within the ‘strong-man’ controlled elite (Gawrich et al, 2010, p.13). Such a 
mix reflects, according to Fisun (2003, p.2), the “renewal, modification and rationalization 
of the [traditional] patrimonial systems of domination, but by no means to the 
establishment of Western-style rational-legal competitive democracy”. In this sense, the 
notion of neo-patrimonialism reflects both the blend of informal, traditional patrimonial 
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politics with modern, superficially-democratic institutional structures and the merging of 
traditional kinship-based elite groups with the business elites that connect broader elite 
structures to the global economy.  
Such a situation is founded on two key facets of neo-patrimonialism, the ‘strong man’ 
figure and forms of systematic clientelism. All Caspian states demonstrate ‘strong man-
centred’ elite  structures where power is concentrated in the hand of one person 
surrounded by a relatively small coterie of elites – usually based on family, clan and/or 
business connections (Gawrich et al, 2010, p 13). In Caspian countries, the strong man 
president exercises power through a mix of their role in formal institutions and through 
informal clientelism (Franke et al, 2009, p.113; Gawrich et al, 2010, p.13). High natural 
resource rents concentrated in elite groups and ultimately controlled by presidents, 
provide the economic goods that make such clientelistic structures both possible and 
durable.  
Resource nationalism 
 
In addition to the effects of the rentierism and neo-patrimonialism, the Caspian region has 
borne witness to a rising trend of resource nationalism during the 2000s (Kennedy & 
Nurmakov, 2010; Domjan & Stone, 2010; Gojayev, 2010; Dzardanova, 2010; Bremmer & 
Johnston, 2009). Domjan and Stone (2010, p.38) state that resource nationalism refers to a 
“wide range of strategies that domestic elites employ in order to increase their control of 
natural resources”. There is a great deal of overlap between the notion of resource 
nationalism and the concept of political risk for companies (that encompasses similar 
behaviour such as expropriation and confiscatory tax changes) (Rubins & Kinsella, 2005, 
p.4). In a broad sense, one can see resource nationalism as a form of short hand for a large 
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number of the potential manifestations of political risk specific in the natural resources 
sector (discussed in chapter four)13.  
Most of the attention to resource nationalism in the Caspian is focused on Kazakhstan. 
This is due to a number of high-profile incidents where the Kazakh government is alleged 
to have used environmental and project development issues to put pressure on foreign 
investors and to forcibly wrest a greater share of key energy projects (Bremmer & 
Johnston, 2009, p.151; Hug, 2010, p.5). In addition to this, Kazakhstan has increased the 
role of the state in the natural resources sector in a number of other ways. Firstly the 
country has increased its revenue share from hydrocarbon exploitation through changes 
to the tax code and raised export duties. Secondly the country has increased regulation on 
foreign companies, particularly that concerning local content requirements (discussed in 
chapter seven). Thirdly, the country has made changes to laws that give the Kazakh state 
first right of refusal on the sale of strategic assets in the natural resources sector, reserved 
a larger role for the state-owned company KazMunaiGas in future projects and bargained 
with investors to gain a larger share of existing contracts (Kennedy & Nurmakov, 2010, 
p.3).  
Domjan and Stone (2010, p.36) argue that Kazakhstan has adopted a form of economic 
rather than revolutionary resource nationalism designed to increase its stake in the energy 
industry and to get a greater portion of resource wealth for the country, rather than expel 
foreign companies completely. The actions of the Kazakh state have not radically altered 
the picture of foreign participation in the country, but rather have sought a greater share 
of resource wealth so as to boost economic growth and political legitimacy (Domjan & 
                                                          
13 As discussed further in chapter four, it should be noted that political risk also can derive from 
governmental omissions and from actions of non-state actors (Rubins & Kinsella, 2005, p.2-3) 
whereas resource nationalism is confined to deliberate state-led actions in the natural resources 
sector. Rubins and Kinsella do argue however that political risk is most commonly thought of as the 
“host state directly or indirectly confiscating, interfering with, or destroying all or a portion of an 
investor’s property rights” [emphasis added] (Rubins & Kinsella, 2005, p.3). 
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Stone, 2010, p.36). Hug (2010, p.3) attributes recent more assertive behaviour as being 
driven both by the 2008 financial crisis that affected Kazakhstan severely in the 
construction and banking sectors, and by a desire to redress contracts signed in the 1990s 
that were deemed to be unfair. Jones Luong (2010, p.2) argues that Kazakh resource 
nationalism should be seen as an attempt by President Nazarbayev to increase regime 
consolidation. She argues (2010, p.5) that Nazarbayev offered generous access to private 
actors in the 1990s to generate quick revenue and counter opposition forces. The country 
is now stronger and more stable and as such Nazarbayev is using greater resource wealth 
to solidify his position (Jones Luong, 2010, p.5).  
Kennedy (2011, p.18-19) notes similar processes of privatisation in Kazakhstan and 
Azerbaijan in the 1990s but argues that while Azerbaijan has taken steps towards 
increasing the role of the state owned oil company SOCAR in future projects, it has not 
taken the same kind of resource nationalistic actions as Kazakhstan in relation to existing 
projects (see also Gojayev, 2010). Kennedy argues this is for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
Azerbaijan is at a much later stage of its oil development (with production expected to 
peak in the next decade) and consequently will increasingly rely on the high-end 
technology offered by Western companies (Kennedy, 2011, p.19-20). Secondly, Kennedy 
suggests that the main reason that Kazakhstan has demonstrated a greater recourse to 
resource nationalism lies in the country’s multi-vector foreign policy (discussed in the 
next section below). He argues that while Azerbaijan has adopted a more Western-centric 
foreign policy, with relations between the state and foreign energy companies the bedrock 
of these broad strategic orientation, the Kazakh government employs a strategy of making 
Kazakhstan “important enough to major players in the region that they will avoid conflict 
[with Kazakhstan], without making Kazakhstan so dependent on any actor that it will lose 
autonomy in foreign policy or economic decision making” (Kennedy, 2011, p.22).  
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Resource nationalism in terms of relations with foreign companies does not at present 
play a particularly big role in the energy politics of Turkmenistan. This is not because 
Turkmenistan demonstrates stable models of energy governance but rather that the 
country is yet to permit large scale involvement from foreign energy companies in the 
country. Dzardanova (2010, p.4) notes how energy management in Turkmenistan is 
extremely centralised with President Berdymohamedov taking major decisions and 
personal relations with him being central to winning contracts. Nevertheless, 
Turkmenistan’s long-term need to attract investment and the very low presence of 
Western companies has meant that examples of resource nationalism are rare (or given 
the secrecy surrounding Turkmen energy politics, not publicly known) (Dzardanova, 
2010, p.4). However, the extremely personalised management of the energy sector in the 
country presents ample scope for such political risks. 
Regional competition and Caspian state agency 
 
The Caspian region is often thought to be the site of fierce regional power competition 
between Russia, China, the USA and the EU (Manning & Jaffe, 1998; Karasac, 2002; Kalicki, 
2001; Barylski, 1995). There is a general acceptance in the contemporary IR literature 
that, with the rise of China and resurgence of Russia, the international system is moving 
towards a more multi-polar direction with power shifting from Europe and the US to the 
“East” (Krastev, Leonard, Bechev, Kobzova, & Wilson, 2010, p.13; Grant, 2011; Buzan, 
2011; Cox & Westad, 2011; Nye, 2011). The Caspian region, strategically important for all 
of its surrounding powers, is located at the intersection of a number of major poles of 
world power.  Indeed, as Cooley (2012, p.11) has noted, Central Asia can be seen “as a 
window into this multi polar world”.  
 
From the European perspective, these processes are somewhat magnified by the relative 
decline of the United States. Long-term EU security and EU foreign policy have often rested 
on a US-ordered international system, or as Leonard (2011) has termed “a European-
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inspired legal order inside the shell of the US security order”. Given Europe’s closer 
alignment with American rather than Russian and Chinese objectives, this relative 
weakening of the US combined with the US’s relative declining interest in Eurasia (a 
product of drawdown in Afghanistan, the “shale gas revolution” in the US and the US’s so-
called ‘Asia-pivot’) hinders Europe’s attainment of its own goals in the shared 
neighbourhood with Russia and China. High oil prices (for Russia) and continuing 
economic growth in China have increased the material capabilities of these actors in their 
near abroad, while European and American capacities have, relatively speaking, stagnated. 
However, the extent to which relations between regional powers in Eurasia represents a 
zero-sum “new great game” is disputed by scholars. Firstly, while all the major powers see 
more regional influence as preferable to less and thus compete in this sense, their major 
security interests in the region are not necessarily zero-sum (terrorism, Afghanistan etc.) 
and their relations have been characterised at times by cooperation, mutual enablement 
and emulation as well as political and economic competition (Collins & Wohlforth, 2003, 
p.292; Cooley, 2012, p.7-8; Weitz, 2006). Secondly, rather than mere pawns in this 
supposed ‘new great game’, the states of the Caspian region are often highly successful in 
balancing between the major powers that operate there. Unlike the original ‘Great Game’ 
where the Russian and the British Empires genuinely aspired to dominate and subjugate 
the region, today’s regional powers are seeking to influence other sovereign states 
(Cooley, 2012, p.5)14. Indeed, regional competition is frequently shaped by the foreign 
policy objectives of the smaller states in the region (Cooley, 2012, p.9). As will be 
described in chapter seven, this regional power-balancing behaviour and consequent 
room for manoeuvre available to Caspian states can present openings and increase 
opportunities in the region for the EU.  
                                                          
14 As Cooley (2012, p.5) argues, these states can be “neither formally conquered nor dissolved by 
foreign powers [and] their sovereignty affords them a wide range of privileges and opportunities 
that their earlier counterparts lacked”. 
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A number of different concepts have been advanced to capture this balancing between 
regional powers. The notion of a “multi-vector foreign policy” is most often ascribed to 
Kazakhstan and is indeed the Kazakh government’s own description of its foreign policy 
practice (Yesdauletova, 2009, p.31). Hanks (2009, p.259) explains that Kazakh multi-
vector foreign policy develops balanced “foreign relations through a framework based on 
a pragmatic, non-ideological foundation”. According to Hanks (2009, p.259) the character 
of partner states’ foreign or domestic policies “does not inform or direct the multi-vector 
approach”15.  
However, perhaps the most useful analytical concept to capture this balancing is 
Mehdiyeva’s (2011, p.27) more subtle description of Azeri foreign policy as ‘strategic 
manoeuvring’. While resting on same multi-vector dynamic as above, this notion both 
avoids reproducing states’ own descriptions of their policy practice and contains an 
explicit recognition of the fact that while states will cooperate with all major powers and 
seek to maximise their benefits from doing so, they do have greater alignment with some 
powers over others (the EU and US in the case of Azerbaijan) (Mehdiyeva, 2011, p.27). 
Indeed, while Hanks notes there that there have been “occasional shifts in emphasis” in 
Kazakhstan’s multi vector foreign policy (Hanks, 2009, p.260), others have more recently 
noted a move towards Russia in Kazakh foreign policy, particularly in the face of the Arab 
Spring and more overt Western support for pro-democracy movements abroad (Smith, 
2012b). Furthermore, despite a rhetoric of neutrality, political realities have meant a 
traditionally predominant focus on relations with Russia in Turkmen foreign policy 
(Anceschi, 2008, p.2; Dennison, 2009, p.429). This policy has undergone a partial shift 
                                                          
15 Turkmenistan follows another, more isolationist, form of multi-vector foreign policy that the 
Turkmen government refers to as “positive neutrality” (recognised as such by the General 
Assembly of the UN in December 1995) (Anceschi, 2008, p.1). Anceschi (2010, p.94) argues that 
there are two primary objectives of the policy of positive neutrality. The first was to create a self-
imposed isolation in order to facilitate the domestic consolidation of the Niyazov regime (until 
Niyazov’s death in 2006). The second objective was to consolidate control over the domestic 
natural gas industry “essential to [the running of] the Turkmenistani economy and to lubricate the 
regime’s patronage system” (Anceschi, 2010, p.94). 
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under current President Berdymohamedov however (Anceschi, 2010, p.95). Indeed, as 
Anceschi (2010, p.95) asserts Berdymohamedov has continued to seek to insulate his 
country from ‘destabilising’ external influences he has gradually opened up to China (via 
the construction of a Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline) and to a lesser extent 
the West via potential participation in the EU’s proposed Southern Corridor project. As 
usage of the term “multi-vector foreign policy” is ubiquitous in the literature on Central 
Asia and the Caspian, it will continue to be used in this thesis. However, its usage should 
be considered as incorporating this more flexible and adaptive notion of “strategic 
manoeuvring”. 
Overland, Kendall-Taylor & Kjaernet (2010, p.7-8) discuss the challenge facing Caspian 
states in their relations with regional powers. They note that cooperation with Western 
countries brings benefits for Caspian leaders in the forms of legitimation and access to 
open transparent export markets, capital and increased technology (Overland, Kendall-
Taylor & Kjaernet, 2010, p.7-8). Yet at the same time Caspian leaders fear Western 
condemnation and disassociation in response to democratic failings or domestic 
crackdowns that are potential corollaries of their authoritarian rule and are increasingly 
worried by Western support for pro-democracy movements, especially in light of the Arab 
Spring (Smith, 2012b). By contrast, other regional players, Russia and China, do not 
criticise human rights or democratic shortfalls and, at least in China’s case, interfere very 
little in domestic affairs. Nevertheless Russia and China are, when compared to Caspian 
states, large regional powers that Caspian states also fear as potential hegemons 
(Overland, Kendall-Taylor & Kjaernet, 2010, p.7-8). Therefore, as described above, Caspian 
states pursue multi-vector foreign policies in an effort balance between the risks and 
opportunities of engagement with both Western powers and Russia and China.  
In sum, the states of the Caspian region are afflicted by a number of energy-related 
phenomena that both shape their political systems and impact on European actors 
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operating in the region. The resource curse increases states’ (and elites’) overall 
dependence on energy revenues whilst at the same time fuelling the personalist, neo-
patrimonial systems within these countries. Likewise resource nationalism, impacted 
again by elite dependence on energy revenues presents risks for foreign investors. Finally, 
the presence of numerous global competitors presents opportunities for Caspian states to 
balance between and bandwagon against major powers. As will be discussed further in 
this thesis, while Caspian states’ multi-vector foreign policies present the EU with an 
avenue for engagement with all of the Caspian states, at the same time, the other trends 
discussed above pose a number of clear risks for European actors operating there.  
EU Upstream energy policy in the Caspian  
 
Having outlined above the seemingly discordant nature of European energy policy and the 
structural challenges present in the Caspian, the rest of this section now turns its attention 
to both the EU’s involvement in the Caspian region itself and the literature on relations 
between political and commercial actors in energy.  
The EU in the (Caspian) upstream 
 
One key theme that emerges from the literature on the EU’s energy engagement with the 
wider neighbourhood is the difficulty the EU faces in exporting its preferred energy 
governance models outside of its immediate periphery, particularly to energy producers 
such as those in the Caspian Region (Padgett, 2011; Van Aartsen, 2008; Pardo Sierra, 
2010). Claes argues that the “EU cannot escape the fact that the legally-based free-market 
logic is ill-suited to relations with many energy producers” (2009, p.51). Likewise, the IEA 
argues that “in  practice, [the  process of regulatory approximation towards European 
norms] has  not  captured  the  imagination  of  Caspian  producers,  who  feel  that  the  
strategic and commercial value of the gas trade – rather  than the details of the Gas 
Directive – should be the basis of their energy relationship with the EU” (IEA, 2008, p. 45). 
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Indeed, Padgett (2011, p.1083) contends that while the EU is able to extend the energy 
acquis to external partners in the near neighbourhood through the EU Energy 
Community16, “there seems little prospect of attracting gas producers in the 
Mediterranean, Caspian Basin and – still less – Central Asia to participate in the Energy 
Community model of co-operation”. For these countries he asserts that “piecemeal 
bilateral diplomacy is the most productive model of co-operation” (Padgett, 2011, p.1083). 
While not elaborated on by Padgett, the dynamics of this European diplomacy and its 
interrelationship with the promotion of energy governance form a core analytical focus of 
this thesis.  
Padgett, (2011) and Pardo Sierra (2010) have both employed aspects of regime theory, 
and the concept of distribution and enforcement costs (see also Lavenex, 2008), to analyse 
the prospects for governance regimes in the EU periphery. Distribution effects, Padgett 
asserts (2011, p.1067), “arise when states have divergent or asymmetrical interests in co-
operation and/or where the benefits are unevenly distributed”. By contrast “enforcement 
problems occur where states have a common interest in co-operation, but where there are 
incentives to defect from agreements for short-term gain” (Padgett, 2011, p.1067). Padgett 
argues that where interests are asymmetrical, such as those between energy consumers 
like the EU and producers such Kazakhstan or Azerbaijan, then distribution and 
enforcement problems will be higher, cooperation is likely to be more difficult and 
institutional structures will need to be correspondingly more flexible and bilateral in 
nature (Padgett, 2011, p.1070).  
Padgett (2011, p.1068) and Pardo Sierra (2010, p.648) also both discuss the role that a 
regional hegemon can play in facilitating the development of international regimes. 
However exploiting this hegemony, especially in an ideological sense, involves “belief [on 
                                                          
16 The Energy Community (based on the Energy Community Treaty) is an EU external energy policy 
framework that entails the export of the EU acquis in energy towards a number of states in the EU’s 
near periphery (the Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova, Turkey and Georgia). 
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the part] of secondary states that they will benefit from the regime, and an underlying 
complementarity of interests” (Padgett, 2011, p.1068). Padgett (2011, p.1070), suggests 
that the EU exerts far less hegemonic pull over countries in the CIS than it does in relation 
to states closer to the EU and correspondingly far less pull than Russia. This, he argues 
(Padgett, 2011, p.1070), means that these states will seek less committal institutional 
energy arrangements with the EU. Pardo Sierra concurs (2010, p.648) arguing that “the EU 
has difficulty fulfilling the role of a classical hegemonic power”. Indeed for the EU to be 
successful in the context of its external energy policies to the wider neighbourhood, Pardo 
Sierra (2010, p.648) argues that the EU needs to seek to build institutional frameworks 
that can work in the absence of hegemony.  
Pardo Sierra (2010) suggests a number of additional factors that hinder the EU’s ability to 
export its external energy governance to the Black and Caspian Sea regions. Firstly, and 
echoing an argument seen above with regard to EU foreign policy, he stresses that 
successful policy action is predicated on a high degree of coherence between member 
states interests and EU level policy (2010, p. 648). Secondly, (and related to the previous 
point) he argues that the EU’s capacity for collective action is hindered by high level 
geopolitics. He asserts that the EU “is generally unable to challenge power politics and has 
not developed the tools or political will to deal with hard realpolitik choices” (2010, 
p.648). Finally, and echoing the work of Youngs (2009b) and Barbe , Costa, Herranz-
Surralle s and Natorski, (2009) on EU external governance, Pardo Sierra avers that both the 
domestic context of third party countries who demonstrate different politico-economic 
norms and the presence of regional players who promote opposing interests, hinder the 
export of the EU’s energy governance (2010, p.649).  
Contrastingly, rather than focusing on the challenges of EU energy governance promotion, 
Prange Gstöhl (2009, p. 5297) presents reasons why third party states in the EU periphery 
(without short to mid-term membership prospects) might wish to adopt EU external 
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energy governance. He offers three reasons. Firstly, those that seek long-term integration 
with the EU may wish to demonstrate their desire and capability to become “part of the 
[EU] club” (Prange Gstöhl, 2009, p.5297). Secondly, he notes that some states may wish to 
engage with the EU to offset the influence of regional hegemons such as Russia (and 
increasingly) China (2009, p.5297). Prange Gstöhl (2009, p.5301) argues that greater 
integration with the EU provides, for example, a way for states in the former Soviet Union 
to offset the risks of Russia’s increasing promotion of regional institutional initiatives 
(such as the Customs Union and EurAsEC) that have the potential to become institutional 
forms of Russian dominance17 (2009, p.5301). Thirdly, Prange Gstöhl (2009, p.5301) notes 
that while access to the internal market does not necessarily compensate for the costs of 
adopting EU regulations, some countries might find that adopting parts of EU energy 
governance “lowers risks, improves a country’s policy framework and makes it more 
stable, and consequently raises the likelihood of investment”18. Indeed, as discussed in 
chapters six and seven, European investments are sometimes favoured by periphery 
countries as they are seen as being attached to fewer political conditions than those from 
Russia and China (Prange Gstöhl, 2009, p.5301).  
Despite the useful insights of the contributions above, the literature on EU’s upstream 
energy policy in the Caspian has a number of shortcomings. The analyses that discuss EU 
upstream policies in the Caspian are for the main part theoretical/conceptual offering 
little detailed empirical investigation. Likewise, these accounts are correspondingly 
prospective suggesting what may or should occur rather than what is taking place in the 
region. Furthermore, most of these accounts assess the prospects and challenges likely in 
the export of EU energy governance rather than the intra-European dynamics of this 
                                                          
17 Conversely however, engagement with Russian institutions provides a way to offset the 
respective (but different) risks of overdependence on the EU. 
18 These latter two motives together also raise the question of the balance between states’ desires 
to defensively shield themselves from regional risks via engagement with the EU and their interests 
in opportunistic interaction as a way to maximise their regional position, opportunities and room 
for manoeuvre. Just as the EU can pursue simultaneous economic and political actions, so too can 
Caspian states.  
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activity. As such, these accounts contain little discussion of cooperation between member 
states, little engagement with the EU’s energy policy in practice and little attention to the 
role and perspectives of commercial actors. Consequently, there remains much scope for 
research into the governance and diplomatic actions of EU upstream cooperation as well 
as the intra-EU relations that accompany these practices in the Caspian. 
Politico-commercial relations in foreign energy policy 
 
Given the focus in this thesis on the EU’s role in the Caspian upstream and the 
corresponding ‘catalytic’ diplomatic interaction between companies and the EU (Hocking, 
2004a, p.100) this section reviews literature on the foreign policy interaction between 
energy companies and political actors. Somewhat surprisingly, given that a great deal of 
the EU’s energy policy pertains to relations between companies and political actors, there 
has been little scholarly analysis of energy companies and their relationships with the EU 
(in the Caspian or otherwise). Given this limited research base, this section first outlines 
some of the findings from literature on US-company relations and the US Government’s 
role in energy markets, so to provide additional context of political-commercial interaction 
in energy, before turning to look at the EU.  
US-company relations 
 
Several scholars and journalists have presented detailed, anecdotal histories of oil politics 
that discuss company-political actor relations. Yergin (1991) for example documents at 
great length the intersection between the worlds of energy business and national security, 
highlighting both the tensions and convergence between these two spheres. Indeed, 
Yergin (1991, p.13) describes the energy industry and the role of oil in national strategy as 
two of the “great themes that underlie the story of oil”. Likewise, Coll (2012) presents a 
rich history of the US oil company Exxon Mobil. He documents, for example (2012, p.362-
3), the extensive links between Exxon and the US Government including cooperation on 
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security in African countries such as Chad, where US embassy officials provided security 
advice and intelligence to Exxon and where the State Department lobbied the World Bank 
(on behalf of Exxon) to lessen pressure on the Chadian Government. Similarly, Coll (2012, 
p.469) highlights Exxon’s requests for defence support from, and information sharing 
with, the US Navy in the Niger Delta following an increase in violence, sabotage and 
kidnapping in the region in 2006. Nonetheless, Coll also documents Exxon Mobil’s initial 
attempts to deal with these issues itself, only turning to the US Government when 
problems became too significant for the company to manage (2012, p.469). Coll (2012) 
refers to Exxon as a “private empire” and, like Yergin, finds examples of both cooperation 
and disagreement between the US Government and the oil company.   
Less historically-detailed but more conceptually focused, a number of scholars have 
documented relations between energy companies and the US Administration through use 
of (structural) Marxist and realist understandings of state-company relations (Vivoda, 
2010; Stokes, 2007; Krasner, 1978; Bromley, 2006). Vivoda (2010), for example, questions 
the role of US multinational oil companies in furthering US energy security interests. 
Companies, he contends, generally act in their own interests and cannot be seen as an arm 
of the US state (2010, p.8-9). Likewise, he contends that the US state often acts 
independently of multinational capital interests pursuing objectives that run counter to 
company preferences (2010, p.9-10). For Vivoda (2010, p.12), US-multinational oil 
company relations are based on pragmatism, with both sides simultaneously pursuing 
their own, sometimes competing, interests and cooperating only when it is in their 
interests to do so. Vivoda discusses these relations in the context of Poulantzas’s structural 
theory of Marxism, where state officials are conceived of as using their “relative 
autonomy” from particular business interests to ensure the long-term general conditions 
for (energy) capital rather than the particular interests of specific businesses (Vivoda, 
2010, p.9). A similar dynamic between the EU and energy companies is identified in 
chapter six and seven. 
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Stokes (2007, p.248), like Vivoda, outlines a structural Marxist understanding of US 
foreign energy policy, arguing that the US seeks not to pursue the interests of individual 
companies, but rather seeks to provide the conditions necessary for global capitalism and 
in doing so provide global public goods that bolster US hegemony. Stokes (2007, p.250), 
argues that the US’s post-World War Two strategy has been based on the “maintenance 
and defence of an economically liberal international system conducive for capital 
penetration and circulation coupled with a concomitant global geo-strategy containing 
social forces considered inimical to capitalist social relations”. Likewise, the energy-
specific application of this policy has seen the US work to ensure adequate supply of 
energy to world markets. Indeed, as Stokes (2007) suggests “American power has played a 
[energy] system-maintaining role that has benefited a number of core states as well as 
America itself […] maintaining a stable supply of crucial energy onto the world market”. 
Bromley (2006, p.429) makes a similar argument, focussing on the trade and economic 
dimensions of this policy. He stresses that “US policy has aimed at creating a general, open 
international oil industry, in which markets, dominated by large multinational firms, 
allocate capital and commodities”. The USA does not, according to Bromley (2006, p.429), 
seek to control markets so much as create the conditions for market penetration by large 
globally-operating companies (including non-US companies) who will adequately supply 
the world oil market. While he does not elaborate on the political risks that companies 
face (as this thesis will), Bromley (2006, p.429) asserts that “investment rights matter”, 
noting that they are the “mechanisms by which the means of technologically more 
developed, capital-rich firms can be applied to the end of increasing [oil] output in the 
technologically less developed, resource-rich but capital-poor regions”. Krasner’s (1978) 
Cold War era study comes to an opposite conclusion, forwarding a statist, realist account 
of US raw-materials policy. For him the US’s decision to cooperate with economically 
nationalist, but not communist regimes (which were equally as bad for investment 
opportunity-seeking energy companies) demonstrates the trumping of national security 
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interests (i.e. countering the Soviet Union) over the interests of companies. The insights 
from Krasner (1978), Vivoda (2010), Bromley (2006) and Stokes (2007) are pertinent in 
the context of this study, raising potential questions about both the nature of the 
relationship between European actors and the energy industry and the wider role that the 
EU plays in energy-rich regions. Indeed, these accounts draw attention to whether the EU 
can play a similar structural role in energy markets, especially given the challenges 
inherent to the formulation of common EU diplomatic positions. Chapters four, five and six 
of this study evaluate the structural energy role played by the EU and chapters six and 
seven together consider the potential for EU diplomatic support in the Caspian. 
In contrast to the approaches that seek to characterise the broader US’s foreign energy 
role in realist or Marxist terms, Goel (2004) examines the micro-level interaction between 
US companies and the US Administration. Using Strange’s (1988) notion of an “implicit 
bargain” (as employed in this thesis) Goel investigates the tacit cooperation between the 
US Executive and Western oil companies in the building of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) 
Pipeline from the Caspian to Turkey in the 2000s. In the BTC case, as Goel (2004, p.487) 
outlines, companies provided the technical capacity and funding, and the US government 
provided funding guarantees and diplomatic support to ensure the security of company 
investments. Goel (2004) demonstrates that using Strange’s (1988) notion of a political 
authority-market bargain is an effective way to evaluate energy relationships between the 
political and commercial actors. As such, and as will be described further in the next 
chapter, this approach is employed and expanded in this study to evaluate the upstream 
relations and resource dependency between European political actors and energy 
companies in the Caspian.  
EU-company relations  
 
While the US foreign policy-energy company relationship has received some (albeit 
limited) academic focus, EU-energy company relations have received comparatively less 
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attention. Youngs (2009; 2007) provides one of the very few discussions of the European 
energy industry in the context of EU external energy relations. Unlike member states, 
Youngs (2009, p. 157) suggests that companies are less worried about the risks of supply 
disruption from suppliers and more concerned with encouraging the EU to focus on 
improving investment conditions in third countries. He notes how companies call for 
stronger political backing from the EU recognising that “individual member states could 
not now achieve very much on their own” and that the foreign policy dimension of EU 
energy policy is one of the areas where “most useful value added could emerge” (Youngs, 
2009, p.154). Building on these observations, companies’ perspectives on EU energy 
diplomacy and support for companies (as well as the tensions this poses for EU officials) 
will be examined in more detail in chapter six and seven. 
Youngs avers that companies have however a somewhat “schizophrenic attitude” towards 
EU energy policy (Youngs, 2009, p.155). He argues that companies recognise “the need for 
enhanced strategic, foreign policy dimension to energy security” and lament the lack of EU 
energy coordination on the world stage, but at the same time fear that the EU will interfere 
in and impede their business practices (Youngs, 2009, p.155). These observations echo 
Levy and Prakash’s (2003, p.133-138) findings on multinational companies’ perceptions of 
international governance. They argue (2003, p.133) that international regimes, can be 
either market enabling or regulatory and that multinational companies, such as energy 
firms, ordinarily seek to internationalise market enabling governance (to reduce 
impediments to their business operations) but aim to keep costly regulatory regimes at 
the national level where they have more scope for influence.  
Indeed, Youngs (2009, p.169) argues, that companies support market-based approaches to 
energy policy in principle but at the same time sometimes seek to impede the free market 
orientation of policy and fear an overregulated market environment in third party 
countries (Youngs, 2009, p.169). Youngs suggests that companies’ espousal of free market 
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policies can at times be disingenuous as they seek generally to limit competition rather 
than increase it (2009, p.157). Companies were rather concerned with building relations 
with pro-market officials in third countries and getting the EU to pursue “business 
enabling” governance, concerning the sanctity of contracts and profit repatriation 
(Youngs, 2009, p.162). Chapter five picks up this theme and considers the overlap between 
company, member state and EU institution perspectives on the promotion of energy 
governance in the Caspian. 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study seeks to expand knowledge on the European upstream energy cooperation in 
the Caspian Sea region. In doing so the thesis investigates EU energy policy objectives and 
diplomatic activity in the Caspian upstream, analyses company and member state 
perspectives of EU policy and examines the relationships and catalytic diplomatic 
interaction between European political and commercial actors in the region. Furthermore, 
theoretically speaking, it develops a politico-economic framework of analysis and a series 
of models needed to explain, respectively, the structural conditions of the Caspian 
operating context, the nature and objectives of EU upstream policy in this area and the 
intra-EU politico-commercial interaction in the region.  
As described above, the literature on EU upstream energy policy and politico-commercial 
relations is at present rather limited. Most scholarly accounts of EU upstream policy in this 
area are prospective and theoretical, presenting little empirical analysis of EU policy in 
action. Likewise, with the exception of the work by Youngs (2009), the research on EU-
company relations in foreign energy policy is also underdeveloped. Indeed, the research 
gaps present in the literature provides much scope for detailed empirical investigation of 
the EU’s upstream energy role and objectives, the perceptions of member states and 
companies of this role and of the upstream interaction between these actors in the Caspian 
region.  
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In contrast to the studies on EU energy policy that highlight the difficulties the EU has 
faced in the formulation of a common energy role, this thesis argues that European energy 
relations in the Caspian upstream are broadly cooperative. Indeed, while European actors 
are not in perfect alignment and tensions persist, a series of shared perceptions on the 
risks in the upstream, (relatively) shared perceptions of the EU policy role and mutual 
resource interdependence between political and commercial actors drives a higher level of 
cooperation than is generally seen in energy policy.  
However, before turning to the empirical analysis of the EUs engagement in the Caspian 
and relationship with commercial actors, this thesis discusses the theoretical frameworks 
and research methods employed.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORISING EU ENERGY COOPERATION IN THE CASPIAN 
REGION  
 
This chapter outlines the theoretical frameworks used to analyse European upstream 
energy cooperation in the subsequent chapters. It argues that the neither the current 
conceptualisations of EU external energy policy nor the broader literature on energy 
politics provide, in and of themselves, suitable models for analysis of intra-European 
politico-commercial cooperation in the Caspian. Furthermore, this chapter contends that 
European foreign energy cooperation defies analysis through any one single paradigm, 
requiring instead, an eclectic interdisciplinary theoretical framework. This is especially 
the case given that this thesis merges two areas of political science (European foreign 
policy and energy policy studies) where eclecticism is particularly appropriate. Indeed, 
European foreign policy analysis is often though to benefit from theoretical eclecticism 
(White, 2004, p.23; Ginsberg, 2001, p.21). Likewise, Strange (1988, p.53), Keating et al, 
(2012, p.2-3), Checchi, Eneghofer and Behrens, (2009, p.1-2) and Harstem and Claes, 
(2013, p.785) have highlighted the politico-economic character of energy politics and the 
subsequent need for politico-economic theorisation.  
The different political and commercial actors, security and commercial objectives and 
politico-economic dynamics that this study entails all call for a degree of theoretical 
eclecticism in the mode of inquiry. As such, this chapter outlines a number of eclectic 
heuristic models derived from the literatures on IPE/IR (Strange, 1988; Goel, 2004; Cox, 
1986; Wolfers, 1962), European external relations/foreign policy (Hyde-Price, 2008; 
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Hocking, 2004a; 2004b; Hill, 1998; Smith 2004a; Keukeleire, 2003) and Public Policy 
(Eising, 2009; Bouwen, 2002) designed to aid explanation of: 
 1) The structural operating conditions of the Caspian;  
2) The EU’s upstream energy role and objectives; and 
3) The cooperation between EU institutions, member states and commercial energy 
actors. 
Eclecticism and the philosophical approach of this thesis   
 
Eclecticism is not, however, a license for conceptual anarchy. So as to avoid the risks 
inherent to conceptualisation of this nature and in an effort to be clear about one’s 
ontological position, this thesis offers a philosophical-theoretical-methodological 
framework underpinned by a critical realist philosophy of science. Critical realism makes 
an important contribution to the thesis as it facilitates theorisation of the complex mix of 
conceptual factors discussed in this theoretical chapter (that, in turn, support the 
empirical analysis in the following chapters). Indeed, as described below, the study of both 
EU foreign policy and the political economy of energy benefit from interdisciplinary 
eclectic analysis that, in turn, requires a philosophical framework logically capable of 
supporting such eclecticism. This fact derives from the complexity of these areas of 
enquiry, involving numerous different types of actor, different forms of power/resources 
and the intersection of different political and economic structures, each with different 
causal logics (see section on Cox below).  
Critical realism is based on the tenets of ontological realism, epistemological relativism and 
judgemental rationalism. Put simply, this refers to a position where one accepts that there 
is an independent reality (mind-world dualism), that it is difficult to know with absolute 
certainty that one has got ‘close’ to this reality, but that it is also possible to give 
systematic, logical reasons for why one is confident in one’s academic results. Taken 
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together the tenets of critical realism offer a philosophy of social science capable of 
logically supporting the multi-causal, inter-paradigmatic framework and heuristic 
theoretical models developed below (Patomaki & Wight, 2000, p.225; Kurki, 2008, p.206).  
The capacity of critical realism to support eclectic theoretical frameworks derives, in 
particular, from the form of abductive reasoning and the broad understanding of causality 
associated with critical realist philosophy. The form of reasoning adopted by critical 
realists is abduction (rather than deduction or induction). Abductive inference relies on 
producing plausible accounts of particular instances based on the data available to 
scholars (Jackson, 2010b, p.82). As Jackson highlights (2010b, p.83), the purpose of such 
an approach is “to posit, or conjecture, the existence of some process, entity or property 
that accounts for the observational data”. Such ‘processes, entities and properties’ may be 
either observable or unobservable factors and can be both material and ideational. This 
form of reasoning does not produce generalizable research findings that would apply to all 
cases of European upstream energy policy or politico-commercial relations in energy. 
However, it does permit forms of theorising that incorporate a mix of different factors 
logically capable of analysing complex interactions of different actors, forms of power and 
politico-economic structures (like those studied in this thesis). The cost of such an 
approach is a loss of theoretical parsimony. However, in cases of complexity, aiming for 
parsimony can risk the production of reductive accounts that miss important information. 
As described in the following chapter, while models derived from this form of abductive 
reasoning are not generalizable and thus do not allow one to construct covering laws of the 
social world, they may however be transferable to other similar instances, where they may 
prove useful in conducting analysis.  
Beyond the abductive form of reasoning, critical realism is useful in analysing complex 
theoretical questions because it adopts a broader view of causality than most other 
philosophies of social science, and thus presents the possibility for different types of cause 
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to have impact in a given instance (Kurki 2006, p.202). This is important from the 
purposes of eclectic theorising because different theories normally disagree on the causal 
logic of action in social affairs rather than the basic ontological facts of reality. Neo-realists 
and classical realists, for example, both agree that states and international systems exist – 
where they disagree is in the causes that determine states’ behaviour and interaction. 
Indeed, it is in the identification of the causal phenomena that different theories and 
paradigms in the social sciences tend to diverge. However, the wider understanding of 
causality inherent to critical realism reduces these dichotomies and allows for 
examination of how the various causal factors employed by competing or overlapping 
paradigms interact in given instances. Critical realism consequently draws focus to the 
overlaps between different approaches, and therefore importantly, the latent prospect for 
theoretical fusion or accommodation (Patomaki & Wight, 2000, p.226) - (Further 
consideration of these philosophical dimensions, and the way they inform the theorisation 
in this thesis, is provided in annex one). 
Furthermore, the tenets of critical realism also support the research methods adopted in 
this thesis. While holding that there is a fixed reality ‘out there’ (ontological realism), the 
epistemological relativist and judgemental rationalist dimensions of critical realist thought 
give researchers a degree of flexibility in the choice of research methods, sources and 
techniques they utilise (Lipscomb, 2011, p.5), provided they can give good reasoned 
arguments for why these have been adopted and how they facilitate the production of 
valid results. As such, this approach also supports the adoption of a pragmatic, 
triangulated series of research methods, as employed in this thesis (see chapter three for 
further discussion on internal validity and the research methods adopted in this thesis). 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. The first section justifies the need for an 
eclectic approach and explains some of the limitations of the wider theorisation of 
European and international energy politics to date. The second section sets out the 
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overarching ontological framework that underpins and guides the specific uses of theory 
in the subsequent chapters. The third section elaborates a series of politico-economic 
heuristic models employed in the following chapters to help explain the EU’s upstream 
energy cooperation. 
THE NEED FOR AN ECLECTIC APPROACH TO THEORISING ENERGY INTERACTION IN 
THE CASPIAN   
 
While establishing parsimonious explanations of social reality is one of the core objectives 
of social science, research conducted exclusively within set paradigmatic boundaries can 
at times entail shortcomings. It is sometimes impossible to capture the intricate reality of a 
particular issue-area through a single paradigmatic framework without oversimplifying 
complex phenomena and consequently missing causally-important factors. As Patomaki 
and Wight (2006, p.226) note, “given the complexity and open nature of the social world 
[…] it is hardly possible that a single paradigm could ever dominate”. As Sil and 
Katzenstein (2010, p.413) argue, specific paradigmatic research traditions permit an 
avoidance of aspects of “complex reality that do not neatly fit within the metatheoretical 
parameters they have established by fiat”. However, such “simplifying moves” are not 
necessarily “independently capable of generating a more comprehensive understanding of 
complex, multi-faceted problems”. Analytical eclecticism (Sil & Katzenstein, 2010, p.414) is 
helpful in these instances as it fosters an approach capable of weighing up the strengths 
and trade-offs of different theories and merging them so that causal mechanisms of 
different approaches can be “reconceptualised and integrated as elements of a more 
complex explanan[s]” [emphasis added]19.   
The interdisciplinary analysis of both European foreign policy and energy politics 
warrants a degree of theoretical eclecticism. Indeed, the involvement of multiple business, 
                                                          
19 It should be noted that this thesis does not adopt analytical eclecticism’s disregard for meta-
theory or the dangers of eclecticism. On the importance of meta-theory see Reus-Smit (2013). See 
annex one for the meta-theoretical position adopted in this thesis. 
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state and supranational actors, the divergent domestic, transnational and international 
spheres of action, the strategic and economic implications of policy decisions as well as the 
impact of both material and ideational influences calls for a mode of analysis capable of 
taking these varied factors into account. However, neither the literature on EU energy 
policy, nor the wider literature on international energy affairs has produced a set of 
theoretical models that are, in and of themselves at least, suitable for the investigation 
undertaken here. While numerous insights can be drawn from these literatures, the 
theoretical literature at present does not offer the kind of frameworks suitable for the 
form of politico-economic analysis conducted in this thesis.  
Current conceptualisations of European energy policy: Explaining policy failure and 
divergent politico-economic ontologies  
 
As mentioned previously, the literature on European energy policy, especially its external 
dimensions, tends to present European policy as discordant. Correspondingly, the (often 
implicit) conceptual underpinnings of this literature mirror debates about the wider 
difficulties of formulating a common European foreign policy in general. A number of 
contributions reflect Zielonka (1998) and Hill’s (1998) notion of “a logic of diversity” in 
European foreign policy. In describing the logic of diversity, Hill (1998, p.36) notes how 
the “different histories [of European states] mean divergent identities, widely differing 
political systems (even within the confines of liberal democracy), differing patterns of 
relationships with the wider world, and differing capabilities at all levels”. He adds that 
this “make[s] common action in foreign and defence policy problematical” (1998, p.36). 
Similarly, a number of EU energy policy contributions reflect the capabilities/consensus-
expectations gaps present in EU foreign policy (Hill, 1993; Toje, 2008) that highlights the 
difference between the expectations placed on the EU (i.e. to develop an effective energy 
policy) and the EU’s actual capacity to reach consensus and develop policies that meet 
these expectations in practice. Indeed, while Europe possesses the potential to be a major 
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actor in energy policy if it were able to devise a rational, common, cooperative policy 
approach (Bozhilova & Hashimoto, 2010; Westphal, 2006), divisions between member 
states and differing member state relations with foreign actors (such as Russia) militate 
against comprehensive European external energy cooperation (McGowan, 2008; Schmidt-
Felzmann, 2008; 2011; Youngs, 2007; 2009; Leonard & Popescu, 2007; Braghiroli & Carta, 
2009; Smith, 2008).  
However, this thesis does not investigate the causes of this intra-EU discord, but rather 
aims to account for the growing cooperation between European political and commercial 
actors in the Caspian upstream. As such, while providing important insights that are 
apposite given the general discord in EU relations, the theoretical repertoire on European 
foreign energy policy does not, in and of itself, provide sufficient tools for examination of 
the impact of the Caspian structural context of EU policy, the EU’s objectives and role in 
the Caspian or the cooperation between European institutions, member states and 
companies.  
Furthermore, in addition to mirroring debates on discord in European foreign policy, the 
theoretical conceptualisation of energy politics in Europe often reflects wider divisions in 
the energy policy literature between political and economic-focused analyses of energy 
affairs. Despite calls for the development of eclectic politico-economic modes of analysis in 
the study of energy relations (Strange, 1988, p, 191; Keating et al, 2012, p.4), and bar a few 
notable examples discussed in chapter one (Stokes, 2007; Bromley, 2006; Vivoda, 2010; 
Goel, 2004) a substantial part of the scholarly literature on international energy politics is 
characterised by a separation between geopolitical/realist20 and economic-market/liberal 
based accounts (Grant, 2008; Chester 2010; Luft & Korin, 2009; Finon & Locatelli, 2008; 
Cuită, 2010; Casier, 2011a; 2011b).   
                                                          
20
 Indeed, (neo) realism and geopolitics themselves are at times conflated without any detailed 
systematic discussion of the similarities or differences between their respective intellectual 
histories (see for example Finon & Locatelli, 2008, p.425). 
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These geopolitical and liberal-market distinctions manifest in several ways, often 
implicitly. Some accounts, for example, present direct reflections on the energy security 
and international energy affairs literatures, accounting for the different 
geopolitical/liberal positions that scholars take without subscribing themselves directly to 
a particular position (Cuită, 2010; Chester, 2010, Youngs, 2009). Others present the 
literature as overly ‘geopolitical’ highlighting how (neo)liberal-institutionalist/economistic 
understandings of energy politics provide a better framework of analysis (Finon & 
Locatelli, 2008; Casier, 2011a; 2011b; Grant, 2008; Taylor & Van Doren, 2008; Noël, 2008). 
By contrast, Luft and Korin discuss this division from the opposite perspective, arguing 
instead for the superior insights of ‘energy realism’ over ‘energy idealism’ (2009, p.340). 
Many empirically-minded accounts do likewise. Klare, for example, discusses potential 
conflict between global powers over oil resources in starkly ‘geopolitical’ terms, titling a 
2009 chapter “There will be Blood21” and arguing that US and Chinese “efforts to militarize 
their foreign energy endeavours will produce a competitive stance between them and 
someday spark a dangerous confrontation” [sic] (2009, p.59). Fettweis (2009, p.66) 
disagrees, arguing that the need for economic cooperation in energy relations and the 
rational futility of conflict over energy supplies means that resource wars are “obsolete”. 
A number of accounts of European energy politics present a form of this wider geo-
politics/market-liberalism divide in their conceptual characterisations (Youngs, 2007; 
2009; Correljé & van der Linde, 2006; Westphal, 2006; CIEP, 2004; McGowan, 2008; Finon 
& Locatelli, 2008; Casier, 2011a; 2011b; Noël, 2008). For example, Correljé and van der 
Linde (2006) and CIEP22 (2004) present ‘regions and empires’ and ‘markets and 
institutions’ “storylines” to account for potential developments in international energy 
relations. Youngs (2007), employs the notions of ‘markets’ and ‘geopolitics’ to characterise 
                                                          
21 Likely a reference to the 2007 Daniel Day-Lewis film with the same title. 
22 It should be noted that CIEP (2004) does discuss at length some of the interactions between 
political and market based actors (p. 42-48). 
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the behaviour of the EU (particularly the European Commission) and a number of 
recalcitrant member states respectively.  
Overall, however, these geopolitical and market-liberal approaches often explain energy 
affairs in a manner that reproduces the longer pessimistic-realist/liberal-rationalist divide 
in international thought. Wight (1987, p.221) famously highlights the difference between 
realist, rationalist and revolutionist tendencies in the historical evolution of international 
thought with these intellectual trends representing the greater emphasis placed by 
various schools of thought on different aspects of international affairs. Realists, in Wight’s 
formulation (as more broadly), place emphasis on the anarchical system of sovereign 
states and are generally pessimistic with regard to international interaction. Rationalists, 
by contrast, are more optimistic, emphasising the prospects for international law, 
institutions and diplomacy. Revolutionists see the current order as illegitimate or invalid 
and in need of change (Wight, 1987, p.222-6). At the level of ontology, geopolitical 
approaches to international energy affairs demonstrate the tendencies of pessimistic-
realist thought. Conversely, market-liberal perspectives present a rationalist view, with 
some accounts (such as those discussing fuel poverty, for example) also incorporating 
elements of the revolutionist (Goldthau, 2012). Just as the different emphases discussed 
by Wight can be traced throughout much of the history of the subject of International 
Relations, including the so-called ‘great debates’23 between realists and idealists and more 
latterly neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists, so too is the international energy 
affairs literature similarly characterised by contemporary formulations of these competing 
pessimistic–rationalist traditions. However, for Wight (1987, p.227) (and other advocates 
of the English school) these three perspectives were logically connected and dynamically 
interwoven yet they were also, he averred, “in mutual tension and conflict”. It is clear 
                                                          
23 It should be noted that some of the the historiography of these debates contests both the 
existence and character of the first great debate (Vigneswaran & Quirk, 2004). Nonetheless, Wight’s 
broad notions of realism and rationalism can be seen in these theoretical contestations as they can 
in the geopolitical/liberal market approaches to energy. 
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nonetheless, that from Wight’s perspective, the “dynamic interweaving” of all three 
needed to be taken into account for a full understanding of international politics (1987, 
p.227)24. Indeed, focusing solely on one of these traditions of thought “will necessarily 
result in an incomplete picture” (Little, 2000, p.398). 
In the case of energy these divergent approaches tend to place greater emphasis on 
different observable trends in the interwoven political and economic dimensions of global 
energy affairs. Claes argues that international energy politics is characterised by 
“contradicting but coexisting trends” (2009, p.38). Here he refers to the contradictory (and 
to some extent dialectical) trends of both global transnational economic liberalisation and 
the simultaneous and conflicting wave of renationalisation and augmented state control in 
energy producing states (2009, p.38). While capital, companies and investments move 
globally in the energy sector and while energy commodities continue to be traded on 
global markets25, over the last decade many energy producers have adopted increasingly 
nationalistic and statist policies in oil and gas, reversing previous market opening trends 
(Claes, 2009, p.40; Behn & Pogoretskyy, 2012; Goldthau, 2012; Noreng, 2009, p.210; Helm, 
2005, p.2). Similarly, Helm (2005, p.1-3) argues that the 2000s saw a “paradigm shift” in 
energy towards a greater acknowledgement of the role of security of supply (and climate 
change), a greater involvement of political actors in energy and a more political notion of 
energy policy. However, the change towards these ‘newer’ challenges does not, he 
contends, involve a rejection of the old liberal paradigm but rather entails a combination 
of liberalising and more political security of supply objectives. This shift, Helm (2005, 
p.14) suggests, is often ‘messy’, involving the merger of institutional structures and ideas 
from the liberal paradigm with others designed to meet new political and security realities 
in energy.  
                                                          
24 Indeed, Wight noted (1987, p.226) that taken together the three constitute “a system of political 
philosophy”. 
25 Albeit to differing extents - oil is more widely traded on international markets than gas (although 
this is changing with advent of LNG and the so-called shale gas revolution). 
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Realist-geopolitical and liberal-market based accounts of international energy politics 
tend to order the analytical (and causal) hierarchy of parallel global inter-state and 
transnational economic systems differently, locating explanations for energy politics 
accordingly, sometimes omitting or reducing attention to their less preferred 
system/actors. Liberal approaches tend to present the virtues of a rationally-designed 
interdependent transnational system capable of constraining state behaviour. By contrast, 
realists privilege analysis of the inter-state system, focusing pessimistically on the 
conflictual character of competing state interests, sovereignties and power, yet at times 
downplaying the role of markets and market actors (Junne, 1994, p.84). While each 
framework brings important insights, they also tend to downplay the contributions of the 
competing schools of thought and consequently make difficult the synthesis of political 
and economic analysis needed in energy policy (Strange, 1995, p.169; 1988, p.191; 
Watson, 2012).  
Neither of these approaches entirely captures the political economy of energy. Indeed, as 
Checchi et al (2009, p.1) note, they are “both two sides of the same coin” and “both are 
necessary to explain the challenges as well as the solutions to dealing with the security of 
energy supply in Europe”. Even the most common components of definitions of energy 
security - ‘affordability’ and unrestricted ‘availability’ - attest to the interconnectedness of 
the respective economic and political dimensions of energy supply security (Checchi et al, 
2009, p.1-2). In sum, what is required is a more convergent politico-economic ontology of 
international energy affairs capable of sustaining a series of eclectic theoretical models 
that can help explain the specific questions raised in regard to cooperation between 
European political and commercial actors in the Caspian.  
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A POLITICO-ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS FOR ENERGY POLITICS  
 
Building on the contributions in Kuzemko et al (2012) 26, Bromley (1991) and Strange 
(1988) for a politico-economic approach to energy, this section outlines an alternative 
analytical framework for the study of international energy affairs. It contends that an 
analytical framework in the study of energy politics needs to systematically consider four 
(scientific) ontological issues:  
 
1) The links between the political and the economic in energy;  
2) The range of actors and sources of power under investigation; 
3) The interplay of transnational, state and interstate spheres of analysis; and 
4) The interplay between sources of ideational and material influence in energy affairs. 
 
In addressing these issues, this section does not subscribe to one particular school of 
IPE/GPE. Rather, it argues that some strands of the literature on International/Global 
Political Economy, most notably contributions from Susan Strange, Robert Cox and a 
number of others (see below), present pragmatic and effective ontological answers to the 
above questions and thus allow one to develop a suitable politico-economic framework for 
analysis of energy cooperation. 
1. Politico-economic synthesis  
The study of international energy relations requires a framework of analysis that 
incorporates political and economic factors without privileging one automatically over the 
other (Watson, 2012, p.viii). One of the founding objectives of IPE was the development of 
a working synthesis between the analysis of politics and economics (Strange, 1970, 
Kindleberger, 1970). While much of the literature on IPE has subsequently presented the 
subject as the “political economy of international economic relations” seeing the field as 
                                                          
26 Especially the chapter by Keating et al (2012, p.1-19) 
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pertaining to the “political aspects of those broadly economic issues that figure on the 
agendas of governments”, others in the field have argued that the “worlds of politics and 
economics are not, and cannot be separate from each other” (Strange, 1995, p.169; Wood, 
1981).  
Indeed, energy commodities, subject both to transnational market trends and of enormous 
strategic value to political actors, lie at the intersection of the transnational economic and 
the interstate systems (Bromley, 1991, p.3; Claes, 2009, p.38). Buzan, Jones & Little’s 
(1993) theoretical discussion of structural realism provides useful insights here. While 
Buzan et al (1993, p. 31) stress that the “international political” can be an overall focus of 
analysis, they recognise that the international political system comprises a number of 
different overlapping sectors (including the political inter-state and economic sectors) and 
that the study of the “international political can be best developed and humanized by 
dropping older realist claims for the superiority of political over economic competition”. 
Indeed they warn that “sectoral blindness [overly focusing on one sector] is an 
occupational hazard of all human specialisations” and encourage explanations of 
international affairs to incorporate analysis of both political and economic sectors (1993, 
p. 31). In this case, international politics means evidently more than inter-state relations, 
going beyond the notion of politics as the “functioning of government by states” (Strange, 
1995, p.169) and getting closer to politics as the workings of the “interhuman system” 
(Buzan, 1993, p.30). More specifically, the version of what constitutes politics here relates 
to Hay and Marsh’s (1999, p.13) discussion of politics as the exercise of power (see below) 
thus transcending both the economic realm and the more conventional understanding of 
the “political sector”.  
Consequently, studying energy affairs requires analytical frameworks that explain the 
respective logics of the inter-state and capitalist-economic spheres and their two-way 
interaction (Teschke & Lacher, 2010). As Watson asserts, the study of energy requires 
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analysis which entails both economic and political processes “but a priori privileges 
neither in explanation” (2012, p.viii).  
2. Core actors and notions of power 
The weakening of boundaries between the political and the economic has implications for 
considerations of both the core actors in international energy affairs and the notion 
power. The work of Susan Strange is instructive here. Cox (1996) argues that Strange’s 
ontological position with regards to both power and actors in the international political 
economy was essentially realist, but not in the conventional sense. Strange’s realism was 
“the search for the effective entities in politics, whatever they may turn out to be” (1996, 
p.183). As Cox asserts (1996, p.183) “instead of defining the world exclusively in terms of 
states, she [Strange] sees power as the basic concern of realism and asks: where does 
power lie? With states certainly, to some degree, but also with markets. With firms, too, 
and possibly with some other entities. The answer is not given with the question and the 
answer is subject to change”. As Guzzini (1998, p.188) notes, for Strange, “anything else 
would seem utterly unrealistic”. 
Strange’s approach to the study of IPE was thus to focus on the actors that have power and 
then to ask cui bono (who benefits?) in particular situations, rather than to assume a priori 
that certain actors always predominate over others (Strange, 1988; Cox, 1996, p.183; 
Guzzini, 1998, p.177). This view reflects Strange’s belief that the world was moving in an 
increasingly pluralist “neo-medieval” direction where “competing authorities co-exist in 
world politics and markets, as power has become more dispersed” (Story, 2000, p.27; see 
also Strange, 1995, p.56). The case of energy draws particular attention to a multiplicity of 
actors. Most notably, such a pluralist view in energy would include states, multinational 
corporations and international organisations such as the EU27.  
                                                          
27 The inclusion of non-state actors here is not to presuppose that states are no longer important 
actors or that they are becoming obsolete. Far from it, they most probably continue to be the most 
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This ‘neo-medieval’ view of the global political economy also has implications for the 
understanding of power. Strange is well-known for a structural view of power in the 
international political economy (1988, p.24). She argued that in addition to relational 
power between actors, it was necessary to take into account the ability of actors to shape 
the four basic structures of the world economy (or any other context) - security, 
production, finance and knowledge (Strange, 1988, p.24-26). Such a view (and typology) 
of power is useful here for three reasons. Firstly, this approach to power is actor neutral, 
reducing dichotomies between types of power and not assuming a priori which actors will 
exercise both the power to determine each structure and the relational power within each 
structure (Lawton, Rosenau & Verdun, 2000, p.9). Secondly, it disaggregates power and 
draws attention to the fact that actors may provide forms of power, in various structures, 
on which other actors rely. As will be described below, this draws attention to the 
interdependent ‘bargains’ between diverse actors, each employing different forms of 
power and resources (Strange, 1988, p.39; Goel, 2004). Thirdly, Strange’s four forms of 
power play a crucial role in the energy sector. The development of energy resources, often 
located in politically unstable regions, requires forms of security provision, expert 
production techniques and equipment, vast sources of credit financing, and finally, 
specialist knowledge-based resources, both in a technical sense and in the wider sense of 
structuring the dominant norms and modes of international energy production (see 
chapter seven). 
3. Transnational forces, states and world orders 
Given that energy affairs take place at the intersection of the transnational economy and 
the inter-state system, frameworks of analysis need to account for the interaction between 
                                                                                                                                                                          
powerful actors. Rather, it is suggested here that this view of state superiority is an open question 
for investigation rather than a sustainable a priori assumption. One should think first in terms of 
power and then ask who has it. Indeed, focus need not be limited to states, companies and 
supranational actors alone. Lobbying organisations such as energy industry associations (Eurogas, 
OGP for example), civil society actors and various forms of insurance providers (inter alia) can also 
be core actors depending on the question in hand (Keating et al, 2012, p.4). 
64 
 
different politico-economic structures – each with its own discernible logic. The work of 
Robert Cox (1996) is useful here. Rather than focus on levels of analysis (that can entail a 
certain hierarchy in explanation), in his ontology of the global system Cox conceives of 
three “spheres of activity”, namely, the spheres of transnational social forces, the state and 
the world order (1996, p.101) (see fig. 2). Such a model lends itself well to studying the 
intersection of the transnational structure of the energy market, the inter-state structure 
and the political and economic structures of states themselves.   
 
Fig. 2: Cox’s three interacting spheres of analysis. Source: Adapted from Cox (1996, p.101). 
It is important to outline the respective structural logics of each “sphere” as doing so 
facilitates useful incorporation of a number of paradigmatic traditions and bodies of 
literature. The sphere of world order is structured by anarchical logic of interstate 
relations, while the transnational level is structured (at least in the energy context here) 
by the logic of capitalist economic production and competition28 (Buzan et al, 1993; Cox, 
1996, p.100; Bromley, 1991; Teschke & Lacher, 2010). As will be discussed further below, 
the state level is highly differentiated in terms of ordering logic as states’ internal logics 
vary. Nevertheless most states can be characterised as exhibiting logics that fall 
                                                          
28
 At the transnational level, it is also possible to distinguish between impersonal transnational 
market trends (of supply and demand for example) and particular powerful market players with 
whom states often must cooperate and thus who may both constrain and enable state behaviour at 
different times. 
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somewhere along both democracy/authoritarian and free market/state-controlled 
economy axes29.  
States’ domestic structures both shape their international actions and are in turn shaped 
by configurations of transnational forces (including, notably, in energy) and world order. It 
is important to stress however that states are affected by the ebb and flow of transnational 
forces and inter-state structures differently (Strange, 1995, p.63). Powerful states such as 
the US or China are of course affected by both transnational and interstate developments 
in energy. However, as noted in chapter one, smaller energy producers that are highly 
dependent on energy production, such as Azerbaijan for example, are profoundly affected 
by developments at both levels to the extent that their domestic political systems are 
strongly shaped by interactions with these structures.  
Cox’s model both complements and is complemented by other approaches in International 
Relations theory. Neo-classical realism, with its focus both on the systemic structure and 
the domestic determinants of state action, provides insights into the state and world order 
level of Cox’s model (see discussion of Hyde-Price [2008] and Hill [1998] below). 
Furthermore, the transnational forces sphere of analysis is complemented by Keohane and 
Nye’s conception of complex interdependence that stresses the interaction of 
transnational forces and their impact on state behaviour (Keohane & Nye, 1989; see also 
Casier, 2011a). Taken together Cox’s three-way ontology of the relations between 
transnational forces, states and world orders provides scope for the utilisation of different 
theoretical insights from different paradigms to explain specific outcomes. Yet by seeing 
these three focuses of analysis as inherently interconnected, Cox’s model weakens the 
tendency to reduce explanation to just one or two of these spheres of interaction or to 
hierarchically order any of them a priori as analytical predominant. Furthermore, it 
                                                          
29 There are of course a number of definable logics that are specific to certain states or sub-groups 
of states such as varying degrees of democracy and relatively free-market economies in Europe or 
rentieristic economies and neo-patrimonial political structures in the Caspian region, for example 
(Franke et al, 2009). 
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presents the opportunity for the incorporation of transnational, state and supranational 
actors in the analysis of energy affairs, as consistent with the pluralist view of actors 
described above30.   
4. Material and ideational factors  
The Coxian conceptualisation of interacting spheres outlined above draws attention to the 
importance of both material and ideational factors in the international system. Cox 
conceives of each sphere as being itself constituted by an amalgam of three different types 
of forces - material capabilities, ideational factors and institutions - which he refers to as a 
“historic structure”31 (Cox, 1996, p.97-99) (see fig.3).  
Institutions 
Ideas
Material 
Capabilities
Ideas 
• Intersubjective 
ideas
• Collective images 
Material
Capabilities
Forces of -
1. Production
2. Destruction 
Institutions
(Regimes) 
reinforcing 
ideas and 
material 
capabilities 
 
Fig. 3: Coxian historical structures. Source: Adapted from Cox (1986) and Gale (1998). 
                                                          
30 It should be noted that, from a theoretical perspective, not all of these actors need to be 
incorporated into the analysis at any one time. Some specific theoretical questions may warrant 
investigation of only certain sub-sets of these actors or interaction between two spheres. However, 
ontologically speaking, an effective framework capable of capturing a full account of international 
energy affairs is unlikely to be established without factoring in all of these spheres of analysis and 
the actors and sources of power they entail. 
31 According to Cox, institutions represent a formalisation of ideas and material power that ‘reflect 
the power relations prevailing at the point of origin and tend, at least initially, to encourage 
collective images consistent with this set of power relations’ (Cox, 1986, p.219). 
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Cox’s (1986, p.218) understanding of material capabilities refers to ‘productive and 
destructive potentials’. This is the capacity to control or facilitate the production of the 
goods and services that different societies need as well as the potential to inhibit or 
(militarily) destroy this capacity (Gale, 1998, p.271). Ideational factors, by contrast, refer 
to the dominant normative contexts of a particular era. Cox (1986, p.218) makes a 
distinction between two forms of ideas. Intersubjective meanings are shared 
understandings about the nature of social and political interactions which perpetuate 
certain expectations of behaviour. These intersubjective ideas constitute the normative 
structures that individuals see as legitimate (Gale, 1998, p. 271). The second type of ideas 
that Cox (1986, p.218) identifies, collective images, refers to the differing images of social 
order held by divergent groups. Unlike intersubjective ideas that are defined by their 
commonly held nature, collective images “clash over legitimacy of existing power 
relations, the definition of a public good, and the meaning of social justice” (Cox, 1986, p. 
272)32. In terms of energy, these notions draw attention to the importance of both material 
and ideational capacities (and their interaction) in energy affairs highlighting, for example, 
the role of control over material factors such as access to hydrocarbon reserves or off-
shore production capacity and ideational factors such as concepts of legitimacy in relation 
to how energy markets should be governed or the rights of foreign investors should be 
interpreted33.  
 
 
                                                          
32 One can relate these aspects of Cox’s notion of a historic structure to Strange’s (1988) structures 
of power. Cox’s material capabilities of production and destruction relate closely to Strange’s 
structures of production and finance and security respectively. Likewise, Strange’s notion of control 
over knowledge structures shares an affinity with Cox’s conception of the dominance of legitimacy 
ascribing intersubjective ideas within a historic structure. 
33 Likewise, in conjunction with Strange’s notions of structural power, these ideas draw attention to 
the capacity of powerful actors to shape the respective interaction of forces in a given sphere of 
activity. 
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USEFUL THEORY: HEURISTIC THEORETICAL MODELS FOR THE STUDY OF EU 
UPSTREAM COOPERATION IN THE CASPIAN  
 
Having established the parameters of an eclectic politico-economic approach to 
theorisation, this section turns its attention to the theoretical models utilised in this thesis 
to explain different aspects of the EU’s external energy policy in the Caspian. This section 
advances a series of models focusing respectively on: 1) the structural challenges of the 
Caspian operating environment; 2) the EU role and objectives in upstream energy; and 3) 
the cooperation between EU institutions, member states and commercial energy actors. 
These models are intended to serve a heuristic function. They are presented here not as 
covering laws or deductive hypotheses, but rather as conceptual maps that simplify the 
complex reality of Caspian energy politics by drawing attention to the major dynamics, 
actors and causal processes investigated empirically in the following chapters.  
1. Analysing the structural challenge of the Eurasian operating context: 
Territorial non-coincidence, politico-economic heterogeneity and natural 
resource-based interdependence 
 
One of the major obstacles facing the EU and European energy businesses in the Caspian 
region is what Murray (1971) has referred to as “territorial non-coincidence”. Territorial 
non-coincidence refers to the risks facing transnationally-operating companies derived 
from heterogeneity at the level of regulation, government practice, rules, norms and 
(commercial) rights between interdependent states. Murray argued that by the 1970s, the 
territorial expansion of the growing transnational economic system had long outgrown 
the national (or previously imperial) boundaries that had hitherto regulated it and that 
private transnationally-operating actors were challenged by forms of governance 
conditions that posed risks to their business operations (1971, p.85).  
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European actors face risks from such territorial non-coincidence in the governance 
structures and policy practices of states in the Caspian region. Indeed, while the EU and 
energy producing states of former Soviet Union are interdependent in energy terms, they 
nonetheless favour quite different forms of energy regulation to meet the needs of their 
different political systems (as discussed in chapter five). As noted in the previous chapter, 
increased instances of augmented state control and involvement are some of the biggest 
political risks from the perspective of energy businesses and one of the most strident 
areas of non-coincidence (Domjan & Stone, 2010; Kennedy, 2011). While these trends do 
not seem likely to abate, this context nonetheless represents the operating environment 
for European actors and the context in which European upstream Caspian energy policy is 
evolving.  
 
The territorial non-coincidence in the Euro-Eurasian energy system is underpinned by 
two core interlocking factors. Firstly, the heterogeneity in political-economic systems 
across the Euro-Eurasian region, and secondly, the natural resources character of the 
independence across many states in the Former Soviet Union that exacerbates this 
heterogeneity. Each of these is addressed briefly in turn below. 
For our purposes here, the Euro-Eurasian region (comprising the countries of the EU and 
the former Soviet Union) can be defined as a heterogeneous regional system (composed of 
two interdependent regional sub-systems) (Aron, 1966, p.100). Aron (1966, p.100) 
defines a heterogeneous system as one “in which the states are organized according to 
different principles and appeal to contradictory values”. The main dividing lines between 
the states of Euro-Eurasia fall along the axes of democracy/authoritarianism, 
market/state-controlled economic structures and rational-bureaucratic/neo-patrimonial 
domestic political structures. These notions are abstract ideal types and no state 
corresponds to any of these labels perfectly. Nonetheless, the EU states fall closer to the 
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democratic, rational bureaucratic and market economy end whereas the opposite can be 
said of most states in the former Soviet Union (including all Caspian states). 
Energy plays a part in shaping these respective political and economic structures. Indeed, 
the energy sector has the capacity to fundamentally impact states’ domestic political 
systems. This is true for both energy exporting and importing states. Indeed, as Mitchell 
(2009, p.400) has shown, the political and economic character of Western-democratic 
consuming states has been shaped by their historically relatively easy access to and use of 
fossil fuels. The economies of Western industrialised states fundamentally rely on 
affordable energy supplies and by implication so do their elected political elites who are 
held directly and indirectly accountable for the impact of high prices (Chester, 2010, 
p.890; Bielecki, 2002, p.237). Likewise, consuming governments rely on taxes on 
petroleum products to finance a significant proportion of wider government spending 
(Bridge & Le Billon, 2013, p.114). In Mitchell’s words “the leading industrialized 
economies are also oil states” (2009, p.400). Given the importance of energy to their 
political systems and economies, consuming countries seek to shape regional energy 
structures that conform to their need for affordable energy supplies (discussed in chapters 
four and five).  
However, for resource-rich exporters, the natural resources sector is often the major 
source of economic activity and thus plays a much more direct role in shaping domestic 
politico-economic structures. The extent to which energy impacts on the development of 
political and economic institutions and practices in resource-rich countries is well-
documented (as outlined in the in chapter one) (Gel’man & Marganiya, 2010; Franke et al, 
2009; Ross, 2012; Collier, 2010). As Franke et al’s (2009) discussion of the “post-soviet 
rentier state” attests, corruption, neo-patrimonialism and informal politics combine with 
high resource rents to create a strong and regionally particular form of rentierism, 
resource curse and continued authoritarianism in the FSU. These forms of political 
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structure, exhibiting executive dependence on the energy sector and weak governance (in 
petroleum and elsewhere), tend to increase the risk of politically-motivated and 
unpredictable action in the energy sector. However, just as consumer states do, producer 
states seek to shape governance structures in energy that provide energy prices 
commensurate with their political economies, especially within their own borders where 
they have sovereign authority. 
However, bringing the notion of interdependence back in, there is a cyclical dynamic at 
play here. Heterogeneity across Eurasia presents risks for diverse actors with different 
demands for energy outcomes, yet at the same time, the continuing transnational flows of 
capital from importers to exporters can exacerbate the resource curse trends that deepen 
this heterogeneity. Furthermore, from the perspective of companies and the EU, this 
diversity in political structures, when combined with ongoing interdependence, feeds into 
the territorially non-coincident structures and governance practices that present risks. 
Yet, the engagement of major Western energy operators, in facilitating the transfer of 
rents and investment from Western consumers to exporters serves to reproduce (in part 
at least) the very political systems that create these risks in the first place.  
In sum, within an energy interdependent Euro-Eurasian energy context, territorial non-
coincidence draws attention to the tensions between an interstate political system and 
transnational economic order, the risks this creates and, as discussed throughout this 
thesis, the consequent actions by governments and the EU to reduce these tensions and 
shape the system in line with their needs. These ideas form the backdrop to much of the 
analysis that follows in the subsequent chapters, providing conceptual insight into the 
motivations behind EU policy objectives and the challenges in the region. 
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2. Analysing the EU’s upstream role and objectives: Milieu-shaping and state 
economic functions 
 
To analyse the EU role and objectives in the Caspian upstream, the thesis employs the 
notions of “milieu-shaping” (Hyde-Price, 2008; Smith, 2004; Wolfers, 1962; Keukeleire, 
2003, p.47) and “state economic functions” (Smith, 2004; Junne, 1995; Murray, 1971). 
Informed by the work of Hyde-Price (2008), Zielonka (2006, p.105), Lavenex (2004, 
p.686) and Keukeleire (2003), this thesis sees the EU’s upstream policy as an effort to 
manage the risks caused by engagement with Caspian states through a (re)shaping of their 
politico-legal structures and political practices in line with EU interests (Hyde-Price, 2008, 
p.31; Wolfers, 1962, p.73). In the Caspian, the EU has both energy security and 
commercial/economic objectives, with core aspects of EU upstream policy both relating to 
the simultaneous pursuit of these interlocking interests and reflecting the multiple roles 
the EU plays in foreign policy (Smith, 2013a). Consequently, to capture both the security 
and commercial dimensions of the EU’s upstream energy policies34, the analysis here is 
built on an incorporation of both realist and structuralist/neo-marxist notions of milieu-
shaping in foreign policy traditionally concerned with actors’ security and “state-
economic” interests respectively (Hyde-Price, 2008; Smith, 2004). 
The EU as milieu-shaper  
 
Presenting a broadly neo-realist analysis of EU foreign policy, Hyde-Price (2008, p.31) 
argues that regional powers (such as the UK and France) always have “an interest in 
shaping a benign international environment favourable to their first-order interests 
(primarily associated with their security and prosperity)”. In the context of European 
foreign policy, Hyde-Price notes how the EU fulfils this role by serving “as an instrument 
for collectively shaping the regional milieu” in line with these security and economic 
objectives [emphasis added] (Hyde-Price, 2008, p.31). This discussion of milieu-shaping 
                                                          
34 The diplomatic dimension of EU policy is discussed further below. 
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rests on Wolfers’s (often neglected) distinction between milieu goals and possession goals 
in foreign policy (Wolfers, 1962, p.73; Hill, 2003, p.239; Keukeleire, 2003, p.46). An actor 
pursuing possession goals is, according to Wolfers (1962, p.74), aiming at the 
“enhancement or the preservation of one or more things to which it attaches value”. 
Because states will often value the same things, in doing so an actor will often find itself 
competing with others (Wolfers, 1962, p.74). For example, pipelines in the European 
periphery have the character of possession goals as they rely on the same sources of gas 
and service the same markets. If the EU were to have been successful in encouraging the 
building of Nabucco, then Russia would not have been able to build South Stream as they 
both rely on the same sources of gas and both service south-east Europe. By contrast, 
when states pursue milieu goals they are “not out to defend or increase possessions they 
hold at the exclusion of others, but aim instead at shaping the conditions beyond their 
national boundaries” (Wolfers, 1962, p.74). Governance frameworks in the Caspian have 
the character of milieu-goals as they are not designed to acquire particular possessions, 
but rather manage the way that things are done in the Caspian. While milieu-goals are 
almost certainly firmly in the interest of the actors that promote them, unlike possession 
goals, they can also match the interests of other actors because they are based on 
shareable principles rather than obtaining material objects (Wolfers, 1962, p.76).  
However, as Wolfers (1962, p.74) and Smith (2004, p.80) note, milieu goals are by no 
means automatically universal. Rather their acceptance depends on the degree of 
agreement around the core principles on which they are formed. Furthermore, seemingly 
universal milieu governance principles can be a means of shaping the external 
environment so as to permit a more effective pursuit of possession goals (Smith, 2004, 
p.80). Indeed, the adoption of international, regional-level milieu-goals may merely shift 
the competition from the international level to competition for possession goals at the 
transnational level (from between states to between energy companies, for example). 
Milieu goals are not distinct from possession goals on the basis of their normative or 
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ethical character but rather their adverbial nature. That is to say they are concerned with 
outlining, facilitating or restricting the way in which things are done, rather than what is 
obtained (Letwin, 2011; Oakeshott, 1975)35.  
Within this line of argument, Keukeleire (2003, p.46-7) argues that the EU promotes a 
form of “structural foreign policy” in its periphery. Such a policy is aimed at shaping the 
long-term character of governance structures (both at the state and regulatory level) in 
third party countries in line, where possible, with EU policy objectives (Keukeleire, 2003, 
p.47). Similarly, but representing a more neo-realist argument, Hyde-Price (2006) links 
the EU’s pursuit of milieu-shaping to changes at the level of the international system and 
the security and economic challenges this poses for the EU. His essentially structural 
realist account of the development of EU foreign policy argues that EU cooperation in 
seeking to influence the common EU regional milieu is driven by changes in international 
structures of power that “shape and shove” EU member states and EU institutions into 
reacting to these changes in ways that will maximise EU security and economic objectives 
(Hyde-Price, 2006, p.219)36. In particular, the end of the Cold War, unipolarity and the 
perceived ‘drawback’ of the US from Europe and the European periphery has engendered 
a greater recognition of the need for European foreign and security policy cooperation to 
shape the regional milieu (Hyde-Price, 2006, p.229).  
Hill (1998, p38-9) similarly expands four reasons to explain why EU member states might 
reach a coordinated position in foreign policy. Firstly, member states might come to a 
rational calculation that they can achieve more together than independently. Secondly, 
external demands such as an increasing regionalisation globally might drive European 
                                                          
35 While scholars of EU external relations sometimes laudably extol the normative milieu-shaping 
character of EU external relations and governance and (incorrectly) contrast it with more strategic, 
less benign foreign policy possession goals (Lavenex, 2004, p.694), they can underestimate the 
extent to which EU milieu-shaping efforts seek to establish frameworks and conditions in the EU 
periphery that serve the EU’s interests and the pursuit of possession goals by member states and 
private companies. 
36 Hyde-Price asserts however that the way that EU reacts to these pressures is not determined by 
these structural forces, but rather depends on a “range of domestic political factors, including 
decision making competence, ideology and sectional interests” (2006, p.223). 
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member states together. Thirdly, evolutions in the international system might foster intra-
European cooperation. Hill notes how, for example, EU cooperation could be precipitated 
by a decline in the US’s capacity or willingness to underwrite European security or the 
emergence of a more threatening international system (1998, p.39). Finally, he suggests 
that a convergence of values could lead to a redefinition of national interests in line with 
more common European objectives (Hill, 1998, p.39). These four ideas are not mutually 
exclusive and could, of course, exist in combination in the context of EU Caspian energy 
cooperation37.  
State economic functions: Making the European periphery safe for the energy industry 
 
In the case of energy however, the realist account of EU milieu-shaping presented by 
Hyde-Price is complemented by structuralist/neo-marxist notions of “making the world 
safe for capital”, especially in terms of the promotion of “state economic functions” (SEF) 
that are all essential to the effective operation of capitalist systems (Smith, 2004, p.79; 
Murray, 1971; Junne, 1994). For Murray (1971, p.87-8), all capitalist systems require 
political authorities to play a structural role to maintain the functioning of the system 
through the provision of certain public goods. Equally as the transnational economic 
system has shifted beyond the boundaries of the ‘Western’ world, the need for the 
extension of state economic functions has grown with it (see section on territorial non-
coincidence above) (Murray, 1971, p.87). Indeed, Murray (1971, p.87) suggests that if the 
“performance of certain economic functions by a state body is a sine qua non of any 
capitalist system, the territorial expansion of that system will imply the need for the 
performance of state economic functions in the expanded territory”. The energy industry 
                                                          
37 Arguments number one and number four presented by Hill (1998) could be seen to be mutually 
exclusive given that the former is based on rationalist assumptions and the latter on constructivist 
understandings. It is none the less the case that gradually converging values could lead to 
recognition of the possibility and rational benefits of cooperative action or (more likely from this 
scholar’s perspective) that a rational appraisal of shared-interests could precipitate the form of 
interaction that develops shared or at least common values. 
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is no exception, relying heavily on the provision of state economic functions in all areas of 
its operations.  
 
Below are a number of state economic functions that are particularly relevant (adapted 
from Smith, [2004, p.79] and Murray [1971, p.87]):  
1. The protection of property rights: This refers to the way that political authorities 
work to develop “stable institutional and legal frameworks based on the 
identification and defence of ownership, and the negotiation of appropriate 
international agreements” (Smith, 2004, p.79). From the perspective of this thesis, 
it relates most strongly to the protection of property and investment rights 
enjoyed by energy companies (hereafter - SEF: protection of property rights).  
2. The provision of competitive advantage: This function refers to the “creation of 
institutional and policy frameworks that structure economic space and activity in 
the interests of national or regional economic agents” (Smith, 2004, p.79). From 
the perspective of this thesis this relates to the creation of structures that provided 
a specific advantage for European companies operating in the upstream (hereafter 
- SEF: provision of competitive advantage).   
3. Protection against commercial disadvantage: This refers to the way that political 
authorities seek to avoid distortions that might give an advantage to competitors. 
From the perspective of this thesis this refers to issues such as ensuring equal 
opportunities for investment or resisting regulations that place unfair burdens on 
foreign companies (hereafter - SEF: protection against commercial disadvantage).   
4. Contributing to collective autonomy: This function refers to the “enhancement of 
the freedom of manoeuvre of national or regional economic agents, and 
recognition of the challenges to this” (Smith, 2004, p.79). From the perspective 
here, this relates most closely to resisting impediments to business action in 
upstream markets (hereafter - SEF: contributing to collective autonomy).  
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5. Contributing to collective security: This function refers to the provision of public 
order and security internally and externally (Smith, 2004, p.79). In the context of 
external energy policy, this relates strongly to the provision of public order as it 
affects the operations of energy companies (hereafter - SEF: contributing to 
collective security). 
While the promotion of “state economic functions” is usually conducted by states, as Smith 
(2004, p.80) points out, they can also be performed by other political authorities - such as 
the EU. Indeed, Murray (1971, p.87) noted that these functions could be performed by a 
number of different actors acting in collaboration. As Smith notes (2004, p.79), 
international actors’ claims to legitimacy and efficacy are increasingly based on their 
contribution to the provision of state economic functions. Indeed, it will be argued in the 
latter chapters of the thesis, that acceptance of the EU’s growing role in upstream energy 
policy relies in no small part on member state and energy company perceptions of the EU’s 
role in the provision of state economic functions.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, these ideas relate to a structural conception of the 
interaction between political actors and the market that conceives of political authorities 
as the long-term guarantors of certain (capitalist) modes of production (Poulantzas, 1976, 
p.70). Governance frameworks promoted by the EU in its upstream energy policy are 
likewise particular models of production, in that they entail certain understandings of the 
roles and rights of certain commercial and political actors, in particular the rights and 
duties of commercial energy companies and resource-rich states towards each other 
(discussed further in chapters four and five). This in turn relates to an important aspect of 
European external energy relations in that, as will be argued in the following chapters, the 
objectives of EU external energy governance in the Caspian (as elsewhere) reflect an 
attempt to promote and sustain a particular, liberal, conception of energy production. 
Amongst the key objectives of this liberal production system is the management and 
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elimination of political risk, one of the core challenges confronting European energy 
businesses38.  
The indivisibility of security and economic milieu goals in the upstream 
 
The European objective of milieu-shaping, designed to establish and maintain certain state 
economic functions and modes of energy production, entails the concurrent promotion of 
both economic and security goals. As described further in chapter four, energy is a largely 
atypical part of the European security agenda given that, unlike most aspects of security, 
energy security is in effect provided by a nexus of commercial companies and political 
authorities (EU institutions and member states). Given this politico-commercial energy 
supply model, promoting state economic functions that seek to shape the regional milieu 
in Eurasia so as to ensure a reduced level of risk for market actors is a strategic priority for 
the EU member states and EU institutions and a clear example of the overlap of economic 
and strategic security objectives in energy. Furthermore, as will be discussed in chapter 
six, this intersection of the EU’s commercial and security objectives entails a clear overlap 
between the EU’s energy diplomacy and commercial diplomacy in areas such as the 
Caspian. 
In sum, this thesis advances a model of EU external relations in energy that seeks to 
incorporate both the realist security-maximising and economic/commercial aspects of EU 
upstream policy. The liberal model of EU energy provision, where energy is supplied by 
commercial companies acting for profit, entails a blurring of commercial and security 
prerogatives. The conception of milieu-shaping outlined above seeks to capture these 
dynamics and the mix of commerce-facilitating, economic and security objectives 
promoted by the EU in its periphery. These concepts will be employed through the 
                                                          
38 However, it should be noted that the structural practice of ensuring the general maintenance of a 
certain system of production is distinct from ensuring the specific interests of particular 
enterprises (Krasner, 1978, p.23) – a question returned to in chapter six in the context of the EU 
institutions’ desire to promote the overall European interest, rather than the particular interests of 
individual companies in foreign energy markets. 
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subsequent chapters but most predominantly in discussion of the EU’s upstream role and 
objectives in chapters four, five and six. 
3. Analysing EU upstream cooperation: Market-authority ‘bargains’, catalytic 
diplomacy and resource dependency  
 
To analyse the relationships between European political authorities and market based 
actors in the Caspian, this thesis employs Strange’s (1988, p.42) concept of an “authority-
market bargain” (for an application of the concept to energy see also Goel, 2004), 
Hocking’s (2004a; 2004b) network-based conception of “catalytic diplomacy” and the 
notion of resource dependency from network theory (Eising, 2009). While network theory 
is traditionally employed to matters of public policy there is no reason why they cannot 
also be applied to matters of international relations/IPE (Hafner-Burton, Kahler & 
Montgomery, 2009). Indeed as Hafner-Burton et al (2009, p.582), have noted network 
analysis is “most useful in international relations when it is carefully married to existing 
theoretical and conceptual approaches” (such as Strange’s [1988] notion of an authority-
market bargain – see below). 
The notion of an “authority-market bargain” focuses attention on the “balances of interest 
and power that allow a working set of bargains [in this case between companies and the 
EU] to be hammered out and observed” [emphasis added] (Strange, 1988, p.42). This 
model draws attention to both the ‘balance of interests’ (that is to say the perspectives of 
energy companies, member states and EU institutions on the challenges in the region and 
what is to be done about them) and the ‘balance of power’ (the respective resources 
provided by each set of actors on which the others rely), that characterise and underpin 
the European upstream political authority–market bargain in the Caspian. Strange (1988, 
p.39) argued that examination of the interdependent “bargains” between political 
authorities and commercial actors was one of the primary tasks of IPE as a discipline. The 
bargains to which Strange was referring are not necessarily consciously designed, 
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publically stated or formal (although aspects are often formalised). Rather, she was 
alluding to the tacit understandings and interdependent structural power arrangements 
that characterise the interaction between political (and commercial) actors in the 
international system (Goel, 2004, p.478)39.  
Hocking refers to the diplomatic expression of these interlinked relations between 
political and non-state actors (such as companies) as “catalytic diplomacy” (Hocking, 
2004b, p.151). Hocking’s conception of catalytic diplomacy rests on a conception of 
networks of (state and non-state) actors in foreign policy “with the [collective] capacity to 
contribute resources to the management of complex [international] problems, whether 
these assume the form of knowledge and financial resources or, less tangibly, the 
conferment of legitimacy on processes and outcomes” (Hocking, 2004b, p.151; see also 
Hocking & Smith, 2011). This increasingly open form of diplomacy is brought about both 
by globalisation and transnationalisation (as described by Murray above) and concomitant 
challenges that cannot be solved by state actors alone (Hocking, 2004b, p.151). Indeed as 
Hocking notes “confronted by ever more complex, multifaceted security objectives, there 
is a necessity [on behalf of a range of externally-operating actors] to establish policy 
networks of varying scope and composition, which bring together governmental actors, 
CSOs [civil society organisations] and business” (2004b, p.151).  
Detailed analysis of this networked EU-company bargain in the Caspian upstream is 
facilitated utilising Strange’s four structures of power (Strange, 1988; Goel, 2004) in 
combination with the notion of resource dependency, adapted from the literature on 
policy networks in public policy (Eising, 2009, p.131). As described above, Strange’s focus 
on different modes of power (security, financial, productive and knowledge-based40) 
                                                          
39 In this sense these bargains differ from the explicit, official, often legally-binding and more static 
public-private partnerships commonly seen in public policy. While implicit however, the contours 
of these bargains nevertheless have a profound impact on international developments. 
40 Strange refers to these as the primary structures of power. She also (1988, p.135) noted that 
there were a number of secondary structures of power (of which energy is one). She stressed 
however that these secondary structures were themselves constituted by the four primary 
81 
 
draws attention both to the key sources of power and influence in energy politics and the 
fact that the control of some of these sources of power can rest with non-state actors, such 
as energy companies or the EU. Indeed, the roles played by different actors within a given 
market-authority bargain (such as EU-company catalytic diplomacy in the Caspian) can be 
analysed by investigating both the structural conditions of the bargain (that is to say the 
geo-political/geo-economic, production, finance and knowledge/ideational challenges in 
the Caspian) and the relative contributions that different actors (EU actors, member states 
and companies) make in turn to mitigate these structural pressures (Strange, 1988, p.25; 
p.39; Goel, 2004, p.478).  
However, to capture the respective sources of power and consequent interdependence 
between European commercial and public actors, it is also fruitful to employ the concept 
of resource dependency from network theory (Eising, 2009, p.131). Resource dependency 
refers to the fact that networks of commercial and political actors (in energy for example) 
are often dependent on each other for the provision of certain (security, production, 
finance and knowledge-based) resources (Eising, 2009, p.131). Bouwen (2002, p.368) 
argues that EU public-private interaction is often based on “exchange relations” between 
interdependent organisations. Echoing Hocking (2004b, p.151), Bouwen suggests 
however that market-authority “exchange relations” in the EU are not uni-directional with 
influence flowing top-down from political to commercial actors (or vice-versa) (2002, 
p.368). Rather, within networks of European political and commercial actors, dependence 
often flows both ways with each actor controlling certain resources that they are able to 
exchange with others to achieve common objectives (Bouwen, 2002, p.368).  
In the case of foreign energy policy, no actor, not even the US Government, can fully 
achieve their objectives without relying on resources provided by other actors. Referring 
to resource dependency, Bouwen, notes how “organisations become interdependent with 
                                                                                                                                                                          
structures (Strange, 1988, p.135). As such, to analyse a secondary structure, one needs to do so in 
terms of its primary structure components. 
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those organisations with which they interact” (2002, p.368). Furthermore, as Bouwen 
(2002, p.368) suggests being interdependent means that “organisations can become 
subject to pressures from those organisations that control the resources they need”. This 
dependence, at least when (relatively) symmetrical, consolidates the tacit bargains 
between networks of actors over time.  
Informational exchange is a very substantial part of the resource dependence between 
commercial and public actors and often a central feature of their interaction (discussed in 
chapter seven) (Junne, 1994, p.98). As Eising observes, EU political actors often rely on 
commercial actors as “a particularly important – and sometimes exclusive – source of 
information” and for support in policy implementation, particularly in external 
commercial relations (Eising, 2009, p.132). As they have only limited resources at their 
disposal, the EU institutions are particularly dependent on expert knowledge in carrying 
out their executive and legislative functions, relying heavily on external expertise 
(Bouwen, 2002, p.369; Eising, 2009, p.131; Junne, 1994, p.98)41.  
In the case of EU upstream energy relations in the Caspian, companies and political 
authorities are mutually dependent on each other’s resources42. Companies provide the 
bulk of the production knowledge, production capacity and financing necessary to exploit 
overseas energy resources. EU institutions also rely on companies as an important source 
of information on Caspian energy developments. The member states and the EU 
institutions, particularly the Commission (in the form of DG Trade and DG Energy) and the 
EEAS both provide political/diplomatic support for companies through direct energy 
diplomacy and in the longer term seek to structure the conditions of external energy 
policy in a way that is conducive to both their energy security needs and the commercial 
                                                          
41 Eising notes that in the EU, information can be considered as “political money” (2009, p.131). 
42 While not discussed here, bargains of this resource interdependent sort are not at all exclusive to 
the EU or the West. Producing countries in the Caspian for example demonstrate very complex 
bargains between political and economic figures. Here deeper dynamics such as clan structures or 
familial links that help bind these bargains are also at play.  
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objectives of companies, who ultimately produce and supply the energy. Neither can fully 
achieve their external objectives successfully without cooperating with the other. Analysis 
of these factors is undertaken primarily in chapters five, six and, especially, seven. 
CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter has sought to outline an eclectic conceptual framework useful for the analysis 
of EU upstream cooperation in the Caspian. The current theorisation of European energy 
policy, despite its strengths and success in explaining intra-EU discord, does not provide 
adequate models for the analysis of European energy cooperation in the Caspian. 
Responding to the calls of Keating et al (2012) and others, this chapter has outlined a 
politico-economic framework of analysis that formulates a more politico-economic 
framework for the study of energy affairs. In addition, the chapter has set out a number of 
heuristic theoretical models that help to explain the territorial non-coincidence challenges 
of the Caspian operating-environment, the milieu-shaping nature of the EU’s overlapping 
political and economic objectives and role in the region, and the dynamics of EU’s politico-
commercial catalytic diplomatic cooperation in the Caspian upstream. 
To complete the discussion of the methodological frameworks for this thesis, the next 
chapter briefly outlines the research methods employed in this study.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 RESEARCH METHODS 
 
This chapter discusses the data collection, data analysis and the research principles 
employed in this thesis43. The chapter comprises three parts. The first outlines the 
research principles of internal validity, transferability and empathetic neutrality adopted 
in this thesis. This section describes the basis for claims to internally validity, but argues 
that the research is potentially transferable rather than externally valid (i.e. generalizable). 
The second section discusses the selection of the Caspian region as a case study example of 
EU upstream energy policy. The final section outlines the data collection and data analysis 
methods employed in the research, highlighting the model of triangulation adopted and 
discussing the development of the research frameworks for this thesis. Challenges 
encountered during the research are raised, where applicable, throughout the chapter. 
VALIDITY, TRANSFERABILITY AND EMPATHETIC NEUTRALITY  
 
Different approaches to academic research often entail divergent understandings of what 
constitutes systematic, rigorous analysis (Robson 1995, p.402-3; Lincoln & Guba, 1985, 
p.37-8; Seale, 1999, p.43-5). The traditional notions of internal validity, external validity 
(generalisability) and objectivity associated with much quantitative and positivist 
qualitative research are often challenged by those from more hermeneutical positions on 
the grounds that they may not be applicable in the case of qualitative inquiry (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985, p.37). Indeed, many qualitative researchers challenge positivistic assumptions 
about the existence of a single reality, independence between the object and subject in 
                                                          
43 Just as the analytical framework and theoretical models delineated in the preceding chapter are 
consistent with the critical realist philosophy of science as presented in annex one, so too are the 
research methods presented here (particularly the notions of epistemological relativism and 
judgemental rationalism).  
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research as well as the supposedly time, context and value free nature of scientific 
postulations (inter alia) (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p.37).  
However, the critical realist approach to the philosophy of social science adopted in this 
study (see annex one) shares aspects with both positivism (the acceptance of an 
independent reality) and more interpretive approaches (transfactualism, the idiosyncratic 
nature of explanation and the impossibility of perfect objectivity). As such, this section 
addresses the questions of validity, transferability and neutrality and offers a middle way 
between the positions outlined above. 
Internal validity  
 
Internal validity refers to the degree of confidence that one can have in the causal 
assertions made about a given piece of research (Trochim, 2006). This thesis adopts an 
ontologically realist approach and thus perceives of an independent knowable (but not 
necessarily observable) reality and a concomitant desire to aim for a (probably ultimately 
impossible) separation between the researcher and their research. As such, it holds that it 
is possible to make valid inferences about causal relations within this external empirical 
reality. However, the practice of collecting and interpreting qualitative data, presents 
ample opportunity for biases to interfere with the validity of one’s causal claims (Robson, 
1995, p.402). This thesis uses a number of methods to seek to ensure validity in its 
inferences about Caspian energy affairs, namely triangulation, member validation and peer 
debriefing.  
Triangulation involves employing a number of different “methods at once so that the 
biases of one method might be cancelled out by those of the others” (Seale, 1999, p.53). 
Robson (1995, p.383) argues that triangulation is “particularly valuable in the analysis of 
qualitative data where the trust worthiness of the data is always a worry”. During the 
research for this thesis, methodological triangulation was adopted by employing different 
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kinds of data collection techniques and comparing across data collected (interview data 
and public documentation). This has the benefits of collecting both the instant reactions to 
questions from interview participants and the more considered opinions of different 
actors available in documentation. This data has however also further been triangulated 
with personal experience from a five-month In-service Traineeship in the Central Asia 
Division of the EEAS. This experience provided an opportunity to triangulate data received 
from other sources with practical experience ‘on the ground’44. 
Furthermore, both as part of the triangulation process and as internal validity measures in 
their own right, this thesis also engaged in member validation (Seale, 1999, p.61) and peer 
debriefing (Robson, 1995, p.404). Member validation involved discussing my findings and 
ideas in off the record, confidential conversations with individuals involved in the 
processes under investigation (most notably EU officials). These discussions allowed 
people to reveal and discuss information that they would not have revealed in formal 
interviews and allowed franker discussions of issues related to my research than would 
otherwise be possible. Correspondingly, they provided a useful opportunity to test ideas 
and arguments in the presence of those in a capacity to challenge them. No information in 
this thesis is derived directly from these discussions, yet they provided a useful form of 
validity assurance. Secondly, peer debriefing, the seeking out of disinterested opinion on 
one’s work, was undertaken by submitting my work to review both through conference 
presentations and by submission to academic journals45 throughout the PhD enrolment.  
 
 
                                                          
44 This ‘blue-book’ traineeship (won through open competition) was conducted in Brussels between 
March and July 2011. It involved paid, full-time work embedded with the EEAS Central Asia 
Division. The role of the author was to conduct research, write briefings, monitor international 
press and academic outlets, to prepare for meetings and public events and various other policy-
orientated administrative tasks. 
45 As outlined in the front matter of this thesis. 
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Transferable but not generalizable  
 
While this study strives for internal validity it does not expect the same of external validity 
(generalizability). It is not possible to extrapolate from the research findings in this thesis 
and assume they will apply in other geographical areas. The distinctive nature of 
particular contexts in qualitative research makes generalizability from a particular case 
problematic as the broader representativeness of a single case study or small number 
cases cannot be guaranteed (Seale, 1999, p.107). Indeed, the non-sample based single 
case-study approach of this research makes generalization impracticable as one cannot 
claim that this case study is representative of a broader collection of cases (Robson, 1995, 
p.405)46.  
However, the research presented in this study may well prove transferable to other 
contexts that demonstrate similar dynamics, and that arguments and models derived from 
this work may well be suitable for investigation in similar situations47 (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985, p.297-298). While this thesis does not directly investigate the degree of 
transferability of the ideas presented here to other areas, several potential areas for 
transferability will however be discussed in the conclusion. 
Empathetic neutrality: Avoiding bias 
 
There are numerous ways that research can be biased by the researcher (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985, p.38). Any piece of research can be affected by: a) the inquirer’s values; b) the 
research paradigms that the researcher chooses; c) the values inherent to the theories 
adopted; and d) the values inherent to the context in which the research takes place 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p.38). In keeping with the view of judgemental rationality outlined 
                                                          
46 This, incidentally, is compatible with the idiosyncratic nature of causality as understood by 
critical realism. The fact that specific causes interrelate in a contingent fashion in given cases makes 
generalisation difficult as the exact causes and antecedent conditions in other circumstances may 
be different (see annex one). 
47 The contexts that present the most suitable environment for further investigation of EU external 
energy governance are other energy-rich regions, geographically proximate to the EU, such as 
North Africa. 
88 
 
in annex one, a position of empathetic neutrality was consciously sought during the 
research. Empathetic neutrality involves deliberate recognition of the inherent 
subjectivities of research and a consequent conscious desire to try to overcome these 
subjectivities by addressing the research context with empathy whilst at the same time 
seeking to remain non-judgemental (Vromen, 2010, p.257).  
In this sense, the position adopted concurs with that recommended by Hedley Bull (2000). 
Bull suggested that research in IR should be conducted in a spirit of “political objectivity or 
detachment” (emphasis added) (Bull, 2000, p.260). However, he also recognised that this 
was extremely difficult in practice and given that there is “no such thing as value-free 
inquiry into International Relations or any other social subject” the best position was to 
aim for political objectivity even if it is not “something we can expect fully to achieve” 
(Bull, 2000, p.260)48.  
Several measures have been undertaken so as to guard against distortion of the research 
through the influence of unseen values. The first, to guard against inherent Euro-centrism, 
involved discussions with Central Asian contacts so as to seek to understand the context of 
that region through their eyes. The second was partaking in the Institute of International 
Relations Summer School in Tinos, Greece (2012) where a two-day session with Christian 
Reus-Smit and Nicholas Onuf was devoted to the role of values in theory and meta-theory. 
Thirdly, constant critique of the positions adopted by the researcher was necessary to 
guard against the risk of adopting the values of context, particularly while at the EEAS. 
Conducting a traineeship there, whist highly beneficial for the research, presented a risk of 
implicitly adopting the values of context, especially as the researcher was reliant on the 
EEAS for training and information. However, the equally self-reflective attitude of almost 
                                                          
48 Indeed, Bull felt that “the most one could hope to do is to be aware of one’s moral and political 
premises, to formulate them explicitly if one is employing arguments that derive from them, and 
(this above all) to be critical about them, to treat the investigation of moral and political premises 
as part of the subject” (Bull, 2000, p.260). 
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all of the people encountered at the EU made mitigating this risk far less difficult than 
anticipated.  
CASE STUDY: THE CASPIAN REGION   
 
The case study of the Caspian region has been chosen for intrinsic and instrumental 
reasons49 (Silverman, 2005, p.127). Intrinsic motivations for case study selection relate to 
the particular characteristics of the case, whereas instrumental motivations concern the 
broader insights that can be gained beyond the case study in question (Silverman, 2005, 
p.127). As described in the previous chapter, the EU’s external energy policy is under 
investigated in the Caspian region. This fact combined with the increasing importance that 
is attached to this region by the EU and the wider importance of the regional with regard 
to energy developments, provides intrinsic justification for the selection of the Caspian as 
a case study area. However, in terms of instrumental reasons, the case study serves as 
locus for the investigation of the theoretical aspects of the EU’s external energy 
cooperation as described in the previous chapter. Secondly, the challenging nature of the 
environment and the important energy stakes, all provide the right context for an 
evaluation of EU upstream energy practice. Thirdly, as noted above, it serves potentially to 
provide some transferable findings regarding energy relations in the EU periphery. Finally, 
investigating a region of this strategic importance in terms of energy provides insights into 
the developing character of the EU’s evolving external energy policy more broadly.  
                                                          
49 There are several reasons behind the decision to adopt a case study methodology. Firstly, case 
studies allow for the collection of rich amounts of data and permit an in-depth study of a 
phenomenon. They are useful, as is the case here, where cross-case data collection is difficult. 
Secondly, case studies allow for multiple forms of data to be brought to bear on a particular case (as 
discussed in the next section) thus permitting the triangulation between these data sources 
(discussed above). Thirdly, case studies are useful in IR where there are regional specificities that 
impact on the outcomes in a particular case – again as is the situation in the Caspian. Of course, as 
described above, it is highly likely that the findings from this case study will prove transferable to 
other contexts. 
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DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS  
This thesis relied on a mixed data collection strategy with data gained from (and 
triangulated between) interviews with selected elite participants from the EU institutions 
(European Council, Directorate Generals Energy, Trade and DEVCO, the EEAS in Brussels 
and the Astana Delegation, Office of the EU Special Representative for Central Asia, the 
British and German governments, Kazakh Government, Samruk Kazyna [the Kazakh state 
holding company that owns the national oil company Kazmunaigaz], British Petroleum, 
the Open Society Institute and the Energy Charter Secretariat) and documentary data 
sourced from member state and energy company responses to EU public consultations, 
energy company annual reports and official Commission, Council and EEAS 
documentation. A full list is available in annex three.  
Interviews were obtained primarily through building up personal contacts and the 
snowballing technique. This was significantly facilitated by the traineeship undertaken at 
the EEAS. In hindsight, conducting this research without this traineeship would have been 
difficult. Interview participants were, unsurprisingly given the sensitive issues they work 
on, often hesitant to release detailed information50. Attempts to gain interviews through 
direct contact without an introduction from a previous contact were unsuccessful in most 
cases. Overall, obtaining interviews with EU officials was considerably easier than member 
state and energy company officials – largely due to having undertaken the traineeship at 
the EEAS and having built up contacts there. 
These challenges however, underline the importance of the interviews conducted. Given 
the sensitivity surrounding the topic, only limited amounts of information are publically 
                                                          
50
 Negotiations, ultimately successful, between the EEAS, Commission and member states as to 
whether or not to grant the Commission a negotiating mandate for a trans-Caspian pipeline were 
on-going at the time of the traineeship and many people working on this issue were quite 
concerned about information being released. This added to an understandably cautious approach 
to speaking with outsiders (of which the researcher was still one despite doing the traineeship). 
After this period had passed, a more open approach was benefitted from during the latter rounds of 
interviews. 
91 
 
available on EU external energy policy, especially on relations between public and private 
actors. Interviews were therefore an essential part of this research as they enabled access 
to individuals in a position to comment on European upstream energy developments and 
yielded data that was not available publically - adding to the research contribution of this 
thesis. 
Extensive notes, rather than recordings, were taken during interviews. This was due partly 
to participants’ concerns over being recorded and the risks of any divulgence or 
misappropriation of information being attributed to them. As discussed below, this had 
implications for the data analysis of interviews. Many respondents were uncomfortable 
with recording and many stressed that they would be limited in what they could discuss if 
interviews were to be taped. A decision was made early on that recording interviews came 
second to obtaining good data. Informing participants that interviews would not need to 
be recorded also increased the number that was happy to take part in the study. However, 
extensive notes were taken during all of the interviews and they present an accurate 
representation of what was discussed (but of course not an exact verbatim record). 
Interviews were conducted in four rounds. The first pilot interviews were conducted 
during the traineeship in Brussels (in July 2011). The second round was conducted in 
Brussels in May 2012. The third round was in Astana, Kazakhstan in August 2012 and the 
final, smaller, round was conducted in November 2012, again in Brussels. 
The approach to interviewing adopted was that of semi-structured interviews. This 
provided a guide for the interviews and a “checklist” of what needed to be discussed 
(Robson, 2011, p.301). It also provided the scope and flexibility to adapt questions, ask 
unplanned questions and respond to participant’s comments as and when necessary. This 
proved to be an effective strategy as participants would often discuss information that was 
not originally expected but that nonetheless provided highly useful insights into the topic 
matter.  
92 
 
Beyond research interviews, the study also relies extensively on document sources. 
Documentation, the majority of which is available on the internet, is derived from four 
major sources. The first is public consultations on EU energy policy including the public 
consultation for the 2006 Green Paper on EU energy policy and the 2011 public 
consultation on the external dimension of EU energy policy. For additional documentary 
insights from companies (particularly relating to company risk) a number of annual 
reports and submissions to financial authorities (the New York Stock Exchange and the 
French Financial Authority) were examined. Thirdly, speeches from EU Commission and 
Council officials were also analysed. Finally, official documentation from the EU (Council, 
Commission and EEAS) was also extensively analysed. Annex two presents a full list of 
documents analysed. 
Using sources of this nature raises the question of whether they represent an accurate 
portrayal of the different positions of respective member states and energy companies. 
This is of particular importance given the reliance on this type of data for insights into 
energy company and EU member state positions. Despite the fact that these documents 
are undoubtedly often written with political purposes in mind (indeed these political 
objectives are discussed in chapter six), there are several reasons, after having analysed 
them, to suggest that they represent a relatively accurate picture of perceptions and 
beliefs of the various actors. First, documents frequently both contradict and support EU 
official positions suggesting that they are not mere platitudes. Second, often these 
documents (such as the submissions to EU public consultations) are an opportunity for 
companies or member states to get their distinctive positions across publicly. Third, 
inaccurate or false responses could be used against actors in the future. Fourth, similar 
objections/positions are often raised independently by similar actors. Fifth, in some cases 
(such as the risk assessments discussed in chapter five) legal obligations compel 
companies to present information accurately to the best of their knowledge. Sixth, the 
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positions presented in documentation align with what would be expected from theory. 
Finally, stated positions also triangulate with the data collected from interviews. 
Data Analysis  
 
The approach to data analysis in this thesis is that of qualitative content analysis. 
Qualitative content analysis refers to a number of different techniques used to analyse 
qualitative data ranging from “qualitatively-orientated quantitative techniques” that 
measure instances of certain uses of language to purely qualitative methods that seek to 
analyse the informational content of data for detail and meaning rather than specific 
measurement (Forman & Damschroder, 2008, p.41; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p.1277). 
Indeed, as Forman and Damschroder suggest (2008, p.41), in contrast to quantitative 
content analysis the objective of most qualitative approaches is to understand a 
phenomenon rather than produce generalisations based on statistical inference (Forman 
& Damschroder, 2008, p.41). Likewise, Zhang and Wildemuth (2009, p.1) assert that the 
qualitative content analysis of data “goes beyond merely counting words or extracting 
objective content from texts to examine meanings, themes and patterns that may be 
manifest or latent in a particular text” in that it allows researchers to “understand reality 
in a scientific but subjective manner” [emphasis added]. 
The particular forms of qualitative content analysis employed here are conventional 
content analysis and directed content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p.1279-83)51. 
Conventional content analysis is used generally “to describe a phenomenon” without 
preconceived ideas (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p.1281). This involves the researcher 
immersing themselves in the data to “allow insights to emerge” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, 
p.1281). This type of data analysis is particularly useful when theory is underdeveloped 
                                                          
51
 By adopting these two approaches this methodology shares a lot with grounded theory in the 
sense that the conventional stage described below was in effect a form of “theoretical sampling” 
whereas the latter, directive, stage represents a form of grounding of theory in empirical reality 
(see Seale, 1999, p.92-96). 
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and research on a phenomenon is at an underdeveloped stage (as is the case in terms of 
Caspian upstream cooperation). This form of analysis was used primarily in the early 
stages of data analysis and during the traineeship in Brussels. While the broad politico-
economic ontology outlined in section two of the previous chapter has been researched 
and developed at this point and thus helped to guide the initial empirical research, the 
theoretical models that best explained the various dynamics under investigation (outlined 
in section three of the previous chapter) had not been selected. As such, this form of 
immersive, data analysis was used to decide which theoretical models were most useful 
and which models could be combined (such as structures of power and resource 
dependency and the various discussions of milieu shaping) to explain the different 
dimensions of the EU’s upstream policy and cooperation.  
By contrast, the goal of directed content analysis is to “validate or extend conceptually a 
theoretical framework or theory” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p.1281). Existing theories and 
frameworks, Hsieh and Shannon note (2005, p.1281), can be used to focus research 
questions via directed content analysis and coding of the data. As Hsieh and Shannon note 
(2005, p.1283) the main benefit of directed content analysis is that “existing theory [in this 
case derived from the conventional content analysis in the early stages research] can be 
supported and extended”. Indeed, while the gradual development of the research 
frameworks is not explicitly presented in the thesis, these two forms of analysis were 
employed diachronically and in an evolutionary fashion over the research period. Having 
used the conventional content analysis to help devise the theoretical models described in 
the last chapter in the earlier stages of research (in conjunction with the existing IPE 
literature), the directed form of analysis has been applied to the data collected in the later 
stages to provide further evidence for and examples of these theoretical models.  
However, it should be noted that while these approaches have been used in relation to 
both the documentary and interview based data, the use is more problematic with regards 
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to the interview data. This is because this data is not an exact verbatim account of what 
was said but rather is based on (albeit extensive) notes taken during the interviews. As 
such it is not possible to analyse this text in the same level of depth in terms of discourse 
analysis as would be the case had the interviews been recorded. Nevertheless, this 
information is highly valuable in that it presents detailed information on the subject 
matter, much of which is not available in the public domain. Furthermore, the data can still 
be analysed in much the same way as the textual data, i.e. via coding, the looking for 
patterns, a source for the validation of theory and ultimately to shed light on the empirical 
reality of EU upstream energy practices in the Caspian.  
CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter has outlined the methods employed in this thesis. The chapter began by 
setting out the core principles of internal validity, transferability and empathetic 
neutrality. The claims to validity made here are premised on methodological triangulation. 
Collection of different forms of data as well as peer-debriefing and member validation 
have been undertaken to ensure internal validity. The first section above also discussed 
how the research findings from this thesis are idiosyncratic and not generalizable. 
Nonetheless, it suggested how they are likely to be transferable to other contexts – as 
discussed further in the main conclusion (chapter eight). Lastly, the first section discussed 
the approach of empathetic neutrality, particularly important given the research done 
while conducting a stage at the EEAS. 
The second section described the intrinsic and instrumental motivations for the selection 
of the Caspian region case study. Intrinsically speaking, a combination of the fact that the 
EU’s upstream energy policy in the Caspian is under-researched and the weight that the 
EU itself attaches to this region provide justification for the case study. Instrumentally, the 
case study provides an interesting venue for theoretical development, presents 
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transferable findings that could be employed in other energy-rich areas and provides 
insights into the EU’s developing external energy policy.    
Finally, the last section outlined the data collection and analysis methods employed. It 
examined the different sources of data used (interviews and documentary sources) and 
highlighted the strengths and the challenges posed by these forms of data. The final part of 
the chapter outlined the data analysis methods. It stressed how the data was analysed 
through conventional and directed content analysis and how, while the theory and 
research findings are presented in a synchronic sense in this thesis, the actual research 
process progressed in an evolutionary fashion with frameworks and theory formulation 
developed in interaction with initial data and then, once refined, (re)applied to old and 
new data to unearth research findings.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
POLITICAL RISK AS ENERGY SECURITY RISK: EU OIL AND 
GAS DEPENDENCE AND THE UPSTREAM RISK 
MITIGATION ROLE IN EU ENERGY STRATEGY  
 
This chapter presents the milieu-shaping risk mitigation role of the EU in the Caspian 
upstream. Overall, the chapter makes two core arguments. Firstly, it demonstrates how, in 
line with the observations of Güllner (2008, p.150), the EU’s external energy policy is best 
thought of as a response to potential risks (as well as extant threats). Secondly, it 
highlights how the EU is heavily reliant on (often a small number of) companies in 
upstream markets and how this dependence creates a strong overlap between the political 
risks that these companies face and EU upstream security of supply objectives. In doing so, 
this chapter demonstrates the overlap between the EU’s realist security-maximising and 
economic commerce-facilitating milieu-shaping activities. 
This chapter does not set out to argue that the mitigation of political risk is the only role 
that the EU plays in Caspian upstream, nor that the EU is able to respond effectively to all 
political risks. Rather, it argues that political risk mitigation and market facilitation is the 
EU’s most important role in terms of fostering European politico-commercial upstream 
cooperation and a central feature of the EU’s emerging upstream milieu-shaping role and 
objectives. 
The chapter is structured into four sections. Following the work of Corry (2010) and 
Kessler and Daase (2007), the first section highlights the distinction between risks and 
threats as different forms of danger and notes, in particular, how risk can be mitigated in 
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advance rather than just reacted to. Secondly, based on discussions with EU officials, the 
chapter examines the EU’s security of supply risk mitigation strategy based on managing 
the risks entailed by EU dependence on producer countries (source risk) and transit states 
(route risk) and the less-discussed reliance on companies (counterparty risk). It argues 
that the EU manages both the potential impact and the likelihood of risks caused by these 
dependencies through three tactical measures: 1) diversification of the actors on which 
the EU is reliant; 2) the promotion of risk-mitigating energy governance; and 3) energy 
dialogue and diplomacy. Given the focus of this thesis on politico-commercial relations, 
this section (and the chapter as a whole) focuses predominantly on the last of the EU’s 
dependencies – counterparties - outlining the reliance of political actors on the European 
(and more broadly Western) upstream-operating commercial sector.  
The third section presents some of the core political risks present in the Caspian Sea 
region. The chapter concludes with a fourth section examining the convergence between 
EU institution, member state and energy company perceptions of energy risk, noting how 
political risks and market hindrances in the upstream (especially investment and market 
access risks) represent the strongest area of risk perception convergence between 
European political actors and energy companies. While this risk-perception convergence 
does not guarantee upstream cooperation between EU actors it is, as argued here, a 
necessary condition of their cooperation.  
RISK AND EXTERNAL ENERGY POLICY  
 
As noted in the introduction, despite calls for attention to risk in analysis of EU external 
energy policy (Güllner, 2008, p.150; Egenhofer & Legge, 2001), the risk mitigation 
dimension of EU external energy policy (and political risk mitigation in particular) is 
under-investigated in the EU energy literature. By contrast, in the wider social science 
literature, the management of risk is increasingly recognised as an important public and 
foreign policy objective (Chertoff, 2008; Jarvis & Griffiths, 2007; Petersen, 2011). This 
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section briefly highlights the connection between risks and threats before the major 
security of supply risks facing the EU are discussed in the next section below.  
Security: risks and threats  
 
A number of scholars argue that the practice of contemporary security policy has shifted 
from balancing against clear identifiable threats (such as the Soviet Union during the Cold 
War) to the management of uncertainty and risk (Daase, 2007, p.4; Kessler & Daase, 2012; 
Güllner, 2008, p.150). In both cases the potential danger may be the same, but the major 
difference surrounds the level of knowledge - or the epistemological status - one has 
regarding a particular danger (Kessler & Daase, 2012, p.413). Threats, in this formulation 
are ‘known knowns52’ – the dangers that an actor knows exist and can identify as 
immediate dangers. Risks, by contrast, are ‘known unknowns’ – the dangers that actors 
know are possible, but where there is uncertainty as to how likely they are or when they 
will manifest. Kessler and Daase (2012, p.414) argue that “where factual knowledge [of a 
potential threat] is partial, yet methods exist for reducing the uncertainty, we might speak 
of security risks”.  Daase (2007, p.3) and Bremmer and Keat (2009, p.4) both argue that the 
level of risk is derived from a combination of the likelihood of an event and the magnitude 
of its impact should it occur (i.e. risk = likelihood of occurrence x magnitude of impact). As 
will be described below, EU foreign policy actions can reduce risk by addressing both 
parts of this equation, that is to say by both diminishing the potential impact of a negative 
event (should it occur) and by reducing the likelihood that it will occur.  
For Corry (2010), risk and threat represent different logics of security, securitization and 
security practice. Both of these approaches to security coexist in reality, but as Corry 
(2010, p.3) suggests “analytically it is useful to be able to distinguish and study how the 
two relate to each other”. In terms of energy, while it is entirely possible that actors will 
face particular identifiable threats (such as the use of energy as a weapon), much of 
                                                          
52 To coin Donald Rumsfeld (Kessler & Daase, 2012). 
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external energy policy is, as Güllner suggests (2008, p.150), better characterised as the 
management of potential risks.  
A major difference between threats and risks rests in how actors (should) respond to 
them. When a danger manifests as a threat it requires a reactive approach to be contained 
and can (at least in theory) be eliminated qua threat (Corry, 2010, p.11). A military 
adversary intent on war, a terrorist attack in the final stages of planning or an organised 
crime group conducting a heist may warrant a direct reactive response. By contrast, when 
dangers are present as potential risks they can be mitigated in advance and thus require 
proactive policy measures (Corry, 2010, p.11). As will be discussed below and throughout 
this thesis, the EU responds both proactively and reactively to risks (and threats) to the 
energy industry in the Caspian upstream. 
EU SECURITY OF SUPPLY RISKS AND (THE ‘THIRD’) DEPENDENCE ON THE 
COMMERCIAL SECTOR   
 
Having outlined the difference between risk and threat, this section now looks at the EU’s 
response to its security of supply risks. The EU faces a major external dependency 
challenge in terms of oil and gas. In 2010, the (then) EU27 relied on imports for roughly 
85% of crude oil and 62% of natural gas consumption with these patterns set to increase 
(EC, 2013a). As Egenhofer and Legge (2001, p.iii) argue, the EU’s ability to ensure security 
of energy supply rests on devising different approaches to managing the supply risks 
associated with this overseas dependence.  
However, this dependence on imported oil and gas in fact entails three different forms of 
security of supply dependence and consequently exposure to three different forms of 
associated risk. Indeed, as will be argued further below, the EU as a whole is exposed to 
risks deriving from dependence on 1) oil and gas producing states (source risk) 2) transit 
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states (route risk) 3) the commercial energy sector (counter-party risk)53. As described in 
chapter one, the first two of these risks (and the subsequent challenges of formulating a 
common European response) are well-discussed in the EU external energy policy 
literature (although the explicit risk mitigation character of these dimensions is less-
discussed). However, the latter risk - dependence on the commercial sector - is rarely 
mentioned in either the external energy policy literature or by the EU institutions 
themselves54. However, as will be described below, it is this dependence on the energy 
sector that helps to explain both the EU’s efforts to mitigate upstream political and 
investment risk and the cooperation between European political and commercial actors in 
the Caspian. 
Before examining the various risk-dimensions of EU dependency on foreign oil and gas 
and the EU response, it is necessary to briefly discuss the terminology of strategy and 
tactics employed. Strategy, as Posen (2001, p.42) notes, “lays out an interlinked chain of 
problems that must be solved to address [an] ultimate problem”. Rumelt (2011) argues 
that a comprehensive strategy contains three components: first, an accurate diagnosis of 
the challenge/problem that the strategy seeks to address (i.e. in this case the EU’s external 
dependence on imported energy); second, a range of strategic policy objectives that guide 
the action necessary to confront this challenge; and third, an effective strategy must 
combine these two factors above with coherent tactical policy measures that put strategic 
objectives into effect. Consequently, the term ‘strategy’ is used here to refer to overarching 
EU efforts to address the EU’s respective external energy dependences, while the concept 
of ‘tactics’ refers to the actual policy measures that operationalize these strategic 
objectives in practice. 
 
                                                          
53
 Interview EU Official [24], Brussels, Summer 2012 
54
 For exceptions see Egenhoffer and Legge (2001, p.3) and Stoddard (2013, p.352). 
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Managing dependence in EU foreign oil and gas strategy: Diversity, governance and 
diplomacy  
In interviews, EU officials note that at a strategic level, EU security of supply policy seeks 
to manage three areas of overseas supply risk55: dependence on sources (producer 
countries such as Kazakhstan and Russia); dependence on routes (transit countries such 
and Ukraine and Turkey); and dependence on counterparties (supplier companies such as 
BP, Shell, Total etc.)56. It is important to remember, especially given the impersonal 
language of routes, sources and counterparties that these three dependencies refer to 
actors. Indeed, the impersonal term ‘counterparties’ refers in any given case to a set of 
companies that can be quite small and very influential in their own right. In Kazakhstan, 
for example, the counterparties that have invested in Kazakhstan’s three major oil and gas 
projects are a small group, numbering only nine firms (of which four are European) (see 
table two - page 235). 
Tackling each of these dependencies and reducing the respective risks involves a number 
of different tactical measures. Most prominently, these include 1) diversification of actors 
on which the EU relies, 2) the promotion of EU and/or international governance rules that 
help to meet the EU’s basic energy policy objectives and 3) energy diplomacy and dialogue 
with each of the three sets of actors (producers, transit states and companies). While they 
                                                          
55 There is a fourth dimension here which is reducing the level of demand inside the EU (which 
lessens overall dependence on external energy sources). Likewise there is a fifth dimension - 
reducing demand in other major consuming states or states with very high projected demand 
growth rates (including energy producers). This reduces pressure on the external supplies that the 
EU needs. These dimensions have been referred to by Bridge and Le Billon (2013, p. 80) as 
“demand destruction” to refer to efforts by oil importing states to encourage reductions in domestic 
and overseas oil use for demand and price motivations (as well as to reduce climate change 
emissions). However, while important, they are beyond the focus of this thesis. 
56 Interview EU Official [24], Brussels, Summer 2012 
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can be analytically separated and discussed in isolation, in practice, these three tactical 
measures are interlinked and mutually supportive57.  
Importantly, as will be shown below, these approaches involve the proactive reduction of 
risk by respectively mitigating both the impact of disruption (diversity) and the likelihood 
of disruption (governance and diplomacy). Both energy governance and diplomacy also in 
turn present the opportunity for the reactive resolution of threats. 
Reducing risk impact: Diversity  
 
One of the basic rationales behind EU security of supply risk mitigation policy lies in the 
contention that the greater the diversity of sources, routes and counterparties, the lower 
the risk to EU security of supply58. The importance of this model of energy supply security 
was first articulated by Winston Churchill in 1913. On the eve of World War One, Churchill 
noted in  Parliament that “on no one quality, on no one process, on no one country, on no 
one route, and on no one field must we be dependent … Safety and certainty in oil lie in 
variety and variety alone” (Yergin, 2011). As Wälde (n.d.) has noted, Western energy 
consuming countries promote investment across a range of countries so as to diversify 
their supply, reduce dependence on “volatile OPEC nations”, reduce prices and reduce 
OPEC’s share of world oil production. Specifically in the European context, the same is 
equally true for Russia. Indeed, Wälde (n.d) notes that “almost all oil producing countries 
are for a variety of reasons high-risk”. As such, Western consuming countries such as the 
EU’s member states “cannot but pursue policies of diversification” (Wälde, n.d).  
Variety and diversification of sources, routes and counterparties however does not entail 
reducing risk by reducing the overall level of dependence on imported oil and gas or by 
                                                          
57 For example, promoting competition and market access through the extension of governance 
institutions (point two above) such as the Energy Charter or Energy Community Treaty diversifies 
the base of counterparties in a given market (point one above – see also below). 
58 Interview EU Official [24], Brussels, Summer 2012 – it should be noted that fuel type is also an 
additional form of diversification but given the focus on oil and gas security (and not the broader 
‘energy security’), this form of diversification is not discussed here.  
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making a disruption less likely, but rather by spreading the risks of dependence amongst 
multiple actors. When supply is diversified enough between different sources, routes and 
counterparties then a deliberate or unintentional disruption will have little overall effect59. 
Indeed, the likelihood of a disruption is not necessarily reduced by diversification, but the 
magnitude of a supply disturbance is minimised.  
Nevertheless, while a highly diversified range of sources, routes and counterparties is 
desirable to break-up the EU’s overall dependence, the EU is still compelled to manage the 
risks associated with dependence on each individual actor (or sets of actors). Here the 
extension of governance and the conduct of diplomacy have a part to play. In each of these 
cases the risks of dependence do not come from reducing the magnitude of some form of 
disruption or political behaviour that runs counter to European interests, but rather from 
reducing the likelihood and uncertainty associated with such actions.  
Reducing risk likelihood: Governance  
 
The promotion of external governance is one of the core proactive measures the EU uses 
to reduce the likelihood of risks. Indeed a number of scholars (Wichman, 2007, p.6; 
Lavenex, 2004, p.685) have highlighted the fact that the EU “extra-territorialises” 
governance institutions as a means of responding to security challenges60. The ability of 
institutional governance structures to reduce risk can be accounted for by both rational 
and sociological explanations. Firstly, the establishment of governance institutions 
delineate responsibilities to different actors and proscribes certain risky behaviours, thus 
reducing uncertainty about others’ actions. Assuming adherence (which is often difficult in 
reality) governance models ensure compliance with risk-reduced behaviour. As Keohane 
(1984, p.97) notes “the principles and rules of a regime (of which EU governance 
institutions are one form) reduce the range of expected behaviour, uncertainty declines, 
                                                          
59 Interview EU Official [24], Brussels, Summer 2012 
60 Although these security interdependences are normally defined of in terms of threats rather than 
risks (see for example Wichman, 2007, p.5). 
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and as information becomes more widely available, the asymmetry of its distribution may 
lessen”. Keohane (1984, p.97) adds that “international regimes perform the valuable 
functions of reducing the costs of legitimate [i.e. in this case risk-free] transactions while 
increasing the costs of illegitimate [i.e. risk-producing] ones”. Secondly, it is also feasible 
that states might rationally adopt European rules because of the material incentives or 
sanctions that the EU is able to impose on them (Schimmelfennig, 2009, p.7). This is likely 
to reduce risk by encouraging risk-free behaviour so long as the incentives for adhering to 
the EU’s rules are maintained. However, engagement with European institutional 
structures might lead, over time, to the sociological adoption of European norms by third 
parties who come to see these norms as appropriate (Schimmelfennig, 2009, p.7). In such 
circumstances, the likelihood of risk-producing behaviour that contradicts EU policy 
preferences will be reduced because third-party state preferences will have become 
aligned with EU preferences. Of course, realising a reduction of risk from the spread of 
governance institutions is dependent on third party adherence to governance rules. If 
actors do not comply with or adopt EU norms over time then the likelihood of risk is not 
reduced.  
Reducing risk likelihood: Diplomacy and dialogue  
 
In line with the European Security Strategy’s (2003) call for a “preventive” European 
approach to engagement with third party countries, energy diplomacy is an additional 
measure through which the EU can seek to proactively manage potential risks. Regular 
dialogue between actors allows for sharing of information on intentions, the early 
resolution of potential disputes and the management of uncertainty due to a greater 
predictability of actions (based on iterative ongoing interaction).  
However, as noted above, the EU generally prefers multilateral, governance-based 
management of international issues to the kind of “concert diplomacy” practised by other 
actors such as Russia and China (Grant, 2011; Laïdi, 2008a, p.57-60). As such, 
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establishment of energy diplomatic fora such as energy dialogues reflects, in part, the 
difficulties of establishing legal governance-based energy relations based on EU energy 
preferences. Indeed, the conduct of energy diplomacy also demonstrates that, at times, 
energy frameworks in certain regions need political support to function effectively61. As 
will be discussed further in chapters six and seven, energy diplomacy is sometimes a 
remedial policy tool available in the upstream when the EU’s broader objectives cannot be 
met through the export of governance or when governance frameworks fail.  
Risks unmitigated: Reactive governance and diplomacy 
 
Furthermore, it should be noted that diplomacy and governance are not solely proactive 
measures but also a reactive response to emergent threats. While some risks are averted, 
others will translate into threats and need active mitigation to be resolved. In this sense, 
governance institutions such as the WTO provide the opportunity for dispute resolution 
and mediation. Likewise, the EU’s energy diplomacy offers a way of negotiating outcomes 
that are acceptable to all parties. Finally, in a less benign sense, the EU’s diplomacy also 
presents a means to exert leverage or threaten third parties so as to reduce an extant 
threat to European interests.   
SOURCE AND ROUTE RISK: MANAGING DEPENDENCE ON PRODUCER AND TRANSIT 
STATES  
 
This section describes the application of the three tactical dimensions described above 
(diversification, governance and diplomacy) to sources and routes respectively. As these 
two forms of dependence have been broadly covered in the literature and do not form the 
core focus of this thesis, they will only be discussed briefly here. Attention will then be 
turned to the less often discussed EU reliance on the commercial sector which is directly 
relevant to this study.  
                                                          
61 Interview EU Official [5], Brussels, Summer, 2011 
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In terms of producers (sources), the member states of the EU are exposed to the political 
and economic decisions of a wide range of oil and gas producing countries (e.g. Russia, 
Algeria, Ukraine, Turkey etc.). The major and most politically salient source dependence 
relates of course to Russia (Casier, 2011a; 2011b; EC, 2009a; Noël, 2008). Nevertheless, 
EU states import oil and gas from a number of third party states in North and West Africa 
(Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria etc.), the Gulf (Saudi Arabia etc.), the former Soviet Union 
(such as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan) as well as from Norway.  
The actual risk of supply disruptions from most producer countries (source risk) to the EU 
is thought by EU officials to be quite low – particularly given the high price at which 
Europe buys gas and the reliance of these countries on energy revenues. The EU is 
supplied by a large number of producers and EU officials see the risk of a prolonged 
disruption from any one of them to be unlikely (and the risk of a coordinated cut-off 
between producers to be even less probable)62. Furthermore, EU officials also argue that 
the EU’s major suppliers (Algeria, Russia and Norway) that sell considerable volumes of oil 
and gas to the EU27 are all very reliable having never cut supplies to Europe63. Officials 
argue that if the risk from production is spread around multiple producer states then the 
aggregate risk to the EU of a supply disruption is deemed to be “virtually zero”. 
EU officials concede however that the risk of an actual producer-induced supply 
disruption is very hard to avert in the short-term when states desire to take such action. 
One EU official cited as an example the case of a post-revolution Egyptian decision to cut 
gas deliveries to Israel in April 2012. Highlighting the difficulty of managing politically-
induced disruptions, one official remarked that “it wouldn’t matter what the legal regime 
was, there is nothing you can do about that”64. The approach to reducing this form of risk, 
                                                          
62
 Interview EU Official [24], Brussels, Summer, 2011 
63
 Ibid - This is true also of Russia which has never cut supplies to Europe, but which did cut 
supplies to the Ukraine (which then diverted European supplies to Ukrainian consumers – see [EC, 
2009a]). 
64
 Ibid 
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EU officials argued, relies on managing long-term political relations (energy diplomacy) so 
that suppliers have no reason to withhold supplies65. Indeed, that the EU provide this form 
of preventive diplomacy appears also to be a core desire of energy companies (see chapter 
six). 
EU officials note however that in diversifying European energy sources it is important not 
to augment the power of transit states. While supply disruptions from producers are 
thought to be unlikely, one EU official argued that it would be “stupid” to then concentrate 
the risk of supply in a few transit states. As an EU official argued “you don’t want to have 
diversified supply and concentrated transit” and that “risk of supply from 20-21 countries 
is not a problem as long as you minimize the transit risk”66. Interestingly, in this area EU 
officials argued that both Europe and Russia share a common strategic desire to limit the 
risk to supply present in transit states. However, the EU and Russia have different 
methodologies for managing these problems. Russia pursues the construction of new 
pipelines that bypass transit states and the EU, officials argue, attempts to extend legal 
frameworks that make it clear who is responsible in the event of a supply disruption. An 
EU official noted “they build pipelines, we build legal frameworks – it’s a different solution 
to the same strategic issue” 67. Officials suggested that you can see this strategy in Russia’s 
response to the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of 2006 with the building of the Nord Stream 
pipeline and the planning of South Stream that both circumvent Ukraine. It was noted 
however that this was no different to the Italian-Libyan Green Stream pipeline, 
inaugurated in 2004, that circumvented transit states in North Africa (Tunisia)68. Officials 
argue that this Russian approach to transit risk is not a new phenomenon, but rather 
transit state-avoiding pipelines have merely received more attention since the Russia-
Ukrainian gas crisis of 2006. “There is nothing new under the sun” one EU official 
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 Ibid 
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remarked69. Of course, the EU is just as keen to build pipelines to diversify supply risks, 
albeit for reductions in both source and transit risk however (see for example the 
discussion of the Southern Corridor in chapter one). 
Regardless of how many pipelines are (or are not) built, for geographical reasons the EU is 
still compelled to manage relations with a small number of transit countries. The energy 
transit relationship between Russia and the Ukraine provides a clear example of this type 
of energy risk. In Ukraine, questions of energy transit strike to the heart of the Ukrainian 
political system with the country geographically, politically and economically pulled in 
pro-Russian and pro-EU directions. This division is itself exacerbated by differing 
Ukrainian political and economic interdependencies towards the EU and Russia 
(Dimitrova & Dragneva, 2009; Balmaceda, 1998). However, in the short-term, the 
likelihood of resolving this tension in Ukrainian politics is small70 and as such the EU is 
compelled to attempt to manage its reliance on the outcomes of this particular tri-lateral 
interaction. A part of managing this process involves conducting direct dialogue with the 
countries in question. The EU has, for example, proposed formulating a tripartite 
cooperation with Russia and Ukraine to ensure stable and “uninterrupted gas supplies 
through the eastern corridor” (EC, 2011a, p.5). In such instances, diplomacy regulates the 
risks of interdependence by aiming to reduce, or at least anticipate, the sorts of political 
problems that cause tensions in the energy transit chain. 
Source and transit route diversification efforts (such as the Southern Corridor and 
enhanced relations with Liquefied Natural Gas producers), better political relations with 
new and existing oil and gas suppliers and transit states, the sharing of bilateral treaty 
information, enhanced political dialogues and the promotion of governance frameworks 
such as the Energy Community Treaty to Ukraine are all aimed, in part, at reducing or 
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 Ibid 
70
 For more information on the challenges of this EU-Russia-Ukraine nexus see Wilson (2011).  
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spreading risk and diminishing the negative effects of EU dependence on external supplier 
and transit countries.  
POLITICAL RISK AS ENERGY SECURITY RISK: EU DEPENDENCE ON THE COMMERCIAL 
SECTOR  
 
While the EU’s dependence on producer states and transit countries are frequently 
discussed in the energy literature, the EU’s reliance on the commercial externally-
operating energy industry, and the policy implications of this dependence, have received 
less attention. This reliance, it is argued here, creates an affinity between the energy 
security policy interests of EU actors and the commercial objectives of companies in 
maintaining a suitable business climate in foreign markets to ensure sustainable business 
conditions for companies and adequate, ongoing supply.  
The EU’s dependence on the commercial energy sector derives ultimately from the liberal 
model of energy supply in the European Union. Unlike most energy producing countries 
(and a number of consumers), the EU has a liberal “regulated market” model of energy 
policy71. This involves market regulation by political authorities (split between the EU and 
member states – see below) and physical energy supply provided by companies. Thus, 
while energy commodities are private goods (to be bought and sold on markets), 
responsibility for the security of energy supply is today divided between companies and 
governments with governments relying on companies to (co)provide the public good of 
energy security (Egenhofer & Legge, 2001, p.1). The European Commission in the 2010 
Communication on Energy Infrastructures highlights this division of labour by noting that 
while “oil companies are primarily responsible for ensuring continuous supply” (EC, 
2010b, p.35) at the same time the EU must provide for the “public good of security of 
supply by bringing member states and companies together” (EC, 2010b, p.32).. 
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 Interview EU Official [9], Brussels, Summer, 2011 
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As discussed in chapter five, this liberal model of energy provision has perceived benefits 
in terms of increasing efficiency as well as reducing risk and energy prices for consumers. 
Furthermore, liberal markets also boost security of supply by encouraging the entrance of 
new market players, increasing the flexibility and adaptability of energy supply 
(Egenhoffer & Legge, 2001, p.1). Indeed, Egenhofer and Legge (2001, p.6) note that 
“responsibility for security of supply can be more effectively distributed in more 
competitive markets. More competitiveness means more actors, hence less dependence on 
single companies or monopolies, and more competitive prices”. EU officials note that 
supply from international and European companies also boosts oil security relative to 
supply by national oil companies (Gazprom etc.) by ensuring that energy is sold on open 
markets72 and subject to fewer outright political calculations. A private company in a 
market has little reason to withhold supply (especially when others will take their market 
share if they do so). A state-owned, politically-influenced company may have reasons to 
withhold supply despite the commercial costs. Furthermore, privately-operating 
international companies buy and sell energy products (especially oil) on open world 
markets and are thus more transparent in their purchases and sale volumes than the 
state-owned companies that operate through closed bilateral deals. These deals reduce 
market transparency which means that less information about global supply and demand 
levels is available and markets become more exposed to speculation (Goldthau & Witte, 
2010b). 
Despite its perceived benefits, this liberal model means that the EU as a whole is therefore 
dependent on the commercial sector for investment in a number of strategic areas 
essential for long-term security of energy supply including mid-stream pipelines and 
upstream exploration and production. Likewise, the EU is dependent on the technology 
that companies possess that make investment and increased production possible, 
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especially in upstream production73. EU energy security is negatively affected by 
reductions in production investment or impediments to company operations and 
investment abroad. With increasing levels of European demand, Western company 
involvement in the upstream is seen as important so that future expected rises in demand 
are met (Pirog, 2007, p.5). National Oil Companies (NOCs) are often seen to be either 
unwilling to invest in future supplies due to depletion policies that view oil in the ground 
as ‘worth more than money in the bank’ (due to expected price rises), or unable to invest 
as many producer governments are not forthcoming with sufficient investment funds 
(Stevens 2008, p.7-8). Both EU and Kazakh officials note, for example, how despite a 
growing sovereign wealth fund, the Kazakh oil company KazMunaiGas has had difficulty 
meeting its spending commitments to consortium partners in Kazakhstan74. Similarly, 
Hulbert (2012) has raised the need for considerable international investment in Russia if 
the Russian government is to maintain or increase export levels over the next decades. If 
national companies do not commit to necessary investments or others are not permitted 
to do so, then there is an increased chance of demand outstripping supply - almost 
certainly resulting in price rises for consumers (Pirog, 2007, p.11). In this sense, European 
companies are also important from the point of the view of source and route risk to the 
extent that their investments and technology facilitate diversification of both. As will be 
discussed in chapter seven, the production of several fields in the Caspian (such as the 
Kashagan ‘super-giant’ field in Kazakhstan) would not be possible without the 
involvement of Western energy companies.  
In addition, it should also be noted that EU member states are very concerned with 
outcomes for European energy companies given their role as major tax contributors and 
employers in several European countries. To give one example, in 2010 BP paid £930 
                                                          
73 Indeed, Goldthau (2008) notes how a lack of investment in the Russian upstream and consequent 
reduction in output may present more of a risk to the EU than the risk of Russian gas disruptions. 
74 Interview EU Official [27], Astana, Summer 2012; Interview Former Kazakh Government Official 
[32], Summer, 2012.  
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million in tax in the UK, down from £1.7 billion that it had paid in each of the previous 
three years75 (Rueben, 2010). Rueben (2010) notes that if one added together “the 
corporation tax and production tax paid by BP, together with the National Insurance and 
income tax paid by its employees and the VAT and fuel excise duty paid by its customers, 
you get £5.8bn, which is about enough to fund the entire budget of the Department for 
International Development”76. Furthermore, major oil companies contribute significantly 
to pension funds and employment. BP accounted for £1 out of 7 paid in pension fund 
dividends in 2009 and alone employs over 10,000 people in the UK (Rueben, 2010). 
However, EU officials acknowledge that the division of responsibility for supply between 
companies and public actors presents a number of challenges. Indeed, such a model raises 
the problem of who is responsible (and thus accountable to citizens) for ensuring energy 
security through market means when problems or disruptions occur77. As Jepma (2009, 
p.1) argues, throughout the 1980-1990s, energy security questions were the prerogative 
of the companies tasked with delivering energy supplies and, with the level of risk 
perceived to be low, security of supply “was seen to be in good hands”. Today however, the 
level of energy security in Europe has become a matter of public security concern (Jepma, 
2009, p.2; Casier, 2011b; Natorski & Herranz Surrallés, 2008). While relying on companies 
and markets can bring benefits in terms of security of supply, as Egenhofer and Legge 
(2001, p.iii) argue, they also “change the nature of supply risks, necessitating a variety of 
government responses”. 
Indeed, commercial companies operating for profit are very sensitive to political risks to 
their businesses, particularly when considering investment decisions that may be 
necessary for ongoing supply (either in exploration and production or transit). This 
                                                          
75 The reduction was due to the cost of clean-up and reparations after the Gulf of Mexico oil spill 
(Reuben, 2010). 
76 The Department for International Development is a relatively small UK government department 
compared to others like Work and Pensions, for example. However, the fact that it could be entirely 
financed from the tax of just one company is quite remarkable – to say nothing for the wider 
economic importance of such a company. 
77 Interview EU Official [9], Brussels, Summer, 2011 
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sensitivity is not without good reason. As Konoplyanik (2008, p.2) notes, energy 
investments, particularly in the upstream, can amount to billions of dollars and have a 
project life-cycle of 30-40 years. Once invested, equipment and money cannot be easily 
retracted and consequently investors require high levels of assurance for the security of 
their business practices (Konoplyanik, 2008, p.5). Indeed, investment from the commercial 
sector is only likely to be forthcoming in areas where companies’ investments are secure 
and the political and regulatory climate is stable. Cutler (2003, p.96) notes, for example, 
how forced changes to accounting laws in Kazakhstan in 2003 lead the Tengizchevroil 
consortium to temporarily withhold a $3bn dollar investment programme. 
Consequently, given the EU’s reliance on the effective functioning of energy companies and 
given that companies require a stable environment, consistent application of the rule of 
law, a secure investment climate and reduced instances of preferential treatment for 
national companies in order to deliver adequate and efficient supplies, threats to the 
provision of these factors by host producer states are also risks to the EU. While 
companies engage in their own representation to host-governments (often through lobby 
firms) and while established mechanisms of international law exist that firms can call on 
when disputes with governments materialise (Rubins & Kinsella, 2005, p.405), companies 
are often ill-equipped to mitigate or respond to these risks and rely on home-
governments, and increasingly the EU, for diplomatic support (see chapters six and seven). 
Mitigating the risks of reliance on the commercial sector: Promoting and supporting 
state economic functions in the regional milieu 
 
To counteract the risks associated with reliance on companies, the EU pursues an 
approach of diversification, energy governance and diplomacy as mentioned above. As 
discussed below, governance and diplomacy are core EU tactics employed to shape the 
regional milieu and promote (and protect) state economic functions that both facilitate 
commercial activity and serve EU energy security interests.  
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However, diversification is a limited policy in terms of reducing the risks of reliance on 
companies. The EU does try to encourage a broad supply base from multiple companies 
upstream to reduce counterparty risk78. Indeed, as Egenhofer and Legge (2001, p.ii) note, 
support for competitive well-functioning markets should “increase the number of market 
participants and thereby the flexibility and resilience of the system”. Nevertheless, 
restrictions on investment by producer states and the size of investments needed to take 
part in major projects means that the number of companies operating in some markets 
that the EU relies on can be limited. As noted above, only nine companies are involved in 
the production of the majority of Kazakh oil. EU officials note that unofficially it is 
recognised that some companies are more present in certain markets and therefore have 
greater strategic value79. Therefore, from a security of supply standpoint (in addition to 
the value of major companies to member states), diversification is a limited tool in 
managing the risks associated with reliance on companies. 
As such, ensuring a reduced level of political risk for European companies operating in 
strategically important locations (and reacting to such risks when they manifest), is a core 
upstream priority for the EU and one that both EU and member state officials assert they 
spend a lot of time on in upstream markets80. Indeed, in Kazakhstan, ensuring a reduced 
level of political risks to investments has particular energy policy relevance given that 
over three quarters of all European FDI is in the oil and gas sector81. Egenhofer and Legge 
(2001, p.iii) argue that “long-term risks relating to oil are mainly associated with ensuring 
sufficient investment to develop and physically deliver the necessary oil to the markets, as 
well as the ability to manage the political risks associated with supplier countries” 
[emphasis added]. Likewise, in natural gas they assert that “long-term security of supply 
relates to investment and political risk” [emphasis added] (2001, p.iii). In practice, 
                                                          
78
 Interview EU Official [24], Brussels, Summer, 2011 
79 Interview EU official [5], Brussels, Summer 2012 
80
 Interview EU Official, Astana [27], Summer 2012; Interview UK Government Official [30], 
Summer, 2012  
81
 Interview EU Official [27], Astana, Summer 2012 
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mitigating these risks relies on promoting and ensuring state economic functions in 
upstream markets. As will be described further in the next two chapters, governance and 
diplomacy are the two primary means by which the EU can seek to promote and maintain 
these state economic functions. The major focus of the EU’s promotion of governance is to 
achieve the provision of state economic functions that correspond to the EU’s basic 
interests in energy (most notably the protection of property rights). Likewise, one of the 
major objectives of energy diplomacy is to ensure adherence to, and to make up for 
deficiencies in, the local upstream provision of these state economic functions. 
Ensuring security of supply and reducing risk to companies: EU external energy 
competence 
 
Before turning to the discussion of political risks present in the Caspian in the next section, 
it is necessary to highlight briefly the competence the EU has in terms of external energy 
policy and the mitigation of risk for companies. At the European level, competence for 
energy policy is divided between the Union and member states (Braun, 2011, p.2). Article 
194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) outlines the four aims 
of the EU’s energy policy: 1) to ensure the functioning of the energy market; 2) to ensure 
the security of supply in the Union; 3) to promote energy efficiency and energy saving and 
develop new and renewable forms of energy; and 4) to promote the interconnection of 
energy networks. Likewise, as Braun (2011, p.3) notes, article 21(2) of the Lisbon Treaty 
stipulates that the Union “shall define and pursue common policies and actions and shall 
work towards a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations [emphasis 
added]”. This includes developing “international measures to preserve and improve the 
quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global resources in order to 
ensure sustainable development [emphasis added]” (Braun, 2011, p.2). The Union’s legal 
base for external action in energy policy is, as Braun (2011, p.3) notes, article 194 (as 
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mentioned above), although there remains some ambiguity as to “where to draw the line 
in the mix of the Union’s and member states’ competences”.  
Crucially however, the EU does not rely solely on energy competence in order to reduce 
risks for the commercial energy sector. Indeed, since the signing of the Lisbon Treaty the 
EU has been (solely) responsible for overseas foreign direct investment (FDI). Indeed as 
the Commission notes in its Communication on a Comprehensive European International 
Investment Policy, “Article 206 of the TFEU provides that by establishing a customs union 
in accordance with Articles 28 to 32, the Union shall contribute, in the common interest, to 
the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and foreign direct 
investment, and the lowering of customs and other barriers” (EC, 2010c, p.2). This 
provision is backed up by Article 207 which includes FDI as one of the policy areas that 
falls under the EU’s common commercial policy (EC, 2010c, p.2).  
While there is some existing ambiguity over the exact balance between EU and member 
state action in this area (see Parello-Plesner & Ortiz de Solórzano, 2013), the Council for 
its part has noted that it “supports the development of a common Policy Framework on 
investment that establishes a level playing field for all EU investors in third countries and 
for investors from third countries in the EU” (Council of the European Union, 2010, p.1-3). 
Likewise, the Council has noted the importance of an EU role in protecting rights to most 
favoured nation or national treatment (non-discrimination), rights to physical protection 
and security, non-expropriation, free movement of funds and capital transfers and dispute 
mechanisms (Council of the European Union, 2010, p.1-3).  
POLITICAL RISK AND THE CASPIAN SEA REGION  
 
Many of the non-commercial challenges that affect upstream operating companies in the 
Caspian fall under the rubric of political risk. As such, this section outlines the concept of 
political risk in more detail and highlights some of the key risks present in the Caspian 
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(and Kazakhstan in particular). Political risk, also known as ‘country’ or ‘sovereign risk’, 
refers to issues such as nationalisation, expropriation, revolution, war, terrorism, 
regulatory discrimination, corruption and political pressure from national and regional 
elites that effect business operations (Giersch, 2011). As Bremmer and Keat (2009, p.5) 
suggest, political risk refers to the “probability and impact that a particular political action 
will produce changes in economic outcomes”. Likewise, Rubins and Kinsella (2005, p.3) 
argue that political risk denotes “probability that a host government will, by act or 
omission, reduce the investor’s ability to realize an expected return on his investment” 
[emphasis added]82.  
Political risk is a form of non-commercial risk in the sense that it is distinct from risks that 
arise from normal changes in the market conditions of supply and demand83. Not only do 
commercial and political risks have different causes (although the line between genuine 
market risks and political risk can be blurred at times), political risk is generally more 
difficult to foresee and can require political action to remedy (Bremmer & Keat, 2009, p.5). 
Political risk is in large part a function of a political system’s (in)capacity to manage 
stresses caused by “political events [and] competing sectional interests” and to “exercise 
legitimacy, and discharge the functions of statehood in a non-violent, stable, orderly, 
democratic manner” (Jarvis & Griffiths, 2007, p.15). In particular, states undergoing 
modernising transitions that challenge traditional power distributions, and perceptions of 
legitimacy tend to exhibit higher risk than those that are modernised or yet to embark on 
modernisation. This focus on political systems also draws attention to how states with 
                                                          
82
 Some definitions of political risks also include actions by the home governments (such as the 
placing of sanctions for example or in the discussion of climate change legislation below) (Giersch, 
2011). 
83 It is also distinct from force majeure risks that can impact on business profitability such as 
natural disasters (earthquakes, tornadoes, tsunamis etc.) (Rubins & Kinsella, 2005, p.3). 
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very different political economies (such as those of the Caspian region) are often viewed to 
present an inherent degree of political risk84.  
Political risks can be analytically separated by level, source and type. In terms of level, 
political risks occur a) at the global level, impacting across the international system, b) at 
the country or state level, impacting across a particular state, and c) at the micro-level, 
impacting broadly at the domestic sub-state level or in a particular economic sector (such 
as oil and gas) (Bremmer & Keat, 2009, p.13). In terms of source, risks can be divided 
between governmental risks that emerge from deliberate political actions of governments 
and societal risks that emerge from sub state actors. The latter is often associated with 
government inaction both in a proximate, immediate sense (i.e. failure to adequately 
provide law and order) and in terms of continued failure to address issues over time (i.e. 
failure to reform that allows public discontentment to fester).  
Political risks also vary by type. Bremmer and Keat (2009, p.13-14) refer to geopolitical, 
expropriation, regulatory and domestic instability risks85. These four types of risk are 
described in more detail below with examples given from the Caspian energy context. 
Geopolitical risk has two components. Firstly, geopolitical risk refers to risks attributable 
to the actions and interactions of global powers. Here risks refer to actions that a regional 
power might take that could impact on business outcomes. An example in Central Asia is 
potential Russian restrictions on Kazakh oil and gas exports (Jarosiewicz, 2010). For 
example, in September 2009 Gazprom stopped taking gas shipments from the 
Tengizchevroil (TCO) project in western Kazakhstan (US Department of State, 2009a). 
This forced TCO to reduce production and flare more gas, for which they were fined $20 
million by the Kazakh Government for unauthorised flaring (US Department of State, 
                                                          
84 However, it should equally be noted that many Western countries also present political risks for 
investors. 
85 The exact forms of risk highlighted by scholars vary. Rubins and Kinsella (2005, p.5-6) talk of 
expropriation, regulatory interference, currency risk, civil unrest, breach of state contracts, 
corruption and trade restrictions. 
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2009a). In a more general sense, Russia places pressure on Kazakh exports that in turn 
places strains on company-Kazakh Government relations. Companies generally want the 
Kazakh government to expand export infrastructure or to be allowed to build (and 
therefore own) the infrastructure themselves86. The Kazakh government would prefer to 
build and own it themselves but if they do, they need to have Russian agreement to accept 
more exports, for which the Russian government will ask concessions. This reduces the 
incentive to build greater capacity and represents a point of contention between the 
government and companies87. 
Geopolitical risk is also concerned with those risks that arise from direct conflict between 
states. In the Caspian region the most significant risk of such conflict derives from the 
ongoing tension between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno Karabakh and the 
potential for conflict or tensions in Georgia between Russia and the Georgian government 
and between the government and separatist regions. Indeed, the Georgia–Russia war of 
2008 disrupted energy supplies through the BP-operated Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan pipeline to 
Turkey (Tsereteli, 2009, p.11; Le Vine, 2008). Overall, the chance of interstate conflict in 
Central Asia is lower, with interstate tensions between Central Asian states relatively calm 
(with the exception of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) (Juraev, 2012). Both Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan (the major Caspian energy exporters) have stable (if not always good) 
relations with their neighbours.  
Expropriation risk refers to the threat that a state will take the property of a foreign 
investor located in the host state (without adequate compensation) (Rubins & Kinsella, 
2005, p.6). Expropriation can range from so-called “predatory tax regulations” or 
“creeping expropriation” to outright nationalisation of an entire economy or confiscation 
                                                          
86 Interview former Kazakh Government official [32], Summer, 2012 
87 Ibid 
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by a state of specific assets (Bremmer & Keat, 2009, p.13; Rubins & Kinsella, 2005, p.6)88. 
In Caspian countries, the investment climate is inextricably linked to the political will of 
powerful individuals. For example, the author has heard accounts (from reliable sources) 
of members of the President of Azerbaijan’s family arriving at the opening parties of 
prominent foreign businesses in Baku to demand 50% ownership of the company. 
Expropriation in energy markets is often referred to under the rubric of resource 
nationalism, as described in chapter one. As previously discussed, in the Caspian region, 
Kazakhstan has been accused of resource nationalism and of forcibly wresting shares of oil 
consortia away from foreign investors through the use of pressure tactics and the selective 
application of laws (Hug, 2010, p.6). In Kazakhstan, EU officials discuss how the 
Government obtained a greater share of the Karachaganak project (the only project that at 
the time had no Kazakh Government involvement)89. In this case the government is said to 
have wanted a 10% share (at a cost of roughly $2bn). To acquire it they (allegedly) 
pressurized companies, imposed a $1bn dollar fine for environmental and taxation 
penalties and requested a $1bn loan from companies. One former Kazakh official noted 
how this was not entirely bad for the companies as they were now likely to receive easier 
treatment from Kazmunaigaz (the national oil company) who is now a partner90. Some 
interviewees argued that the desire for greater equality between the Kazakh Government 
and foreign actors had in the past trumped legal stability and the sanctity of agreed 
contracts91. One interlocutor suggested that they would not be surprised if this trend 
continued92. Likewise, a representative from one EU member state government described 
                                                          
88 Usually the state is involved in these instances of expropriation, however in some cases 
expropriation can be undertaken independently by powerful political elites. 
89 Interview EU official [27], Astana, Summer 2012 
90 Interview former Kazakh Government Official [32], 2012 
91 Interview former Kazakh Government Official [11], 2012; Interview EU official [31], Astana, 
Summer 2012 
92 Interview EU official [31], Astana, Summer 2012 
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sanctity of contracts, forced renegotiations and pressure on company officials as key risks 
to the energy sector in Kazakhstan93. 
Regulatory risks can manifest in a number of ways. Regulatory interference/discrimination 
does not necessarily aim at the seizure of assets (although it can amount to expropriation) 
but rather seeks to reduce the profitability of an investment or restrict the way that the 
benefits from that investment are received or utilised. Here the specific risk in question 
relates less to changes in law in the host state than when changes in law, or the application 
of law, are conducted in such a way as to deliberately disadvantage a foreign investor. 
Here the threat in question is the potential use of government bodies using “regulatory, 
legalistic, procedural and prosecutorial means to favour domestic firms over outside 
companies or inflict additional costs on foreign companies” (Bremmer & Keat, 2009, 
p.145). This type of risk is more common than outright expropriation and ultimately more 
difficult to prove (Bremmer & Keat, 2009, p.145). One EU official noted how investment 
challenges of this type in Kazakhstan derive from the post-Soviet nature of the country 
and uncertainty is created by regime dynamics94. They argued in particular that problems 
derive from the informality of the political system and the fact that power ultimately 
resides with one person – the President. This high level of centralisation means that 
ministers are afraid of making mistakes and thus tend to put off important regulatory 
decisions, leading to unpredictability95. Furthermore, EU officials argued that the country 
has very little tradition of public consultation meaning that regulatory decisions are taken 
quickly in parliament and then implemented without warning – whereas companies need 
predictability and time to adapt if things change96. 
Likewise, in Kazakhstan, ministers move between offices regularly, resulting in foreign 
investors spending time building a solid relationship only to find after a short period of 
                                                          
93 Interview EU member state government official [30], Astana, summer 2012. 
94
 Interview EU official [27], Astana, Summer 2012 
95
 Ibid 
96
 Ibid 
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time one has to liaise anew with a different official97. The informality of the political 
system in Kazakhstan also means that there can be competing sources of power within the 
system. Senior energy business officials in Kazakhstan report how the financial police, 
who report directly to the President, have an “immense” amount of power and can cause 
considerable problems for companies (US Department of State, 2009a). For example, after 
negotiating an agreement with Kazakh Prime Minister Massimov that guaranteed tax 
stability for the Kashagan oil project (see chapter seven), the financial police asserted that 
the document was not a legal agreement and threatened to press criminal charges against 
individuals in the companies (US Department of State, 2009a). The police were alleged to 
have said that they worked for the President and not the Prime Minister and that unless 
told to “back off” by Nazarbayev they were going to continue with the case. They 
subsequently requested 40,000 pages of company documents, translated into Kazakh 
within seven days or they would proceed with the criminal prosecutions (US Department 
of State, 2009a). Likewise, Kazakhstan has been criticised by companies more generally 
for calling into question tax stabilisation clauses in production sharing arrangements 
(PSAs) (US Department of State, 2010b). 
Domestic stability risks (civil strife) concerns risks that arise from “severe regime or 
government instability, and crises such as state failure, civil war, revolutions, coup d’états 
and riots” (Bremmer & Keat, 2009, p.84). Often these result as much from state inaction as 
from the deliberate intentions of political leaders. Globalisation, rising inequalities, 
increased international communication and travel all contribute to the increased presence 
of this risk (Bremmer & Keat, 2009, p.84). As the International Crisis Group note (2007), 
energy producing regions often “suffer poverty, repression, environmental degradation 
and labour tensions without seeing benefits from the wealth that is created”. These 
conditions can create resentment both towards foreign companies and government 
structures. The countries of the Caspian region all present various forms of domestic 
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stability risk. Uprisings and violent crackdowns are not uncommon to the region. For 
example, in December 2011 a crackdown on striking miners in the Western Kazakh town 
of Zhanaozen killed 16 people. The government responded quickly and quelled further 
action by firing the regional governor Krymbek Kusherbayev and the President’s son-in-
law Timur Kulibayev98 (Jackson, 2011a). Nonetheless, the risk of uprising or instances of 
political violence is present in all Caspian states99. 
Additionally, a number of the states in the Caspian/Central Asia region face an instability 
risk derived from potential succession crises (Mueser & Giersch, 2011). Within the neo-
patrimonial systems in the region the president holds a significant amount of informal 
power, balancing the interests of rival elite groups. These tacit balances that provide (an 
often uneasy) stability can easily be disrupted by succession and the political influence of 
prominent individuals in society (and the security this gives to foreign partners) can be 
undermined (Mueser & Giersch, 2011). This is a particular issue in Kazakhstan given the 
advanced age of President Nazarbayev (currently 73). Released US State Department 
Cables document Kazakh insiders as describing the battles that could ensue between rival 
elites when Nazarbayev dies as “frightening” (US Department of State, 2009b). Such 
battles would likely have consequences for foreign investors, especially if they affected 
those state officials with whom they have built good working relationships. 
THE POLITICAL RISK CORE: DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE IN EUROPEAN 
PERSPECTIVES OF ENERGY RISK  
 
The various actors in European external energy policy are presented with a variety of 
different risks to their overall energy objectives. This final section of the chapter evaluates 
convergence and divergence in the energy policy risk perceptions of European political 
                                                          
98 Kulibayev was fired from his position as head of the country’s sovereign wealth fund Samruk 
Kazyna (which controls the national oil company) because the company was said to have not 
responded adequately to workers’ demands (Jackson, 2011a). 
99 As indeed it is in many Western states 
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and commercial actors. Through an examination of EU institution (particularly 
Commission), member state and energy company energy security discourses, this section 
demonstrates how political risks and market hindrances in the upstream (especially 
investment and market access risks) represent the strongest area of risk perception 
convergence between European political and commercial actors. It should be noted that 
not all of the risks discussed here relate to the Caspian upstream, but rather risk in energy 
more broadly. However, a full discussion of the respective risks as perceived by different 
actors allows for an understanding of how risk perceptions contribute to areas of both 
tension and, importantly for this thesis, upstream cooperation between EU actors. 
The convergence on political risk and market access does not in and of itself guarantee 
European cooperation in addressing these risks in the upstream100. It is suggested here 
however that the convergence on upstream political risks is a necessary condition for the 
European cooperation and unity needed to address these risks in the upstream. As such, 
this section below sets up the analysis (continued in the following two chapters) of 
convergence around the EU external governance and energy diplomacy policies that aim 
to tackle these risks. 
The section is divided into three parts. The first part discusses areas where there is no or 
little risk perception convergence between European actors (although there is often 
convergence between the Commission and member states101). These are risks related to 
demand, climate change and energy prices102. The second part briefly highlights those 
areas where there is little real convergence or divergence between actors (liquidity, credit 
and source and route dependence risk). Some issues, such as states’ political dependence 
on producers and transit states, are broadly political and concern companies only 
                                                          
100 Witness, for example, Commission and member state convergence on the risks posed by 
dependence on producers such as Russia and the corresponding difficulty in formulating a 
European response (see below and chapter one). 
101 If not agreement on what to do about it. 
102 In some areas of risk, different actors’ risk perceptions clash and in some cases the Commission 
itself is seen as a source of risk by energy companies. 
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peripherally. Others, such as credit and liquidity risk, are commercial risks and 
correspondingly do not feature in Commission or member state discourses. The final part 
of this section discusses the areas of convergence between all three actors, namely on 
operational-environment risks, risks related to a lack of investment/market access and 
political risk. Indeed on these issues, the risks present to companies are also considered to 
be risks by the political actors analysed here103. This reflects the upstream dependence of 
these actors on the commercial sector and represents a core dimension of the 
interrelationship between them. 
The data in this section is derived from a wide range of EU institution, member state and 
company documentation and interviews. In particular, it is based on a number of 
Commission documents104 and public speeches from 2002 to 2011, member state and 
company responses to EU public consultations on energy policy (2006) and external 
energy policy (2011), as well as company risk statements in annual reports and company 
submissions to stock exchanges in the US and France that contain risk assessment 
sections105. All of the commercial actors discussed in this section are either actively 
engaged in the Caspian region or involved in projects that rely on supply from the Caspian.  
 
 
                                                          
103 It should be noted that while some issues are identified as risks by all actors (such as climate 
change or energy prices) the actual specific issues they raise are frequently divergent. However, 
importantly for the analysis here, all the issues where agreement is seen fall within the purview of 
external energy governance and diplomacy. 
104 In addition, however, whilst not a Commission official, this section also considers the 
securitisation discourse of the former High Representative for Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, Javier Solana, given his particularly important high-profile role as a supranational agenda-
setter in foreign policy during the time frame analysed. 
105 With regard to energy companies, the analysis in this section is based on the examination of 
annual reports and responses to European Commission public consultations from a number of 
European and international energy companies - BP, Eni, Statoil, ExxonMobil, Chevron, Royal Dutch 
Shell, OMV, EDF, RWE, BG Group and Total. In cases where annual reports did not include a section 
on risk factors facing each of the respective companies, filings to financial authorities - the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission and the French Financial Markets Authority - that do 
include a section on risk were analysed. 
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Areas of risk divergence: Energy demand, prices and climate change  
 
In its public pronouncements the European Commission extensively highlights the risk of 
increasing global demand for energy and precipitant high prices. Former Energy 
Commissioner Piebalgs (2008, p.2) notes that rising energy demand is one of the most 
serious challenges undermining stability in energy markets. He asserts that global demand 
is increasing by 1.9 per cent per year and that at current rates an extra thirty-three million 
barrels of oil may be needed every day relative to current levels (Piebalgs 2008, p.2). 
Former External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner echoed these 
statements in 2008 when she noted that if China and India consumed the way Europeans 
do, adjusting for population, “we would need two planet earths to cope” (Ferrero-Waldner, 
2008)106.  
In their response to the consultation for the 2006 Green Paper, EU member state 
governments are largely unanimous in highlighting the energy security risks created by 
demand rises in emerging economies (see for example UK Government, 2006b, p.3; The 
Dutch Ministry of the Economy, 2006, p.1; The Government of the Republic of Poland, 
2006, p.1). Echoing Commission perceptions, the UK government refers to “secure energy 
at affordable prices” as one of the UK’s overarching long-term energy challenges107 
(2006b, p.1) - although one UK government official interviewed argued there was a 
difficult trade-off between promoting affordability in energy and the negative impact of 
low prices on the UK’s environmental agenda108. Similarly, the Netherlands Government 
(Dutch Ministry of the Economy, 2006, p.1) stresses the risks of “structurally higher oil 
                                                          
106 More recently, Commissioner Oettinger has argued that “rising demand in developing countries 
is diverting supplies away from Europe” and that even if the worst effects of this shift are managed 
the EU “will face sharp price increases” (Oettinger 2011, p.3). 
107 This, they note, translates into a broad vision for energy based on “reliable, affordable and 
sustainable energy for Europe” a position very close to the Commission’s own view of energy 
(2006b, p.1). The UK demonstrates a view on energy policy that is very closely aligned with that of 
the European Commission. See for example the UK responses to the 2006 Commission Green Paper 
consultation.  
108 Interview UK Government Official [30], Astana, August 2012. 
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prices” and the Hungarian Government concurs with the Commission’s analysis of growing 
demand trends discussed above109 (Hungarian Government, 2006, p.1).  
Energy companies also note changes in global supply and demand as a factor of risk. 
However, as commodity businesses, they concentrate on the consequences in terms of 
increased competition, oil prices and precipitant profit levels. Low prices decrease profits 
and liquidity, impair the ability to attract finance for investment in future projects and 
threaten to reduce booked reserves as some may become uneconomic in a lower price 
environment. Conversely, higher prices reverse these risks and ultimately increase profits. 
However, substantial price increases can carry a number of risks. BP for example, 
referring to the increase in political risk that derives from augmented prices, notes that 
high prices encourage ‘fiscal take’ from governments and more “onerous terms for access 
to resources” (2010, p.14).  
However, perhaps the biggest risk from high prices concerns long-term moves away from 
hydrocarbon use, rising efficiency and the decoupling of economic growth and energy 
demand. All of these represent serious long-term risks for companies that sell oil and gas, 
and are in a sense risks created, or at least exacerbated, by the actions of member states 
and the EU institutions110. Price volatility111 represents another, price-related risk for 
companies. Large variations in energy prices create uncertainty that increases the risks of 
investment for companies, hamper companies’ mid to long-term planning, and threaten to 
reduce (or even eliminate) the profits from certain projects. 
Both these areas see partially conflicting agendas between company, member state and 
Commission perceptions. Highlighted specifically as risks by Eni (2010, p.38) and Statoil 
                                                          
109 Both highlight that the Commission’s competitive, sustainable and secure vision of energy 
corresponds closely to their national policy objectives (The Hungarian Government, 2006, p.1; The 
Dutch Ministry of the Economy, 2006, p.1). 
110 Exxon Mobil (2011, p.1) for example argues that an “effective EU energy strategy should provide 
clear and positive demand signals” and that doing so will “encourage investment in the EU but also 
help ensure long-term investments from outside the EU”. 
111 Price volatility is also an issue for political actors, although they would prefer stable relatively 
low prices, whereas companies would prefer stable, relatively speaking, higher prices. 
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(2010, p.153), the EU’s attempts to increase competition inside the EU, itself designed to 
mitigate demand and price risks in internal markets, sit uncomfortably with energy 
company fears over greater competition in their previously-protected home markets112. 
Likewise companies’ general inclination towards higher prices (despite the challenges 
posed by this eventuality) does not fit easily with the risks to the European economy and 
citizens from high prices highlighted by the Commission and some member states above. 
Risks associated with climate change are also highlighted extensively by EU actors. The 
2006 Green Paper, for example, notes how the Earth is getting warmer and that numerous 
global regions, including the EU, will “face serious consequences for their economies and 
eco-systems” (2006, p.3). The UK Government (2006a, p.2), concurs asserting that “the 
risk to the climate caused by the world’s increasing consumption of hydrocarbons is now 
beyond doubt and the EU needs a sustainable energy policy that will meet the challenges 
this presents”. The French government supports EU-level measures on tackling climate 
change (2006, p.7) and the Lithuanian Government notes the EU’s “striving for leadership” 
on climate change and the importance of obtaining CO2 reductions from major consuming 
countries (2011, p.4). Taking a more political tone, former Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner 
(2008) and former High Representative Solana (2008, p.3) both argue that climate change 
is a ‘threat multiplier’. Solana notes that climate change directly affects European interests 
by worsening existing tensions in countries and regions which are already fragile and 
conflict-prone (2008, p.3)113.  
However for companies, government responses to climate change and the low carbon 
agenda are identified as risks. Some companies such as BP, ExxonMobil and Statoil note 
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 In their 2009 annual report, Eni discusses the implications of increased competition deriving 
from the implementation of Italian legislative decree 164/2000, itself implementing EU directive 
98/30/CE that required member states to restrict national companies to a certain percentage of 
input into national gas transport networks and volumes of gas sold to national companies. This 
allows new competitors to enter the market and reduces selling margins on gas (Eni, 2010: 38). 
113
 Ferrero-Waldner asserts that climate change aggravates other energy risks such as increasing 
global demand as consumers use more energy to stay cool in hotter summers and warm in colder 
winters (2008). 
130 
 
that both increased public awareness of climate change and corresponding international 
climate change regulations are likely to reduce demand for the kind of products that oil 
and gas companies produce as well as impose tougher emissions controls on them directly 
as businesses. Exxon Mobil (2011, p.1-2) notes that “the [EU’s} 20:20:20 Climate and 
Energy Package provides no long-term signal that investments in projects with long 
payback times will still be needed”. BP notes climate change legislation can result in 
capital expenditure to meet compliance requirements, increased taxes, higher operating 
costs and reduced revenues (2010, p.15). 
Total and Statoil point out the risks posed by EU climate legislation to their businesses. 
Statoil notes that the EU’s Environmental Package114 implemented in 2008 will have 
“positive and negative impacts on the competitive position of natural gas as a fuel” (Statoil 
2010, p.154). Total (2009) notes that “growing concerns in the EU and globally that rising 
greenhouse gas emissions and climate change may significantly affect the environment 
and society could adversely affect our businesses, including by the addition of stricter 
regulations that increase our operating costs, affect product sales and reduce 
profitability”115(p.6).  
Areas of little apparent tension or convergence: Credit and liquidity risks, great power 
politics and (inter)dependence  
 
This section highlights the areas of little apparent convergence or divergence between the 
perceptions of EU public and private actors. Firstly, from a company perspective, it 
highlights the credit and liquidity risks that are not a primary focus of public actors. 
                                                          
114 The Environmental package in question consists of (inter alia) a revision of the EU Emissions 
trading Scheme (ETS), binding targets on the production of renewable energy, promotion of carbon 
capture storage (CCS) and revised rules for state aid on environmental projects (IEEP, 2008). 
115 It should be noted however that some companies do not see aspects of the EU decarbonisation 
agenda as entirely threatening. For example, concerning carbon capture storage (CCS), Shell 
highlights that “the technology required for geological sequestration is proven and in common use 
in the oil and gas industry for enhanced oil recovery”. They add “this fits with our business and 
builds on our strength in understanding subsurface structures and processes” (Royal Dutch Shell, 
2006: 7). 
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Secondly it considers the risks to states and the EU associated with dependence that tends 
to fall outside of the direct purview of private actors.  
Credit and liquidity risk  
 
Common to all the company risk perceptions examined here is a concern with the credit 
risk from exposure to counterparties (such as banks or other companies) unable to pay 
amounts due. The risk from these counterparties is distinguished from the other forms of 
credit risk such as those deriving from retail customers. This risk is very similar to that 
facing most commercial operations and is not specific to energy companies, although the 
size of the industry does make the sums notable. 
Another risk cited by energy companies with energy security repercussions is that of 
maintaining liquidity. Liquidity risk refers to the ability of oil and gas companies to 
maintain access to finance to be able to fund future projects and debt obligations. This is of 
course a direct concern to energy companies as it would be to any company, but it has a 
broader significance for energy security in terms of the ability of energy companies to 
maintain both the investment in infrastructure and exploration needed to meet projected 
demand. The prevailing economic climate provides an important context here as periods 
of recession make it more difficult for energy businesses to raise finance through 
commercial loans from banks and through financial instruments such as issuing bonds. BP 
also notes the impact of commodity prices on investment programmes, highlighting the 
damaging effect of prolonged low prices (BP, 2010, p.14). Shell highlights for example the 
risk deriving from partner organisations in joint ventures (Royal Dutch Shell, 2009, p.14). 
Eni also notes the liquidity challenges posed by ‘take or pay’ and ‘ship or pay’ clauses 
whereby a company is obligated to buy a certain amount of gas (take or pay) or transport 
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capacity (ship or pay) from their supplier and transit partners regardless of demand 
(2010, p.93)116.  
It should be noted, however, that while there is little evident co-identification of this form 
of risk between companies, the Commission and member states, the actions of political 
actors (at the member state and the EU level) can have a negative effect on company 
prospects and credit ratings and, as a result, their relations with financial institutions. 
Given the large sums of investment needed to ensure future European energy supplies 
(predominantly invested by companies), this is a potentially important form of risk from a 
company perspective. 
Source and route dependence  
 
Risks of dependence on certain producer countries and transit routes and the possibility 
that this dependence might be exploited for political purposes presents a particular form 
of risk that is regularly raised by the EU officials and member states, but infrequently 
highlighted by companies117. Indeed, one company official spoken to claimed that 
dependence on foreign supplies was not a problem so long as one was concerned with the 
governance situation (in both legal and good governance sense) in the countries where 
energy is produced118. In its securitisation discourse, the Commission stresses the 
increasing dependency of the EU on foreign sources of energy. Commissioner Oettinger 
notes, for example, that “our [European] imports are rising while our oil and gas 
production is declining” (2010b, p.2) and that this situation is likely to increase 
significantly over the next decade (2010d, p.2). Ferrero-Waldner notes “there is nothing 
wrong with importing energy per se, provided that we are talking about open, transparent 
and competitive global markets. However, in today’s world we are often not” (2008). 
                                                          
116 Such contracts pose a risk to gas companies as they usually cannot be cancelled and involve 
long-term obligations. Here there is some potential convergence with EU efforts to take actions in 
this area. 
117 The actions of these countries certainly present a risk to companies but one that is better 
described via the notions of political risk (see below). 
118 Interview Energy Company Official [33], Brussels, Autumn, 2012 
133 
 
Ferrero-Waldner (2008), for example, linked the ‘events in the Caucasus’ (the Russo-
Georgian War) of 2008 to European energy security concerns on two separate occasions 
during her 2008 speech to the UN on external energy policy.  
However, the most strident exposition of the geo-political risks of dependence in the 
sample of speeches reviewed comes from Javier Solana (2008). He notes how the 
expectation of tightened energy demand is already triggering “all sorts of behaviour” and a 
“dash for gas” (2008, p.1). He adds that “by 2020, world energy markets will be tighter, 
leading to more political tensions. In all scenarios the power of resource-holders is set to 
increase” (2008, p.1). Solana saves his strongest rhetoric for discussions of the 
relationship with Russia, whose energy policy, he argues, “follows a tight script” with a 
sense of “strategic purpose” (2008, p.2)119.  
Virtually all member state responses to the 2006 and 2011 public consultations place 
stress on rising levels of dependency on external suppliers, echoing Commissions 
discourses. The stress placed on this risk varies however between member states. In their 
responses to the 2011 EU public consultations, the French Government (French 
Permanent Representation, 2011, p.2-3) refers to the importance of the energy dialogue 
with Russia and mentions Russian (and Chinese) energy competition in the Caspian 
region. The UK stresses risks of growing dependency on external suppliers and the need to 
engage with Russia on “an equal footing” (UK Government, 2006a; 2006b). Others 
however, particularly Eastern European member states, place greater stress on this risk, 
running closer in some cases to Commission levels of securitisation. Hungary notes that 
“while Russia has proved to be a reliable energy supplier” the supply disruptions of early 
2006 “can be assessed as a warning signal” (Hungarian Government, 2006, p.3). The 
Benelux countries stress that the EU needs to reduce the vulnerability that arises from the 
                                                          
119
 This kind of language and direct reference to Russia is unusual amongst the speeches and 
documents analysed as in most of the references to the political aspects of dependence on 
suppliers, the suppliers deemed to be a threat or to pose a risk are not mentioned so explicitly. 
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fact that “it is now more dependent on energy imports than the countries exporting energy 
are dependent on the EU” (Governments of the Benelux Countries, 2006, p.1). The Czech 
Government asserts that “without a unified stance, the EU is an easy target for divide-and-
rule policies by third party suppliers” (2011, p.1). The Dutch Government notes that 
“developments of the past year (the Ukraine-Russia gas crisis) tell us that political factors 
are exerting greater influence on the energy markets than they previously did” and that 
“energy policy is increasingly becoming a matter of foreign policy” (Dutch Ministry of the 
Economy, 2006, p.5).  
Despite the fact that these issues are not raised frequently by companies, there is 
nonetheless a sense in which inter-state political tensions impact on outcomes for energy 
businesses. Companies are of course affected by both the rise and fall of major powers and 
by effects of conflict and its aftermath (geo-political risk as described above)120. 
Furthermore, in hindering the political action of the EU or certain member states, this risk 
of political dependence may impact on companies’ risk mitigation strategies if their 
political backers are unable to support them because of their heightened dependency. 
However, from a company perspective, these issues manifest most often in country-level 
political risk (described below). 
Areas of risk convergence: Operational-environmental risks, risk of 
underinvestment/reserve replacement and upstream political risk   
 
This section outlines areas where EU, member state and energy company perceptions of 
risks overlap. Firstly, it considers operational-environmental risks, i.e. risks relating to 
damage to people or the environment caused by operational disasters. Secondly, it 
highlights convergence on risks associated with underinvestment and restricted market 
access that induce energy price rises and hinder companies’ reserve-replacement. Finally, 
                                                          
120 The 2008 conflict in Georgia presents a case in point here. 
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it assesses risks that fall under the rubric of political risk, particularly governmental 
interference and producer state stability. 
Operational-environmental risk  
 
Energy companies face a number of operational-environmental risks in the conduct of 
their business that are broadly in line with Commission objectives. Primarily these refer to 
the risk of industrial disasters to people and the environment. Ramifications associated 
with these risks include litigation and reputational damage. Most of the documents 
analysed here note that environmental damage caused through oil spills, pipeline ruptures 
or refinery explosions, for example, carry significant risks to company reputations (the 
Gulf of Mexico Deep Water Horizon oil spill is a case in point here) and expose companies 
to the risk of legal action. 
In the 2011 Communication on the external dimensions of EU energy policy, the 
Commission raises safety and operational-environment risks as an important issue, 
highlighting the high safety standards in this area within the EU and stressing that the EU 
should be committed to ensuring the highest levels of operational safety in oil and gas 
production internationally (EC, 2011a, p.14). With the exception of short references by the 
French (French Permanent Representation, 2011, p.1) and Latvian Governments 
(Government of Latvia, 2011, p.1), in their responses to EU public consultations, member 
states do not tend to expressly highlight safety standards in external energy policy as a 
particular concerns. However, as is described in the next chapter, a number of member 
states (e.g. France, Lithuania, Poland, Latvia, the UK) do call for harmonisation of 
regulatory standards, suggesting a concern with lower standards outside of Europe and 
the potential for commercial advantage that higher standards might entail for European 
businesses.  
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Risk of underinvestment/reserve replacement risk  
 
Issues surrounding lack of investment are some of the key risks highlighted throughout 
Commission texts. Principally the Commission highlights the sheer number and cost of 
investments needed to meet future energy demand in Europe and the investment 
openness and stability needed in partner states121. The Commission, quoting the 
International Energy Agency, notes that “the ability and willingness of major oil and gas 
producers to step up investment in order to meet rising global demand are particularly 
uncertain” [emphasis added] (EC, 2007a, p.4)122.  
Member states also raise these issues, highlighting the importance of market access for 
private actors that would boost investment. Poland calls for “significant facilitation for EU 
investors in producing and transit states, arguing that the EU needs to aim towards the 
elimination of the trade barriers that all member states face (Polish Ministry of the 
Economy, 2011, p.3-4). The Dutch Government notes how the EU should pursue 
agreements with producing countries that “include stipulations governing market access” 
(Dutch Ministry of the Economy, 2006, p.5). The Dutch Government (Dutch Ministry of the 
Economy, 2006, p.5) also notes the importance of diversifying sources of supply123 and the 
consequent need for the EU to focus on “creating a level playing field to enable market 
parties to effectively engage in complex infrastructural projects on a non-discriminatory 
basis”. The French Government notes that energy security is in part assured by 
“guaranteeing equitable market access and production conditions [for companies]” 
(French Permanent Representation, 2011, p.1-2).  
                                                          
121 Investment attraction and investment security are intrinsically linked, as few are likely to be 
attracted to invest in areas where previous investments are not secure. 
122 Solana asserts that “there is justified concern across Europe about Russia seeming more 
interested in investing in future leverage than future production. “Contrast Gazprom’s strategic 
spending spree abroad with the lack of investment and waste at home” he notes (Solana, 2008, p.2). 
123 The Dutch Government also describes the Caspian as a potential location for this supply (Dutch 
Ministry of the Economy, 2006, p.5). 
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Companies place considerable stress on gaining market access. Indeed, doing so 
represents one of their core business objectives – the maintenance of their ‘reserve-
replacement ratio’. Reserve-replacement ratios refer to a company’s ability to acquire 
access to new reserves as it depletes its existing ones. An increasing reserve/replacement 
ratio is a key performance indicator for companies, vital for maintaining or increasing 
valuations on stock markets. However, access to reserves is in many cases controlled by 
producer states, presenting difficulties for companies and meaning that they are not 
always able to gain access to new reserves as quickly as their existing ones are depleted 
(Vivoda, 2009, p.525). BP notes, for example, in the risk section of its 2010 report to the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission that “successful execution of our group strategy 
depends critically on sustaining long-term reserves replacement” (2010, p.14). Likewise, 
Shell argues that “future oil and gas production will depend on our access to new proved 
reserves through exploration, negotiations with governments and other owners of known 
reserves, and acquisitions. Failure to replace proved reserves could result in lower future 
production” (Royal Dutch Shell, 2009, p.13). 
Political risk  
 
However, the clearest area of commonality in the risks identified by energy companies, the 
EU and member states relates to the levels of domestic political stability, legal stability and 
non-interference in producer states. Linking European energy security directly to the 
domestic stability situation in producer states, Solana (2008, p.2) argues that the rent-
seeking and high levels of corruption in many energy-producing states mean that they are 
“nine times more likely to suffer from violent conflicts than those that are non-resource 
rich” and that “nearly all experience political instability, poor governance and human 
rights abuses”. Solana points out that energy rents shield producer regimes from pressure 
to improve good governance, including from the EU (2008, p.2). Other Commission 
documents reviewed touch on these issues of domestic instability but tend to do so more 
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from the perspective of investment and legal stability rather than the political standpoint 
taken by Solana.124 
Problems of investment security and government interference are afforded significant 
focus in Commission public documents. Given that most investment comes from the 
private sector, the quality of the investment climate, both in terms of country-level 
political stability and investment security, is of crucial importance (EC 2006b, p.15-18; EC 
2007a, p.4; p.24-25; EC 2008a, p.7-8). Ferrero-Waldner (2008) highlights “growing 
resource nationalism and interference by the state in producer countries” and stresses 
that Europe needs to integrate its energy markets to achieve the “bargaining power we 
need”. When talking about investment stability the Commission and Commissioners rarely 
mention the particular issues of instability present in specific producer countries, 
concentrating rather on provisions needed to address them. One can deduce however, 
both from Commission discourse and the space allotted to these investment provisions, 
the importance placed on this area of energy risk. 
The 2006 Green Paper talks of the need to use ‘trade policy tools’ to develop a more secure 
investment climate and the need to “improve the conditions for European companies 
seeking access to global resources” (EC 2006b, p.17-18). According to the Commission, 
provisions “based on the Energy Acquis and where appropriate the Energy Charter 
Treaty”, need to provide clear conditions for access to markets, dialogue on policy and 
market developments, dispute settlement and transit arrangements to ensure normal 
flows of energy “even in periods of political tension” (EC 2008a, p.8). The need for legally 
binding mechanisms is highlighted in the 2006 Green Paper, in both the first (2007a) and 
second (2008a) Strategic Energy Reviews and in the Communication on External Energy 
Policy (2011). This reflects contemporary investment stability concerns such as those 
                                                          
124 Less direct than Solana, Oettinger notes for example that “uncertainty [in oil] is exacerbated by 
poor governance and a lack of transparency in parts of the global oil market” (2010c, p.2). 
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evidenced by alleged recent assertive state behaviour and pressure on the foreign 
investors involved in the Karachaganak and Kashagan projects in Kazakhstan (see above). 
While member states do not tend to place as much stress on these concerns in their public 
discourses as Javier Solana or Benita Ferrero-Waldner (at least in public), they also 
highlight the risks associated with these issues. The Dutch Government stresses the 
importance of “encouraging stability in those parts of the world, upon which we depend 
for our fuels, whilst at the same time creating the conditions for a stable and secure 
supply” (Dutch Ministry for the Economy, 2006, p.5). The French Government stresses the 
need for EU relations with energy partners to pursue a judicial framework for the 
protection of company investments (French Permanent Representation, 2011, p.2). 
Referring to investment in infrastructure projects, the Polish Government notes that “the 
EU should concentrate on eliminating identified legal, administrative and organizational 
barriers, as well as minimizing the investment risk” (2011, p.5). The Czech Government 
calls on the EU to “focus on promoting stable and transparent legal environment in 
producing countries protecting European investments” [sic] (2011, p.2).  
Company perceptions of political risk closely mirror those of other actors. Referring to 
political risk to investments and its impact on business, one official from a prominent 
international energy company referred to how, for them, company value is determined by 
cash flow divided by the exposure to risk125. Given that political risk is an important part of 
that overall risk exposure, it is essential that levels of country risk are managed. However, 
they were keen to stress that regardless of the difficulties and tensions of operating in 
energy-rich countries and the risks this may entail, companies have a right to expect that 
their private property will be treated as sacrosanct and that the law will not be applied 
selectively126. It is clear that, for energy companies, domestic stability and the investment 
climate in producer states are central to the risks associated with the oil and gas business 
                                                          
125 Interview Energy company official [33], Brussels. Autumn, 2012,  
126 Ibid 
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and that the EU should be involved in mitigating these risks. Reflecting both its core 
concerns and recognising the EU’s dependence on increased investment, Exxon Mobil 
(2006, p.9) suggests, for example, that the “EU should keep promoting with its energy 
partners political and legal stability, reliable institutions and respect towards contractual 
agreements (particularly those increasing investment)”. Eni goes so far as to say (2011, 
p.3) that “the primary aim of the EU external energy action should be that of applying all 
political tools to guarantee investment protection at an international level”.  
As highlighted by Solana above (2008), the authoritarian nature of oil and gas producing 
countries is perceived to create a number of social stability risks that can impact on energy 
company operations. In particular, most of the energy companies highlight societal risk 
factors such as terrorism, civil unrest, international conflict, industrial action and sabotage 
(Eni, 2010, p.94; Chevron, 2010, p.30; BP, 2010, p.14; Statoil, 2010, p.151; Exxon Mobil, 
2010, p.4).  
However, the majority of the focus put on political and stability risk is concentrated on the 
potential intentional actions of producer states. In terms of what is highlighted as risk by 
the energy companies here, one can make a distinction between the politico-legal context 
(i.e. a lack of well-established and reliable legal structures) and the intentional and 
punitive actions of governments (ranging from unpredictable tax and royalty changes to 
nationalisation and expropriation) that the lack of a developed (and respected) legal order 
permits (Eni, 2010, p.94; Total, 2009, p.78; Statoil, 2010, p.151; Exxon Mobil, 2010, p.3; 
Chevron, 2010, p.30; BP, 2009, p.14). 
Several of the energy companies (Statoil 2010, p.151; Eni 2010, p.94; ExxonMobil 2010, 
p.3) note that a number of countries in which they operate have underdeveloped legal 
structures, creating uncertainty and risk in their operations. ExxonMobil (2010, p.3) 
asserts that even when this risk is circumvented by international agreements to arbitrate 
disagreements, companies still rely on local legal systems to enforce decisions. The nature 
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of the producer state legal infractions highlighted by energy companies range from tax and 
royalty interpretation, production and exploration restrictions, to more serious issues 
such as unilateral contract changes, forced changes to asset ownership, expropriation and 
nationalisation (Eni, 2010, p.94; Total, 2009, p.78; BP, 2010, p.14; Chevron, 2010, p.30-31). 
A number of the companies assert that state-run NOCs do not operate according to 
commercial imperatives and factor political interests into their commercial decisions. 
Statoil (2010, p.151) notes that governments and national oil companies in some regions 
have begun to impose greater control over and more stringent restrictions on energy 
projects and that this is a trend they expect to continue. As mentioned above, BP (2010, 
p.14) notes that rising prices can lead to increased ‘fiscal take’ and difficulties in gaining 
access to resources. ExxonMobil (2010, p.3) alludes to a shifting power relationship 
between producers and energy companies when they note that “restrictions on foreign 
investment in the oil and gas sector tend to increase in times of high commodity prices, 
when national governments may have less need of outside sources of capital”127. 
 
Fig. 4: Public and private perceptions of energy risk. Source: Own elaboration. 
                                                          
127 Several of the companies (Chevron, BP, ExxonMobil and Statoil) also highlight the potential risks 
associated with OPEC’s ability to apply production quotas, change supply levels and consequently 
affect oil prices. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
As the sections above have demonstrated, EU institutions, member states and energy 
companies demonstrate the highest level of energy risk perception convergence on 
matters of political risk (investment and market access risks in particular) (see fig. 4 
above). Given the EU’s liberal security of supply model the EU is heavily reliant on a 
(frequently small) number of companies in the upstream for the physical production and 
delivery of supply and the necessary investment to maintain supply levels. As described in 
section three above, in upstream markets such as those of the Caspian region, companies’ 
abilities to conduct their role in the provision of EU energy supply is hindered by political 
risks. The EU’s reliance on the commercial sector means these political risks are also 
energy security risks and, as this chapter has discussed, this reliance creates a strong 
overlap between company desires for a stable investment environment and the EU’s 
security of supply policy. In turn, the chapter has demonstrated the overlap between the 
EU’s realist security-maximising and commerce-facilitating activities in the upstream 
(discussed further in the next two chapters). 
As with its other foreign dependencies (sources and routes), the EU manages the risks of 
dependence on the commercial sector by encouraging diversification (to limit the 
magnitude of risk impact) and through governance and diplomacy (to reduce the 
likelihood of risks materialising). However, as noted above, diversification is of limited use 
in the upstream and as such the promotion of energy governance and conduct of energy 
diplomacy take on particular significance. Here, EU actions are generally proactive, 
seeking to shape the regional milieu so as to offset risks before they occur. However, as 
noted above, both diplomacy and governance also provide some capacity to re-act to 
extant threats as well as avert potential risks.  
This chapter has outlined the convergence between European political and commercial 
actors on upstream risks (a necessary condition of upstream cooperation), discussed the 
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dependence of political actors on the commercial sector in the upstream, highlighted the 
importance of political risk mitigation in EU external energy policy and drawn attention to 
the overlap between the EU’s energy security and upstream commercial policy aims. In 
turn, it has discussed the role of energy governance promotion and energy diplomacy in 
the pursuit of these objectives. In doing so, this chapter sets up the analysis of EU 
objectives and convergence on external energy governance and diplomacy in chapters five 
and six respectively and leads the way for investigation, in chapter seven, of the political-
commercial interdependence and catalytic diplomacy that characterises the EU upstream 
market-authority bargain in the Caspian. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
EU UPSTREAM ENERGY GOVERNANCE: EXAMINING EU 
GOVERNANCE OBJECTIVES, STATE ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS 
AND THE LIBERAL SHAPING OF THE CASPIAN ENERGY 
MILIEU 
 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the EU operates a liberal, public-private model of 
energy policy that entails milieu-shaping in strategic regions to facilitate companies and 
offset risks to the commercial energy sector on which the EU, in part, relies. This chapter 
examines both the institutional and normative-regulatory dimensions of the EU’s upstream 
governance in the Caspian and the extent to which member states and companies support 
this milieu-shaping governance in the region. 
In particular, this chapter examines how the EU’s energy governance promotes a number 
of the risk-reducing and market facilitating “state economic functions” (SEF) in the 
Caspian region discussed in chapter two (Smith, 2004; Murray, 1971). These include, most 
notably, the protection of property rights (SEF: protection of property rights), defence 
against commercial disadvantage (SEF: protection against commercial disadvantage) and 
the promotion of autonomy for economic actors (SEF: contributing to collective 
autonomy). In turn, the chapter provides further evidence of the overlap between security 
and economic-commercial objectives in the Caspian upstream.  
This chapter comprises four parts. To provide a framework to analyse the EU’s 
governance, the first section discusses Mommer’s (2000) typological distinction between 
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‘liberal’ and state-led ‘proprietorial’ models of energy governance. Mommer’s liberalism-
proprietorialism continuum of energy governance draws attention to the contrasting 
features of different energy governance models. However, while Mommer’s original 
analysis focuses on price outcomes, this section will concentrate on different models in 
terms of security of supply and political risk and the way they correspond to the state 
economic functions discussed in chapter two. Presenting Mommer’s framework in this 
way allows for identification of the liberal and risk-mitigating aspects of European 
upstream governance and the way these governance structures seek to ensure state 
economic functions in the subsequent sections.  
Through an examination of the overarching macro and the sector-specific meso-level 
governance structures that the EU promotes in the region (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 
2009; Lavenex, 2008; Lavenex, Lehmkuhl & Wichmann, 2009), the second section 
discusses the EU’s promotion of a ‘governance complex’ of different overlapping 
institutional structures that impact on energy policy in the Caspian. However, as noted by 
Padgett (2011) and Barbé et al (2009) the EU has difficulty at times externalising its own 
internal governance structures and, as a result, relies on the promotion of both EU-
administered and broader international structures that apply in the energy sector (such as 
the Energy Charter Treaty and the WTO).  
The third section switches focus to the norms and rules of the EU’s Caspian governance 
complex  arguing that EU upstream policy in the region revolves in particular around five 
energy governance norms (investment protection/promotion, sustainable competition, 
safety, environmental and technical standard regulatory harmonisation, revenue 
transparency and multilateralism/regionalism) that seek to reproduce (inter alia) 
European state-economic functions above in the region and contribute to the EU’s broader 
role of investment facilitation and risk mitigation.  
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The fourth and final section follows on from the analysis of risk perception in the previous 
chapter to consider member state and company convergence on the normative objectives 
expressed in EU external energy governance in the Caspian. In doing so it highlights both 
areas of convergence and divergence on EU Caspian energy governance but notes (as in 
the previous chapter) how the greatest area of convergence surrounds the norms and 
rules of political risk mitigation. 
CONTRASTING STATE ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS: LIBERAL AND PROPRIETORIAL 
MODELS OF ENERGY GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL RISK   
 
Before turning attention to the EU’s governance structures and the promotion of specific 
liberal state economic functions in the Caspian, this section discusses different forms of 
energy governance highlighting their differing objectives and impact on energy security 
and risk. Mommer (2000) forwards a typological distinction between two ideal-types of 
energy governance that is useful for understanding different European and Caspian 
approaches to energy governance. He suggests that oil and gas governance regimes can be 
located somewhere on a scale between liberal and proprietorial models (Mommer, 2000, 
p.25). Historically speaking, the clearest examples of liberal models have existed in OECD 
countries (such as the UK) while the most strident examples of proprietorialism were seen 
in the states of the Arabian Gulf after the OPEC oil nationalisations in 1973 (Muttitt, 2005, 
p.3). These different forms of governance outline different patterns of state economic 
function provision and determine how the benefits of energy production and transit are 
divided between companies, producers and consumers. In general, the EU favours liberal 
forms of governance, whereas Caspian countries demonstrate varying (and arguably 
increasing) levels of proprietorialism.  
However, while Mommer’s analysis is most concerned with the benefits of energy in terms 
of price outcomes (as befits his background as an economist), the analysis below will refer 
to the impact of these upstream governance models on supply/political risk and the state 
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economic functions highlighted by Smith (2004). Indeed, as Wälde (n.d.) has noted, 
consumer governments promote certain forms of international energy governance for 
security of supply motivations as well as for price reasons. In particular, this section will 
address these governance frameworks from the point of view of the EU’s reliance on 
companies and the associated dependence risks of inadequate investment and political 
risk this entails. As will be demonstrated below, because of its more overtly political 
objectives, the expanded role for the state and the opportunities for political intervention, 
proprietorial systems present greater risks for companies, and by implication for the EU. 
Indeed, a large part of the EU’s efforts to export its governance model relate to attempts to 
mitigate or at least manage the risk-inducing elements of proprietorialism. 
It should be noted that these designations of liberalism and proprietorialism are ideal-
types. There is no perfectly proprietorial or liberal model in existence (Wälde, n.d). 
Nevertheless, as Mommer suggests (2000, p.25), all regimes governing hydrocarbon 
production and transit (including the EU’s preferred mode of upstream governance) exist 
somewhere along this liberal-proprietorial spectrum128.   
This next sub-section discusses Mommer’s governance typology with regard to four of its 
prominent normative distinctions; the role of the state, investment processes, the role of 
competition and the general objectives and beneficiaries. While not a radical liberal regime, 
the EU’s upstream energy governance in the Caspian approximates most closely to the 
liberal end of this typology. As such, it reflects an attempt to facilitate markets and to 
mitigate the risks of state-led proprietorialism in the region in support of the EU’s wider 
risk mitigation role and security of supply objectives in the Caspian.  
                                                          
128 While contrasting, real world expressions of these forms of governance are linked (to an extent 
dialectically) as institutional expressions of the opposing interests of many consuming and 
producing states (Mommer, 2000, p.25). Indeed, they reflect governance manifestations of the 
“contradictory trends” and “paradigm shifts” between state-led energy politics and market 
organisation identified respectively by Claes (2009) and Helm (2005) discussed in chapter two. 
International linkage means that these energy regimes compete both economically and politically 
with “their national characteristics [forced] to confront, to adjust to, or to screen themselves off 
from, developments within the international economy” (Mommer, 2000, p.25). 
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The role of the state 
 
The role of the state is of central importance in energy governance models. Mommer 
(2000, p.1) notes that in cases where hydrocarbon reserves are publicly owned (which is 
the case in nearly all countries outside of the USA, including the Caspian) there are two 
basic options for a state. Firstly, natural resources can be conceived of as “non-property”, 
not belonging specifically to anyone and therefore a free gift of nature (the liberal 
approach) or rather, they can be seen as part of the patrimony of a state or people and 
therefore be subject to more statist/nationalist policies (Mommer, 2000, p.10; Boué & 
Luyando, 2002, p.10-12). Radical liberal regimes, correspondingly envisage a relatively 
small role for the state contributing to a greater role and more autonomy for commercial 
actors (SEF: contributing to collective autonomy) in energy governance. The key 
relationship from this liberal standpoint is between commercial energy companies and 
end-consumers. Here, the state’s role is not so much natural resource owner, but rather 
licensee and regulator (Boué & Luyando, 2002, p.10; Mommer, 2000, p.25). Thus, the 
actions of the state should be limited to regulatory functions and to adapting to the market 
relationship between consumers and private companies (Wälde, n.d.). A minimal role for 
the state in energy in this way correspondingly minimises the political risks associated 
with state involvement such as investment restrictions, political interference and the 
infringement of property rights (SEF: protection of property rights, SEF: protection against 
commercial disadvantage and SEF: contributing to collective autonomy). Indeed, as Wälde 
(n.d.) notes, aspects of this model were employed to attract investment into numerous 
areas of high political risk, such as Russia and Kazakhstan in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
Actions of both states in the mid to late 2000s (see chapter one) saw them move away 
from this approach however. 
By contrast, proprietorial views of energy governance advocate a direct relationship 
between producer states and end-consumers, with a restricted direct role for overseas or 
149 
 
private companies. This of course has the potential to reverse or dramatically reduce 
companies’ autonomy and opportunities for investment (SEF: protection against 
commercial disadvantage and SEF: contributing to collective autonomy) (Boué & Luyando, 
2002, p.12). This approach sees governments as the guardian of the state’s resources that 
should be used for national advancement and socio-economic development. This might 
involve for example, pursuing local content rules, where companies are obliged to employ 
a certain number of nationals from the host country or to purchase a certain level of 
services or goods from local suppliers. As will be described further in chapter seven, local 
content has become a key political issue in Kazakhstan (Yerkebulanov, 2012)129.  
Most fundamentally, however, the proprietorial approach aims at ensuring collection of a 
politically acceptable level of economic return. From this perspective, a direct role for the 
state in energy production is legitimate and necessary in that it guarantees that the state 
receives a ‘fair’ proportion of benefits from energy exploitation. Countries like Kazakhstan, 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan rely very heavily indeed on their energy export revenues. Of 
course, what is ‘acceptable’ or ‘fair' is highly subjective and varies considerably, but states 
operating such a model must be prepared to intervene to ensure that the state receives an 
acceptable return from energy operations. Normally this function is ensured by national 
oil companies (NOCs) such as Kazmunaigaz in Kazakhstan and SOCAR in Azerbaijan, who 
present a window onto the industry and act as a form of surveillance in consortia 
overseeing and monitoring foreign companies and maximising revenues (Mommer, 2000, 
p.22). As was discussed in the previous chapter however, states will sometimes ensure 
NOC involvement in major projects through coercive means, as is alleged in the Kashagan 
and Karachaganak cases in Kazakhstan. This form of arrangement raises a substantial 
contradiction however from a liberal perspective in that the state emerges as both 
regulator (usually via the oil and gas ministry) and a participant in the hydrocarbon 
                                                          
129 State involvement of this nature, may also involve supplying the local population with energy at 
subsidised prices (Mommer, 2000, p.10). 
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production that it regulates (via the involvement of national companies). Some Western 
companies operating in Kazakhstan have highlighted the contradiction between the 
national oil company Kazmunaigaz’s (KMG) role as both an equity partner in projects such 
as Kashagan and position as the state’s ‘recognised authority’ with responsibility for 
regulatory matters such as approving ongoing investment decisions (US Department of 
State, 2010c). While managers at KMG are thought to try to run the company along 
commercial lines, senior Western energy company officials argue that “political directives 
win the day” (US Department of State, 2010c). Similarly, another Western energy company 
official noted “that the people seconded to Kashagan from KMG represent the government 
not the project” (US Department of State, 2009c). Examples have been given where 
companies have outvoted KMG in board meetings on the Kashagan project only to have 
their decisions vetoed by KMG in their role as the approving regulatory authority (US 
Department of State, 2009c). Some Kazakh officials note however that by partnering with 
KMG (even if this is due to alleged forced acquisitions by the Kazakh Government) foreign 
companies are likely to be subject to less political interference and pressure from 
government than they otherwise might130. Nonetheless, such decisions limit their room for 
commercial manoeuvre and their ability to fully exercise their property rights (as 
conceived in a liberal sense). 
Investment processes 
 
Liberal governance regimes, such as those promoted by Western OECD countries, aim to 
maximise the free flow of investment and guarantee the unhindered development of 
hydrocarbon resources so as to ensure that supply meets levels of demand (Mommer, 
2000, p.2; Boué & Luyando, 2002, p.9). Taxes levied on oil and gas production should, 
under a radically liberal regime, aim solely at taxing profits so as to minimise the impact 
on investment decisions (SEF: protection against commercial disadvantage and SEF: 
                                                          
130 Interview Former Kazakh Government Official [32], Astana, Summer 2012 
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contributing to collective autonomy). Under these circumstances tax take on marginal 
(break-even) energy resources should be zero, meaning that it is the market price alone 
(not government taxes) that determines whether a company should invest - ensuring a 
direct link between consumer demand and supply and ensuring maximum levels of 
investment (Boué & Luyando, 2002, p.9-10; Mommer, 2000, p.2)131. From this perspective, 
companies should be guaranteed broadly unrestricted access to energy resources with 
consumers ultimately benefiting through increased supply and access to oil at the cost of 
extraction plus profit taxes and company profits (themselves moderated by market 
competition) (Mommer, 2000, p.10). Ultimately, liberal investment frameworks should fit 
and flex around prevailing economic market conditions so as to guarantee a continued 
flow of investment into oil and gas production, adequate supply, a diversified range of 
producer sources and counterparties as well as lower prices (Mommer, 2000, p.19; 
Egenhofer & Legge, 2001). Consequently, liberal governance frameworks tend to promote 
long and ongoing lease times for companies as disruptions between different leases can 
lead to inefficiencies and production declines (Mommer, 2000, p. 16). Such arrangements 
increase stability for companies and reduce uncertainty and risk. Likewise, active political 
risks such as forced contract changes or regulatory discrimination that could impinge on 
property rights and hinder investment must be minimised and guarded against (SEF: 
protection of property rights). Again, this view of investment calls for a curtailing of the 
state’s rights to change taxes or impose restrictions or conditions (after an initial 
agreement) that might impede companies’ autonomy and thus limit or deter future 
investment in the oil and gas sector (SEF: contributing to collective autonomy). The 
importance of investment protection in EU Caspian energy governance will be further 
highlighted below. 
                                                          
131 Muttitt argues that the UK’s governance regime corresponded to this model in the 1990s (2005, 
p.9). He notes that publically owned oil was extracted by companies under license from the 
government. Under this model, companies paid no fees to the government for extraction with the 
exception of corporation tax on their business profits, the same as any other business (Muttitt, 
2005, p.3). He likens it to an agricultural company being allowed to grow crops on a field they did 
not own without paying any rent and only being required to pay tax on the profits from those crops. 
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Proprietorial regimes, by contrast, operate to a set of more overtly political objectives and 
additional constraints. Investment decisions in this case are not granted on the basis of 
whether they meet levels of demand but rather whether they will produce sufficient 
economic rents for government (Boué & Luyando, 2002, p.10-11; Mommer, 2000, p.19). 
Ensuring sufficient economic rent usually takes the form of royalty payments levied in 
addition to the taxes paid on company profits with states likely to block access to reserves 
that will hinder the collection of sufficient rents (Boué & Luyando, 2002, p.10-11; 
Mommer, 2000, p.19). Thus, in contrast to a liberal regime, investment conditions under a 
proprietorial regime flex around the political and fiscal objectives of producer 
governments rather than levels of international supply and demand or the profitability of 
accessing reserves for companies (Boué & Luyando, 2002, p.11; Mommer, 2000, p.19). 
These restrictions apply even on marginal (break-even) barrels of oil, meaning that oil that 
would be profitable at lower market prices under a liberal regime is not profitable under a 
proprietorial regime with the consequence that investment is not made and the oil supply 
stays in the ground. The outcome of this is higher prices for consumers (than would be 
expected under a liberal regime), but a greater fiscal take for the host state (Mommer, 
2000, p.19). Furthermore, (and again in contrast to the liberal view) the proprietorial 
perspective on upstream energy production does not favour long leases in exploration but 
rather relatively shorter contracts that allow for regular opportunities to renegotiate rent 
returns when market or political conditions change (Mommer, 2000, p.21; Boué & 
Luyando, 2002, p.11). Such an approach runs counter to provision of the liberal state 
economic functions discussed above (particularly SEF: protection of property rights). 
Indeed, the strong political logic behind proprietorial regimes means that, at times, states 
may feel the need to intervene directly in markets to renegotiate conditions for foreign 
(and domestic) companies to ensure certain political objectives and a politically 
acceptable level of rent is met (as was arguably the case in Kazakhstan with the 
Karachaganak and Kashagan cases – see chapter one and chapter seven). Such objectives, 
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however, create the latent potential for political risk from the perspective of foreign 
investors.   
Competition  
 
Liberal and proprietorial governance types have contrasting perspectives on competition. 
From the liberal point of view a level playing field and competition (SEF: protection 
against commercial disadvantage) between companies in both the upstream and 
downstream is to be encouraged to diversify the supply base of counterparties and drive 
down prices for end consumers, benefitting them and benefitting the governments of 
energy importing states who can then either tax their citizens more on energy products 
(with little or no economic impact as prices remain the same) or reduce taxes (to positive 
political effect) (Bridge & Le Billon, 2013, p.22). As Bridge and Le Billon (2013, p.22) note, 
taxes on energy consumption in importing countries allow a number of consuming 
governments to earn more revenue from energy taxes than some hydrocarbon producing 
states do from energy exports. Likewise, as discussed in the previous section, increased 
competition and open markets in producer countries is beneficial from a security of supply 
standpoint as it increases the diversity of producers and companies that supply a given 
market (such as the EU), thus reducing both producer and counterparty risk.  The EU’s 
efforts to promote competition are discussed further in this chapter below. 
However, from the proprietorial perspective, foreign companies should be transformed 
from active production partners into service providers to the national oil company when 
(and only when) their particular capacities are needed (Mommer, 2000, p.22; Boué & 
Luyando, 2002, p.11). This type of arrangement would guarantee foreign companies a 
profit (otherwise they would not participate) but would ensure that they did not receive 
excess profits (rents) as their payment is not tied to final end consumer prices. In contrast 
to the liberal model, the benefits of competition between companies in this case would not 
be passed on to consumers but rather would be collected by the host producer state in the 
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form of higher rents (Mommer, 2000, p.22). Likewise, such an arrangement would present 
increased security of supply risk by combining counterparty and source into one actor. 
Under these circumstances, companies would no longer be supplying oil or gas and the 
total supply from one producer source would be provided by one national company, 
concentrating the risk considerably. As it stands, Caspian states do not have the 
technological of financial weight to conduct operations in this fashion and there are 
reasons related to the spreading of risk (discussed in chapter seven) why they might wish 
to maintain Western company involvement. Nonetheless, both Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan 
show a clear desire to increase the role of their state-owned companies in the 
hydrocarbon sector (as one would expect). 
Contrasting objectives and beneficiaries  
 
Ultimately, liberal and proprietorial regime types have contrasting overall objectives (see 
fig. 5 below) The first seeks to facilitate open and secure investment in hydrocarbon 
production, limit the role of the state and encourage investment access so as to guarantee 
a diversified base of counterparties, reduced source risk and low prices for consumers (as 
well as the potential for downstream rent collection by consumer governments). As such, 
it reflects the interests of import-dependent countries (such as those of the EU) and is 
predicated on provision of a number of the state economic functions discussed above (in 
particular property rights, protection against commercial disadvantage and autonomy). 
Lower prices for consumers benefit energy-consuming actors such as the EU (and even 
those like the UK that produce oil and gas) because the majority of their citizens and 
businesses rely on affordable energy prices and because low prices mean that consuming 
governments can capture rent themselves via taxes (on petrol for example) without 
negatively affecting economic growth. In addition, and as discussed below, as Mommer 
(2000, p.11) notes, this liberal approach in energy is an example of the broader global 
trend towards liberal trade and free-market models, as embodied globally in the World 
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Trade Organisation (WTO) which envisages a reduced role for the state. Companies also 
benefit, at least in the upstream, through open investment access and strong property 
rights protection, although they should be in theory subject to competition from other 
companies especially in the downstream (which, as described in chapter one, companies 
have consistently campaigned against with support in some cases from home 
governments).  
 
Fig. 5: Liberalism and proprietorialism in energy governance.  Source: own elaboration. 
By contrast, proprietorial models aim to achieve a politically acceptable level of rent for 
the producing state so as to meet fiscal spending requirements, risking the liberal state 
economic functions mentioned in the paragraphs above (Mommer, 2000, p.2; Boué & 
Luyando, 2002, p.11). This model reflects the national (and arguably elite) interests of 
energy-producing states, such as those in the Caspian, whose economies, development-
programmes and in many cases political stability and legitimacy rests on the maintenance 
of minimum level of revenue for state budgets. As described in the first chapter, this 
reliance on energy revenues is deeply entwined with the rentier political systems of 
Caspian energy-producing states. Indeed, their tendencies towards proprietorial models of 
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energy governance reflect their dependence on flows of energy revenue and a 
consequently different range of state economic functions. As mentioned above, increased 
state assertiveness and changes to mineral laws in Kazakhstan can be seen as a shift 
towards proprietorialism (albeit not a complete shift as in full-scale nationalisation). Here 
beneficiaries should include the populations of oil and gas producing states that, in theory 
at least, benefit in the form of lower taxes and better quality public provision. 
Undoubtedly, however, given the often corrupt and authoritarian nature of many 
producing states plus the effects of the resource curse, economic and political elites within 
these countries are also likely to benefit, in some cases very disproportionately. 
Furthermore, proprietorial models of governance, especially in regions where the rule of 
law is weak and political systems are personalised such as the Caspian, create a strong 
incentive for governments to intervene directly in energy markets to ensure a politically 
acceptable level of rent, fostering in turn the potential for property right infringements, 
commercial disadvantage and reduced autonomy – all political risks from the perspective 
of foreign investors. 
THE ENERGY GOVERNANCE COMPLEX IN THE CASPIAN: THE INSTITUTIONAL 
STRUCTURES OF LIBERAL MILIEU-SHAPING  
 
Following the discussion of liberalism and proprietorialism above, this section analyses 
the institutional dimensions of the EU’s upstream governance in the Caspian. Specifically, 
this section outlines the ‘governance complex’ of institutional structures that the EU 
promotes in the region. As noted above, when promoting governance structures, the EU 
prefers to establish EU-led institutions and export its own EU acquis rules132. However, as 
Barbé et al (2009, p.835) have noted, when it lacks capacity or legitimacy to enact 
convergence around the EU rules, as is the case in the Caspian (Padgett, 2011), the EU 
promotes institutions and rules that are international in character rather than strictly 
                                                          
132
 The Energy Community Treaty, with an EU-administered secretariat and requiring signatories to 
adopt the full EU energy acquis, is the clearest example of this. 
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European. For example, as well as EU institutions such as INOGATE/the Baku Initiative, 
the EU also promotes other international institutions such as the WTO and the Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative that are neither EU institutions nor controlled by EU 
member states. Nevertheless, these bodies do reflect strong EU involvement and entail 
normative frameworks with regard to energy that approximate broadly with EU 
preferences (even if they differ in some ways from the EU acquis or are not as extensive as 
the EU would like). Thus, as will be discussed below, while the EU has established EU-led 
macro institutions in the Caspian region (such as the Central Asia strategy), it also 
promotes its objectives through meso, sectoral-level governance structures that tend to be 
a mix of both European and broader ‘Western’ international institutions. 
Macro and meso structures  
 
Lavenex, Lehmkuhl and Wichmann (2009) argue that EU external governance can be 
broken down into macro and meso (sectoral-level) structures. Rather than acceding to 
existing EU institutions, as new EU member states do, in the case of the EU’s external 
promotion of governance with its wider neighbourhood, new overarching macro-level 
institutional frameworks are established collectively by the EU to facilitate meso-level, 
long-term sectoral convergence between the EU and periphery states (see fig. 6 below).  
Macro structures constitute an institutional “roof” over more sector-specific meso 
structures and, as overarching policy frameworks, “lay down the overall goals and 
instruments” of EU-periphery relations (Lavenex, Lehmkuhl & Wichmann, 2009, p.3). Such 
structures result from EU negotiations with third party countries but are ‘EU’ structures in 
that they are established and administered by EU institutions (Commission and EEAS) in 
conjunction with third parties (Lavenex, Lehmkuhl & Wichmann, 2009, p.3). Through this 
process, these structures come to determine areas of cooperation, the level of 
approximation and the rules and basis (EU or international) on which this approximation 
will take place. Macro structures can be multilateral or bilateral.  
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Meso institutions, by contrast, relate to “sectoral modes of interaction” (Lavenex, 
Lehmkuhl & Wichmann, 2009, p.3). Meso policies tend, where possible, to represent the 
externalisation of internal EU rules and are motivated by “functionally-driven answers to 
situations of interdependence and the externalities produced within individual sectors” 
(Lavenex, Lehmkuhl & Wichmann, 2009, p.3). However, as noted above, sectoral energy 
cooperation may take place within institutional structures that are not European (in that 
they are not established or administered by the EU), but rather Western or international 
in nature133. International structures such as the WTO, as Barbé et al (2009, p.835) note, 
may enjoy more legitimacy than EU rules and frameworks.  
Meso structures may also transcend different macro structures. To give an example from 
energy in the Caspian, the Baku Initiative forum for energy cooperation (an EU-
administered meso-sectoral structure) extends to countries that are in both the Eastern 
Partnership and ENP (macro structures in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus) and the 
Central Asia Strategy (macro structure in Central Asia).  
 
Fig. 6: Macro and meso-sectoral breakdown of energy governance in Kazakhstan. Source: 
Own elaboration.  
                                                          
133 Of course Caspian states also take part in other non-Western governance structures such as the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s ‘Energy Club’ – see Stoddard (2012). 
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Macro structures and meso sectoral-level structures in the Caspian energy 
governance complex 
 
The EU has neither a single external energy governance policy nor a unitary 
comprehensive energy governance institutional framework in the Caspian Sea region. 
Rather, the EU’s Caspian energy governance consists of an overlapping clustered 
arrangement of macro and meso structures that can be characterised as a “governance 
complex134” (Keohane & Victor, 2010) (see fig. 7 below). 
 
Fig. 7: The Caspian energy ‘governance complex’. Source: Own elaboration. 
The EU has three primary overarching multilateral macro structures in this Caspian 
governance complex; the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership (both 
of which apply to Azerbaijan) and the Central Asia Strategy that covers Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan (as well as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan). While focusing on a 
broad number of policy sectors (rule of law, democracy, trade, education etc.), each of 
these encourages cooperation in energy, sets out general energy objectives and establishes 
                                                          
134 This concept is borrowed from Keohane and Victor’s discussion of “regime complexity”. For the 
application of regime complexity to the Caspian region see Stoddard (2012). 
160 
 
a number of fora for dialogue and coordination. Due to space constraints, the discussion of 
macro structures below concentrates specifically on the Central Asian Strategy.  
The Central Asia Strategy lists energy (and transport) as the fourth, and economic 
development, trade and investment as the third of its seven priority cooperation areas 
(EU, 2009, p.19-22). The Strategy outlines a number of objectives in energy. Inter alia, it 
discusses aims of establishing a Central Asian energy market, convergence on EU energy 
market principles, rehabilitating regional infrastructure, attracting investment, enhancing 
transparency and promoting energy efficiency (EU, 2009, p.23). It also notes the need for a 
market-based approach to investment and the need for stable and non-discriminatory 
regulatory frameworks in energy (EU, 2009, p.22).  
 
Trade and economic development have particular significance in terms of energy in 
Central Asia where, in the case of Kazakhstan for example, 80% of trade with the EU is in 
crude oil135. Likewise, EU officials note how dealing with post-investment challenges 
represents a particularly core area of energy policy in Kazakhstan given that some of the 
EU’s biggest energy companies (TOTAL, Royal Dutch Shell, Eni to name a few) have very 
sizable investments in the country136. Indeed, the Central Asia Strategy highlights EU 
support for Central Asian states’ WTO membership and notes how the EU will help create 
“regulatory and institutional frameworks for an improved business and investment 
environment and further support economic diversification” (EU, 2009, p.19). In this 
endeavour the EU notes how it “will cooperate with interested companies from the EU in a 
public-private partnership to promote the market economy” (EU, 2009, p.20). 
Furthermore, the Central Asia Strategy establishes regular political dialogues between the 
countries of Central Asia and the EU (where energy matters are discussed) and dedicated 
energy dialogues for (often more technical) energy discussions (EU, 2009, p.11) (see next 
chapter on energy diplomacy). 
                                                          
135
 Interview EU Official [27], Astana, Summer 2012.  
136
 Ibid 
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Bilaterally, the EU’s relationships with Caspian states are governed by Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements (PCA). Unlike the Central Asia Strategy, which is essentially a 
political/strategic document, the PCA is a comprehensive bilateral legal document that 
forms the legal basis of EU-Caspian state relations. It has a number of provisions in the 
case of energy and trade that apply to the energy sector. In terms of energy, the Kazakh 
PCA notes the intention to cooperate in improving the energy sector “in line with a market 
economy”, energy supply and diversification, investment attraction, modernisation of 
infrastructure and energy efficiency (EU, 1995, p.29). In terms of trade, Article 23 of the 
PCA stipulates that both parties offer most-favoured nation treatment to businesses from 
the other party (EU, 1995, p.14). However, Article 34 notes that these provisions can be 
overridden on the basis of “public policy, public security or public heath” (EU, 1995, p.20). 
Likewise, Article 46 on investment only calls on parties to “aim to establish a favourable 
climate for investment [emphasis added]” (EU, 1995, p.20). The PCA is nonetheless 
important as it provides the legal basis for EU action in the event of a dispute with a third 
country in the Caspian (along with the Energy Charter Treaty)137.  
Beyond these macro structures however, energy cooperation in the Caspian region is also 
regulated via meso-sectoral regimes that focus specifically on the energy sector. In oil and 
gas, the EU actively promotes a number of EU and international sectoral energy level 
structures in the region. Here there is less division between the Eastern and Western sides 
of the Caspian as meso structures tend to be trans-Caspian (or broader) in nature 
reflecting the transnational character of transport routes, the geographical spread of 
energy production and the EU’s support for increased multilateralism/regionalism.  
EU officials cite the Energy Charter Treaty, the Baku Initiative and the Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) as the three most important specifically energy-focused 
                                                          
137 At present the EU is in the process of negotiating an Enhanced PCA agreement with Kazakhstan 
that will, according to the European Commission, “bring about better conditions for the trade and 
investment relations between the two parties” (EC, 2012b). 
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governance structures in the region138. Indeed the Council of Ministers reiterated the 
importance of these three regimes in recent council conclusions on Central Asia (Council 
of the European Union, 2012, p.3). Likewise, in interviews, EU officials often also describe 
WTO accession as a crucial energy governance objective in the Caspian region139.  
As will be discussed further below, one of these four, the Baku Initiative, is a specifically 
‘EU’ institution in that it was established and is administered by the EU. The other three 
(WTO, Energy Charter and EITI) in line with the observations of Barbé et al (2009) 
discussed above, are broader international institutions or initiatives. However, while not 
administered by the EU, these sectoral structures are nonetheless promoted by the Union 
for energy policy reasons in the Caspian region. Each of these meso structures in now 
discussed in turn.  
The Baku Initiative (also known as the enhanced INOGATE programme), established by 
the EU in 2004 and expanded at a meeting of foreign ministers in Astana in 2006, aims to 
further cooperation in energy between the states of the Black and Caspian Seas through a 
harmonisation of standards based around EU internal market rules. The four priority 
areas of the Baku Initiative are laid out in detail in the Astana Roadmap of 2006. They 
include: 1) “the converging of energy markets on the basis of the EU internal energy 
market principles taking into account the particularities of the partner countries”; 2) 
“enhancing energy security by addressing the issues of energy exports/imports, supply 
diversification, energy transit and energy demand”; 3) “supporting sustainable energy 
development, including the development of energy efficiency, renewable energy sources, 
and demand side management”; and 4) “attracting investments towards energy projects of 
common and regional interest” (EC, 2006a, p.1).  
                                                          
138
 Interview EU Official [31], Astana, Summer 2012 
139
 Ibid 
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While the Baku initiative has wide ranging liberal objectives, it is important to note that 
the short-term expectations for the Caspian region (and Central Asia in particular) are 
more limited. For example, while the second priority area of cooperation on enhancing 
energy security envisages (inter alia) open and non-discriminatory access to investment in 
energy resources and networks in participating countries (in line with the liberal model of 
governance discussed above), the “approved actions” for the Central Asia region (those 
parts that Central Asian governments have agreed to) do not mention this objective, 
focusing instead on less politically sensitive issues such as the rehabilitation and building 
of new infrastructure, enhanced maintenance and the installation of new metering 
facilities (EC, 2006, p.7).  
The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), while not an ‘EU’-institution, is an important part of 
European governance in the Caspian. Konoplyanik (former Deputy Secretary General of 
the Energy Charter Secretariat) and Wälde (2006, p.524) note that the European Energy 
Charter (signed in 1991) and the legally-binding follow-up Energy Charter Treaty (signed 
in 1994) were born out of a European need to diversify energy supplies (primarily from 
the Middle East) and the chronic need and potential for investment in the energy sectors 
of the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the Former USSR. All former Soviet states in the 
Caspian region are signatories (except for Russia). Despite being promoted from the 
beginning by European states and the European Commission, the epithet ‘European’ was 
dropped before the signing of the ECT in 1994, reflecting the broader scope and wider 
regional remit of the ECT140. The Energy Charter Treaty is thus not an ‘EU’ treaty (although 
the European Commission is a signatory) and the Energy Charter is not an EU institution. 
Rather, it is an independent international organisation administered by an international 
secretariat (the Energy Charter Secretariat) headed by a secretary general appointed by 
the Energy Charter member states. As such, EU support for the ECT is one example of the 
EU supporting an institution in energy that is not specifically European. However, as 
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described below, the ECT is both ‘European’ (and more broadly ‘Western’) in its political 
and legal heritage.  
In addition to facilitating the diversification of European energy supplies and the 
attraction of inward investment into the former Soviet Union, the ECT was hoped to 
provide a means of bringing Europe and the Former USSR together, both economically and 
politically, and in doing so further reduce residual tensions from the Cold War 
(Konoplyanik & Wälde, 2006, p.525). In particular however it also sought to initiate 
former Soviet states into liberal trade practices based on the WTO (then GATT) rules 
contained within the ECT. It was assumed that all ECT members would join the WTO and 
thus the ECT was seen as a first step towards WTO membership and full trade 
liberalisation by allowing transition states to gain experience of the WTO practices and 
rules (Konoplyanik & Wälde, 2006, p.542).   
The Energy Charter Treaty sets out provisions in five main areas that correspond to the 
liberal forms of governance described above (Konoplyanik & Wälde, 2006, p.525):  
 
 The protection and promotion of foreign energy investments, based on the 
extension of national treatment, or most favoured nation treatment (whichever is 
more favourable); 
 Free trade in energy materials, products and energy-related equipment, based on 
GATT/WTO rules; 
 Freedom of energy transit through pipelines and grids; 
 Reducing the negative environmental impact of the energy cycle through 
improving energy efficiency;  
 Mechanisms for the resolution of state-to-state and/or investor-to-state disputes.  
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While the ECT is an international treaty, its provisions are strongly influenced by three 
areas of international and European law. Firstly, a large number of bilateral investment 
treaties (roughly 500 at the time of the ECT negotiations) and the investment chapter of 
the North American Free Trade Area provide the substantial basis for the investment 
aspects of the ECT (Konoplyanik & Wälde, 2006, p.528). Secondly, EU law on the licensing 
of upstream resources, transit, utility procurement and non-discriminatory access form an 
integral part of the ECT. Thirdly, the provisions under the trade chapter of the ECT are 
essentially those of the GATT in 1994 (Konoplyanik & Wälde, 2006, p.528). That the 
provenance of these laws is found in Western trade regimes sheds light on the ECT’s 
intellectual-political heritage and liberal nature. 
The WTO is also seen by EU officials as an important part of the governance of energy in 
the Caspian141. Whilst energy did not feature specifically in the negotiations of the GATT 
and whilst no agreement on natural resources was reached at the Uruguay round of trade 
negotiations that established the WTO in 1995, generally applicable trade provisions of the 
WTO do relate to trade in energy products (Selivanova, 2007, p.11; p.37). As such, EU 
officials place a lot of stress on the potential role of the WTO in Caspian energy 
governance. One EU official referred to the WTO as the biggest priority in energy from a 
trade point of view and as a form of ‘panacea’ in terms of energy142. They argued that WTO 
accession would encourage minimum standards in energy trade and investment ensuring 
the free movement of capital derived from energy production and transit, investment 
security and reduced tariffs and restrictions (such as local content requirements)143. 
Another EU official concurred, stating that EU energy policy in the Caspian was in part 
about the promotion of “WTO rules” in energy144. EU officials assert that WTO accession is 
important in terms of energy policy for two reasons. Firstly, the WTO is highly symbolic 
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142 Ibid 
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144 Interview EU official [31], Astana,  Summer 2012 
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and thus has the potential, it was argued, to positively impact on Caspian state behaviour. 
Secondly, the dispute mechanism of the WTO can be initiated in the case of any disputes, 
including in energy145. This is felt to be beneficial as the process of dispute resolution in 
the WTO is less political than direct bilateral negotiations. However, these measures can 
only be initiated once a state has acceded to the WTO, making WTO accession for Caspian 
states (all of whom are yet to join) a priority in energy policy, as well as a broader trade 
objective146. 
Finally, while Mommer did not discuss transparency in his typology, transparency 
initiatives are deeply liberal in orientation. In the Caspian region, the EU promotes 
transparency by encouraging Caspian states to join the Extractive Industry Transparency 
Initiative (EITI). Originally put forward by the UK Government under Tony Blair, the EITI 
represents one of the most notable areas of EU support for transparency in third party 
countries. The EITI (again an international energy governance regime) seeks to improve 
transparency by requiring natural resource companies to publish their payments to host 
governments and governments to publish receipt of these payments. These processes are 
audited by independent accountants and validated by the EITI multi-stakeholder group 
composed of governmental, civil society and energy company officials (EITI Secretariat, 
2013a, p.1). The European Commission participates in the board of the EITI and in the 
EITI Multi-Donor Trust Fund administered by the World Bank (EITI Secretariat, 2010). 
Twelve EU member states are also donors and supporters of the initiative (EITI 
Secretariat, n.d. [a]). Discussed in the Central Asia Strategy (EU, 2009, p.24), EU officials 
stress the importance of encouraging transparency in upstream markets to improve both 
                                                          
145 Interview EU official [4], Brussels, Summer 2012 
146 Furthermore, the EU cannot negotiate planned ‘deep and comprehensive free trade agreements’ 
(that would have energy stipulations) with a periphery country without WTO membership as to do 
so would effectively have to include and be compatible with WTO provisions or the DCFTAs would 
need to be re-negotiated on neighbourhood country WTO accession – Interview EU official [26], 
Brussels, Summer 2012 
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the governance and the investment climate147. EU officials argue the merits of the EITI in 
this regard but note that obtaining EITI validation in Kazakhstan has been difficult148. 
Certain ministries such as the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR), energy 
companies in Kazakhstan (such as KazMunaiGas) and non-energy natural resource 
companies (such as KazZinc) have historically failed to take the EITI seriously or shown 
little interest in the process (US Department of State, 2009c). More recently, the Kazakh 
Government has also apparently become suspicious that a failure to validate the EITI is a 
politically-motivated bid to present Kazakhstan in a bad light149. Nonetheless, the EU puts 
considerable effort into promoting the EITI in Kazakhstan. The EU Delegation in Astana, 
for example, organises a regular EITI group with member states. EU officials highlight 
concerted efforts to develop a coordinated message on the EITI between member states, 
the EU institutions and the EITI Secretariat in Oslo towards the Kazak Government150 
MILIEU-SHAPING AND STATE-ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS: NORMATIVE 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ENERGY GOVERNANCE COMPLEX IN THE CASPIAN  
In assessing the EU’s energy governance complex in the Caspian, it is useful also to focus 
on the normative premises on which this complex is founded. Doing so facilitates an 
understanding of the commonalities between different governance institutions, outlines 
more clearly the objectives the EU is seeking to (collectively) advance through this 
complex and highlights how they contribute to the provision of state economic function in 
the Caspian upstream.  
This section proposes that the EU’s external energy governance in the Caspian region can 
be broken down analytically into the promotion of five broad governance norms, namely: 
investment protection/promotion, sustainable competition, safety/technical and 
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environmental standard regulatory harmonisation, revenue transparency and 
multilateralism/regionalism. As Table one (below) highlights, the normative premises on 
which EU Caspian energy governance is built tend to be quite consistent across the EU’s 
governance complex.  
 Investment 
Protection 
Competition Transparency EU Standards 
Harmonisation 
Multilateralism 
and/or 
regionalism 
 
ENP 
yes yes yes yes Multilateralism 
and regionalism 
EAP yes yes yes yes Multilateralism 
and regionalism 
Cent. Asia 
Strategy 
yes yes yes yes Multilateralism 
and regionalism 
Energy Charter yes yes no partially 
(by default) 
Multilateralism 
EITI partially no yes no Multilateralism 
Baku Initiative yes yes yes yes Multilateralism 
and regionalism 
WTO yes yes no no Multilateralism 
 
Table 1: Consistency of normative preferences in the Caspian energy governance complex. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
As will be discussed below, these normative preferences fit along the liberal end of the 
liberal-proprietorial scale of governance regimes described above and further, in 
particular, the protection of property (SEF: protection of property rights), commercial 
advantage and/or defence against disadvantage (SEF: provision of competitive advantage 
and SEF: protection against commercial disadvantage) and collective autonomy for 
economic agents operating in the region (SEF: contributing to collective autonomy).  
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Investment protection and promotion 
 
In line with the liberal model described above, improving the investment climate and 
protecting property rights once investments are made (SEF: protection of property rights 
and SEF: contributing to collective autonomy) are particularly important normative 
objectives of EU external energy governance. EU documentation such as the 2006 Green 
Paper on energy, the 2007 Energy Policy for Europe communication and the Second 
Strategic Energy review all discuss the importance of a stable investment climate (EC, 
2006b; EC, 2007a; EC, 2008b). The Commission’s Energy 2020 communication (2010a) 
notes specifically that “essential for EU security […] are good governance, respect for the 
rule of law and protection of EU and foreign investments in energy producing and transit 
countries” (p.18). This is especially true in a region such as the Caspian where, as 
described in the previous chapter, the investment climate is often weak, unpredictable and 
open to government intervention. Ensuring that producer states do not forcibly alter 
conditions for investors rates as one of the highest priorities for EU officials working on 
the Caspian region151.  
The Central Asia Strategy calls for “a market-based approach to investment” and “stable 
and non-discriminatory regulatory [investment] frameworks” (EU, 2009, p.22). Indeed, 
strengthening the legal and regulatory climate so as to reduce the risk to company 
operations and to attract investment is a core EU objective underlying both the desire to 
extend the WTO to Caspian states and to support the Energy Charter Treaty in the Caspian. 
The core principles here relate to the protection of property rights, and to non-
discrimination in particular, where states agree to offer most-favoured nation (MFN) or 
national treatment (whichever is the more preferable) to investors (Konoplyanik & Wälde, 
2006, p.529) - these two rules supporting SEF: protection of property rights, SEF: 
protection against commercial disadvantage and SEF: contributing to collective autonomy. 
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The promotion of these legal frameworks and related issues are discussed regularly with 
Caspian countries at PCA meetings (Cooperation Councils and Committees) and in energy 
Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) meetings152.  
The Baku Initiative approaches the question of investment more from the perspective of 
investment attraction rather than protection, calling for cooperation in the “further 
improvement of the investment climate in order to facilitate investment in the energy 
sector” (EC, 2006a, p.8).  Nevertheless, in reality, investment attraction and promotion are 
inherently interconnected. Investors are unlikely to be attracted to invest in a market 
where their investments are not seen to be secure. However, improving the investment 
climate is rarely presented as being in the EU’s interest in official documentation, but 
rather as essential for the diversification and internationalisation of Caspian states’ 
economies – objectives shared by these states (EC, 2006a, p.8; EU, 2009, p.19). 
Investment protection is a particularly key issue for EU officials in Kazakhstan where 
three quarters of EU investment is in the energy sector153. As noted previously, the Kazakh 
investment climate is perceived by some to have deteriorated in recent years (Suleimenov 
& Osipov, 2010, p.5). Indeed, EU and member state officials agree that, as Kazakhstan has 
grown more prosperous in recent years, the government has grown more assertive and 
the investment climate has correspondingly deteriorated. At the same time some of 
Europe’s biggest companies (Total, Shell, Eni) have very substantial energy investments in 
Kazakhstan. While European companies continue to invest in the country, EU officials cite 
a number of issues that continue to create risks, including the highly personalised political 
system which (as described in the previous chapter) inhibits decision-making and 
presents legal uncertainty for investors154. 
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Sustainable competition and “levelling the playing field” 
 
Again reflecting the liberal conception of European energy governance, increasing 
competition in Central Asia represents a core EU normative objective (SEF: provision of 
competitive advantage and SEF: protection against commercial disadvantage). EU-Central 
Asia Strategy notes, for example, that “a market-based approach to investment and 
procurement and transparent stable and non-discriminatory regulatory frameworks 
guarantee, for all sources of energy, the best prices and increased opportunities for all 
stake holders” (2009, p.22). The energy provisions of the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements (PCAs) with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan also both note that cooperation in 
energy is to “take place within the principles of the market economy” (EC, 1995; EC, 
1996)155. 
Increased competition through the externalisation of market-based rules ranks amongst 
the top EU energy governance priorities in the region156. Competition in the Caspian 
region relates to what EU officials refer to as ‘levelling the playing field’ for European 
companies vis-à-vis state-owned national counterparts157. Likewise, officials from the 
Energy Charter Secretariat also stress the ‘levelling of the playing field’ between market 
participants as a core objective of the ECT158. EU officials note, however, that competition 
must be sustainable in the sense that while lower prices brought about by competition are 
good for the EU, prices must not fall below that which is sufficient to attract future 
hydrocarbon investment159.  
There are multiple dimensions to competition in the Caspian however. Analytical 
distinctions can be drawn between competition in the domestic markets of Caspian states 
                                                          
155 The new enhanced PCA with Kazakhstan and the new Association Agreement with Azerbaijan, 
both currently being negotiated, will include deepened engagement on energy (Lussac, 2010b; 
Sopinska, 2011). 
156 Interview EU Official [27], Astana, Summer 2012 
157 Ibid 
158 Interview, Energy Charter Secretariat [36], Brussels, Summer 2011  
159 Ibid 
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(generally between domestic market players and the reduction of the role of state 
monopolies), competition relating to the involvement of foreign oil companies and their 
relations with state companies and competition relating to international trade. In the 
internal sense, EU objectives include increasing the sustainability of Caspian states’ energy 
systems, reducing subsidies that place a burden on state budgets160, and ensuring 
competitive practices that will encourage adequate investment both from private actors, 
the government and international finance institutions (IFIs) in domestic infrastructures. 
However, competition also relates to practices concerning the actions of international oil 
companies and the establishment of equal treatment between them and national (and 
other international) players. Often there is a strong degree of overlap between these two 
spheres. Intellectually speaking, both approaches are underpinned by the same market-
based logic. Domestic competition objectives are however more driven by a 
marketization-as-route-to-development logic and most of these objectives are 
correspondingly pursued under the auspices of the Baku Initiative with the involvement of 
DG DEVCO, INOGATE and DG ENERGY (see EC, 2006a, p. 4-5; p.8-10). Competition in 
relation to the involvement of foreign capital (including equal non-discriminatory 
treatment and access to markets) and competition relating to trade have more of a 
strategic edge for the EU - predicated on the mix of commercial and security objectives 
discussed previously. These objectives are pursued through the ECT/WTO and EU trade 
agreements, falling more squarely under the remit of DG TRADE and DG ENERGY (and 
potentially the EEAS in terms of disputes). The division of labour between EU institutions 
in foreign energy policy will be further discussed in chapter six. 
While the ECT contains strict rules with regard to the post-investment phase, it is less 
strong on competition in terms of market access. Here states’ “permanent sovereignty 
over national resources” (Article 18 of the Energy Charter Treaty) pertains and despite 
                                                          
160 In 2005 the Kazakh Government spent $7bn on energy subsidies, with $3.5bn spent on natural 
gas subsidies alone (Auty, 2008, p.4). 
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(unsuccessful) efforts to deepen the ECT in this area by the EU and USA, states retain the 
right to control access to their resources and the terms of such access. Indeed, in terms of 
non-discrimination in market access, the ECT asks that producing states conduct licensing 
processes in a clear and transparent way without discriminatory practices, with 
provisions based on the EU Hydrocarbons Licensing Directive (94/22/EC). Producer 
states are not however compelled to follow these stipulations but rather, as Konoplyanik 
and Wälde note (2006, p.534), the Charter is intended to provide a “standard of objective, 
transparent and non-discriminatory access”. In reality, in Kazakhstan for example, 
decisions to let foreign companies invest in major oil and gas fields are controlled by the 
Presidential Administration and based on political considerations161. Kazakh tendering 
processes can be closed and opaque rather than open, and transparent licensing of oil 
fields in not mandatory by law (unlike in the EU) (Gentech International, 2008).  
So as to manage the influence of Chinese companies in the hydrocarbon sector, the Kazakh 
President imposed a moratorium on new oil and gas investment between 2007 and early 
2013 (Revenue Watch Institute, 2013, p.1). The sheer scale of Chinese investment in 
Kazakhstan does raise issues regarding open licensing competitions and the extent to 
which they create a level playing field. Indeed, despite the EU’s promotion of open 
competition in the Caspian, one EU official expressed a concern that if Kazakhstan was to 
conduct entirely open competitions for hydrocarbon licenses, then Chinese companies 
may win most of the contracts162. With generous state backing, cheap loans and lower 
commercial pressures (as well as opportunities for corruption), Chinese companies could 
potentially outbid private actors who did not receive state-backing. Such a situation would 
be bad from an EU security of supply point of view and more broadly a set-back for 
competition generally. Indeed in this sense, competition could lead to a monopolisation. 
This risk was backed up by one Kazak official who feared the consequences of open 
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competitions, arguing that the risk of corruption in Kazakhstan means that those 
companies that were able to afford and get away with paying the biggest bribes would 
may be likely to win contracts, rather than those with the best bid163. US officials noted 
how in 2009 (unlike all the major Western companies), no Chinese companies operating in 
Kazakhstan had signed the EITI memorandum of understanding that would increase 
transparency of their payments to government officials (US Department of State, 2009c). 
Market access issues vary as a priority across the region however. Kazakhstan and 
Azerbaijan permit the (controlled) participation of the majority of European majors in 
their territory. Rather it is Turkmenistan, where foreign involvement is heavily curtailed, 
that provides both the greatest challenge and opportunity in terms of market access for 
exploration and production for the European commercial sector164. Engagement with 
Turkmenistan is particularly exciting from an EU point of view (especially if the European 
Commission and EEAS are able to facilitate the construction of a trans-Caspian pipeline165) 
as the country offers the opportunity for source, route and counterparty diversification. 
As noted above, WTO is perceived as a solution to a number of market problems in energy 
deriving from state-proprietorialism. This is because WTO membership should ensure 
commitment on a broad range of liberal market-led competitive principles, such as 
reduced export duties, reduced restrictions in terms of local content, most favoured nation 
non-discrimination, certain curtailments on state involvement, subsidies and export 
restrictions - all of which would serve to create a more level playing field for European 
commercial actors. Crucially as well, the WTO has strong dispute and enforcement 
mechanisms that the EU can take in instances when states breach WTO rules. Indeed, the 
EU has recently initiated WTO dispute proceeding against new WTO member Russia 
regarding Russian import restrictions on cars from Europe (EC, 2013b). 
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 Interview Former Kazakh Government Official [32], Astana, Summer 2012 
164 Interview British Government Official [30], Astana, Summer 2012 
165 The prospects for this pipeline have been hindered however by the recent decisions not to 
award Shah Deniz gas to Nabucco (see chapter one). 
175 
 
Safety, environmental and technical regulatory harmonisation  
 
The export of regulatory convergence in terms of safety, environmental and technical 
standards is a core EU preference in external energy governance. While the Energy 
Charter organises best practice information sharing and dialogue on energy efficiency 
under the PEEREA (Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects) 
programme (Constantinescu, Janssen & Nielsen, 2005), the Baku Initiative is the main 
framework for the promotion of EU safety, environmental and technical standards norms 
in the Caspian (EC, 2006a, p.4). Key areas relate to minimising the deterioration of energy 
networks (so as to reduce the risk of supply disruptions), ensuring sustainable tariff 
setting practices, developing legal and financial frameworks for the development of 
renewable energy sources and meeting European environmental regulations (EC, 2006a, 
p.5-8).  
In general, the EU supports regulatory convergence in these areas for security of supply, 
environmental and competition reasons. Technical harmonisation on safety standards can 
lead to increased security of supply by reducing the risk of pipeline explosions or 
industrial disasters. Harmonisation in the areas of energy efficiency both further the EU’s 
efforts to reduce climate change emissions and help Caspian states to reduce their internal 
demand ensuring that more oil and gas is available for export. Finally, harmonisation also 
has an impact on competition and the creation of a “level playing field” (relating to SEF: 
protection against commercial disadvantage and SEF: contributing to collective autonomy) 
as some states are able to undercut EU producers by adhering to lower standards. 
Encouraging the use of EU standards also carries a benefit for those (predominantly 
European) companies that are already used to operating under these conditions. 
Producing countries have incentives to cooperate here however as European safety 
standards are amongst the most advanced in the world. Producing countries have to deal 
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with the aftermath of any potential environmental disaster and thus have a reason to 
cooperate with the EU on increasing their domestic standards to avoid these risks. 
Revenue transparency and country/project level reporting 
 
The Central Asia Strategy calls for increased transparency in the governance of the energy 
sector (EU, 2009, p.23). As is the case with competition, transparency can have multiple 
meanings. The EITI, (as discussed above) promotes transparency in the sense of 
accountability, good governance and anti-corruption in regard to government revenues 
and business practices. Likewise, recently, the EU agreed amendments to the EU 
Accounting and Transparency Directives that cover financial reporting in the EU and that 
now compel natural resource companies listed on EU stock exchanges (including, of 
course, those which are active in the Caspian) to increase the disclosure of payments to 
resource-rich states, increasing the scrutiny of company payments. Transparency is 
however also mentioned in both the ECT and the Astana Road Map. In these cases, 
transparency is however related more to market price transparency for the purposes of 
encouraging economic competition and better understanding of supply and demand 
levels, rather than good governance and the mitigation of corruption (Axelrod, 1994, 
p.501).  
The form of transparency required by the EITI was traditionally ‘country-level reporting’ 
where companies and states had to account for the totality of the payments made and 
received in a given year. This allows public scrutiny of government revenues derived from 
the oil and gas sector and provides civil society groups with some of the information 
needed to hold governments to account. However, the new EU Accounting and 
Transparency Directives, like the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States, go further (in terms 
of companies at least) requiring ‘project-level reporting’. This presents the opportunity for 
greater levels of scrutiny of company payments by requiring that companies report 
payments for each project (over 100,000 Euro) they are involved in, rather than the 
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overall sum for the country (Ruby, 2012). At the May 2013 EITI Global Conference in 
Sydney, the EITI decided to adopt an updated standard in transparency that includes 
project-by-project reporting, increased scrutiny of national mining companies and more 
scrutiny of beneficial ownership (Moberg, 2013). Doing so will increase revenue 
transparency in signatory states as breaking down the payments received by governments 
to individual project-level makes it easier to monitor exactly what monies have been 
received, from whom and when. However, as will be discussed further in the next section, 
the shift to project-level reporting faced some resistance from members of the EITI Board 
(predominantly those from the commercial sector) because of disagreement over the 
definition of a ‘project’, fears of prosecution in states where there are rules prohibiting the 
reporting of payments and fears of competition with companies that do not have to meet 
these more stringent requirements, such as Chinese companies (Westenberg, 2012). 
Furthermore, as one EU official noted, these transparency requirements are still in a sense 
limited in that they do not shed light on what happens to money once it has been handed 
to governments166. 
Multilateralism/regionalism 
 
The EU’s energy policy in the Caspian region contains both regionalist and multilateral 
elements. To a certain extent regionalism and multilateralism both underpin and are 
inherent to a number of the other norms discussed above - in particular competition and 
standards harmonisation. The encouragement of market-governance practices through 
the ECT and WTO implies a degree of multilateralism in energy and relies on such 
multilateralism for success. Likewise, the Central Asia Strategy, presenting an approach 
that is regionalist, highlights the EU desire to “promote an integrated Central Asian energy 
market” and support “technological cooperation between the EU and the Central Asian 
states in the energy sector” (EU, 2009, p.23). More generally the Central Asia Strategy 
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(2009, p.23) talks of how “the EU can offer experience of regional integration leading to 
political stability and prosperity” [emphasis added]. Likewise, the Baku Initiative has as 
one of its first major objectives, the long-term desire to establish a regional integrated 
energy market in the Caspian/Black Sea regions and a short-term desire (as noted above) 
to encourage energy market convergence.  
Importantly, these regional and multilateral perspectives should not be seen merely as 
attempts to facilitate cooperation. Indeed, they are also a defensive means of mitigating 
the impact of other forms of energy cooperation that the EU does not favour - such as 
energy cooperation within Russian or Chinese regional projects such as Eurasian 
Economic Union or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. While they seek to increase 
cooperation between Caspian states and Europe, EU regional projects generally exclude 
Russia and China and the multilateral frameworks that the EU promotes in the region 
(such as the Energy Charter Treaty and WTO) seek to ensure that any other agreements 
entered into by Caspian states with Russia or China do not contravene the EU’s 
fundamental normative preferences in energy (as in other sectors). 
EU CASPIAN ENERGY GOVERNANCE NORMS: PATTERNS OF EUROPEAN 
CONVERGENCE  
 
This section examines the perspectives of member states and energy companies on the 
EU’s energy governance norms in the Caspian. It does so by identifying patterns of 
convergence and divergence around the five norms of the EU’s external oil and gas 
governance in the Caspian discussed above. As was the case in the previous chapter, all of 
the companies below are involved in projects located in or directly reliant on supply from 
the Caspian. 
This section identifies a mixed pattern of European actor preference on these norms. It 
will be argued that, in line with the risk perceptions observed in the previous chapter, the 
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greatest degree of commonality is seen on the norms and principles associated with 
investment protection and market facilitation. Other areas, however, present a more 
mixed picture. While broad agreement is seen on all of the international norms that find 
expression in the EITI, WTO and the Energy Charter (inter alia market access, investment, 
non-discrimination, country level transparency), there are, however, degrees of 
divergence regarding the specific EU norms (EU regulatory convergence, internal market-
based competition) pursued predominantly via the Baku Initiative and other EU 
structures. As the section below demonstrates, member states and companies present a 
broad (albeit not perfect) agreement on the norms of EU upstream governance and the 
state economic functions it entails. Moreover, and significantly, member states and 
companies also largely agree on the EU role in promoting these norms and rules through 
the governance complex highlighted above. 
Investment protection and promotion 
 
Member states are quick to highlight the importance attached to investment protection. 
The Dutch Government notes that the EU should be “able to play a more prominent role 
[…] by concluding investment agreements with oil and gas-producing nations and regions” 
(The Dutch Ministry of the Economy, 2006, p.5). One UK Government Official argued that 
responding to political risks to UK business investments reflected one of the major tasks of 
their work in the Caspian region167. The Polish response to the 2011 consultation noted 
the EU’s significance in facilitating EU investment in third party markets and its 
contribution to “increased security and transparency with these countries” (Polish 
Ministry of the Economy, 2011, p.3)168. A number of member states place particular stress 
on the Energy Charter and WTO. The French response to the 2011 consultation on 
external energy notes that the Energy Community Treaty and the Energy Charter Treaty 
                                                          
167 Interview UK Government Official [30], Astana, Summer 2011. 
168 The Czech Government (2011, p.1) notes that the EU should continue to promote a “stable” and 
“transparent legal environment” in producing countries (including those in the Caspian). 
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constitute fundamental elements of the “harmonised judicial space around the EU 
particularly in the domains of the security of networks and transportation and the 
protection of investments” (French Permanent Representation EU, 2011, p.1). Poland 
likewise, speaks of the virtues of the Energy Charter, and its role in facilitating investment, 
and the WTO in term of dispute settlement (Polish Ministry of the Economy, 2011, p.3).  
All energy companies and both industry associations that responded to the EU 2011 public 
consultation on external energy stress the importance of investment protection and, 
importantly for this study, their desire for the EU to be active in this policy area (Eni, 2011, 
p.1; Eurogas, 2011, p.2; RWE, 2011, p.1; Statoil, 2011, p.5; Shell, 2011, p.5; OMV, 2011, p.1; 
OGP, 2011, p.4). Likewise, several companies feel that investment protection and the 
promotion of a stable investment climate is a priority over other areas (such as regulatory 
convergence). Eni (2011, p.1) for example, captures this position when it argues that “in 
the short and medium term, promoting a sound framework for investment protection is 
more practicable and urgent than achieving full implementation of the whole energy 
acquis in non-EU countries”. As noted above, energy companies are fundamentally 
concerned with ensuring respect for their property rights and that legal structures are not 
imposed in a discriminatory manner169. Eni stresses that the primary aim of any EU 
external energy action should be to apply “all political tools at EU level to guarantee 
international investment protection” (Eni, 2011, p.1). Likewise Eni argues that the EU 
should cooperate on investment protection with other major consuming countries (such 
as the US) (Eni, 2011, p.4). The International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP) 
argues “investment protection and sanctity of contracts [are] the most important points to 
achieve” (OGP, 2011, p.4). RWE and Eurogas (the latter representing most European gas 
companies) note the importance of the WTO and Energy Charter in this regard (RWE, 
2011, p.2; Eurogas, 2011, p.2). EU and company officials interviewed note regular 
meetings, both in Brussels and Caspian states, between the EU and companies to discuss 
                                                          
169 Interview energy company official [33], Autumn 2012 
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issues such as investment problems, local content requirements and other related 
concerns170.  
Sustainable competition (levelling the playing field) 
 
Member state responses to the public consultation generally support EU efforts to 
establish a ‘level playing field’ with regard to third party countries through the reduction 
of barriers to trade and the convergence of standards to facilitate competition (see for 
example French Permanent Representation, 2011; The Polish Ministry of the Economy, 
2011). The Dutch Government (Government of the Netherlands, 2011, p.1) notes that the 
EU should engage with third party countries with the objective of advancing “the creation 
of a level playing field for market parties”. The WTO and (EU) bilateral agreements are 
highlighted as tools that should be aimed at eliminating trade and investment barriers 
(Polish Ministry of the Economy, 2011, p.10). Poland also notes that efforts need to be 
made by the EU to ensure a level playing field with regard to interference by producers in 
the energy raw materials market, including inter alia the removal of subsidies, the 
application of double energy prices as well as export duties which increase the costs of 
energy transported to the EU (Polish Ministry of the Economy, 2011, p.4). The Polish 
response to the 2011 consultation on external energy policy also argues that the EU 
institutions should facilitate the identification of and devise solutions for the removal of 
barriers to energy trade, investment and energy infrastructures (Polish Ministry of the 
Economy, 2011, p.12).   
Similarly, responses from the French government call for greater incorporation of energy 
issues into existing agreements, including free trade agreements (French Permanent 
Representation EU, 2011, p.1; p.3) The French Government notes how the EU has an 
evident interest to export its own legislation in energy matters and that doing so is 
                                                          
170 Ibid; Interview EU official [14], Brussels, Summer 2012; Interview EU official [27], Brussels, 
Summer 2012 - The EU’s role in political support for companies is discussed further in chapters six 
and seven. 
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important in terms of “guaranteeing access to markets and equal production conditions 
between the EU and neighbourhood countries” (French Permanent Representation, 2011, 
p.1). 
Generally speaking, as identified by Youngs (2009, p.157), companies express support for 
free markets and increased competition and press for the EU to support increased market 
access in the external energy sector. ExxonMobil, Shell and OGP highlight the importance 
of reciprocity and equal market opening so as to maximise access to upstream resources 
(ExxonMobil, 2011, p.1; Royal Dutch Shell, 2011, p.5; OGP, 2011, p.3). Shell argues that 
gaining access to resources is a “major challenge” and suggests the need for EU political 
support to accompany broader competition and investment regulatory frameworks and 
calls on the EU to develop “good [political] relationships with all countries that can 
contribute to the security and diversity of supply” (Royal Dutch Shell, 2011, p.5). Several 
companies highlight the importance of maintaining a level playing field between 
international and producer companies (OMV, 2011, p.1; Eni, 2011, p.1). OGP argues that 
“international competition and open markets create a broad supply base and bring about 
energy security”171 (OGP, 2011, p.4). Statoil welcomes EU efforts to increase “fair access 
rules in neighbouring energy markets as this will help create a level playing field and 
promote cost-effective energy solutions” (Statoil, 2011, p.1). Linking market access (a 
company commercial objective) to broader European economic prosperity, Eurogas 
(2011, p.1) argue that “supporting the EU’s economic competitiveness by means of 
supporting [company] access to reliable and cost-competitive global energy supplies 
should be a central mission of [EU] public policy”. 
However, it should be noted that there appears to be some disagreement over the 
promotion of competition on the basis of internal EU energy rules (an objective of the 
                                                          
171 Statoil welcomes EU efforts to increase transparency and fair access rules in neighbouring 
energy markets as this will help create a “level playing field and promote cost-effective energy 
solutions” (Statoil, 2011, p.1).  
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Baku Initiative). Smaller European companies tend to promote close alignment of energy 
systems in third party states with EU rules. Support for these measures may relate in part 
to smaller companies’ desires to constrain and compete on a more equal footing with 
larger international majors (Youngs, 2009, p.156). EDF notes, for example, that “the 
benefits of free trade [in energy] are widely acknowledged” and that they “would be keen 
for other countries to adopt the [EU] internal market rules and the general regulatory 
approach” (2011, p.1). OMV (2011, p.1) argues that the EU’s internal market principles 
“need to be promoted in neighbouring countries [emphasis in original]”.  
However international majors and the associations (that include international majors) 
tend to be more cautious, expressing less support for the promotion of competition on the 
basis of EU rules. Generally speaking, larger companies welcome increased support in 
terms of access to resources but, as Youngs (2009, p. 157) has noted, larger firms are often 
quite content with their relations with producer states and fear being subject to new 
regulations or competition. Shell (Royal Dutch Shell, 2011, p.1) for example cautions that a 
“degree of realism” is needed with regard to the potential for internal market convergence 
with external partners. Eurogas (2011, p.1) suggest that while the EU approach could be a 
“model” for neighbouring countries, “national environments and specificities need to be 
taken into account”. OGP172 (2011, p.2) notes that the EU should pay close attention to 
“differences of circumstances and political opinion in third countries”. For some 
companies, access to resources is thought to be better obtained through the promotion of 
international regimes such as the WTO and the Energy Charter Treaty (Statoil, 2011, p.1) 
as well as through offering reciprocal downstream access in the EU for access upstream 
(Royal Dutch Shell, 2011, p.4; OGP, 2011, p.4). Likewise, a number of others (Eurogas, 
2011, p.2; Eni, 2011, p.1) suggest that the protection of investments and the promotion of 
                                                          
172 The commonalities and crossover between OGP and Exxon Mobil’s contributions to the EU 
public consultation is striking. At several stages throughout both contributions, whole paragraphs 
are identical. 
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existing commitments (WTO/Energy Charter) should take clear priority over the full 
implementation of the energy acquis in non-EU countries.  
Safety, environmental and technical regulatory harmonisation  
 
Broader regulatory issues, while not deliberately related to increasing competition, are 
nonetheless closely linked to questions of commercial advantage and competitiveness. 
Regulatory standards in terms of environmental conditions, safety and technical standards 
can offer both opportunities and drawbacks for certain companies. For companies 
successfully engaging without these measures, their imposition can be a market 
hindrance, incurring additional costs. However, for those already used to operating under 
them, they can use them to their commercial advantage and provide opportunities vis-à-
vis others. As Luttwak has noted, states and “blocs of states” (such as the EU) use 
regulation as a means of gaining commercial advantage over others (1990, p.126). Youngs 
highlights, for example, how some European companies lobbied Brussels to promote EU 
regulatory structures in sub-Saharan Africa to give European companies a competitive 
advantage over US firms (2009, p.168). Regulatory standards can also pose a barrier to 
less technically advanced companies who may be able to operate more cheaply but who 
cannot meet high European standards. They can therefore, under certain conditions, 
present a source of technical advantage for European/international companies. EU 
officials with responsibility for energy policy in the Caspian noted that some companies 
seek the adoption of higher technical standards by producer and transit countries as they 
are able to sell this technology necessary to meet these standards to upstream states173. 
Officials also note that there is a business case for standards relating to energy efficiency 
given that energy extraction is an energy intensive business and these costs are born by 
companies.174 
                                                          
173 Interview EU official [17], Brussels, Summer 2012 
174 Ibid 
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Member states generally note their desire to see increased regulatory convergence with 
third party countries and the creation of a common regulatory area in energy. While 
noting that a differentiated approach may be necessary, the Latvian Government (2011, 
p.1) suggested that it was “crucial to promote regulatory convergence especially regarding 
environmental and safety standards”. The Dutch Government (Government of the 
Netherlands, 2011, p.1) noted that the Netherlands is “strongly in favour” of promoting 
regulatory convergence on EU lines. The most commonly cited tool for this was the Energy 
Community Treaty, including its extension to the states of the Caucasus (including 
Azerbaijan)175 (Polish Ministry of the Economy, 2011, p.2). As noted in the previous 
chapter, the Baku Initiative is the main source of regulatory convergence across the 
Caspian. The French government argues for the extension of EU legislation to the EU’s 
immediate neighbours, “notably that concerning regulation of markets and environmental 
and security norms”. Similarly, the Lithuanian Government, for example, notes that lower 
safety and regulatory standards in third party countries means that EU companies are 
sometimes uncompetitive against their non-European counterparts (Government of 
Lithuania, 2011, p.3). The UK Government (2006a, p.29) stresses support for the 
progressive integration of the energy markets in the Caspian region into the EU market 
and UK support for the Baku Initiative that entails promotion for regulatory safety and 
environmental harmonisation.  
Again, like competition, regulatory convergence appears to be an area of EU external 
energy governance where one witnesses some discord both between companies and 
between companies and the EU. While the majority support the regulatory convergence of 
EU neighbours with EU standards, international majors Exxon and Shell both cautioned 
against the export of regulatory norms noting that such actions should not take place until 
the regulatory landscape was settled inside the EU (Royal Dutch Shell, 2011, p.1; 
ExxonMobil, 2011, p.1). It is likely that they fear that encouraging convergence too early 
                                                          
175 However, notably not to the states on the other side of the Caspian. 
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might lead to a continuously changing external regulatory environment. Better, in this 
instance, to wait until the EU internal context is fixed and then pursue convergence with 
that. Likewise, OGP (2011, p.2) advises the EU to respect differences of opinion when 
promoting the energy acquis in third countries. Imposing EU standards abroad could entail 
higher operating costs for companies. In cases where they face little competition from 
other companies who might struggle to operate under more stringent conditions, higher 
regulatory costs (beyond ensuring that environmental disasters are averted) offer fewer 
immediate incentives for companies (see below).  
The majority of commercial respondents to EU public consultations on external energy 
policy however (including Eurogas that represents all companies), noted that, while it 
should demonstrate a degree of flexibility in respect to the specific needs of each 
neighbouring country, the EU should pursue a policy of regulatory convergence with 
states in the EU’s periphery (Eni, 2011, p.1; RWE, 2011, p.1; Eurogas, 2011, p.1; EDF, 2011, 
p.3; Statoil, 2011, p.1). Arguing the business case for convergence, OMV posits that the 
adoption of environmental and safety standards in energy by EU neighbouring countries 
“will contribute to a stable and predictable business climate” (2011, p.1). Likewise Eni 
notes that “extending the main internal market, environmental and safety principles to 
neighbouring countries would add certainty to the investment climate and level the 
playing field and certainly benefit energy companies” (Eni, 2011, p.1). Partly relieving the 
tension between the different company positions highlighted above, one energy official 
from an international major noted that support for the promotion of regulatory 
convergence depended on the time frame involved. In general, they stated, it was better to 
have regulatory harmonisation, but noted that it was never good to have this imposed on 
them. They noted that while it could sometimes be a competitive advantage not to have to 
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respond to EU harmonisation, if one was committed to a market long-term, it was 
generally preferable to have higher EU standards in place176.  
Revenue transparency  
 
Revenue transparency, on the basis of the country-level reporting norms of the previous 
EITI standards, is an area of strong convergence. However, transparency principles based 
on project-level payment reporting do present an area of contention, especially for energy 
companies. A large number of European countries (UK, France, Germany, The Netherlands, 
Spain, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, and Sweden) are active members and supporters 
of the EITI “providing political, technical and financial support” (EITI Secretariat, 2013a, 
p.4). EU officials note how regular EITI coordination meetings take place between EU 
member states at the EU delegation in Kazakhstan177. The UK Government (2006a, p.29) 
notes how it “supports Commission work in the region to promote good governance [such 
as through the EITI], in particular in the energy sector”.  
Companies who are, unlike states, directly affected by transparency requirements do 
nonetheless offer some support for greater transparency in the extractive sector. Energy 
companies generally support the EITI and participate in its programmes. European 
companies BP, BG Group, DONG Energy, Eni, GDF Suez, Repsol, RWE, Shell, Statoil and 
Total and US companies Chevron, Conoco Phillips and Exxon all sit on the EITI’s Multi-
stakeholder Coalition and abide by its existing protocols (EITI Secretariat, n.d. [b]). A 
number of companies sit on the EITI’s Board (BP, Total, Statoil, Shell, Exxon, Chevron) 
(EITI Secretariat, 2013b, p.2). Companies were also involved in consultation for and 
agreed to a new EITI standard at the EITI Global Conference in Sydney in May 2013 
(Moberg, 2013). OGP, which represents virtually all European upstream operating 
                                                          
176 Interview energy company official [34], Brussels, Autumn 2011. 
177 Interview EU official [31], Astana, Summer 2012. 
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companies178, argues that companies should publish payments to governments and that 
this practice provides the information necessary for citizens to hold governments to 
account (OGP, 2012, p.1).  
While companies support transparency and the EITI, the nature of the transparency 
(country or project-level) has proven more contentious. OGP assert that country-level 
payment reporting provides an “accurate picture of the global distribution of an upstream 
oil and gas company’s direct financial contribution to the public sector” (2012, p.1). The 
EITI is the preference for companies in terms of promoting this standard of 
transparency179. Companies however have been much more cautious around project-level 
reporting. Companies have noted a number of perceived problems with this kind of 
transparency. They caution that there is both no commonly agreed definition of the term 
‘project’, that payment at the project-level varies considerably over time and across 
countries and that disclosure of payments based on this principle could thus lead to 
misleading data (OGP, 2012, p.2). More fundamentally, they argue that project-level 
disclosure could contravene local laws that forbid the publishing of government revenue 
data (putting companies and individuals at risk) and could thus hinder European 
companies subject to such rules against other national and international companies that 
are not. This, they argue, would represent “an unwelcome distortion of competition 
against European companies” that “could undermine the ability of Europe’s oil and gas 
sector to retain existing contracts and to win new business, giving an advantage to non EU-
based competitors” (OGP, 2012, p.2). Furthermore OGP note that European/Western 
international companies are responsible for a minority of global production and that 
transparency measures that apply solely to them will be unlikely to have a broader 
demonstrable effect (OGP, 2012, p.2). One energy company official cautioned that 
                                                          
178 See the OGP website - http://www.ogp.org.uk/about-ogp/membership/upstream-companies/ - 
for details. Furthermore, as the statement is unequivocal and there appears to be no contradiction 
in its message, one can deduce a broadly homogenous position amongst companies represented by 
OGP. 
179 Interview energy company official [33], Brussels, Autumn 2012 
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disclosure would also force companies to reveal their cost structures and internal 
workings to competitors180. They argued that the EU should be more specifically engaged 
in pushing for good resource governance. Companies, they said, were often in the firing 
line but it was the European Union, they felt, that needed to do more in terms of reform 
and in terms of giving producer countries better examples of how to manage political 
power181.  
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, Western energy companies did agree to the new EITI 
standard at the Global Conference in May 2013 that now involves project-level reporting. 
It appears that the EITI standard may well have benefitted from the adoption of the new 
Accounting and Transparency Directives and Dodd-Frank Act in the US (discussed above) 
that also entail project-level reporting (the major difference being that the EITI also 
applies to producer countries). Following the adopting of these requirements, companies 
had little reason to withhold agreement on the same requirements in the EITI. Overall 
then, despite some company reservations, we can see a strong (if sometimes reluctant) 
alignment between the transparency policies of member states, companies and the EU 
institutions around the EITI – an organisation strongly supported by the EU in the Caspian 
region.  
Regionalism/multilateralism 
 
EU member states continue to support the regional elements of the EU’s strategy in 
Central Asia (Council of the European Union, 2012, p.1). Council Conclusions (2012, p.2) 
on Central Asia from June 2012 note how the EU should continue to promote “broader 
regional co-operation for Caspian basin [energy] development and further strengthen the 
participation of Central Asian partners in the enhanced INOGATE (Baku Initiative) 
                                                          
180 Ibid 
181 Ibid - Some member states have also expressed some reservations with regard to new 
transparency laws. The German Government, for example, has shown some concern that new rules 
might undermine German mineral extraction companies (Hayman, 2012).  
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programme”. German Government officials argue that encouraging regionalism underlines 
the approach taken by Germany in Central Asia (under whose presidency the Central Asia 
Strategy was launched in 2007). By working more closely together, German officials assert 
that the Central Asian and Caspian states will be able to both learn from the region-
building experience of the EU and be more capable of standing up to their larger 
neighbours182. However, as noted in the previous chapter, a number of the core pillars of 
EU energy governance in the Caspian are multilateral and not specifically regional in 
nature. The EITI, WTO and Energy Charter are all broad multilateral forums that as 
described above, continue to be strongly supported by member states (Council of the 
European Union, 2012, p.2-3).  
 
Companies in general do not explicitly profess a particular preference for any type of 
governance framework, although the desire noted by some for differentiated interaction 
lends itself towards more bilateral forms of engagement. As discussed above, companies 
recommend taking third party positions into account which entails bilateral arrangements 
rather than regional or multilateral adherence to a complete set of rules. As noted 
previously, companies do expressly support several frameworks that are multilateral in 
nature (in particular the EITI, WTO, and Energy Charter). One energy company official 
noted that companies prefer energy arrangements to be embedded in broader agreements 
such as the EU’s deep and comprehensive free trade agreements (DCFTAs) or the WTO, as 
these give European/international actors greater bargaining power since they can 
leverage across different issues and gain upstream concessions by giving access to EU 
markets etc.183. However again, there is little particular stated preference for 
multilateralism or bilateralism but rather a concern with the content of the agreement 
(and its market enabling or regulatory functions). As noted in the sections above on 
competition, regulatory convergence and investment, it is the outcome of the governance 
                                                          
182 Interview German Government Official [22], Brussels, Summer 2011 
183 Interview energy company official [34], Brussels, Autumn 2012 
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(does it improve the investment climate, does it lower operating costs or provide a more 
competitive position etc.?) that matters to companies, rather than the form of engagement. 
However, as noted above, companies do tend nevertheless to demonstrate mixed 
perspectives on the more regionally EU-orientated integration frameworks and policy 
areas such as regulatory standards harmonisation and market integration under EU rules 
(Eurogas, 2011, p.2; Eni, 2011, p.1). Again however, this is likely to be related to the 
impact of the rules and the risk of higher regulatory burdens that these entail rather than 
the type of cooperation (regional/multilateral) they involve.  
CONCLUSION: A LIBERAL SHAPING OF THE CASPIAN MILIEU 
 
This chapter has outlined the EU’s tactical milieu-shaping energy governance objectives in 
the Caspian upstream. The chapter had two broad objectives. Firstly, it sought to outline 
how the EU’s complex of energy governance structures promotes certain liberal risk-
mitigating state economic functions in the Caspian. Secondly, the chapter described the 
perspectives of member states and energy companies on the EU’s upstream governance 
objectives.  
To set up analysis of the EU’s upstream governance the chapter first presented Mommer’s 
(2000) distinction between liberal and proprietorial models of energy governance. This 
section outlined liberal and proprietorial models in terms of their conception of state 
economic functions, the role of the state, investment, competition, intended beneficiaries 
and political risk mitigation/creation. The rest of the chapter sought to demonstrate how 
the EU’s energy governance complex in the Caspian corresponds broadly to the liberal 
model of governance and how it in turn contributes to the EU’s broader strategic role in 
market facilitation and political risk mitigation. 
The second section analysed the institutional dimension of the governance structures 
promoted by the EU in the Caspian upstream and drew attention to EU’s ‘governance 
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complex’ of macro institutional structures (such as the Central Asia Strategy) and meso-
sectoral level structures in energy (and wider meso structures in trade that apply to 
energy). It was noted that three of the four major meso structures promoted by the EU in 
terms of energy governance in the Caspian, such as the Energy Charter and the EITI, are 
actually international in character rather than EU-administered institutions, although they 
do still approximate to European preferences and desired state economic functions (albeit 
perhaps to a lesser extent that EU officials would like).  
The third part of the chapter analysed the governance norms and state economic functions 
that these institutional structures support in the region. It was argued that the EU 
promotes five overarching norms in the Caspian upstream; investment 
protection/promotion, sustainable competition, safety/technical and environmental 
standard regulatory harmonisation, revenue transparency and 
multilateralism/regionalism. Analysing these norms allows detailed examination of the 
milieu-shaping character of EU governance and outlines more clearly how the EU’s policy 
in the region helps support the broader objective of protecting and facilitating commercial 
actors in the region. Indeed overall, the second and third sections sought to demonstrate 
how the EU’s governance structures in the Caspian seek to obtain adherence to a number 
of state economic functions, most notably: 1) protection of property rights; 2) protection 
against commercial disadvantage; and 3) the promotion of autonomy for commercial 
actors. 
The final section considered member state and energy company perceptions of the norms 
promoted by the EU in the Caspian region. In line with the discussion of upstream risk in 
the previous chapter, the greatest area of convergence surrounded investment protection 
and the creation of a level playing field for businesses. However, while there is general 
agreement on the EU’s upstream governance norms, companies in particular have 
historically expressed doubts about the level and speed of regulatory harmonisation and 
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project-level transparency reporting. Most of this divergence on the part of companies can 
be explained, as suggested in chapter one (Levy & Prakash 2003, p.133; Youngs, 2009, 
p.155), by company desires to encourage EU action in areas that increase their business 
prospects but to reduce it in areas that might create higher costs or increase the 
competition they face. Nonetheless, a picture emerges from this chapter of a relatively 
cohesive EU milieu-shaping governance complex in the Caspian supported by EU 
institutions, MS and (sometimes recalcitrant) energy companies. However, as the next 
chapter will demonstrate, it is not enough to just promote energy governance institutions 
in the Caspian. The EU’s milieu-shaping efforts require the support of EU-level energy 
diplomacy.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
EUROPEAN ENERGY DIPLOMACY AND POLITICAL 
SUPPORT  
 
This chapter examines the role of EU energy diplomacy in reducing and responding to risk 
in the Caspian milieu and company and member state perspectives on this upstream 
energy diplomatic practice. In addressing the diplomatic dimension of the EU’s milieu-
shaping activities, this chapter has a number of core objectives. Firstly, it seeks to 
demonstrate how the EU’s reliance on energy companies creates a strong link between the 
EU’s energy diplomacy and commercial diplomacy (especially the ‘problem-solving’ 
variant of commercial diplomacy). Secondly, the chapter seeks to shed some light on the 
tensions caused by this overlap, both in terms of the inter-institutional question of who is 
responsible for EU energy diplomacy and in terms of the tensions between the particular 
commercial interests of companies and the EU’s wider energy policy. Third, the chapter 
seeks to outline the different aspects of the EU’s energy diplomacy in the Caspian, 
highlighting the different forums and modes of EU energy diplomacy towards Caspian 
states. Finally, given member states’ general hesitance to afford the EU a strong role in 
external energy policy (as described in the introduction), this chapter seeks to gauge 
member state and energy company support for a strong EU diplomacy role in upstream 
foreign energy policy. This section finds strong support from member states and 
companies for both an active EU upstream diplomatic role and for a high level of company-
EU interaction and information-sharing in the process of formulating and conducting 
energy diplomacy. A number of explanations are offered for this support focusing on the 
changing power dynamics in the Caspian/Central Asia, the more politically ‘neutral’ 
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perception of the EU institutions (relative to member states) and the risk mitigation 
strategies of companies themselves. This support for an EU energy diplomacy role 
represents a gradual, but ongoing supranationalisation of the commercial diplomacy and 
political support function that companies have traditionally expected from national 
governments and bucks the generally-witnessed trend of disunity and discord in EU 
foreign energy policy.  
The chapter is organised into four sections. The first outlines the overlap between energy 
diplomacy and commercial diplomacy and the role of diplomacy in the reduction of 
political risk. The second section outlines the EU’s energy diplomatic activity towards the 
Caspian upstream and highlights some of the overlap between EEAS and EU Commission 
roles in Caspian energy diplomacy. The third section examines intra-European 
convergence on a growing EU role in (commercial) energy diplomacy in the Caspian. This 
section examines the degree of member state and company support for EU-level 
commercial energy diplomacy and suggests how the positive respective positions of both 
national capitals and energy firms on upstream diplomacy can be explained. The fourth 
section discusses some of the tensions between company and EU perspectives on the 
respective roles of companies and the EU, noting how companies seek to involve the EU in 
their particular disputes, while being keen to preserve their business autonomy. However, 
the EU Commission and EEAS for their part, seek to respond to broad issues that affect the 
general interest of the upstream-operating energy industry as a whole, rather than be seen 
as responding to the specific interests of any one energy company.    
RISK MITIGATION AND COMMERCIAL ENERGY DIPLOMACY IN THE CASPIAN   
 
While the phrase “energy diplomacy” is frequently used in the literature on energy politics 
(Hazakis & Proedrou, 2012; Goldthau, 2010, p.28), discussion of EU diplomacy in energy is 
far less common – especially in terms of the catalytic diplomacy towards third party 
countries. The expression ‘energy diplomacy’ is often (erroneously) used interchangeably 
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with the terms ‘foreign energy policy’ or, in the EU context, the ‘external dimension of 
energy policy’ (see for example Saryusz-Wolski [2011, p.7] & Hazakis and Proedrou 
[2012]). However, the terms ‘diplomacy’ and ‘foreign policy’ are not synonymous. Like the 
promotion of governance, the practice of diplomacy in general and energy diplomacy in 
particular, is a tool of foreign policy (Hocking, 2004a, p.92). Indeed, Hocking (2004a, p.92) 
argues that ‘foreign policy’ constitutes “the substance of an actor’s international policy”, 
whereas ‘diplomacy’ refers to “one of the instruments through which this can be effected” 
[emphasis added]. Likewise, Carta (2012, p.13) refers to EU diplomacy as a “means to an 
end” and, echoing Wight (1979), states that European diplomacy is “defined as an 
instrument of foreign policy, an instrument of representation, a method whose main 
functions are ‘information, negotiation and communication’” [emphasis added]. The 
difference between foreign policy and diplomacy is important as the two are often 
confounded in discussions of European external relations (Hocking, 2004a, p.92). Indeed, 
Goldthau (2010, p.28) suggests, for example, that “it would seem appropriate to define 
[energy diplomacy] as the use of foreign policy to secure access to energy supplies abroad 
and to promote (mostly bilateral, that is, government to government) cooperation in the 
energy sector”. Yet, as Hocking argues (2004a, p.92-3) it is one things to suggest that the 
EU is developing a “foreign and security policy in terms of outputs and quite another to 
posit that this is accompanied by a distinctive style and mode of delivery”.  
As was described in chapter four, the EU’s energy diplomacy has both a long-term 
proactive risk-mitigating function that seeks to offset risks before they happen and a 
short-term reactive focus that aims to minimise the impact of extant threats to the 
upstream operating energy industry. EU diplomacy has the potential to reduce risk in a 
number of senses. Firstly, like energy governance (which establishes a degree of certainty 
on others’ actions through the fixing of rules) energy diplomacy has the potential to 
establish a degree of certainty through the sharing of information. This by no means 
eliminates uncertainty as interlocutors may lie and one may be deceived. However 
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diplomacy and dialogue increase the potential for the sharing of information on interests 
and future behaviour and thus can reduce the uncertainty associated with others’ actions. 
Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, diplomacy presents the opportunity for 
negotiation both to create situations that avoid risk and to resolve it when it cannot be 
averted. This may involve consensual dialogue to reach a cooperative solution or may 
involve the threat of sanction. In either case, there is the potential for the reduction of risk 
or the mitigation of extant threats. 
The 2011 European Commission communication on external energy policy notes that to 
ensure the effective promotion of “EU and national energy interests beyond [the] EU’s 
borders” (EC, 2011a, p.18), it is in the EU’s interest to develop its strategic partnerships 
with energy suppliers (EC, 2011a, p.10). Indeed, the Commission (2011a, p.17) makes 
clear that EU relations with supplier countries are based on a number of different 
instruments including the promotion of strategic energy dialogues with suppliers – in other 
words, opportunities for energy diplomacy. Furthermore, in reinforcing the diplomatic 
dimension of EU external energy policy, the Commission notes the active role of the EEAS 
and the EU’s delegations (the EU’s foremost diplomatic institutions) in the promotion of EU 
foreign energy priorities (EC, 2011a, p.17). 
The overlap between energy diplomacy and commercial diplomacy  
 
EU reliance on energy companies for energy supply and the consequent link between the 
EU’s energy security and commercial objectives means that the EU’s commercial 
diplomacy is a core dimension of the EU’s wider energy diplomacy. Commercial diplomacy 
refers to “a government service to the business community which aims at the development 
of socially beneficial business ventures” (Kostecki & Naray, 2007, p.1). These government 
services include networking on behalf of companies, providing (business) intelligence, 
support during negotiations and ‘problem-solving’ (Kostecki & Naray, 2007, p.7). 
‘Problem-solving’ commercial diplomacy refers to the actions of public actors involved in, 
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inter alia, the protection of property rights, tax and regulatory issues and “assistance to 
national companies which have suffered losses and wish to obtain compensation as well as 
various forms of support provided as diplomatic protection” (Kostecki & Naray, 2007, 
p.10). As the Commission noted in 2010 (EC, 2010c, p.8) as part of the Common 
Commercial Policy, the EU in the form of the Commission (see below), is responsible for 
creating the conditions that allow European businesses to invest in third party countries 
and the protection of European investment interests in the post-investment stage within 
these countries. This includes enabling and protecting “all the operations that accompany 
that investment and make it possible in practice” (EC, 2010c, p.8).  
As will be discussed below, one of the core functions of (commercial) energy diplomacy is 
to politically support the EU’s governance objectives (discussed in the previous chapter) 
and to ensure that broader political issues do not impinge on energy relations (and vice-
versa). In this sense, the EU’s energy diplomacy serves the liberal function of presenting a 
buffer between the energy industry and the (risk-inducing) realm of politics – a distinction 
denied of course by the more proprietorialist producers. Indeed, as noted in chapter four, 
the embedding of energy cooperation in diplomatic arrangements reflects, at least in part, 
the challenges of establishing legally-based energy governance relations and highlights the 
political support that is sometimes needed so that these arrangements function 
effectively184. As will be discussed further below, energy diplomacy is sometimes a 
remedial policy tool available in the upstream when the EU’s broader risk mitigating 
objectives cannot be met through the export of governance or when governance 
frameworks fail. Given the post-investment nature of the EU’s ‘problem-solving diplomacy’ 
it tends to be conducted by EU officials working within the Caspian upstream countries 
involving the Trade, Energy and Political Officers who operate there, although they are 
often supported by officials from headquarters in Brussels. Commercial diplomacy is thus, 
especially in its reactive problem-solving form, an important component of the EU’s 
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upstream capacity to pursue its strategic objective of managing political risk in foreign 
markets.  
However, from an inter-institutional perspective, the overlap between energy diplomacy 
and commercial diplomacy creates a potential tension between the roles of the EEAS and 
the Commission. While the Commission is undoubtedly responsible for the commercial 
policy and investment issues, the EEAS is responsible for managing the political 
ramifications of EU energy relations and the impact of political relations on energy. 
Furthermore, the EEAS is responsible for the overall management of the political relations 
with partner countries and (most of) the formal macro-level political interaction between 
them (see next section). As discussed below however, this does not always cause tensions 
in practice. Firstly, this is because the people directly responsible for reacting to these 
commercial energy diplomacy issues often work in delegations where the 
EEAS/Commission/member state distinction is far less acute than in Brussels. Secondly, 
EU officials in different institutions and services in Brussels are generally able to 
overcome institutional differences – often on the basis of strong personal relations at the 
level of individual units/divisions and officers, many of whom have years of working 
together as colleagues in the Commission before DG External Relations was merged with 
parts of the Council Secretariat into the EEAS.  
PROACTIVE AND REACTIVE RISK REDUCTION: EU (ENERGY) DIPLOMATIC 
PRACTICES WITH CASPIAN STATES 
 
This section discusses the EU’s multiple opportunities for proactive and reactive risk-
reducing diplomacy with Caspian states and provides an overview of roles played by 
different EU institutions (EEAS and Commission) in the provision of this diplomacy.  
The EU has the opportunity to conduct energy diplomacy with its Caspian ‘partners’ in a 
number of different settings. Firstly, for example, EU officials meet with Caspian 
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counterparts at low-level technical INOGATE working group meetings held under the 
auspices of the Baku Initiative. These fora allow officials to meet, in a multilateral setting, 
most often in Brussels, to discuss ‘best practice’ in energy. Here the EU uses forms of soft 
pressure via so-called ‘bench-marking’ exercises that track the progress of various 
countries in line with the objectives of the Astana Road Map (discussed in the previous 
chapter) and the broader EU energy acquis. The results of bench-marking reports are 
made available to the Baku Initiative participants and successful instances of reform are 
presented to the broader working party. These reports and presentations highlight those 
countries that have made progress towards EU objectives on issues such as the investment 
climate and the establishment of independent energy market regulators (EC, 2011d). At 
the Working Group meeting in 2011 for example, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan were rated 
as having ‘basic’ investment frameworks (meaning that a legislative framework favouring 
investment is not in place) and a ‘developing’ investment climate (meaning the investment 
climate is “under development”) (EC, 2011d). Turkmenistan was rated as having both a 
‘basic’ investment framework and investment climate (EC, 2011d). While there are no 
sanctions for not making progress, these sessions provide the EU with an opportunity to 
promote ‘best practice’ amongst partners from Eastern Europe and highlight to Central 
Asian states areas for further potential alignment with European norms. While EEAS 
officials attend these meetings, they are managed and coordinated largely by the European 
Commission (DG Energy and DG DEVCO). 
While the Baku Initiative meetings are broadly technocratic in nature, the EU conducts 
political-level diplomatic interaction with Caspian states in bilateral Cooperation 
Committees and Cooperation Councils and (in the Central Asia case) EU-Central Asia 
Ministerial Meetings. Cooperation Committees and Councils are held annually at a more 
senior political level than Baku Initiative meetings. These meetings cover a multitude of 
cooperation issues contained within the PCAs and the Central Asia Strategy, including 
energy and energy-related issues such as development and trade. Cooperation Committees 
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involve deputy ministers (or above) from the Caspian states and are attended by both 
officials from the EEAS and the European Commission and chaired by the EEAS at Director 
or Head of Unit level. Cooperation Councils are more senior and more strategic in nature 
and tend to discuss topics of broader significance. They are also attended by both 
Commission and EEAS officials and chaired by the EEAS, usually by the High 
Representative or an EU foreign minister. During the stage conducted for this research for 
example, the 2011 Cooperation Council meeting with Kazakhstan (attended by the author) 
was chaired by Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski as High Representative 
Catherine Ashton was unavailable.  
The most sensitive issues are discussed at informal (off the record) lunches that take place 
between the (on the record) morning and afternoon sessions185. Conducted in small 
groups (usually roughly 5 on each side) these are held at head of division and director 
level with perhaps the desk officer for the country present in the case of 
Association/Cooperation Committees and at a higher level in the case of 
Association/Cooperation Councils. Such lunches are most likely to include exclusively 
EEAS officials and officials from the EU Special Representatives office. The most restricted 
points for discussion, including the sensitive aspects of energy cooperation such as the 
Southern Corridor and relations between the respective Caspian country and Russia take 
place in these more intimate, off the record, lunch fora186.  
Bringing together all five Central Asian countries, Central Asia-EU ministerial meetings are 
multilateral and held at the level of Caspian foreign ministers, the EU Special 
Representative and either an EU Foreign Minister, the High Representative or a 
Commissioner. In addition, there are of course also other informal meetings between 
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diplomats at all levels, including regular visits to the region from Commissioners and EU 
Special Representatives187.  
Other important diplomatic tools of energy policy with suppliers are energy memoranda 
of understanding (MOU) which outline areas of energy cooperation188. Under the auspices 
of the MOUs, the EU holds annual meetings with senior representatives from these 
countries to discuss energy related issues of common interest. EU officials assert that 
while these MOU documents are political in nature and not legally binding, MOUs 
nonetheless play an important role in energy relations189. MOU meetings with Central 
Asian countries take place in the margins of Cooperation Councils (or similar meetings) 
and officials assert that much work goes into pushing cooperation on the areas outlined in 
the MOU agreements with partner states190. As such, officials suggest they provide 
valuable benchmarks for third party action and a (discursive) tool through which to 
pursue EU preferences. MOU meetings are conducted by officials from DG Energy with 
EEAS and DG DEVCO officials in attendance. 
Furthermore, there is extensive diplomatic activity conducted by the EU delegations in the 
region and, as would be expected, delegations are at the forefront of the EU’s proactive 
and reactive diplomatic activity. Interaction here occurs at numerous levels with technical 
meetings taking place between officials from the EU delegation and Caspian 
administrators, up to meetings at the level of ministers and ambassadors. The EU 
delegations play a particularly important role in commercial and problem-solving 
diplomacy. Indeed, in the case of Kazakhstan, EU officials describe how the EU has a 
number of potential reactive options in the event of a dispute between investors and the 
government. Firstly, the EU can take advantage of low-level technical meetings with 
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Kazakh officials to raise an issue and explore whether a speedy resolution is possible. 
Secondly, in more significant cases, the EU will utilise contacts in the Kazakh government 
to send an official letter or have a meeting so as to set out their point. Recent examples 
include a joint letter sent by the EU on behalf of a number of EU member state 
ambassadors to the Kazakh Prime Minister on the imposition of new (more restrictive) 
licences for engineering companies that were thought to have a negative effect on energy 
business operations191. Thirdly, the EU can also send an official demarche to the ministry 
of foreign affairs which will often be followed-up by a related meeting with Kazakh 
officials192. Such meetings will sometimes be undertaken by the EU delegation (with 
member states kept up to date with regular debriefs and written briefings)193, and at other 
times officials from the EU delegation may go to meet Kazakh counterparts with a number 
of EU member state officials present (and sometimes those from non-EU states such as the 
United States)194. At times, EU ambassadors will collectively make a visit to Kazakh 
interlocutors together so as to emphasise the importance and degree of common EU 
agreement on a particular issue. 
In the upstream, the institutional distinctions between EU institutions matter far less than 
they do in Brussels. In the Caspian delegations, Commission and EEAS colleagues work 
very collaboratively alongside each other – with little evident distinction between them on 
a day to day basis. Likewise, as will be discussed further in the next chapter, divisions 
between member states and the supranational organisations (Commission and EEAS) are 
less significant and relations more cooperative in the upstream than they are in Brussels. 
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THE SHIFT TO SUPRANATIONAL COMMERCIAL ENERGY DIPLOMACY AND POLITICAL 
SUPPORT  
 
Having discussed EU energy diplomacy and the link between commercial diplomacy and 
energy diplomacy, this section now examines the extent to which member states and 
energy companies see the EU as the appropriate level at which energy diplomacy should 
be conducted. The previous chapter argued how member states and (to a slightly lesser 
extent) energy companies demonstrate support for EU energy governance policy in the 
Caspian195. Despite the sensitivity of the EU conducting foreign energy relations (described 
in chapter one) this section identifies how the EU-level is also increasingly seen by 
companies as an important source of broader commercial energy diplomacy and reactive 
political support for companies alongside, and sometimes in place of, member states. 
While member states continue to back their own energy companies, in light of the 
convergence on political risks highlighted above and in support of the broader energy 
governance and investment protection functions listed in the previous chapter, the EU is 
increasingly seen by both energy companies and member states as a core venue for 
political support. Correspondingly, as will be described below (and in chapter seven), 
companies and member states also encourage a greater systematic interaction and 
information sharing between EU public and private actors.   
In the context of an evolving EU external energy policy, the value of EU political support 
for companies is two-fold. Firstly, in some circumstances, the EU can collectively present 
more political weight than individual member states. Secondly, the EU represents an 
alternative avenue of available support when reliance on a particular member state is not 
politically expedient. This is especially the case when there are bilateral tensions between 
a member state and a third party energy producer. This type of engagement with the EU is 
a conscious form of risk mitigation strategy for companies. Just as political actors are keen 
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 Even if this often amounts to encouraging EU support for international rules and norms, such as 
those of the WTO for example, rather than strictly EU-administered institutions and norms. 
205 
 
not to be too dependent on small numbers of “contracting parties” (i.e. companies – see 
chapter four), energy companies stress how a diversified network of supporting political 
actors is also part of their political risk mitigation strategies196.  
Likewise, while member states are cautious about supporting a strong EU role in energy, 
in terms of commercial upstream energy diplomacy, a number of member states express a 
clear desire for a robust EU role. As will be described below, EU member states see the EU 
as providing an opportunity for more influence in Kazakhstan than member states 
operating alone197. In these circumstances the EU is thought to provide a way to pool 
resources and exert more influence198. Generally speaking, from the member state 
perspective, the EU provides a rational way to achieve economies of scale and have more 
influence with external energy players, such as the Caspian energy producers. This is 
particularly the case given the ambiguity created by the declining global role for the 
United States (traditionally a supporter of Western energy majors) and the international 
relative weakening of West/European powers more broadly in relation to other states 
such as Russia and China. 
A strong EU risk mitigation and political support role and greater company-EU 
interaction  
 
All the companies examined here present a high degree of support for EU-level 
involvement in energy diplomacy. Indeed, Eni (2011, p.4), which experienced a major 
investment dispute with the Kazakh Government in 2007 (Lillis, 2007) argues that the EU 
“should politically support the industry when it comes to establishing and preserving key 
relationships” and that the “primary aim of any EU energy external action should be that of 
applying all political tools at the EU level to guarantee international investment protection” 
[emphases added]. Eurogas notes that EU political dialogue “can only be beneficial for the 
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business climate”. RWE (2011, p.2) suggests that the “EU should carry on its efforts to 
provide, at a political level, strong and reliable legal and institutional frameworks through 
mutual and beneficial relations with producing and transit countries”199. Centrica (2006, 
p.2) argues that the EU should “take the lead in a common external policy on energy, for 
example, by promoting relations with the main energy producing nations” (p.2) as well as 
dialogues aimed at “mitigating producer power” [emphasis added] (p.5). OMV (2011, p.1) 
notes how the EU is able to bring “added value to its industry” by enacting “mutual 
beneficial relations with producing and transit countries outside the EU” [emphasis in 
original]. 
Despite having been cautious about a foreign EU role in energy in some areas (see chapter 
one above), a number of member states echo company calls for a greater EU political 
support role. The French Government (French Permanent Representation, 2011, p.2) 
notes that “an important objective of partnerships between the EU and producing 
countries (notably gas producers) must be support for European energy companies 
present in these countries, who are, and who will remain, the principal agents of European 
energy supply”. The Czech Government (2011, p.3) notes how “not all issues are better 
dealt with at the national level” and that “some strategic objectives might be better 
secured by pooling and coordinating actions”. Likewise, they highlight the EU role in 
“protecting European investments” (Government of the Czech Republic, 2011, p.1-2). The 
Polish Government stresses that the EU should elaborate a coherent “approach to the issue 
of counteracting negative phenomena related to the interference of third countries 
(producers) in the energy raw materials market” (Polish Ministry of the Economy, 2011, 
p.4). 
                                                          
199
 RWE (2011, p.3) proposes that the EU develop “tools or products” that it can offer “to companies 
who are doing business in development [sic] countries providing political risk cover”.  Likewise 
(RWE, 2011, p.3) they note how EU involvement in international governmental agreements helps to 
“facilitate” business relations. 
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Greater EU-company interaction 
 
Following aspirations for a stronger EU support role for the private sector, companies 
demonstrate a corresponding desire for close collaboration between EU officials and 
energy companies. OMV (2011, p.2) suggests that “improved consultation with the 
industry would help in ensuring that the European Union weighs in fully on key 
international issues”. Statoil notes that the EU should use its “convening power to bring 
industry players more systematically into the policy-making process at an early 
stage”…“especially in preparation for visits and missions abroad” (2011, p.3). OGP (2011, 
p.4) expresses a desire to see the Commission hold regular meetings with industry and 
civil society regarding external energy relations. Eurogas (2011, p.6) notes that given the 
“potentially large investment needs”, European companies “should be regularly consulted 
by policy makers with respect to how external energy objectives are delivered”. They 
stress that they will be able to “contribute most if there is close coordination around 
political visits where there is an overlap of industry and political interests” (Eurogas, 
2011, p.7).  
Perhaps most suprisingly, a number of EU member states also welcome closer direct links 
between the EU and energy companies. On this topic, the French Government has 
reiterated that energy companies are the key actors in European energy supply and 
suggests that “a close cooperation with the principal [industry] operators is essential to 
reinforce the European energy policy” (2011, p.5). The Polish Government (Polish 
Ministry of the Economy, 2011, p.11) suggests that the EU institutions should be free to 
contact energy companies and relevant non-governmental organisations when 
“developing new solutions for external energy policy”. For the UK, the Former Soviet 
Union, including the Caspian, appears to be a particular area of importance in terms of EU 
institution-company interaction. Despite noting that the Commission (2006a, p.25) needs 
to provide “assurance that legitimate interests of member states are not prejudiced in 
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areas where the Community has not competence” the British Government highlights that 
“the UK would also support continued working between the Commission and businesses 
active in Russia, Caspian and Central Asia to get a better understanding of the problems of 
doing business there” [emphasis added]. They do note however that “it is important that 
this is carried out in a transparent way with clear objectives and appropriate member 
state involvement” (UK Government, 2006, p.28). 
Specific EU role in Central Asia/Caspian  
 
While all the companies reviewed in this section are either active in the Caspian or 
engaged in projects that rely on Caspian supply, several companies expressly spell out 
their desire to see the EU active in the Caspian region. Shell calls explicitly for EU political 
business support in Central Asia, arguing that a significant up-scaling of Commission and 
member state government financial and political resources invested in Central Asia is 
needed” (Royal Dutch Shell, 2011, p.4)200. Shell also notes a role for the EU in 
intergovernmental agreements and calls for help with sovereign risk and political support 
in general (Royal Dutch Shell, 2011, p.6). RWE (2011, p.3) talks of the need for the EU to 
support “trust-building and partnership” with states of Central Asia. Eurogas notes that 
the countries of the Caspian and Central Asia region are of “strategic importance” (2011, 
p.2). OMV (2011, p.2) discusses the need for an EU “political/diplomatic and financial 
umbrella” in relation to transport capacity development in the Caspian region. Likewise, 
Statoil (2011, p.3) stresses the benefits of high level diplomacy in the Caspian such as 
visits by Commission President Barosso to Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan in 2011. The 
Caspian region is also similarly mentioned by some member states. The UK Government 
noted in 2006, for example, that the EU should review its representation in the 
Caspian/Central Asia region arguing that EU resources should be at the right level and 
with the right competencies “to add value to the relationship between the EU and the 
                                                          
200
 Shell also suggests that in Central Asia “the development of a long-term relationship on the 
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region’s governments” (2006b, p.4). UK officials spoken to in 2012 welcomed the fact 
there is a dedicated EU energy officer covering the Central Asia region201.  
Changing conditions, developing roles: Explaining company and member state 
positions on EU level commercial diplomacy  
 
There are multiple reasons why EU-level commercial diplomacy might be preferable to 
support from national governments. Firstly, as power shifts globally eastwards and the 
USA and European countries decline relatively vis-à-vis other parts of the globe, a single 
European member state may not have enough influence to fully support a company, 
particularly in the face of increasingly assertive producers in geopolitically-contested 
regions such as the Caspian. In such circumstances, European-level action presents an 
opportunity for greater influence. Secondly, in situations where a member state has poor 
political relations with a producer government (like the UK in Russia, Germany in 
Azerbaijan or Spain in Argentina), the EU may offer a form of “institutional camouflage” 
(Wood, 2009, p.613) presenting a more ‘neutral’ and less politically-divisive source of 
support. This is similar to what Wood (2009, p.611) has described as “pragmatic realist-
institutionalism” where member states come together under an EU banner to stop difficult 
bilateral political issues hindering the pursuit of state interests. 
Furthermore, for companies, there are risks involved with being dependent on a single 
source of political support (Henisz & Zelner 2011, p.214). These include the fact that 
national governments may not prioritise issues as much as a company and governments 
may be prepared to sacrifice company objectives for broader political issues. While 
outside of the Caspian region, the case of Argentina’s nationalisation of Spanish company 
Repsol in 2012 provides an example here. Following the Repsol expropriation, the EU 
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started WTO proceedings against Argentina, partly as a response to the nationalisation202. 
As Minder (2012) notes, in raising these issues with the EU, the Spanish Government had 
been warned by its trade lawyers of the risk to other Spanish companies in Argentina had 
it acted unilaterally. This fact also highlights, however, how other considerations (the 
interests of other Spanish companies etc.) might have limited Spain’s ability to respond to 
the Repsol crisis (Minder, 2012). This case highlights the value for companies of having 
the EU as a source of diplomatic support. Just as the EU and member states seek to manage 
risk by diversifying sources of supply, routes and counterparties, companies seek to 
manage instances of political risk by having multiple sources of political support.  
Shifting power and shifting modes of political support 
 
Numerous commentators have observed a relative power shift from the West to the rising 
‘Eastern’ countries (Lee, 2013). From a European perspective this shift has been 
accompanied by a realignment of the United States’ global imperatives away from Europe 
and Eurasia. One EU official noted, for example, that since the coming to power of the 
Obama Administration in 2008 there had also been a subtle yet perceptible desire on the 
part of the US to avoid policies in Central Asia that might be likely to cause tensions with 
Russia203. In the face of these trends, one official from a prominent energy company 
described how it was important for the EU to be present in the upstream given the 
perceived declining role of the United States. They proposed that the EU might be able to 
replace the US in this role if it developed in the right way (i.e. developed a strong capacity 
for providing political support and the projection of influence)204. They highlighted for 
example how projects in the South Caucasus, such as the BTC pipeline205, were backed 
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politically by the United States and were based on strong cooperation between the US and 
a number of private companies206. Company officials contend however that this backing 
was now waning and that the EU needed to fill the void. This, they argued, was an expected 
progression, inevitable given the US’s other priorities, and it was thus natural that the EU 
should then lead207. Similarly, companies such as RWE, note that creating a conducive 
political and regulatory environment outside of the EU may be an impossible task for both 
industry and individual member states and only possible at the EU level (RWE, 2011, p.3). 
Member states also recognise how the EU-level can offer more diplomatic weight in 
energy than national capitals alone. One German Government official noted that member 
states acknowledge that international energy relations are becoming more challenging 
(given the increased assertiveness and power of producers), and that the Union is 
consequently evolving to meet this reality208. They noted that while small member states 
may prioritize the most important aspects of their respective external environment (with 
small eastern member states prioritising relations with Ukraine/Belarus/Russia etc.) 
larger member states try to cover all geographical regions, and consequently get stretched 
in places like Central Asia209. A UK government official noted that in the Caspian region, 
the UK has more influence when working in collaboration with other EU states (and 
sometimes non-EU states such as Switzerland or Norway)210. They stressed that while UK 
lobbying gets noticed by the governments in the region, political pressure is more effective 
when member states are speaking for all European companies in conjunction with 
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Commission delegations (see, for example, the case of increasing Kazakh local content 
rules in the next chapter)211. 
A more ‘neutral’ source of support  
 
The EU is also seen as a potential option for political support for member states when the 
seemingly more neutral banner of the EU allows states to present difficult messages 
without negative repercussions. Similarly, EU support is also expedient from a company 
point of view, when it is either impossible or politically disadvantageous to seek the 
diplomatic help of a home government due to poor state-state relations with the producer 
state in question. 
As mentioned above in the Spanish-Argentinian Repsol case, circumstances exist when 
member states are unable to support companies because of their own existing political 
tensions with producing countries. Other recent examples that have hindered the foreign 
policy capacity of member states include the poor relations between the UK government 
and Russia over several issues (including the murder of Alexander Litvinenko) and 
German tensions with Azerbaijan over human rights issues212. Under such circumstances, 
the EU presents a useful avenue for states to pursue their energy interests by providing 
forms of “institutional camouflage” (Wood, 2009, p.613). British companies operating in 
Russia, for example have been known to turn to the EU when disputes between the UK and 
Russian Governments meant that representation by the UK may do more harm than good 
in the resolution of a dispute.  
Under such circumstances, the European Union is thought by both member states and EU 
officials to be seen as a more ‘neutral’ actor than other international players (and most 
individual member states) in international affairs. As will be discussed further in the next 
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chapter, one EU official contended that Central Asian states trust the EU more than the US, 
Russia or China and that the lack of defence/military aspect to EU external interaction in 
the Caspian region reduces fears of the EU relative to other actors213. Another EU official 
noted that the EU does not try to directly coerce states in the Caspian region and is thus 
seen as a more straightforward negotiating partner than others214. Indeed, energy 
companies appear to stress that the EU should seek to retain this neutral image, acting as a 
mediator, maintaining positive relations with producer states and refraining from actions 
that might cause political or commercial tensions (Royal Dutch Shell, 2011, p.6). In its 
response to the 2011 Public consultation on external energy policy, Shell (2011, p.6) 
argues that “it is important that the EU avoids the creation of unnecessary obstacles and a 
possible negative impact on commercial relations and negotiations”. While they do not 
highlight what such obstacles could be, it is probable that factors such as trade sanctions 
and human rights/political concerns are likely to feature.  Likewise, one EU official 
asserted that in addition to questions concerning legal and governance regimes, 
companies most commonly lobby the EU to maintain positive political relations with third 
party countries215. 
Member states exhibit similar opinions. One German Government official, for example, 
contended that, from the perspective of Central Asians, the EU is seen to be far away and a 
more neutral actor than others216. Action through the EU is also therefore seen to be able 
to neutralise the potentially negative perceptions amongst third party actors of single 
European states based on historical factors or previous disputes217. Another official from 
an EU member state suggested that the EU banner is useful when a member state wants to 
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deliver a difficult message to a third party country in Central Asia as people were less 
likely to “get grumpy” if the message was seen to emanate from the European Union218.  
From a company perspective, the EU’s more neutral appearance is particularly useful 
when both company and home government are involved in (different) disputes with a 
producer government. Under such circumstances a company may wish to minimise their 
association with the home government so that the wider dispute does not hinder the 
resolution of the company’s particular issue219. An energy expert interviewed noted how 
the UK government has at times been unable to help British energy companies in Russia 
because of difficult Russia-UK bilateral relations220. UK companies have had, for example, 
difficulties getting visas for high level officials following disputes with the Russian 
government. Under these sorts of circumstances, the EU presents a more viable source of 
political support221.  
In such a situation companies will approach officials in the EU Commission and the 
External Action Service, find out who will next be making a visit to a country in question, 
ascertain who is able to raise their issue with senior politicians and ask that these issues 
be placed on the agenda. Companies, one EU official noted, tend to rely on personal 
relations when they decide who to approach in the EU and member states222. They do, 
however, regularly approach the EU directly rather than going indirectly via member 
states223. Companies generally do not ask the EU to schedule specific meetings with third 
party countries as this may draw too much attention to a particular situation and negative 
attention to them (and it is unlikely that the EU would do so anyway – see below). 
Concerns for one company are however often wider problems for the industry as a whole, 
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so EU officials or representatives are able to raise it as a broader issue224. When the EU has 
taken up an issue (such as support in an investment dispute), it keeps member states and 
companies up to date through regular meetings and briefing reports225.  
Recognising the commercial-security overlap: Framing and company risk mitigation 
strategies 
 
Energy companies clearly recognise that the EU presents a potential source of diplomatic 
support (Eni, 2011, p.4; Shell, 2011, p.4; Statoil, 2011, p.3; Eurogas, 2011, p.3). Indeed, 
from the perspective of some energy companies, engagement with the EU is an important 
part of their broader risk mitigation strategy226. Analysing companies’ responses to EU 
public consultations on energy policy (and other public documentation), one can identify 
company attempts to garner EU level political support by framing themselves as essential 
to European energy security and the ‘Europeaness’ of their operations. Indeed, as part of 
their wider engagement with the EU, a number of energy companies appear to be well 
aware of the overlap between EU energy security and commercial objectives discussed in 
this chapter (and chapter four) and are thus keen to demonstrate their ‘European’ 
credentials and the importance of their operations for European energy supply security. In 
doing so they appear to be seeking to ensure that the EU recognises the overlap between 
European energy security and their particular business interests. BP, for example, stresses 
that they are a European company as well as a British one227. BG Group notes how their 
“strong position in NW Europe”, their “portfolio of gas supply capable of accessing 
European markets” and their gas import terminals in Wales and Italy make the group 
“potentially an extremely significant contributor to EU diversity of gas supply” (BG Group, 
2006, p.1). Eurogas asserts the “importance of the European gas industry in contributing 
                                                          
224 Ibid 
225
 Interview EU Official,  Astana, Summer 2012 
226 Interview energy company official [34], Brussels, Autumn 2012 
227 Ibid 
216 
 
to a sustainable energy supply for Europe”228 (Eurogas, 2006, p.1). Royal Dutch Shell 
however is perhaps the most prominent in displaying their ‘Europeaness’. “Shell”, they 
note, “is a European company with our global headquarters in Holland, our downstream 
headquarters in Britain and major operating and research centres across Europe” (Royal 
Dutch Shell, 2006, p.1). Royal Dutch Shell, they note, “plays a role in bringing gas into the 
European market and distributing gas across the EU” (Royal Dutch Shell, 2006, p.1). They 
also utilise the European theme to demonstrate their importance to the EU economy and 
energy market highlighting that “Shell employs 50,000 in the EU, has interests in 17 
refineries, maintains a network of 15,000 service stations, has Upstream [sic] interests in 
eight countries and serves over seven million customers a day” (Royal Dutch Shell, 2006, 
p.1). “Europe”, they note, “represents a core operating area for Shell and we are here for 
the long-term in both the upstream and downstream operations” (Royal Dutch Shell, 2006, 
p.1). 
SUPPORTING THE GENERAL INTEREST RATHER THAN THE PARTICULAR: 
PERCEPTIONS AND LIMITS OF THE EU POLITICAL SUPPORT ROLE   
 
However, despite the EU’s growing support role in the area of upstream diplomacy, the EU 
does not represent a direct replacement for member states. Indeed, this section contends 
that there is a fine, but nonetheless distinct, division between the general nature of EU 
commercial energy diplomacy and the specific business interests of particular companies. 
Indeed, while companies will seek to engage with the EU when they face a difficult 
upstream issue, unlike member states, the EU is not keen to provide particular support at 
the behest of individual companies. Rather, the EU seeks to reflect the general interest of 
the upstream sector and thus is most concerned with upholding or countering breaches to 
energy principles and norms that apply to the upstream-operating sector as a whole, even 
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though this may happen to favour a particular company or group of companies in a 
particular instance.  
In the face of an increasing degree of interaction between private actors and European 
institutions, (discussed also in the next chapter) both sides remain broadly clear on the 
division of labour between them. As discussed above, companies generally speaking are 
keen to see the EU involved in the maintenance of political relations, investment 
conditions and in the resolution of disputes, but seek to discourage any impingement on 
their freedom for action as businesses. EU actors, for their part, are willing to be active in 
the general promotion of governance frameworks and the general support for the industry 
as a whole, but are cautious about being drawn into what are perceived to be the specific 
business issues of individual companies.  
While companies express a clear desire for the EU to be involved in political matters, they 
are keen to spell out that the EU should not be involved in any way that impinges on their 
business practices. Eni (2011, p.3) suggest that it is “companies’ responsibility to carry out 
commercial negotiations” and that the EU’s role should be to politically support this 
process. Similar sentiments are expressed by Eurogas (2011) and OMV (2011). RWE 
(2011) gives a clear description of their perspective on division between the EU and 
companies. They argue that the EU’s role is to be involved at “a political, non-commercial 
level” in order to enable “European interests in energy be pursued on a commercial basis 
by commercial entities” [sic] (RWE, 2011, p.3). They note a clear distinction between 
political support in the form of EU involvement in intergovernmental agreements, for 
example, and “commercial agreements, such as gas purchase agreements” that “should 
remain the task of private enterprises229” (RWE, 2011, p.3). 
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business.   
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Some member states echo this distinction, expressing their desire not to be involved in 
any decisions related to business. One UK official noted that the job of the UK government 
in the Caspian region was to help companies overcome political difficulties. They stressed 
however that this did not relate to business difficulties. Officials noted that they are not 
businessmen and stressed that companies would resist such a role in any case230. Rather 
the member state role was, they felt, to help with political and legal difficulties. The French 
government similarly calls for respect for the “autonomy of market actors” (French 
Permanent Representation, 2011, p.5). Member states are, however, of course quicker to 
support national companies than they are the broader industry. Nonetheless, as will be 
described in the next chapter, pushing the interests of a national oil company can 
sometimes entail the pursuit of objectives that benefit the industry as a whole and 
facilitate intra-European cooperation231.  
EU officials are quite clear in spelling out what they see as their role in terms of political 
support. One EU official noted that there are both formal channels of communication 
between energy companies and EU officials (such as through industry associations) and 
that it is quite common for EU officials to have less formal direct contact with industry 
officials from both companies and associations, most often at Head of Unit level232. They 
noted that in general companies are well aware of what the EU can and cannot do in 
external relations, but that they will try to involve the EU when disputes occur as a counter 
to pressure from a host-government233. Perhaps unsurprisingly, companies are strongly 
concerned with getting representation for themselves and seek to have a privileged 
position vis-à-vis other companies234. Officials stress, however, that in the case of disputes, 
the EU prefers to occupy itself with the specific principles and implications of the dispute 
in question, rather than the business situation of particular companies. The EU will seek to 
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engage with upstream countries, pointing out how a dispute might hurt their international 
standing and damage their ability to attract investment235. For EU officials, their role (in 
terms of support) concerns reacting to infringements that affect the general interest of the 
upstream energy industry rather that the particular case of any individual company-host 
government dispute. The EU, they aver, does not try to take sides, but rather seeks to 
engage both parties in dialogue so as to ensure dispute resolution. It is clear however, that 
by raising issues and by promoting resolutions on the basis of certain frameworks, the EU 
institutions are not strictly speaking ‘neutral’ observers – however presenting themselves 
as such may carry a degree of weight, especially when they are appealing to international 
norms that states have signed up to or are thinking of signing up to (such as the Energy 
Charter or WTO). Furthermore, it is clear that officials do not want be seen as on the ‘side’ 
of the companies. Another EU official argued that it was not the job of the Commission or 
EEAS to intervene in specific, precise business affairs or to promote the particular 
interests of specific companies but rather, as described above, the EU should engage when 
necessary to uphold particular norms and frameworks that affect the general interest of 
the industry236. It was important to note, they asserted, that there was a strong distinction 
between business affairs and broader governance and legal matters. Sometimes a specific 
issue for a company (such as attempts to corrupt, tax issues, investment pressure) raises a 
broader systemic sector-wide issue and under those circumstances it would be, in their 
opinion, the EU’s responsibility to react237. As described in the next chapter the industry 
structure in certain upstream markets (such as Kazakhstan) means that issues for one 
company (and by implication member state) can easily become broader country-wide 
issues affecting a number of European actors. Under such circumstances, EU action may of 
course benefit a specific company in that particular instance, but this would be a 
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secondary consequence of EU action, rather than a direct EU motivation238. Furthermore, 
as described above, companies recognise the value of preserving the EU’s more ‘neutral’ 
position and from their own point of view do not wish to be singled-out as enlisting 
political support as this can carry costs in terms of their relations with host governments.  
Nonetheless, the EU Commission and EEAS are generally speaking cautious about being 
seen to be too close to energy companies. The Commission is keen not to be seen to overly 
reflect the interests of industry players, particularly in the light of debates about the gap 
between EU rhetoric and normative policy (Bailey & Bossuyt, 2011). This point is reflected 
in the EU’s rare mention of energy companies in official documentation and public 
discourses, despite their being core energy actors and the EU’s promotion of governance 
frameworks that directly relate to companies. In interviews however, EU officials do 
express the importance of engagement with companies. One official noted how some 
criticise the EU for having too much interaction with companies but remarked in turn that 
it is impossible to regulate an industry without having contact with it (see below)239. 
Another EU official remarked that people should not be surprised by EU support for 
companies given the EU’s origins as an economic project240.  
Nonetheless, EU officials are very keen not to be seen to be ‘picking winners’ amongst 
companies. Company officials note that for commercial reasons energy businesses do not 
like to interact with each other and as such they prefer bilateral meetings with EU 
officials241. Companies are also however very sensitive to perceptions of favoured 
treatment for other firms (and the advantages this might imply). As such, officials are 
consequently keen not to be seen to be providing preferential access for specific 
businesses. Energy industry associations such as Eurogas and OGP are reportedly very 
useful in this regard as they permit EU-industry interaction in a way that raises fewer 
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questions about the particular influence of certain firms and reduces the perception of 
‘picking winners’242. Industry associations are however also useful from the EU’s 
perspective for other reasons. Associations can provide an overall industry-wide 
perspective on relevant energy developments (such as the new transparency 
requirements described in the previous chapter) and offer an opportunity to coordinate 
with a large number of players. The EU has utilised the economy of scale presented by 
associations such as Eurogas, for example, to organise conferences and seminars with 
companies on issues such as sour gas treatment in Turkmenistan243.  
Operating through associations has drawbacks however. While associations sometimes 
present a coherent message, at other times, when companies are not in agreement on an 
issue, energy associations may represent only the lowest common denominator. 
Furthermore, an association may not have access to detailed information on specific cases 
that the EU needs. Officials note that sometimes the EU needs to engage specifically and 
directly with a small number of major companies when they need detailed information on 
particular situations (such as government actions, the impact of EU-Caspian state 
agreements or issues concerning a specific consortium or a particular part of the 
market)244. This interaction will sometimes take the form of informal written 
consultations and sometimes direct meetings. In the Kazakh context, EU officials talk of 
high levels of interaction with companies operating in the Kashagan consortium, for 
example245. EU officials regularly meet both formally and informally with officials from 
numerous energy companies both in Brussels and in the Caspian delegations to discuss a 
wide range of issues such as discriminatory government actions, investment matters, 
“doing business” issues and restrictions on personnel or local content for example246. 
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These companies, with excellent contacts in Caspian governments, often have specific 
information on developments that the EU needs to be able to conduct upstream political 
and diplomatic action (discussed further in the next chapter). 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has discussed the EU’s energy diplomacy in the Caspian region. In particular 
it has highlighted the overlap between energy diplomacy and commercial problem-solving 
diplomacy born of the EU’s reliance on energy companies. The first section discussed 
energy diplomacy, the relationship with commercial diplomacy and some of the ways that 
energy diplomacy contributes to the mitigation of risk. The second section turned 
attention to the EU’s diplomatic practices in energy highlighting some of the key forums 
for, and modes of, diplomatic interaction. This section also drew attention to the overlap 
between the responsibilities of the EEAS and the Commission in energy diplomacy and 
highlighted some of the reasons why tensions here are often overcome in practice. The 
third section, investigated company and member state perspectives on the 
supranationalisation of commercial energy diplomacy. It contended that energy 
companies and member states support both a strong role for the EU in energy diplomacy 
and a high degree of public-private interaction between the EU institutions and the 
commercial energy sector in the process of formulating and carrying out energy 
diplomatic activity. Member states support an EU energy diplomacy role because they find 
the EU to be a potentially more rational and effective means by which to enact greater 
influence in politically-difficult regions such as the Caspian. Likewise, companies 
encourage EU commercial energy diplomacy as they see the EU as being, at times, able to 
offer more effective support than individual member states. This is particularly the case 
given the rising power of major emerging countries such as Russia and China, the growing 
strength of local energy-producing countries and the declining international presence of 
the USA and the West in general. Furthermore, the EU, it was argued, also provides a more 
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‘neutral’ outlet for the promotion of energy interests and provision of support either when 
member states want to deliver a politically-difficult message or when broader political 
disputes between third party countries and individual member states hinder the 
possibility of a member state being able to offer effective commercial diplomatic support 
for a company. Under these circumstances, the European Commission and EEAS offer a 
more ‘neutral’ and potentially more effective source of supporting energy diplomacy. 
Finally, this section highlighted that, just as public actors (such as the EU) seek diversity of 
supply, routes and counterparties to reduce their energy risk, companies equally seek 
diversity in their options for political support. The last section drew attention to the EU 
officials’ perceptions of the EU’s upstream political support role. It noted companies’ 
desires to involve the EU politically to counter the weight of producer governments and 
their simultaneous desire to preserve their business autonomy. It highlighted however, 
that EU officials very clearly see their role as providing support in the general interest of 
the upstream industry as a whole, rather than to promote the particular private interests 
of specific companies. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
EUROPEAN POLITICO-COMMERCIAL INTERDEPENDENCE, 
CATALYTIC DIPLOMACY AND RESOURCE DEPENDENCY IN 
THE CASPIAN  
 
With a particular emphasis on Kazakhstan, this chapter turns attention to the actual 
engagement, interaction and mutual dependence that underpins the upstream energy 
relationship between European political and commercial actors in the Caspian.  
Indeed, this chapter uses a slightly modified version of Strange’s (1998) four-way typology 
of power to analyse the array of geopolitical-security, technical-production, financial and 
knowledge-based energy policy challenges EU actors face in the Caspian and the 
respective European resources employed to meet these challenges. As was mentioned in 
the introduction, Goel (2004) employs Strange’s model to assess US-company ‘bargain’ in 
the construction of the BTC pipeline in the Caucasus. This chapter builds on this analysis in 
a number of ways. Firstly, it strengthens this model by merging it with the concept of 
resource dependency and by applying it to European actors and the context of upstream 
politics (rather than to the US and midstream-pipelines). Secondly, the discussion below 
seeks to bring the Caspian structural environment into the equation, evaluating how EU 
company interaction reacts to the prevailing politico-economic challenges in the Caspian 
region. 
Consequently, this chapter is divided into four sections that assess the (geo)political-
security, production, finance and knowledge-ideational challenges in the Caspian region 
and the respective resources that different European actors employ (and share) to 
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mitigate these challenges. In doing so, this chapter analyses the resource dependency 
between EU actors (Eising, 2009, p.131; Bouwen, 2002, p.368; Hocking, 2004b, p.151) and 
provides insights into the catalytic diplomacy that characterises their upstream bargain. 
Resource dependency is particularly useful in analysing the contours of this upstream 
bargain. Indeed, in challenging politico-economic contexts such as the Caspian upstream, 
European political actors need to be able to devise policy that allows them to pursue their 
public objectives whilst ensuring that the private actors on whom they rely (and who in 
turn rely on them) can achieve their own ends (Eising, 2009, p.22). As was noted in 
chapter two, Hocking (2004b, p.151) suggests that in response to “evermore complex, 
multi-faceted security agendas” political agents are forced to bring together a range of 
actors that have “the capacity to contribute resources to the management of complex 
problems, whether these assume the form of knowledge and financial resources or, less 
tangibly, the conferment of legitimacy on processes and outcome”. This chapter sets out to 
examine the political-security, financial, technical and legitimacy/knowledge-based 
resources of the EU’s upstream energy cooperation. 
In the investigation of the EU’s catalytic diplomacy and the implicit bargains it entails, this 
chapter makes a series of core arguments. Firstly, in terms of the geopolitical-security 
dimension, it contends that rather than pose a threat to the EU, the political and economic 
actions of Russia and China in the region are somewhat paradoxically a major source of EU 
influence. Indeed, and secondly, the chapter argues that the biggest challenge to EU 
objectives in Kazakhstan comes less from Russia and China than from the Kazakh state 
itself, especially considering the Kazakh Government’s increased desire and capacity to 
assert their sovereignty over the energy sector. In the face of this challenge the EU is 
responsible, increasingly, for providing support to companies. Thirdly, the chapter 
demonstrates how the EU’s collective reliance on the commercial sector, the nature of 
commercial upstream industry structures in the region and the common pressures that 
companies face foster the form of political unity between member states which allows the 
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EU to carry out an upstream market facilitation and political risk mitigation role. In the 
production and finance sectors however, the EU relies on the capacity of European (and 
other Western) companies to extract oil and gas as no other companies (from Russia, 
China, Kazakhstan or elsewhere) presently have the capacity to operate in the technically 
difficult fields of the Caspian region. As this chapter will argue, Caspian states of course 
rely on these Western companies too, and this tempers somewhat their ability to exert 
control and influence over the energy sector. Finally, in the knowledge/ideational 
dimension, this chapter discusses firstly how the EU has a certain degree of legitimacy-
ascribing power and expert knowledge that it is able to use to influence Caspian 
governments and, secondly, how companies and the EU share information between 
themselves on developments in the region. These sections together demonstrate how the 
supply of various resources by both the EU and companies, as well as being an important 
factor in the energy politics of Caspian countries, also presents insights into the character 
of the EU-commercial actor relationship.  
As in the previous chapters, there is no attempt here to claim that the EU has made 
member states obsolete in energy policy or that companies and the EU are in perfect 
alignment. Rather, the objective here is to demonstrate how European actors both interact 
closely and rely on one another in the Caspian upstream - highlighting the underlying 
factors that contribute to a higher level of European cooperation than ordinarily 
witnessed in EU energy policy.  
POLITICO-SECURITY: REGIONAL COMPETITION, MULTI-VECTOR BALANCING, 
DOMESTIC RISK CONSIDERATIONS AND THE ROLE OF EUROPEAN ACTORS  
 
This first section highlights a number of the challenges present in the region in terms of 
great-power competition, Caspian government multi-vector foreign policies, Caspian 
states’ domestic strategies for development and empowerment, and the impact these have 
in turn on European actors. Furthermore, it demonstrates the respective roles European 
227 
 
political and commercial actors play and the resources that they employ in this 
challenging political environment.  
Energy production depends on a secure and broadly stable political, security and legal 
environment247. As discussed previously, the scale of energy company investments mean 
that companies need guarantees and protection against the non-commercial, political risks 
to their operations. Indeed, as Strange (1988, p.25) argued, it is impossible to have 
economic power (as an energy company might) “without the legal and physical security 
[state economic functions] that can only be supplied by political authority”. Given the 
European reliance on companies for energy provision, support for their business 
operations has direct energy security implications for the EU (Kachikwu, 2009, p.92).  
Using the Kazakh example, this section argues that Russian and Chinese geo-political and 
geo-economic actions in the region provide a somewhat paradoxical opportunity for both 
the EU and the European energy industry to gain political influence. Secondly, it will 
highlight how Kazakh desires for state consolidation and control over the energy sector 
have actually presented the greatest upstream challenges in the region for energy 
companies. Thirdly, this section highlights how the challenges the Caspian region presents 
for companies, and the consortia-based nature of their operations, foster a form of intra-
European unity that allows the EU to carry out its upstream market facilitation and risk 
mitigation role. 
Regional competition in the Caspian: An opportunity for European influence? 
 
The Caspian Sea is often considered to be a site of fierce regional competition between 
Russia, China, the EU and the USA (Cooley, 2012; Menon, 2003; Kleveman, 2004; 
Zabortseva, 2012). This regional competition impacts on both the EU and energy 
companies as Russian and Chinese actions can present a challenge to Western interests. 
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However, unlike the original ‘Great Game’ where the major protagonists sought to 
dominate Central Asian leaders, today’s Central Asian states are sovereign and cannot be 
controlled in the same way. Adept at balancing between the major powers in the region 
(as described in chapter one), the regional aspirations of major powers are filtered 
through the multi-vector foreign policies of Central Asian states.  
Despite what EU officials see as changing balance of power conditions in the region, the 
Russian Government continues to be highly suspicious of foreign involvement in what is 
traditionally considered its “backyard”248. As noted in chapter one, the Russian 
Government seeks a privileged position in Central Asia (Cooley, 2012, p.51) with 
Kazakhstan seen by Russian leadership as the most important state in the region (Allison, 
2004, p.284). There is little doubt that Russia and Kazakhstan have a strong relationship. 
Due to their geographical proximity, shared Soviet history and the large number of 
ethnically-Russian Kazakh citizens in Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan shares more ties with 
Russia than it does with any of the other regional powers. Likewise, the two Governments 
share a similar political and economic outlook. Both Governments, for example, promote 
forms of “sovereign democracy” (Kimmage, 2006) and (perhaps to a lesser extent in the 
case of the Russian Government) “neo-Eurasianism” that emphasises the common bonds 
between the Russian and Turkic peoples of Eurasia (Laurelle, 2012, p.177). Likewise, both 
the Kazakh and Russian governments have been behind attempts to forge regional 
institutions such as the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) and subsequent 
Customs Union (Cooley, 2012, p.59-60; Vinokurov, 2010, p.6).  
Yet while Russia is undoubtedly the primary foreign partner for a number of Central Asian 
states, most notably Kazakhstan, governments in the region are still keen to maintain their 
independence from Russia and engage with other powers (such as the EU). Despite public 
displays of unity such as the consecutive “year of Kazakhstan in Russia” in 2003 and the 
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“year of Russia in Kazakhstan” 2004 (Putin, 2004), EU officials argue that the Kazakh 
Government does not fully trust the Russian leadership and consequently wishes to 
reduce its dependence on its northern neighbour249. Evidence of Kazakhstan’s desire to 
maintain a healthy distance can be seen in Russia-Kazak relations within EurAsEC 
(Jarosiewicz, 2013). While President Nazarbayev was one of the main instigators of 
EurAsEC, the government is also sceptical of the risks of increased dependence on Russia 
that forms of political integration might bring and consequently has stressed in public the 
economic rather than political nature of the project (Jarosiewicz, 2013; Konyrova, 2013). 
Over-reliance on Russia would, Jarosiewicz (2013) argues, run counter “to the policy 
Nazarbayev has maintained over the last two decades, of strengthening Kazakhstan’s 
sovereignty and independence, and harbouring ambitions for his country to play an 
independent role on the global stage”.  
Likewise, despite growing ambitions in the region, increasing Chinese presence in Central 
Asia fuels Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy orientation and provides openings for 
the EU. European officials describe the Chinese Government and Chinese business sector 
as fierce economic competitors in the region250. Over the last decade the Chinese 
government has been growing in influence in Kazakhstan with Chinese businesses 
emerging as a major source of foreign direct investment, particularly as other sources of 
FDI reduced following the financial crisis (Vinokurov, 2010, p.6). Indeed, during the midst 
of the financial crisis in 2009 that badly affected Kazakhstan, China provided financial 
assistance to the Kazakh government, offering a $10 billion dollar loan and $3.5 billion 
industry programme (US State Department of State, 2009d). When asked by (then) Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin why Kazakhstan had accepted money from China, Kazakh Prime 
Minister Massimov reportedly put out his hand and responded “what do you have to 
offer?” (US Department of State, 2009d). 
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While China is less overtly political in its involvement in the region than Russia, Chinese 
economic influence has made the Chinese government increasingly influential amongst 
Central Asian leaderships. Indeed, EU officials argue that Chinese influence is directed 
through the economy with China seen to be buying-up companies and investing in a steady 
but increasingly strategic fashion in the region251. For example, in recent years, Chinese 
companies have obtained a number of major strategic acquisitions in the Kazakh energy 
sector such as investments in PetroKazakstan and an 11% stake in the national oil 
company KazMunaiGas’s Exploration and Production arm (Kielmas, 2005, p.28; Hoyos, 
2009; Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Kazakhstan, 2013, p.2).  
However, as with the Russian example above, this Chinese presence also creates 
opportunities for the EU. Indeed, fear over China’s continuing rise (in addition to Russia’s 
ongoing aspirations for regional leadership) increases the importance of the EU in the 
multi-vector foreign policies of Caspian (particularly Central Asian) states. Kazakh officials 
specifically highlight the threat posed by China’s rising influence in the country. Kazakh 
officials perceive Chinese business acquisitions as politically-motivated, noting that they 
are directed towards strategic assets that carry political influence252. Kazakh officials fear 
that Chinese economic control in the country presents risks for Kazakhstan’s fledgling 
independence253. Despite accepting Chinese loans (as described above), Prime Minister 
Massimov reported to US interlocutors that Kazakhstan never takes more than is 
necessary from China (US Department of State, 2009d). Indeed, fears of increasing Chinese 
influence in the Kazakh economy (especially in the energy sector) are widespread in 
Kazakhstan and appear to ellicit more concern than corresponding Russian investments. 
For example, in May 2013 Kazakh media outlets carried stories highlighting unofficial 
reports that Chinese companies would soon own over 40% of Kazakh oil production 
(TengriNews, 2013). Knowledge of the extent of Chinese control is believed to be obscured 
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through shadowy (and allegedly) corrupt business arrangements (TengriNews, 2013). 
One German government official jokingly remarked that while the EU member states and 
the EU as a whole felt themselves to be not ‘visible’ enough in Central Asia (and were thus 
actively trying to be more ‘noticeable’), the Chinese Government was trying to be more 
inconspicuous, lest its actions raise fears of Chinese domination254. Furthermore, in a more 
economic sense, senior officials in Kazakhstan fear that Chinese energy interests in the 
country cannot be assumed to be durable. One risk for Kazakhstan, they averred, was the 
prospect of large-scale finds of shale oil in China that could reduce substantially China’s 
dependence on Kazakh energy resources255.  
Central Asian fears of over-dependence on the Russian and Chinese economies (and the 
negative influence this dependence entails) work in the EU’s interests. In light of 
Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy and desires for independence, concern over their 
relationships with Russia and China ensures an opening to Western powers and, in 
particular for discussion here, to the EU. This is especially the case given the relatively 
neutral and less threatening perception of the EU in the region (discussed further below). 
Indeed, EU officials note how the EU does not try to geo-politically induce or coerce 
Central Asian states, but rather exercises power in the region because it controls access to 
legitimacy and technology that Central Asian governments need (see discussion below). In 
relations with Caspian states, EU officials argue that the EU was often seen as behaving in 
a different way to other regional powers. Europe is seen (in certain sectors) as an example 
of how things ought to be done and Caspian governments do not want to lose access to this 
expertise256. Another EU official suggested that EU power in the region derived from 
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attractiveness rather than leverage per se, and added that this should not be 
underestimated in the long-term257. 
As such, despite the so-called ‘new great game’ of regional competition in the Caspian, the 
EU does not so much actively balance against China or Russia as present the Kazakh 
government with an opportunity, or an opening, for the pursuit of their multi-vector 
foreign policies. The EU’s influence in the region is less based on the direct ability to 
project power, but rather the opportunity-cost to Kazakhstan of not engaging with the EU 
and European powers, i.e. continued over-reliance on Russia and China. This influence, 
born of regional competition and Kazakh desires for independence, in turn creates the 
opportunity for EU-level of diplomacy that can be employed, when necessary, to support 
the interests of the European energy industry or to push policies that reflect European 
interests in oil and gas. Crucially however, this is only possible in situations where 
European actors can act with a degree of unity.  
Asserting sovereignty and controlling rent: State-level risks and international 
companies in the Caspian  
 
The countries of the Caspian all present a number of risks for European companies. While 
some of the political risks inherent to the region were discussed in chapter four, this 
section explains some of the underlying factors that contribute to political risks in 
Kazakhstan – in particular Kazakhstan’s growing confidence, assertion of sovereignty and 
desire for greater control in energy. Indeed, sovereignty and the control of the main 
sources of rent-creating revenue are core, intertwined considerations for state elites and a 
major factor in both international political relations and interaction with major overseas 
oil companies (Ostrowski, 2011, p.12, Ipek, 2007, p.1184).  
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The countries of the Caspian region emerged from the Soviet Union as newly formed, or 
re-formed, states in need of state-consolidation, keen to assert their sovereignty. 
Cummings and Hinnebusch (2011, p.1) argue that sovereignty is particularly precarious 
for states such as those of Central Asia that are “left behind by empire, with state builders 
struggling to establish internal sovereignty and defend against encroachment on their 
external sovereignty by great powers”. At the time of independence in 1991, all of the 
Central Asian states, including Kazakhstan, faced similar pressures relating to the need for 
international independence, the consolidation of state structures, economic development 
and domestic legitimacy. Indeed in his most recent State of the Union speech, President 
Nazarbayev suggested that this process was now completed, discussing his country’s 
travails on their path to consolidated sovereignty and arguing that “21st Century 
Kazakhstan is an independent and self-confident state” (Nazarbayev, 2012). This trend 
towards an increased domestic assertion of sovereignty conflicts, at least to a degree, with 
the liberal model of energy governance discussed in chapter five that relies on a curtailed 
role for the state. 
Indeed, the states in the region, while acutely aware of the geo-political dependence on 
regional powers (and Russia in particular) see their energy sectors as core sources of their 
domestic and international sovereignty and thus an area in which they seek to be 
independent258. At the same time, as Ostrowski (2011, p.12) argues, “whoever guarantees 
a steady flow of rent is also seen as a strategic partner and a best guarantor of a country’s 
sovereignty”. One EU official noted that Kazakhstan’s development over the last decade 
has been driven primarily by growth in the oil sector and, while the national Kazak oil 
company is becoming more influential (as described below), it is still the international 
majors that, as strategic partners, are providing the bulk of oil and gas payments to the 
finance ministry259. For example in 2011 the three major projects in Kazakhstan 
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(TengizChevroil, Karachaganak and Kashagan) paid over 13 billion dollars to the Kazakh 
Government - roughly 55% of all governmental energy revenues (EITI Secretariat, 
2012)260. For perspective, the total Kazak state budget stood at roughly 34 billion dollars 
in 2011 (TengriNews, 2011). The global financial crisis, that hit the Kazakh economy hard 
after 2008 and required a government bank bail-out, emphasised to the Kazakh 
Government the importance of the oil sector for their stability and prosperity261. European 
companies, as will be discussed below, play a very important role in the guarantee of a 
steady supply of rent for the government but are also deeply entwined in and affected 
(sometimes negatively) by the Kazakh government’s attempts to manage the internal and 
external aspects of its sovereignty and consolidate its domestic regime. 
The politics of rent distribution in international oil projects in Kazakhstan has however 
been quite turbulent in recent years. From the perspective of the European energy 
industry and their investments, Kazakhstan appears to have become a less secure place 
over the last decade. The conditions companies received at the beginning of their 
involvement in Kazakhstan were certainly favourable, but recent renegotiations have 
resulted in amendments to contracts and increased shares for the Kazakh state (Domjan & 
Stone, 2010, p.38). This degree of increased assertiveness on the part of the Kazakh state 
is related, at least in part, to the desire for oil empowerment (i.e. greater control over 
national resources), the need for state consolidation, democratic legitimacy and a desire to 
spread the benefits of oil wealth more broadly, especially in Kazakhstan’s poorer and 
(relatively) more restive Western regions.  
There is a perception amongst some officials that this desire for empowerment means that 
the situation for foreign investors has become more precarious in Kazakhstan. The 
country is far more self-confident and assertive today than in the past, officials suggest262. 
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Formerly, the government was in a weak position and consequently offered very 
favourable conditions to companies. Now by contrast, several years on from the signing of 
contracts with international oil consortia, the government is accused of having engaged in 
the selective application of laws, forced contract changes and the discriminatory and 
coercive use of financial police and tax audits263. It has been suggested that the 
hierarchical nature of police and audit bodies means that when audits are conducted 
officials must find some evidence of wrong doing or they could lose their jobs264. Tax 
issues, officials argue, are incredibly difficult to counter as you cannot ask the government 
to stop collecting tax265. While Kazakh laws provide for non-expropriation, and guarantees 
of legal stability and transparent government procurement, the US State Department notes 
that “inconsistent implementation of these laws and regulations at all levels of the 
government, combined with a tendency for courts to automatically accept government 
positions as correct, can create a significant obstacle to business in Kazakhstan” (US 
Department of State, 2012). Furthermore, officials in Kazakhstan stand accused of using 
regulatory pressure to extract bribes from foreign companies (US Department of State, 
2012). 
The Kazakh energy sector renegotiations in the latter half of the 2000s were certainly 
linked to the growing assertiveness of the Kazakh state. For example, the renegotiation of 
Karachaganak, which ceded a 10% share to the Kazakh government from the KPO 
consortium, was announced the day before the Kazakh day of national independence - a 
highly symbolic time that some feel was evidence of the political nature of the 
renegotiation266. Some officials argue that in Kazakhstan, political expediency trumps legal 
sanctity, and that this situation is likely to continue267. Some Kazakh officials also note a 
degree of political calculation behind renegotiation decisions, suggesting that they were 
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indeed done with political considerations in mind, but at the same time also done for the 
betterment of future generations268. Other Kazakh officials argued that no country in the 
world would have allowed the previous situation of favourable contracts to continue and 
suggested that the renegotiations were based on the impropriety of the international 
companies relating to tax and environmental violations269. Kazakh officials suggest that 
most of the Western companies have accepted this situation and renegotiation has 
brought a number of benefits. It was noted that companies now have KMG as a partner, 
which means they are far less likely to have problems with the financial police, for 
example270.  
EU officials highlight a number of the perceived risks in the Kazakh energy sector for 
businesses and describe several contextual factors that provide a degree of instability and 
risk. Firstly, in line with discussions of neo-patrimonialism described in the first chapter, 
the Kazakh political systems exhibits a high-degree of informality, meaning that while 
there are given administrative structures within the state designed to deal with oil and gas 
matters, opaque informal political actions can often drive developments and this can in 
turn impact on the stability for companies271. Indeed, while formally coordinated by the 
Ministry of Oil and Gas, in Kazakhstan, energy policy is strongly influenced by President 
Nazarbayev’s son in law Timur Kulibayev, the former head of the state-owned holding 
company Samruk Kazyna, current Chairman of KazMunayGas (KMG - the state-owned oil 
company) and Chairman of the influential KazEnergy group272. Influential individuals in 
the Ministry of Oil and Gas and KMG are believed to be “his people” or members of his elite 
grouping, indicating that they answer to him. Kulibayev is consulted on all major energy 
decisions in Kazakhstan, even if it not him that actually takes these decisions273. This is still 
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the case despite his resignation from the board of Samruk Kazyna and replacement by 
Umizak Shukeyev following the shooting of a number of oil workers in the Western 
Kazakh town of Zhanozen in December 2011. Likewise, Prime Minister Karim Massimov is 
another very influential figure in Kazakh energy policy decisions274. Formally part of 
Kulibayev’s clique, the well-respected Massimov275 is thought now to occupy a more equal 
place with Kulibayev276 and to be able to exert influence through his role on the Board of 
Samruk Kazyna277. One EU member state official remarked however, that ultimately, the 
President is the final arbiter on energy policy decisions. Indeed, as well as being close to 
both Kulibayev and Massimov, Nazarbayev is thought to maintain influence on energy via 
Chairman of KMG and former Oil and Gas Minister Mynbayev and former Deputy Prime 
Minister and current Chairman of Samruk Kazyna, Umirzak Shukeyev, who are both close 
to the President278.  
Some EU member state officials argue that many legal problems in Kazakhstan derive from 
the implementation of top-down hierarchical dictats and a failure to consult with 
industry279. The Kazakh state is very hierarchical by European standards and problems 
often occur at the implementation stage on policies decided on by elites and enacted in 
Parliament without prior public consultation. One EU member state official averred that 
when the President gives an order, officials quickly react and try to enact the new policy as 
soon as possible280. The little experience of consulting before legal changes are made 
means that investors can find that new legal changes negatively affecting their businesses 
are enacted in parliament and hastily implemented without any warning, presenting risks.  
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Western companies, industry structure and EU-level cooperation in Kazakhstan  
 
Given their size and importance in terms of oil development, and the importance of this 
development for the Kazakh state, Western oil companies also form part of the hedging 
strategy for the Kazakh government in line with their multi-vector foreign policy and 
alongside their interaction with the EU more broadly (see table two below for major 
Western investors in Kazakhstan). Indeed European companies in Kazakhstan are a core 
pillar of the European vector of Kazakh multi-vector foreign policy (Ipek, 2007, p.1184). 
Permitting Western companies to invest in Kazakhstan allows the government to both 
manage its dependence on Russian and Chinese companies (and thus on China and 
Russia), whilst at the same time increasing the stake of major Western/European states 
and the EU in developments in Kazakhstan.  
 
Foreign companies with investments in 
Kazakhstan’s three largest projects 
 
 
Home government 
 
BG Group 
Chevron 
Eni 
Exxon Mobil 
Lukoil 
LukArco  
Shell 
Total 
Inpex 
 
UK 
USA 
Italy 
USA 
Russia/US 
Russia/US 
UK/The Netherlands 
France 
Japan 
 
Table 2: Foreign companies involved in Kazakhstan's major energy projects. Source: Own 
elaboration 
 
Kazakh officials note that decisions to involve foreign companies in Kazakhstan are highly 
strategic and that the international relations repercussions of these decisions were very 
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important281. In Kazakhstan, President Nazarbayev is ultimately responsible for approving 
all of the major investment agreements with foreign companies and the international 
state-state dimension of these relationships plays a very important role in his 
considerations282. The President of Kazakhstan has met in the last few years with 
President Sarkozy of France, Berlusconi of Italy, Chancellor Merkel of Germany and Prime 
Minister David Cameron (during the 2012 Olympics in London). One official suggested 
that these sorts of meetings affect energy and broader political relations considerably. It 
was noted that, if Presidents Sarkozy and Berlusconi are seen to be visiting Kazakhstan, 
one should not be surprised to find French and Italian companies operating in the 
country283. Italy is thought of by some as the pre-eminent pillar of the European vector of 
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy (Cristiani, 2011). Italians are the biggest foreign investors in 
Kazakhstan284 and relations between Kazakh President Nazarbayev and former Italian 
President Berlusconi were particularly close285. The majority of this Italian investment is 
in the hydrocarbon sector and the role of Eni (and a number of other Italian companies) in 
Kazakhstan is a particularly important part of this relationship.  
In the early stages of the post-Cold War development of the Kazakh energy sector, the 
involvement of Western companies provided the government with the opportunity to 
develop its energy sector and gain access to revenues that could be used for regime 
consolidation, national development and the building of domestic legitimacy. Ipek (2007, 
p.1188) highlights that in these initial phases of the post-Cold War period, investments 
from European companies were specifically welcomed (in addition to those from the US) 
both because they were thought to be likely to bring with them TACIS investment from the 
EU and because European companies were less likely to be exposed to potential sanctions 
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derived from using Iran as an export route (unlike US companies)286. In addition to other 
factors relating to financing and technology (discussed separately below), one Kazakh 
government official argued that it was useful to have foreign investors in Kazakhstan from 
major Western countries as they were the only ones that could offset the growing 
influence of China287. Furthermore, Kazak officials suggested that large Western 
companies were also less likely to take part in bribery. Officials note that it is (almost288) 
impossible to demand bribes from larger companies. Smaller companies and non-Western 
companies may give into the pressure to bribe (or may be more inclined to in the first 
place and face no sanction from doing so), whereas larger companies face greater public 
scrutiny, specific anti-bribery measures at home and have the clout and the contacts to be 
able to say no. One official suggested that such companies have direct access to the 
President and can use this to offset pressures to offer bribes289. This means that when the 
major international companies are involved, projects are likely to be awarded, at least to a 
greater degree, on the basis of merit rather than on the basis of the companies with the 
biggest (unofficial) pockets290. 
Consortium structures and EU cooperation 
 
The structure of the energy industry plays an important role in the Kazakh upstream, 
contributing to EU cooperation in the country. As the literature reviewed in chapter one 
suggested, EU member states are frequently thought to shape their political positions 
around commercial projects with negative consequences for European energy unity (see 
the discussion of the Southern Corridor projects for example). Indeed, EU officials remark 
how major companies have considerable influence on member state governments and 
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note how member states will often be swayed in their opinions by national companies 
(including instances of one member state reading out a national position from a company 
document in a Council meeting and another changing a publically-stated position after 
receiving input from a company)291.  
Yet despite this, in the upstream Kazakh context, the commercial level can at times spur 
rather than hinder cooperation between EU member states and facilitate the EU’s 
diplomatic action and subsequent leverage in the region. The form of commercial 
interaction in Caspian states is important here. In Kazakhstan the major oil developments 
are run by consortia of international companies with minority stakes held by the Kazakh 
national oil company KazMunaiGas (KMG). One of these projects, Tengizchevroil is 
composed of American and Russian companies and KMG. Chevron holds a 50% share, 
ExxonMobil 25%, KMG 20% and the Russian company LukArco controls 5% (TCO, 2013a). 
The other two major projects in Kazakhstan, Karachaganak and Kashagan, include high 
participation from European companies. The Karachaganak consortium (Karachaganak 
Petroleum Operating B.V. or KPO) is a joint-venture composed of BG Group (29.25%), Eni 
(29.25%), Chevron (18%), LUKOIL (13.5%) and KazMunaiGas (10%). The North Caspian 
Operating Company (NCOC) consortium that runs the Kashagan project is composed of 
Eni, Shell, Total, ExxonMobil and KazMunaiGas, (all 16,8%) ConocoPhillips (8,49%) and 
Inpex (7,56%) (KazMunaiGas, 2012). 
The nature of consortia-based project development in Kazakhstan helps to drive 
cooperation between companies involved and fosters collaboration between member 
states. One member state official remarked how problems and issues in Kazakhstan rarely 
relate to one member state company and thus member states are able to coordinate on 
industry-wide issues292. International consortia, they felt, tend bring the international 
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community together293. They argued that when issues or disputes with the Kazakh 
government arise, member states with companies in an affected project (and other 
international players such as the US) will at times coordinate collective responses294 
(discussed further below). These problems are generally milieu-goal problems in 
character in that they affect the way that things are done in Kazakhstan. They do not, by 
contrast, generally relate to possession goals in that they do not concern issues where one 
European member state will lose out to another. Rather changes or problems for one 
company will often affect the whole consortium, or have potentially industry wide 
implications, and thus tend to unite member states. 
Furthermore, European member state engagement is not limited solely to instances when 
a national company is involved in a consortium. Sometimes European member states will 
concern themselves in a dispute related to a particular project even when they do not have 
a company directly involved (such as US-led Tengizchevroil) but where major national 
companies are involved in supplying goods or services to the consortium. Sometimes these 
supply contracts can themselves be worth millions of dollars and adverse conditions for 
the major project can have negative impacts for hundreds of supply businesses in 
European states295. Officials in Kazakhstan believe that similar circumstances are also 
likely to be found in Azerbaijan296. These industry conditions can pull member states 
together to support their energy companies in Kazakhstan and provide impetus for the 
sort of unity needed for collective European commercial diplomatic support. 
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Catalytic diplomacy: EU-company interaction and political support 
 
The European Union operates a diplomatic support function for energy companies in two 
senses. Firstly, as described in the previous chapters, the EU engages in a proactive, pre-
emptive sense seeking to shape a stable and reduced-risk Caspian milieu through the 
export and promotion of governance structures and through the conduct of energy 
diplomacy. Indeed, one EU official noted that part of the EU approach in the region was 
about managing relations in advance to ensure that political risks do not occur in the first 
place (an approach welcomed by companies – see previous chapter). However, in addition 
to this proactive role, the EU also provides a reactive ‘problem-solving’ political support 
role to companies when issues occur in the upstream. 
One member state official noted that, in Kazakhstan, the EU Delegation is very good at 
organising and coordinating member state responses to problems that arise and suggested 
that this led to a stronger overall position for those member states involved297. The EU’s 
combined weight as a trading bloc is a particularly important factor when interacting with 
the Kazakh Government, they felt298. Indeed, as EU Ambassador to Kazakhstan Aurélia 
Bouchez has recently noted, the EU is Kazakhstan’s biggest source of foreign direct 
investment and imports, and the destination of the majority of Kazakhstan’s exports 
(2013). Likewise, one EU official highlighted that Kazakhstan exports roughly 75% of its 
oil to Europe, whilst accounting for only 3-5% of EU imports. While the lobbying efforts of 
one member state are taken into account by the Kazakh government, the combined weight 
of the EU is seen by member state officials to be more effective299.  
Companies, the same official argued, have good access to and regular communication with 
European officials in Kazakhstan and, as mentioned above, officials recognise that the 
nature of the industry structure in Kazakhstan and the challenges that companies face 
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means that it is often preferable for EU member states and companies to coordinate 
together in response to issues, rather than to act separately300. There is regular contact 
between EU delegation, member state and energy company officials both in Brussels and 
the EU delegations in the Caspian. Indeed, in Astana the EU delegation, most EU member 
state embassies and most European energy companies are all located in the same building. 
Likewise, EU officials working in Brussels, both in the EEAS and the Commission, are in 
regular contact with energy company officials301. One company official in Brussels 
remarked how they prefer to meet with representatives from different DGs and the EEAS 
and that at times they try to bring different parts of the EU together302. Generally, however 
cooperation between different parts of the EU on Caspian energy policy is thought to be 
good with topics such as tax problems and unfair treatment discussed in meetings.  
In Kazakhstan, there are a number of different fora for meetings and coordination on 
energy matters. Firstly, local formal coordination working group meetings at the EU 
Delegation bring together energy and trade officials from member states and the 
delegation, and provide the opportunity to also invite Kazakh officials to explain policy 
changes303. These meetings are a forum for discussing developments and formulating 
coordination actions when necessary. Likewise, there are informal energy lunches every 
six weeks, coordinated by some of the prominent member states, the EU delegation and 
the US Embassy304. These bring together interested member and non-member states for 
informal discussions on energy matters, developments and necessary actions. US 
diplomatic cables record, for example, a lunch organised and hosted by the Hungarian 
ambassador Janos Balla on the 14th January 2010 to discuss Kazakh participation in the 
Nabucco project. A number of EU member state diplomats, including those from the UK, 
are reported to have attended (US Department of State, 2010d). The delegation in 
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Kazakhstan also organises an EITI meeting group so as to formulate a coordinated 
message with member states, the EU and the EITI secretariat in Oslo305. One official 
working in the Kazakh delegation noted that the cooperation between member states on 
energy matters was quite different in Kazakhstan when compared with similar interaction 
in Brussels. In Brussels, they felt, there was sometimes a feeling of member states being in 
competition with the Commission, whereas in the delegations it was rather member states 
and the Commission/EEAS together facing a common third-party interlocutor306. 
EU officials only intervene in energy matters in Kazakhstan however if they receive a 
specific request to do so from a company or member state and, as discussed previously, 
officials with experience of Kazakhstan note that the EU’s role is only to support member 
states and companies diplomatically on issues that relate to overall energy governance 
frameworks. While companies often try to resolve issues themselves directly with the 
Kazakh government and do not like to escalate or over-politicise a matter unnecessarily, 
as described in the last chapter, the EU has a number of different diplomatic options 
ranging from off-the-record informal discussions to demarches and joint lobbying 
strategies that it can employ to provide political support to companies in the event of 
problems in Kazakhstan. In meetings with the Kazak Government, EU officials stress that 
they avoid mentioning companies by name, rather focusing on the legal or political 
principles and issues at stake, seeking to present the need to resolve disputes to third 
parties307. This fact further reinforces the tendency to try to deal with disputes in terms of 
principles rather than particular issues (as well as the political risk of exacerbating 
disputes between the Kazakh Government and companies). Officials do note however, that 
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this is difficult in certain projects where there are only a small number of companies, such 
as Kashagan308.  
One recent example of a unified European catalytic diplomacy and problem-solving action 
was in an EU response to Kazakh decisions to impose stricter local content requirements 
on foreign companies operating in the country. Local content rules compel foreign 
companies to “use local goods, works and services in their operations, as well as to 
increase proportion of local employees among their staff and their contractors’ staff” 
(Yerkebulanov, 2012). Indeed, one EU member state official referred to moves to increase 
local content as a desire to increase the ‘Kazakhisation’ of the oil industry309. Such issues 
are very politically sensitive in Kazakhstan given the country’s development plans and 
increasing living standards, and the role that these play in stability and social harmony - 
particularly in the poorer west of the country away from the two major cities Astana and 
Almaty. Indeed, as the US State Department notes, “employers' reliance on foreign labor in 
the face of persistent poverty in rural Kazakhstan has become a political issue in recent 
years [sic]” (2012; International Crisis Group, 2007, p.30).  
Kazakhstan enacted two laws that had a significant impact on local content in 2010 (The 
2010 Law on Subsoil and Subsoil Use) and 2009 (Local Content Law) - both imposing local 
purchase requirements on foreign companies (US Department of State, 2012). In 
December 2010 the Kazakh Government adopted a special programme on local content 
that laid out mandatory targets of 90% Kazakh personnel at the technical level and 70% 
for executive level officials in the country (Yerkebulanov, 2012). Likewise, the government 
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perception that companies were undertaking such practices to inflate their expenses - expenses 
that they would later re-coup from the Kazakh government in the form of ‘cost-oil’309 
(Yerkebulanov, 2012). 
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expects 16% of goods and 85% of services to be Kazakh in origin (Yerkebulanov, 2012). 
The Local Content Law permits the government to revoke the licences of companies that 
do not meet local content requirements.  
Laws on local content are thought to hinder the operations of companies due to 
unavailability of local staff and suppliers. EU officials suggest that local content 
requirements are normally not a problem for foreign investors but the sophistication of 
machinery and the skills needed means that it is difficult to source the level of products, 
services and workers in Kazakhstan310. In response to these changes, the EU delegation, a 
number of member states (Italy, UK and the Netherlands) and non-EU embassies (the US), 
developed a successful joint lobbying strategy with affected companies to achieve a three-
year moratorium on the local content rules for the three major projects (Karachaganak, 
Tengiz and Kashagan).  
PRODUCTION AND CREDIT: RELIANCE ON WESTERN TECHNOLOGICAL AND 
PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY AND FINANCE 
 
This section sets out the contribution of European companies to the production and 
finance structures in the Kazakh oil sector. It details some of the production and financing 
difficulties in the Caspian and outlines the unique capability (at present) of Western 
companies to operate some of the major fields in the region. In doing so it documents the 
reliance of both the EU political actors and the Caspian governments on the operations of 
these companies.  
Production and finance in oil and gas 
 
The ability to decide what is produced, in what quantity, by whom, by what combination of 
“land, labour, capital and technology and how the relative parties should be rewarded is”, 
as Strange notes (1988, p.29), “as fundamental a question in political economy as who 
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decides the means of defence against insecurity”. In oil and gas, control over production is 
shared (predominantly) between state-owned companies that, along with oil ministries, 
control access to state-owned resources, and energy companies (mostly Western) that 
control access to the high-tech production capacity and know-how that makes oil and gas 
extraction possible – particularly in environmentally-fragile or geologically-challenging 
regions.  
Likewise, the ability to provide finance in the form of credit is often decisive in the 
competition between both commercial companies and states and thus a major source of 
power in the global economy (Strange, 1988, p.30). In major high-capital intensive 
industries like energy, investments would sometimes not be possible if capital had to be 
accumulated in advance (Strange, 1988, p.30). The size of energy investments, as will be 
seen below, often requires access to credit on international markets with major 
international energy companies sometimes finding it easier to access these credit markets 
than some oil exporting countries311.  
Western companies and production in the Caspian  
 
Within Caspian countries, energy companies exert their greatest influence in terms of 
financial clout and technical productive capacity. The Caspian region presents particularly 
challenging conditions in terms of oil and gas production and these difficult conditions 
increase dependence on Western companies. The Kashagan field in Kazakh section of the 
Northern Caspian provides a good example. Containing 13 billion barrels of recoverable 
oil, numerous technical, safety and environmental risks are associated with the Kashagan 
project. Firstly, harsh north-Caspian winters mean that the sea around Kashagan is 
covered with thick surface ice for five months of the year, creating a major production 
challenge as ice floe movement presents serious risk to fixed production equipment 
(Demytrie, 2012). Secondly, the field itself is highly complex and geologically fragmented 
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between different sites. Thirdly, the ‘associated gas’ in the project that is released along 
with the oil contains heavy concentrations of hydrogen sulphide (“sour gas”) and is highly 
toxic. One breath of this gas would be enough to kill a human (Trefis, 2012). Fourthly, the 
oil is located deep under the sea floor (2.5 miles) but, somewhat paradoxically, the sea 
itself in this part of the Caspian is too shallow (at only four metres) to allow for ordinary 
deep-sea underwater technology to be used (Trefis, 2012; Demytrie, 2012). Finally the 
area is highly environmentally sensitive with a number of rare species native to the region 
(including Caspian seals and sturgeon). Being an enclosed inland body of water, the effects 
on an environmental disaster such as a major oil spill, would be very severe indeed and in 
all likelihood much worse than a spill in open water such as the Gulf of Mexico disaster 
(Demytrie, 2012)312. Other major oil and gas fields with similar, albeit not identical, 
challenges are present in Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and elsewhere in Kazakhstan. The 
Tengiz field for example, also in the Kazakh northern Caspian, is one of the deepest super 
giant oil fields in the world (Tengizchevroil, 2013a). 
Under these difficult production conditions, Caspian countries rely on the technical 
capacity of European and Western firms. One EU official argued that some fields such as 
the South Yolotan field in Turkmenistan are incredibly complicated and that national oil 
companies do not have the technical capacity to fully produce from these sites by 
themselves313. One official cited de-sulphurication, drilling and gas-cleaning technologies 
as capacities that Caspian states need and currently lack314. Another noted that Western 
technology plays a central role in the Caspian – they argued that without Western 
technology there would be no Shah Deniz (in Azerbaijan) and no Kashagan (in 
Kazakhstan)315. Indeed, one official noted that technological competence of companies was 
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one of the reasons why the EU did not need to actively discriminate in the promotion of 
European companies over others. Rather, provided competitions were held openly, 
European and Western companies would win contracts due to their technological 
superiority316. The Kazakhs and Azeris, one EU official noted, could not get the required 
production know-how and technical capacity from other sources, such as Russia, and this 
they felt contributed to the need to have positive relations with the EU317. Another EU 
official remarked that reliance on companies for drilling in deep water areas in Azerbaijan 
contributed to positive relations between the government and international energy 
majors there318. In an example of public commercial diplomacy, Commissioner Piebalgs 
highlighted (and actively promoted) the technical production capacity of European energy 
businesses in 2007 at the Turkmenistan International Oil and Gas Conference in Ashgabat 
(hosted by the Turkmen Government) (EC, 2007). He noted that EU energy companies 
bring with them “highly advanced technical expertise and technologies” (Piebalgs, 2007). 
He went on to note further, “let me cite a few concrete areas: environmental and sulphur 
processing capabilities, gas flaring reduction measures and advanced hydrocarbon 
exploration. Our companies are also well known for working with country partners in the 
transfer of technological skills, appropriate training and the exchange of expertise” 
(Piebalgs, 2007). Incidentally, as was noted in the previous chapters, some companies 
specifically cite trips such as Piebalgs’s 2007 visit to Turkmenistan as important moments 
for EU-energy company cooperation. Likewise, EU Ambassador Bouchez in Kazakhstan 
recently remarked that European companies were “key for the development of 
Kazakhstan’s impressive oil and gas reserves” (Bouchez, 2013). One EU official noted that 
Chinese companies for example, struggle to match European companies on technical 
issues such as energy efficiency in oil production319. The Kazakhs, they noted, have 
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improved their technology over recent years, but Caspian production is difficult and the 
government still needs Western companies320.  
Kazakh officials also recognise the technological contribution made by Western and 
European Companies. One Kazakh official spoken to remarked that there were major 
advantages in involving Western companies in off-shore production in the Caspian, 
arguing that they brought expert technology especially in health and safety standards321. 
Furthermore, they noted that despite recent environmental disasters involving 
international majors (such as the BP Gulf of Mexico oil spill) the prospects for a similar 
event would be much higher with smaller companies322. In turn, in the event of a major 
spill, the large Western companies can be called upon to pay for the clean-up and 
compensation. One official highlighted that in the event of such a disaster happening under 
a production model only involving the national oil company KazMunaiGas, it would be 
impossible for the Kazakh government to get any compensation or have anyone else to 
blame politically323.  
Finance 
 
European companies also have considerable financial weight in Kazakhstan. One EU 
official highlighted how three quarters of all foreign direct investment in Kazakhstan takes 
place in the energy sector with European companies holding major stakes in two of the 
three major energy projects (Kashagan and Karachaganak). These projects, one Kazakh 
Government official noted, are 50 - 60% of all oil production in the country324. European 
oil companies bring funding to Kazakhstan that is unavailable to the government. One 
Kazakh government official argued that the Kashagan project in the Kazakh part of the 
Caspian Sea (run by a consortium containing three major European companies) is 
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estimated to cost upwards of 125 billion dollars to develop and that not many companies 
can (even collectively) spend that much money on one project325. They added that while 
the Kazakh government has built up 80 billion dollars within the Kazakh Sovereign Wealth 
Fund (Samruk Kaznya) over the last few years, the whole fund would still not be enough to 
finance Kashagan. Furthermore, companies find it easier to raise credit on international 
markets than either the Kazakh government or the national oil company Kazmunaigaz 
(KMG). While KMG can finance smaller projects, the money for projects ultimately comes 
in large part from banks, and companies have easier access to these funds as they 
generally have better credit ratings326. KMG has a credit rating of BBB whereas Royal 
Dutch Shell, for example, has a rating of AA/A-327. Following the taking of a greater stake in 
a number of major oil projects, one interlocutor argued that KMG was now finding it 
difficult to meet some of its financing liabilities to consortium partners (the credit risk 
companies mentioned in chapter four). In 2012 for example some members of the 
Kashagan consortium (Shell and Exxon) agreed to finance KMG’s cash liabilities to the 
project in 2012/2013. While the government as a whole has the money to meet these 
commitments, it is reluctant to spend funds that are invested in the Sovereign Wealth 
Fund as this is seen by both government and the population in Kazakhstan to be for future 
generations, not current consumption328. These funds, it was argued, are also seen to be 
needed for potential crises (as they were used by Kazakhstan in the financial crisis) and 
future development, rather than contemporary investment329. 
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KNOWLEDGE: LEGITIMACY, EXPERT KNOWLEDGE AND THE SHARING OF 
INFORMATION  
 
This final section considers the last of Strange’s power structures - knowledge - and 
focuses on the EU’s ability to use the control over certain forms of knowledge to further its 
objectives in the Caspian. Knowledge, in the form of both the ability to control information 
as well as the broader ability to shape the dominant understandings (norms and rules) 
that pertain to the energy sector are potent sources of power in energy politics. This 
section outlines the various forms of knowledge power that the EU is able to employ in the 
Caspian to support the general interest of the commercial sector. Firstly, this section 
briefly outlines the contested normative context in the Caspian. Secondly, it discusses the 
EU’s capacity to shape (in part) what is considered legitimate practice in the region as well 
as companies’ role in Caspian state legitimation. The section then considers the EU’s 
ability to employ expert knowledge in the Caspian, and finally, outlines the importance of 
information and knowledge-sharing between European companies and the EU institutions 
on Caspian developments.   
Knowledge in energy  
 
Bartlett (1989, p.85) notes that situations of imperfect information imply a degree of 
power for actors who hold more information. In a broader sense however, the notion of 
knowledge is also tied up with concepts of legitimacy and the ability to define what is 
understood as acceptable or appropriate. This relates closely to discussions of ideological 
power, frequently considered in a positive sense under the label of “soft” (Nye, 2004) or 
“normative” power (Manners, 2002) and less benignly under the notion of “hegemony” (of 
a Gramscian form) (Robinson, 2005). In the context of energy, knowledge can thus refer to 
the localised application of information that forms part of power in specific structures (for 
example technical production know-how or expert legal knowledge, as below). However, 
in a broader sense the knowledge structure also refers to the ability to determine the 
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dominant concepts surrounding how the energy industry should be managed330. These 
ideas themselves are in many cases linked to broader international economic and 
commercial norms (as discussed in chapter five). As mentioned in the discussion of liberal 
and proprietorial governance structures in chapter four, these broader aspects of the 
knowledge structure can be subject to much contestation and division.  
The wider normative context in the Caspian 
 
In addition to their material competition in the Caspian/Central Asia region, Russia, China, 
the US and the EU also compete ideationally in the region. Firstly, unlike the EU which is 
founded on the principle of shared or delimited sovereignty, Russia and China are more 
‘souverainist’ in their approach to international affairs, perceiving the rules of global 
governance to be both created in the interests of Western countries and less important 
than power relations331 (Grant, 2011). Both Russia and China are strongly committed to 
non-interference (in both hard power and ‘softer’ economic areas) especially in strategic 
sectors such as energy. Both tend to oppose forms of supranationalism and prefer 
cooperation based on intergovernmental ‘concert diplomacy’ (Grant, 2011) rather than 
the multilateral, legally-based frameworks that the EU seeks to export. Given each party’s 
considerable interest in the area, these factors have implications for energy governance in 
the Caspian region. The EU’s contrasting objective of rules-based multilateral energy 
policy predicated as much as possible on the EU energy acquis and/or international norms 
does not always sit well with Russian and Chinese visions based more firmly on ad-hoc 
intergovernmental negotiation. 
EU officials talk of selective adoption of Western norms by regional powers in the Caspian. 
EU officials note, for example, that they can be confident that oil supplies produced by 
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international companies in the Caspian will be exported via and traded on world markets, 
but question at the same time whether Chinese companies can be relied on to do the 
same332. While some would argue that it doesn’t matter if oil destined for China goes via 
international markets, (because if it does not China would just import less from those 
markets), a well-functioning international oil market is a core element of Western energy 
policy and any deviation from it is seen as a risk. 
EU officials note that China’s growing influence in Central Asia may lead to an increase in 
Chinese influence over the way political relations are conducted in the region333. The 
Chinese mode of direct state-state negotiations is well-received in Central Asia, for 
example, and mirrors Central Asian states’ preferred modes of interaction. However, EU 
officials suggest that it was Russia that had most to fear from this at the moment, as Russia 
is still, overall, the regional norm-setter334. 
One of the energy policy challenges of the post-Soviet Caspian region is that the normative 
context of energy governance is not yet fixed. The countries of the region, as described 
above, are developing and growing in confidence. As Caspian states move from one system 
to another the “rules of the game” change and in many cases these rules are not yet 
decided and remain unstable. EU officials argue that Caspian states have a different set of 
conceptual value references and ways of working from the EU, and while the export of EU 
values and norms to the region could be successful, this was likely to take time335. Some of 
the core European concepts relating to energy production, such as the role of markets or 
property rights, are not necessarily fully-accepted in the Caspian region. EU officials note 
that such notions are relatively new for Central Asian states. In addition to the Soviet 
heritage where market concepts were alien, traditional hierarchical societal structures can 
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militate against leaving crucial economic functions to impersonal markets336. One EU 
official noted that, for energy-rich states like Turkmenistan, it seems natural that all 
citizens should have free or cheap gas provided by the government. When EU officials 
suggest that energy is better left to the market, Caspian leaders tend to resist. Central 
Asian leaders, one EU official noted, are unlikely to engage with the EU unless you have a 
message that is legitimate for their societies337.  
Likewise, other rules over important issues in the context of energy such as property 
rights are also evolving in Caspian states with political power still playing a strong role in 
determining investors’ rights over property. In Kazakhstan, the possession of full property 
rights was granted by the civil courts only in 1994 and in certain respects Kazakhstan still 
has a restricted approach to the possession of and use of property. Core strategic sectors 
of the economy, as is the case in Russia today, are subject to state property laws that 
ensure the government first right of refusal on the sale of property in strategic sectors. 
The government is able to determine whether a particular asset is strategic or not. 
Furthermore, the strength of norms concerning property rights is still in flux amongst 
certain sections of the elite. Some parts of the Kazakh political class do not see rights over 
property as a fixed function of the rule of law but rather as a function of political power338. 
Indeed, arguably the only ultimate guarantor of property rights in Kazakhstan, as in the 
other Caspian states, is the political will of the President.  
Legitimacy  
 
The EU’s role in terms of contributing to what is seen as legitimate in the Caspian region is 
thus complex. In interviews, EU officials argue that the EU has a degree of influence in the 
Caspian because it controls access to legitimacy and has a role in shaping the rhetoric of 
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legitimate practice in energy339. However, in addition to playing a role (often 
unsuccessfully) in shaping the dominant and legitimate norms in the Caspian, it can also 
be argued that the EU and energy company interaction with the Caspian states contributes 
to the public perception of the legitimacy of these governments themselves. One can think 
of this legitimacy-ascribing role in two senses. Firstly, in terms of the direct legitimacy that 
arises from interaction with the EU as an international partner, and secondly, the indirect 
impact on Caspian populations’ perceptions of governmental legitimacy that derives from 
companies’ (inadvertent) assisting of the Kazakh government in the provision of public 
functions within their states.  
This question of legitimacy is of significant importance to Caspian governments. None of 
the Caspian states is a full electoral democracy and all rely on the maintenance of political 
stability, economic prosperity and the prestige attached to international relations to 
maintain support from their citizens. It should be noted that neither the EU nor energy 
companies deliberately seek to add to government legitimacy in Caspian states. It is, 
however, a largely inevitable consequence of their interaction340.  
However, despite the difficulties involved in doing so, the EU is able to shape, at least to 
some degree, the perceptions of legitimacy practice in energy – even if obtaining 
adherence to these norms is often difficult. Part of the EU’s strengths in this area derives 
from Caspian states’ desires for international recognition. Countries in the region are keen 
to be associated with the West as this helps with both domestic and international 
legitimation and the attraction of inwards investment341. Azerbaijan, one EU official noted, 
seeks to be seen as part of the ‘European family’, while Kazakhstan demonstrates a strong 
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desire for international recognition342. Indeed, the recent “Kazakhstan-2050” strategy 
announced by President Nazarbayev in December 2012 spoke to Kazakhstan’s aspiration 
to be seen as a “globally recognised country” (Nazarbayev, 2012). Indeed, even in relation 
to the conflicts with energy companies and Kazakhstan’s acquisition of a greater role in 
major energy projects discussed above, Kazakh officials are keen to stress that their 
actions were not nationalisations in the mould of international (energy) pariahs such as 
Venezuela and that original contracts remained in place, but with a greater role for KMG to 
reflect changed circumstances343. An official from one EU member state noted that even in 
the process of renegotiations undertaken in Kazakhstan, the government was careful not 
to go as far as other states (such as Russia or, more recently, Argentina) as they didn’t 
want to lose international acceptance344. While it is unclear whether the investment 
climate is now stable (Kazakh officials suggest it is while Western officials are less 
certain345), Kazakhstan’s need and desire for international acceptance and recognition 
limits the degree of resource nationalism possible. Furthermore, questions of international 
prestige and regional competition between Caspian states also play into desires for 
recognition from the European Union. EU officials note that during the Soviet period 
leaders of Soviet republics would compete for bilateral relationships with Moscow and 
that one can see elements of these patterns in their current international relations with 
major powers346. 
However, EU officials do suggest that the quality of the relationship, and the strength of 
the EU’s normative influence, diminishes as one crosses from the western to the eastern 
side of the Caspian347. While both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, for example, have clear 
publically-stated intentions to be more integrated with Europe, officials argue that the EU 
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has notably more influence with Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan, it has been suggested, looks for 
the EU stamp of approval in policy decisions and, as noted above, seeks to be part of the 
‘European family’348. Kazakhstan by contrast is more independent and, as described above, 
cuts a more balanced role between the major international players in the region349. 
Despite this, other EU officials noted that in a number of areas of governance reform areas 
such as internal energy infrastructure liberalisation, Kazakhstan has actually performed 
better than Azerbaijan350. This suggests how, despite the greater influence that the EU has 
in Azerbaijan, the intrinsic domestic interests and context of states is also highly 
significant.   
Undoubtedly - as described by Prange Gstöhl, (2009) (see chapter one) - questions of 
adherence to international practices in energy are caught up with Caspian states’ ongoing 
need and desire to attract investment. Policy frameworks such as the Energy Charter, the 
EITI and the WTO are important from the perspective of attracting inward FDI.  
Azerbaijan, one EU official noted, was especially keen on the EITI as it is a front runner in 
the organisation. EU officials note that companies will only invest under certain legal 
frameworks351. As described in the previous chapters, the EU provides and promotes such 
frameworks, often based on long established principles of international law. EU officials 
argue, however, that legal frameworks also protect Caspian host countries352. Countries do 
not set up their own international legal frameworks completely from scratch as there is 
concern that they could make mistakes that would make them out of kilter with the rest of 
the world. This could in turn both increase the risk of legal disputes and reduce 
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investment. Rather, it is better, they suggested, to adopt internationally-based frameworks 
with more established protocols so that the risk is lower353. 
As mentioned earlier, the EU institutions also derive a degree of legitimacy from their 
perceived neutrality. Dealing with the EU, one official suggested, was a straight-forward 
business354. Unlike Russia, China, or the US who link between different issues for leverage, 
the EU only negotiates on the issue in question355. While the EU is undoubtedly more 
multi-voiced and plural than states such as China or Russia, and while this sometimes 
frustrates Caspian states, it is also less threatening and this is one of the reasons why 
engaging with the EU is attractive356. The European Union, one EU official noted is seen as 
a reliable partner in the Caspian/Central Asia region357. Another suggested that Caspian 
leaders saw the EU as an honest player358. The EU institutions are in a relatively unique 
position in terms of energy policy in that they have no energy company (at least directly) 
and are not (again directly) involved in the capture of rents359. However, while this may 
contribute to the creation of a more neutral perception that benefits the EU, it should be 
noted that the EU is nonetheless promoting and advising on legal frameworks that are 
premised on European norms or at least international norms amenable to the EU.  
Additionally, companies also play an important role in terms of legitimacy in Caspian 
states as they (indirectly) facilitate Caspian states’ efforts to augment domestic legitimacy. 
In the case of Kazakhstan for example, the country is growing at roughly 6-7% per year 
and an important part of this growth comes from the Tengiz and Karachaganak projects 
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run by international consortia360. Given that companies play an instrumental role in 
facilitating the development of these projects they are consequently indirectly 
instrumental in ensuring a core component of governmental legitimacy in Kazakhstan. 
The EU’s use of expert knowledge in the Caspian upstream 
 
Other, more direct, examples of EU power based in the control of information derive from 
the EU’s ability to use its experience of and expertise in legal energy matters to its 
advantage. One official noted that the EU can act as an amicus during negotiations and 
disputes between states and between states and companies given its particular, more 
neutral, position and the fact that it was involved in the drafting of much international 
energy legislation, such as the ECT361. Some legal questions in the energy field have never 
been subject to international litigation and in these instances the EU is able to offer 
Caspian states a degree of (relatively) objective advice362. EU officials, one interviewee 
suggested, were the only people who really understand how policies such as the Energy 
Charter should work in these instances because it was EU Commission officials that 
originally drafted them363. This type of policy action is concurrent with the EU’s objective 
of promoting the general European interest in energy rather than the preferences of any 
particular company. It nonetheless reflects the possibility of using this informational 
advantage to support the general European commercial interest abroad – a core EU 
foreign energy policy objective. 
Indeed, possessing such expertise provides the EU with an important source of knowledge 
power and presents the opportunity for influence-enhancing actions when advice is given. 
One energy expert spoken to was aware of instances when the EU had provided direct 
legal advice to some Caspian states in their negotiations with other regional powers – a 
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practice apparently very much appreciated by Caspian political leaders, giving the EU a 
great deal of influence364. Other players, such as China, do not do such things, it was 
noted365. EU officials observe that their advice is not always in the commercial energy 
sector’s short-term interests but that it is an important part of developing lasting 
partnerships in energy366. Again this last point provides evidence of EU promotion of the 
European general interest discussed in the previous chapters. Some EU officials however 
argue that companies may not always see things in the same way and that it is at times a 
challenge to get them to consider their long rather than short-term interests367. 
EU-energy company information-sharing  
 
Information-sharing represents a core component of the EU public-private interaction in 
energy policy with companies and the EU institutions both relying on each other’s 
knowledge for information on upstream developments. EU officials interact formally and 
informally, and share information with the industry both directly through contact with 
individual firms and indirectly via industry associations368 (as discussed in the previous 
chapter). The EU is in a relatively unique position as it is one of the few actors able to 
speak to all major companies369. Some member states will only consult with their national 
companies and form opinions on that basis. Likewise, EU officials note that there are 
things that member states and energy companies will not say to each other. The EU 
institutions by contrast, in the form of the EEAS and Commission, are the only actors that 
are able to talk to everyone and this gives officials a useful overall picture370. One official 
noted, for example, how the EU receives information from all of the 71 companies involved 
in the various Southern Corridor projects. They did note as well, however, that while this 
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degree of contact was beneficial for the EU, companies would also withhold information 
from them at times371.  
Companies inform the EU, for example, on issues that arise relating to investment 
disputes, ‘doing business’ issues, government actions, rules on local content, restrictions 
on foreign personnel and future investment decisions etc.372. Companies are also able to 
give broader political information relating to specific companies, state leaders etc. EU 
officials highlight that energy companies have very good contacts within Caspian 
governments and that they can provide useful information on domestic developments373. 
EU and company officials both describe this sharing of information as reciprocal374. The EU 
and energy companies do not have identical interests, it was suggested, but a mutually 
beneficial relationship exists between the two. One company official noted that they had 
ongoing operations in most of the strategic energy areas surrounding Europe and that this 
presented them with highly detailed knowledge that can be passed on to the EU375. One 
official operating in the Caspian noted that the nature of information shared with the EU 
had changed over time. Before the EU had a stable presence in the region, companies, they 
felt, were very important sources of information for the EU. Now the EU has delegations in 
the region it relies on their information less and the relationship has consequently become 
one of sharing and comparing information376.  
Officials note that it is difficult to always trust the information provided by companies 
however. Indeed, one EU official suggested that companies that always presented accurate 
information to the EU would likely be at a structural disadvantage vis-à-vis other firms377. 
As such, one had to sometimes be cautious about the information received. Another official 
                                                          
371 Ibid  
372 Interview EU official [17 & 18], Brussels, Summer 2012 
373 Interview EU official [27], Astana, Summer 2012 
374 Interview EU official [26], Brussels, Summer 2012; Interview energy company official [34], 
Brussels, Autumn 2012 
375 Interview energy company official [34], Brussels, Autumn 2012 
376 Ibid 
377 Interview EU official [6], Brussels, Summer 2012 
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noted that, when information is received by companies, delegations will consult with 
Brussels so as to decide whether or not to take action378. 
CONCLUSION: THE EU AND THE EUROPEAN INDUSTRY IN THE CASPIAN UPSTREAM: 
NOT PERFECT ALIGNMENT, BUT REINFORCING ROLES  
 
This chapter has outlined the contours of the EU-company bargain in the Caspian region 
(and in Kazakhstan in particular) drawing attention to the roles that both sets of actors 
play in the region and relative resources they command. The first section drew attention 
to the (geo)political challenges. It highlighted how Kazakh fear of regional hegemons 
Russia and China provides an opportunity for European engagement in the country as part 
of Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy. Following this, it highlighted how the presence 
of energy companies, the challenges they face and the consortia-based nature of the 
industry pull member states together and allows them to foster the unity necessary for 
common European action in line with the milieu-shaping and (commercial) diplomatic 
behaviour discussed previously.  
The second section highlighted how both Caspian states and European actors are reliant 
on the productive capacity and finance of European firms. It was noted how European 
(and some other Western) companies have the financial clout and technology to deal with 
the Caspian region’s various ecological and geological production challenges that other 
non-Western/European companies do not. One official put it simply by highlighting that 
without European companies there would be no production at some of the major fields in 
the region – a problem for Caspian leaderships of course, but also for an EU keen to 
diversify its supply base. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the presence of Western 
companies is preferable to the EU from a security of supply point of view as they are most 
efficient, most likely to invest and most likely to sell their products on international and 
regional markets. 
                                                          
378 Interview EU official [27], Astana, Summer 2012 
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Finally, the last section considered the knowledge-based aspects of energy politics in the 
region. In doing so, it examined the contested normative context in the Caspian and 
demonstrated how important normative questions, such as those surrounding property 
rights, are not yet fixed. It documented, however, how the EU was able to determine (to a 
degree) what constitutes legitimate practice in energy and ascribe legitimacy to Caspian 
actions, giving it some influence over their behaviour. It was also noted how the EU is able 
to use its expert knowledge to further European objectives in the region. All of these 
normative objectives, however, are concerned with the promotion of the liberal model of 
energy governance discussed in chapter five (even if they are not always in the interests of 
individual companies) and thus support the EU’s broader structural risk mitigation role in 
the region. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION: EVALUATING EUROPEAN COOPERATION IN 
THE CASPIAN UPSTREAM 
 
EU energy policy is a complex entity with varying objectives and fluctuating levels of 
cohesion in different areas. This thesis has investigated cooperation between European 
member states, EU institutions and commercial actors in one small, but nonetheless 
important, area of this energy policy - the Caspian upstream. Indeed, the observation of 
the relatively high degree of cooperation and interdependence between European actors 
on Caspian upstream policy, witnessed in the preceding chapters, challenges the generally 
discordant nature of EU external energy policy. This thesis has demonstrated that 
European actors cooperate well on some upstream energy matters, that European 
companies strategically engage with and seek support from the EU alongside their home 
governments, that EU member states often support and take part in this engagement and 
that commercial relations and political structural factors can spur member states to 
cooperate at the EU level on strategic energy affairs. Furthermore, in addition to empirical 
contributions, this thesis has developed a series of useful theoretical models to account for 
the EU’s upstream policy and the broader politico-commercial cooperation between 
European actors in the Caspian upstream. 
This concluding chapter presents the main research findings of this thesis. It starts by 
highlighting the theoretical contributions offered and then turns to the series of empirical 
arguments advanced. The chapter concludes with a short series of critical reflections on 
the research undertaken and a brief discussion of potential avenues for future research 
based on the findings here. 
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THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS: TOWARDS A POLITICO-ECONOMIC THEORISATION 
OF EU UPSTREAM ENERGY COOPERATION 
 
Chapters one and two identified how the literature and theoretical discussion of EU 
external energy policy tend to be characterised by discord and division. Many scholarly 
accounts of EU foreign energy policy have (albeit often implicitly) mirrored the wider 
theoretical discussions on the challenges of EU foreign policy coordination. Observations 
of a “logic of diversity” (Hill, 1998; Zielonka, 1998) in European member states’ energy 
policies and a “capability/consensus-expectations” gap (Hill, 1993; Toje, 2008)  between 
the EU’s potential in energy policy and its often less impressive capacity for action are 
widespread in the EU external energy policy literature (although rarely expressed in these 
terms). Furthermore, like the wider energy politics literature, accounts of EU foreign 
energy policy tend to be characterised by division between realist/geo-political accounts 
and liberal market-based accounts of energy politics (Keating et al, 2012). However, such 
accounts do not adequately theorise areas of EU external energy cooperation and do not 
present models for evaluation of the EU’s overlapping security and market-promoting 
roles in energy. 
In response, this thesis sought to explain and move beyond these divisions. Drawing on 
Wight’s (1987) discussion between realist, rationalist and revolutionist tendencies in 
international thought, it examined how each strand of the literature explains energy 
politics by focusing on and privileging one of the “coexisting and contradictory” market 
and security trends in energy policy identified by Claes (2009, p.40) and Helm respectively 
(2005, p.1-3). Indeed, as Helm (2005, p.14) notes, the market-based paradigm in energy 
policy is not obsolete but rather has been messily merged with more security-minded 
objectives. In focusing on one of these two broader trends, conceptual accounts of energy 
politics have rarely captured this merge of liberal commercial and security objectives and 
practices in energy policy. 
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This thesis offers an alternative politico-economic ontology that reduces the tensions 
between these traditions in international thought (as advocated by Wight, 1987), built, in 
particular, around the work of Strange (1988) and Cox (1986). Specifically, it accounts for: 
1) investigation of the links between the political and the economic in energy; 2) a 
widening of the range of actors and sources of power under investigation; 3) an 
examination of the interplay of transnational, state and interstate spheres of analysis; and 
4) the interaction between ideational and material factors in energy affairs. Crucial to this 
approach was a view that puts power at the heart of the analysis, but that does not assume 
which actors hold power or what form that power takes. As Cox (1996, p.183) describes, 
this is essentially a form of realism (in that there is a strong focus on power), but it is a 
realism where the objective is “the search for the effective entities in politics, whatever 
they may turn out to be”.  
Models for analysing energy cooperation and interaction 
 
On the back of this framework, an interdisciplinary, eclectic mix of heuristic politico-
economic concepts was presented in chapter two to help explain the different empirical 
dimensions of the research undertaken here. The amalgamation of these concepts and 
their application to the context of EU energy policy is original and offers a new set of 
theoretical models for the analysis of EU upstream energy policy. 
Three such models were advanced. The first, based on the diversity of politico-economic 
structures between Europe and the Caspian, sought to conceptualise the challenges of the 
regional operating context for the EU. It highlighted the interdependence of states across 
Eurasia, especially in the energy sphere, but noted the heterogeneity of political and 
economic structures across that geographical space. Furthermore, it drew attention to 
how energy independence and flows of revenue from Europe to the Caspian have the 
effect of exacerbating these structural differences over time (due to the effects of the 
resource curse and resource nationalism). Furthermore, the notion of territorial non-
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coincidence (Murray, 1971) was introduced to highlight how this broader diversity also 
manifests as a disjuncture between a transnational economic sphere on which all players 
rely and the different regulatory structures in each state that can produce risks for 
commercial actors. Territorial non-coincidence is particularly acute in energy given that 
the interdependence is greater and the politico-economic stakes higher than in other 
sectors. These concepts together – interdependence, heterogeneity and territorial non-
coincidence - help conceptualise the structural challenges seen in the Caspian region and 
the structural factors that EU’s milieu-shaping efforts are reacting to.  
Second, “milieu-shaping” (Hyde-Price, 2008; Wolfers, 1962; Smith, 2004) and “structural 
foreign policy” (Keukeleire, 2003) were introduced to help conceptualise the overlap 
between the EU’s market-facilitating and security role in the Caspian region. Hyde-Price 
(2008) argues that EU member states seek to utilise the EU to promote a regional milieu in 
keeping with their security and economic objectives. It was noted that the EU can be 
spurred into this kind of action by changes in the structural conditions around Europe 
(Hill, 1998, p38-9). Indeed, as was argued in chapter six, in the face of a difficult 
international environment and the decline of the US role in the former Soviet Union, EU 
member states see the EU as offering a rational way to collectively have more influence in 
the Caspian. However, these factors account only broadly for what the EU does and why. 
To understand the EU’s specific objectives in the Caspian upstream, the realist notion of 
milieu-shaping as a response to structural factors was combined with neo-marxist notions 
of “making the world safe for capital”, in particular the notion of “state economic 
functions” (Murray, 1971; Smith 2004; Junne, 1994). These functions include, above all, 
the mitigation of political risk and market facilitation (Smith, 2004). Smith (2004, p.79-80) 
discusses how these functions can be performed by international bodies such as the EU 
and how international actors can gain a great deal of prestige and legitimacy from the 
provision of these functions. The EU’s role in the provision of these risk-reducing functions 
was correspondingly a major research focus of this thesis. 
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Thirdly, to conceptualise the actual cooperation between European actors in practice, this 
thesis employed the notions of an implicit “market-authority bargain” (Strange, 1988; 
Goel, 2004), “structures of power” (Strange, 1988), “resource dependency” (Eising, 2009) 
and “catalytic diplomacy” (Hocking, 2004a; 2004b). Strange’s (1988) four structures were 
used to break-down the operating context and challenges for European actors in the 
Caspian and then to consider the relative responses made to these challenges by European 
actors. Resource dependency and catalytic diplomacy in turn were employed to capture 
how actors are mutually reliant on each other for the supply of certain resources in their 
collective diplomacy in the upstream.  
However, these models are by no means limited to investigation of intra-EU cooperation, 
the Caspian region or energy policy. Indeed, they are readily transferable and could be 
applied to numerous areas of international political economy both inside European 
foreign policy studies and within the wider field of IPE. 
EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS: RISK MITIGATION, MILIEU-SHAPING AND EUROPEAN 
POLITICO-COMMERCIAL INTERACTION IN THE CASPIAN UPSTREAM 
 
Overall, this thesis makes an important empirical contribution to knowledge in a number 
of areas, notably: 1) the relationship between political risk and the EU’s upstream milieu-
shaping role and objectives; 2) the relatively high level of overlap between commercial 
and political objectives and perspectives of Caspian energy policy; 3) the overlap of (and 
some of the tensions between) EU energy and commercial diplomacy; and 4) the 
structural upstream interdependence between European political and commercial actors 
in the Caspian. Each of these areas is discussed in turn below. 
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The EU upstream role: Risk mitigation, market facilitation and state economic 
functions 
 
This research has presented a comprehensive analysis of the EU’s upstream energy role 
and its relationship with political risk. Chapter four explained the external risk-inducing 
dependencies that shape broader EU strategic objectives in energy (on sources, routes and 
counterparties respectively). The most important of these, from the perspective of this 
thesis, is the EU’s rarely-discussed dependence on the commercial energy sector. The EU 
model of energy supply relies heavily on (an often small number of) Western companies 
for the necessary investment and physical delivery of oil and gas resources from foreign 
markets. Indeed, chapter six highlighted company efforts in public consultations to play on 
this link and present themselves as crucial parts of the EU’s energy security supply.  
As chapter four argued, actors can seek to respond to such dependency risks by both 
diversifying the number of actors on whom they rely and by taking preventive action to 
avoid the likelihood of risk events occurring in the first place. However, in terms of 
European dependence on companies, diversification is difficult for three main reasons. 
Firstly, there are only a small number of companies responsible for and capable of 
managing major projects. Secondly, producer countries, as described in chapter seven, can 
be very selective with regard to whom they will allow to invest in the extraction of their 
resources. As such, diversification is somewhat limited as a policy objective and the EU is 
compelled to focus on preventing risks before they happen as well as being able to react to 
them when they occur. 
Indeed, echoing the theoretical intersection of realist and neo-marxist notions of milieu-
shaping discussed above, chapter four demonstrated how the EU’s reliance on energy 
companies in the upstream creates a strong overlap between the EU’s energy security 
objectives and some of the non-commercial, political risks to companies. Consequently, 
chapter four argued that playing a structural role in shaping the regional milieu so as to 
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mitigate political risks and facilitate markets was one of the EU’s most significant 
upstream strategic energy priorities in the Caspian region. Correspondingly, EU measures 
employed to mitigate these risks in practice were discussed. It was shown that two 
measures in particular (energy governance and energy diplomacy) were of particular 
significance in the EU’s structural milieu-shaping foreign policy. In terms of governance, 
the EU seeks to mitigate risk by bringing third party states’ energy governance systems in 
line with European (risk-reducing) requirements. EU energy diplomacy, by contrast, is 
used to support the EU’s governance objectives, increase dialogue so as to avoid risks and, 
lastly, to react to risks when they occur.  
Having discussed the broader EU upstream role and convergence on upstream risk, the 
thesis turned attention to the EU’s specific upstream objectives in the Caspian region. 
Chapter five highlighted the difference between liberal and proprietorial models of 
governance and their implications for state-economic functions and risk, arguing that the 
EU pursues a set of liberal risk-reducing objectives in its energy governance. 
Subsequently, chapter five demonstrated the mix of different European and international 
institutions and norms that the EU promotes in upstream energy in the Caspian region. 
Particularly, it showed how the EU pursues an energy ‘governance complex’ of different 
institutional structures in the Caspian comprising both EU-administered (for example, 
Baku Initiative) and international governance structures (for example, the EITI and WTO). 
Furthermore, this chapter drew attention to the five norms of EU upstream energy policy 
(investment protection/promotion, competition, safety, regulatory harmonisation, 
transparency and multilateralism/regionalism) noting their liberal character and 
illustrating how they promote upstream state-economic functions in the Caspian - 
supporting at a governance level the EU’s market facilitation and mitigation of political 
risk.  
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Overlapping perspectives on upstream energy policy  
 
This thesis has also further contributed to knowledge on EU upstream energy policy by 
demonstrating the overlap (and tensions) between commercial and political perspectives 
on upstream energy policy. This analysis was commenced in chapter four which illustrated 
the extent of EU actor perception convergence on the major risks in energy policy. It found 
that while there were differences of opinion between companies, member states and EU 
institutions, there was a high degree of convergence around matters of upstream political 
risk and market access/investment risk. While this shared risk perception does not 
guarantee EU policy convergence, chapter four argued that it represents a necessary 
condition for and a core part of EU upstream energy policy cooperation in the Caspian.  
Chapter five moved from analysis of risk perception to policy perspectives, and in doing so 
further established the level of European convergence on Caspian upstream policy. 
Specifically, chapter five examined the perspectives of member states and energy 
companies on the norms of energy governance in the Caspian. Mixed patterns of 
convergence were observed. While all three sets of actors demonstrated very similar 
perspectives on investment protection, opinions on transparency, competition, regulatory 
harmonisation and regionalism/multilateralism presented a more mixed picture with 
broad (if not perfect) convergence on international frameworks, but lower levels of 
convergence on EU structures. While the EU’s reliance on international frameworks in the 
Caspian means that, ultimately, a relatively high degree of convergence can be observed 
across the EU’s upstream governance, chapter five further illustrated how matters of 
political risk mitigation and business facilitation provide the fundamental core of 
convergence between member state, Commission/EEAS and company objectives. 
Finally, further reinforcing support for an EU role in Caspian upstream energy, chapter six 
examined company and member states’ perspectives on the supranationalisation of 
commercial energy diplomacy. Bucking the trends of division in EU energy policy seen in 
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the wider literature, it found that member states and companies support both a strong 
role for the EU in energy diplomacy and close interaction between the EU institutions and 
the commercial sector. Member states and companies see the EU as a potential source of 
additional influence in politically contested regions such as the Caspian - especially given 
changing structural conditions such as increased Russian and Chinese power, the 
augmented assertiveness of energy-rich producers and the declining influence of the USA. 
Member states also consider the EU to provide a more ‘neutral’ cover for the promotion of 
energy interests and provision of support when member states want to deliver a 
politically-difficult message or when political disputes between governments hinder the 
prospects of effective member state commercial energy diplomacy. Likewise, just as the 
EU seeks to reduce its dependence on the commercial sector (described above), 
companies seek to diversify the actors that can offer them political support. As such, 
companies also welcome a strong commercial diplomacy role for the EU, which provides 
them with an alternative source of backing when member states are unwilling or unable to 
help them. 
Energy and commercial diplomacy  
 
Building on discussion of the intersection between company and EU energy interests in 
chapter four, chapter six also demonstrated the overlap between the EU’s commercial 
diplomacy (traditionally the responsibility of the Commission) and energy diplomacy 
(largely the responsibility of the EEAS). While the division of the EU’s diplomacy between 
the EEAS and the Commission presents the potential for tension it was noted how, in 
practice, personal relations between officials (who in some cases are former Commission 
colleagues) are able to manage intra-institutional relations and how the divisions between 
the Commission and the EEAS (and between the EU institutions and member states) are 
far less acute in delegations than in Brussels. Chapter six also described the various fora 
that the EU uses for proactive energy diplomacy and highlighted some of the measures 
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that the EU employs in Kazakhstan when reacting to emergent risks in the region (such as 
joint-EU demarches and joint-EU meetings with Kazakh officials).  
Furthermore, some of the tensions between the EU’s general structural role and specific 
company objectives were discussed. Overall, chapter six explained how companies both 
seek to strike a balance between involving the EU as a political counterweight to producer 
governments and the preservation of their business autonomy. However, chapter six also 
examined EU officials’ perceptions of their own upstream political support role in the 
Caspian. Indeed, it was demonstrated that EU officials seek to maintain a clear line 
between commerce and policy and do not desire to be involved in business decisions. 
Rather, they see their role as providing support in the general interest of the European 
upstream industry as a whole, rather than to pursue the particular specific interests of 
individual companies. Such a view concurs with the discussion of the EU’s structural 
energy role above. 
Structural conditions, interdependence and catalytic diplomacy 
 
This thesis also documented the mutual dependence between EU political and commercial 
actors in the upstream and in so doing offered contributions to discussions of EU catalytic 
and multi-stakeholder diplomacy. Chapter seven employed Strange’s (1988) typology of 
politico-security, production, financial and knowledge-based power to analyse the 
structural operating challenges in the Caspian and the resource-interdependent responses 
of various European actors. It was explained how, in the political context, the involvement 
of regional powers (Russia and China) and Caspian states’ own desires for independence 
and autonomy present both challenges and opportunities for European actors. This 
section likewise highlighted how the industry structure in Kazakhstan can contribute to 
European political cooperation, and detailed the various forms of interaction and policy 
measures open to European officials for coordination and commercial energy diplomacy. 
Investigation of the production and financial aspects of EU-company interaction drew 
276 
 
attention, by contrast, to the major technical and financial production challenges that the 
Caspian region presents. These challenges mean that European dependence on companies 
is high here because the EU does not only rely on companies for investment and efficiency, 
but in this case, the energy (the majority of which comes to Europe) would not be 
produced at all without the involvement of Western companies. Finally, completing the 
analysis of the interaction and resource dependence between European actors in the 
Caspian, chapter seven considered the EU’s knowledge-based resources. It re-highlighted 
how the EU is seen as more ‘neutral’ than other actors, firstly because it is less threatening, 
and secondly because it is not considered to be tied to the particular interests of any given 
company. These factors help the EU in the influence it derives from the provision of expert 
knowledge and its ability to ascribe a certain degree of legitimacy in the region. Indeed, 
Caspian states’ relatively recent exposure to energy production means they sometimes 
rely on the EU for information and, even when engaging in actions that run counter to 
European interests, Caspian states are still very concerned by their international image. 
Nonetheless, while the EU may be one stage removed from energy companies, the 
information it provides and the policies that it promotes do not run counter to the long-
term structural interests of the European energy industry, even if they might not support 
the individual actions of specific energy companies in a given instance. Finally and further 
highlighting the mutual reliance of European actors in the Caspian, chapter seven 
illustrated the knowledge-sharing that exists between European political and commercial 
players and explained the importance of this information-sharing in terms of European 
upstream politico-commercial energy interdependence. 
Having outlined the various research contributions offered in this thesis, this chapter 
concludes with a brief discussion of some critical reflections on the research done, 
followed by a short section on potential areas for future research that build on the findings 
advanced above. 
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CRITICAL REFLECTIONS 
 
This penultimate section offers a series of critical reflections on some of the major themes 
and challenges that have emerged from this thesis. In particular, it focuses on the concepts 
of cooperation and power, the linkages between different core scholars (Strange, Cox and 
Murray in particular), the related linkages between the three heuristic theoretical models 
offered and, finally, the challenges posed by empirical and theoretical complexity in this 
study.  
Reflecting on cooperation and power 
 
As noted in the introduction, this thesis sought to examine cooperation, involving the 
active coordination and interaction between European political and commercial energy 
actors (Keohane, 1984, p.51). A challenge inherent to this study has been the 
conceptualisation and empirical investigation of cooperation that is in many cases 
informal and ad hoc. Indeed, the thesis sees a complex mixture of different forms of 
cooperation. Some opportunities for intra-European engagement and cooperation such as 
consultations or meetings in the Council are formal and institutionalised. Others are less 
so, such as the informal, but regular, energy lunches organised by the EU delegation in 
Astana that bring together officials from member states (described in chapter six and 
seven). Other forms of cooperation, such as joint lobbying by EU member state 
ambassadors in Astana or meetings between companies and Commission/EEAS officials in 
Brussels, are quite ad-hoc and irregular. One of the benefits of this study has been to 
document these latter types of interaction which are rarely referred to in official 
documents or literature. Indeed, this demonstrates the importance and benefit of 
interviews in this area of research (especially those conducted in third-party upstream 
states where much of this cooperation and associated coordination actually takes place). 
Conceptually speaking, as this thesis has demonstrated, network-based models prove 
useful in being able to conceptualise the resource-interdependent relationships that lie 
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behind these forms of interaction. However, as highlighted in the section below, 
conducting this form of network-based analysis presents some research difficulties in 
terms of time, cost and the challenge of gaining access to the respective networks. It is 
also, reflecting one of the broader drawbacks of the methodology adopted here, only able 
to describe with certainty the interactions of the specific networks investigated, rather 
than offer wider, generalizable, research findings (although, as discussed in chapter two, 
theoretical explanations derived from this research may well be transferable). 
Likewise, of significant importance to the arguments in this thesis is the concept of power. 
The thesis employs a focus on power derived from Strange’s (1988) conceptualisation of 
‘structural power’ as a means of theorising the different forms of power inherent to energy 
politics. Strange’s model, also employed by Goel (2004) in the context of energy, is 
important as it draws attention to the different forms of power that actors need to bring to 
a specific politico-economic ‘bargain’ and it provides a framework for analysing the ways 
different forms of power, provided by different types of actors, interact. Such an approach 
was essential given the pluralist view of actors and the political-economic approach 
adopted here. However, as the research advanced it became evident that this approach 
could be advanced further by combining it with a resource-based, networked 
understanding of actor interaction (Hocking, 2004b, p.151). Adopting such an approach, as 
the final chapter does, allows one to conceive of the structural environment requiring 
certain forms of power and networks of catalytic diplomatic actors providing different 
resources that meet these structural requirements. In this case, power comes both from 
what actors can provide (member state and EEAS/Commission officials can offer 
diplomatic services, for example), but also from what actors can withhold (information, 
finance, cooperation etc.). In this latter sense however, the power derived from control 
over resources is only significant if one has a monopoly on that source of power. If other 
actors can get the resource from elsewhere, the power of the first actor is significantly 
reduced (companies have leverage in Kazakhstan, for example, because they collectively 
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have a monopoly on the technology necessary to access the most difficult fields). However, 
because actors are keen not to rely overall on only one or two actors, offering 
opportunities for the diversification of dependence risk is also, in and of itself, a form of 
power (just as the EU, for example, presents opportunities for Astana not to be too 
dependent on Russia and China).  
The investigations of both power and cooperation have thus both benefited from network-
based analysis in this thesis. However, taking such an approach also draws attention to 
one of the methodological difficulties of this kind of research. It is not really possible to 
fully study these networks without engaging with them (at least to some extent) oneself. 
To get access to the details of these networks one has to talk to the people in and around 
them. Doing so in some cases however, given the sensitivity of the subject matter, can 
prove challenging and costly both in terms of time and money, as well as demanding in 
terms of interpersonal skills.     
Linking models and scholars  
 
Another area for reflection is the way in which the core scholars, and the models based on 
their work offered in chapter two, are related to one another. This thesis presented three 
models in the theoretical chapter that are intrinsically linked to one another – both in 
terms of their design and in terms of the scholars on whose work they are based. The first 
model, resting primarily on Murray’s (1978) notion of territorial non-coincidence, is a 
conceptualisation of the structural problem facing European actors. In effect it considers 
the challenge of ensuring a low political risk environment in a region where the very 
process of energy production and trade can serve to heighten this risk. In the face of such a 
structural challenge, the network based model of catalytic diplomacy conceptualises 
European actors’ multi-stakeholder efforts to deal with this structural environment 
(Hocking, 2004b, p.151). A third model, focused on the EU’s milieu-shaping/structural 
foreign policy and the promotion of state economic functions (Hyde-Price, 2008; 
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Keukeleire, 2003; Smith, 2004; Murray, 1971), in turn relates to the EU institutions’ (EEAS 
and Commission) primary resource contribution to this catalytic diplomacy.  
The theoretical frameworks in this thesis benefit from a certain commonality between 
three core scholars - Strange, Cox and Murray - whose work underpins the theorisation 
offered in chapter two. All three of these scholars can be located toward the ‘critical’ end of 
the theoretical spectrum in International Political Economy and their ideas lend 
themselves well to the analysis of intersections of political and economic power, and thus 
support the eclectic interdisciplinary effort conducted here. Cox and Murray offer accounts 
that are historical materialist/structural neo-marxist but with a very strong sensitivity to 
the actions of political actors. One can see this in Murray’s focus on the importance of state 
economic functions and Cox’s focus on the complex intersection of the transnational 
economic, interstate and state systems (and the fact that each impacts on the other – see 
chapter two). Strange, a leading light in the early development of International Political 
Economy as a field of study, was by contrast a realist, but as highlighted in chapter two, a 
realist whose focus was on power whatever form it may take and wherever it may lie 
(including economic power) and a realist who explicitly sought to conceptualise the 
interactions of market-based actors and political authorities by putting them on a broadly 
level footing (at least in terms of analysis). The models advanced in this thesis fit together 
and are internally consistent because they are based, in part, on the work of a series of 
highly intellectually compatible and complimentary scholars (and because they are 
consistent with the philosophical and scientific ontological frameworks outlined in 
chapter two and annex one). 
In terms of research contribution, the added value of the interaction between these 
models is that they focus on the interplay of both the structural and agency-based factors 
relevant to this thesis. In this sense, this framework offers a structurationist view that 
seeks to incorporate both structure and agency in analysis (Marsh, 2010, p.216). One of 
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the challenges inherent to a study such as this, is thus how to analyse the impact of the 
structural environment (comprising multiple actors - Russia, China, Kazakhstan, and other 
challenges - geological, financial etc.), and the responses of agents (EU institutions, 
member states and energy companies in this study) to this environment. These models, 
compatible because of their shared ontologies, allow for examination of the structural 
Caspian environment (political risk, non-coincidence, great power involvement etc.) and 
the corresponding European response (catalytic diplomacy, milieu-shaping etc.). The 
collective European response to this structural challenge has been to develop and employ 
catalytic diplomatic cooperation and interaction. The focus on catalytic diplomacy 
facilitates investigation of the resource and ideational links within this network and the 
way that different actors’ resource contributions allow them to (collectively) mitigate the 
challenges of the wider Caspian structural environment. The focus on milieu-shaping and 
structural foreign policy, in turn draws attention to the resources that the EU institutions 
have at their disposal both within this proximate network structure and in the Caspian 
more broadly. The resources of different European actors are indeed both contributions to 
the catalytic diplomatic network of European actors itself and, simultaneously, also 
important contributions to the wider structural environment in the Caspian. 
Complexity  
 
Finally, this thesis is a study in complexity and the challenges of complexity in at least 
three senses: policy, research methods and theory. Energy policy is well known as a 
complex or ‘wicked’ policy area (Chester, 2009). The inherent complexity of this topic 
matter, the number of actors, their geographical spread, the different forms of power they 
can employ and their different and competing interests makes both the devising of policy 
and the study of this policy a challenge. Indeed, the complexity inherent to this project 
raises several research challenges both in terms of the research methodology/methods 
and the analytical frameworks needed to study this area.  
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Adopting a critical realist philosophical approach was instrumental in dealing with this 
complexity methodologically and theoretically. The judgemental rationalist dimension of 
critical realism (discussed in chapter two and annex one) encourages one to critically 
reflect on the multiple methods by which one can study a given instance of reality and the 
corresponding importance of triangulating between different sources information. The 
traineeship at the EEAS in Brussels helped immeasurably with finding different ways to 
investigate the research matter. For example, through colleagues, the traineeship exposed 
me to the right networks of policy actors and to other useful public sources, such as the 
2011 public consultation which was being worked on by a fellow trainee at the time. 
Likewise, the experience of being immersed in that policy environment for an extended 
period of time helped me intellectually to get to grips with the complexity of the policy 
area, with people on hand who could help explain the multi-faceted dimensions of the 
topic.  
Critical realism was also fundamentally important in terms of the capacity of the analytical 
frameworks to conceptually manage this empirical complexity. The critical realist 
framework adopted, based on abductive reasoning and with a broad view of causality, 
enables one to combine different theoretical approaches and frameworks with attendant 
benefits in terms of capturing conceptually complex policy areas. In this sense it allows a 
version of (and the benefits of) the analytical eclecticism described in chapter two, but 
with attention to the risk of incommensurability. Indeed, this form of theorising enables 
one to draw on different concepts simultaneously, employing them together, incorporating 
different parts of the multi-dimensional picture of EU upstream energy policy and thus to 
develop potentially transferable theoretical models that can manage the inherent 
complexity of the topic matter in question. As described in the theory and methods 
chapters, the cost of this approach is reduced parsimony and the fact that the research 
models cannot be generalized (although they can be transferred). However, what is lost in 
parsimony and generalisability is made up for in the ability to capture the rich and 
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multifaceted politico-economic, market-authority, material-ideational, transnational-
interstate and post-Soviet-EU dimensions of what is an empirically complex and multi-
layered area of study.   
AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
The investigation conducted in this thesis opens up a number of areas for further study. 
Indeed, further exploration of the research outlined in this thesis would allow for 
examination of the transferability of the models employed (and the relevance of the 
findings highlighted above), both to other instances of European external energy 
interaction, and to similar cases of politico-commercial engagement outside of energy 
sector. In particular three avenues of future research engagement are suggested in this 
final section: 1) EU upstream energy policy in other energy-rich regions; 2) analysis of EU 
upstream energy policy successes/failures (in the Caspian and elsewhere); and 3) EU 
political risk mitigation and catalytic diplomacy outside of energy policy. 
Firstly, having examined cooperation in the Caspian upstream, a clear area of further 
research would be comparative analysis of EU cooperation in other energy-rich regions. A 
number of regions in the EU periphery present themselves for comparison, including in 
particular North and West Africa and the Gulf region379. Such investigation could adopt a 
comparative foreign policy perspective seeking to compare the milieu-shaping activities of 
the EU across these regions. Furthermore, this analysis could, as this thesis has done, 
investigate the challenges of the structural context and the corresponding level of EU, 
member state and energy company catalytic diplomacy in these regions.  
A second area for potential further research could be investigation of EU upstream energy 
successes and failings both in the Caspian and elsewhere. Such research could be 
conducted along two axes. Firstly, how successful has the EU been in promoting its energy 
                                                          
379 However, other ‘newer’ energy-rich areas such as the eastern Mediterranean (in the territorial 
waters of Turkey, Cyprus and Israel) also present scope for similar analysis. 
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governance in the upstream? Which areas have third party countries adopted and how can 
patterns of adoption be explained380? Likewise, how successful has the EU’s commercial 
energy diplomacy been, both in the sense of opening markets, reacting to political risks and 
mitigating territorial non-coincidence in foreign energy markets (particularly in the MENA 
region following the Arab Spring)?  
Thirdly, there is considerable scope for the investigation of EU political risk mitigation 
beyond the energy sector. At present, knowledge of EU public-private interaction, external 
governance promotion and commercial diplomacy is underdeveloped and an important 
emerging field of research. Focusing on dimensions of political risk mitigation across 
different economic sectors, a project in this area could advance knowledge of the EU’s 
proactive and reactive political risk mitigation policies, evaluate public-private 
partnerships in European commercial diplomacy across a number of sectors and further 
contribute to understandings of the overlap between the EU’s various security, market-
promoting and diplomatic activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
380 An additional question here could be focus on how regional players and countervailing 
governance structures (such as EurAsEC in Central Asia) impact on the EU’s efforts to export 
governance. See Stoddard (2012). 
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ANNEX ONE 
 
JOINED-UP THEORY: PHILOSOPHICAL AND SCIENTIFIC 
ONTOLOGY, ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS AND HEURISTIC 
THEORETICAL MODELS 
 
As described in chapter two, this thesis seeks to develop an eclectic approach to theorising 
European energy cooperation. However development of an eclectic style of 
conceptualisation does not license an incoherent, ‘anything goes’ approach. Little is to be 
gained from eclecticism if the result is methodological disjointedness or theoretical 
incommensurability. Furthermore, given that this thesis critiques some of the ontological 
foundations of contemporary energy theorisation, it is incumbent on the author to outline, 
in detail, his approach. Therefore this annex seeks to outline the joined-up ontological-
theoretical approach employed in this thesis starting with the most abstract philosophical 
issues and working down to a discussion of the type of heuristic theoretical frameworks 
that are utilised to explain European upstream cooperation in the Caspian.  
The first section outlines the distinction between philosophical and scientific ontology, 
explaining how philosophical ontology underpins scientific ontology and is thus 
analytically prior. The second section details and further justifies the critical realist 
philosophical ontology381 adopted in this study. The third completes this annex by 
elaborating on the links between scientific ontology, analytical frameworks and the 
heuristic, theoretical model formulation of explanation employed in this thesis (outlines in 
chapter two). This section contributes to the analytical frameworks employed in this 
thesis by forwarding a politico-economic scientific ontology that seeks to avoid the risks of 
                                                          
381  Not to be confused with realism in International Relations. 
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incommensurability when incorporating a number of insights from different, and 
sometimes ostensibly competing, paradigms. 
PHILOSOPHICAL AND SCIENTIFIC ONTOLOGY 
 
Within the philosophy of social science, ontology can be thought of in both a philosophical 
and scientific sense (Jackson, 2011b, p.28; Patomäki & Wight, 2000, p.215; Hay, 2006, 
p.80). These two are intrinsically related, with philosophical ontology being the most 
foundational and thus both analytically prior to and the basis for scientific ontology. 
Jackson (2011b, p.28) explains that philosophical ontology concerns the “conceptual and 
philosophical basis on which claims about the world are formulated in the first place: [this 
is] ontology as our ‘hook up’ to the world, so to speak, concerned with how we as 
researchers are able to produce knowledge in the first place”. As Hay (2008, p.80) states, 
this form of ontology is “concerned with the nature of being itself – what it is to exist382, 
whether (and if so why) there exists one logically consistent world”.  
Less abstract and closer to the empirical content of research, (social) scientific ontology is 
the “catalogue of objects, processes, and factors that a given line of scientific research 
expects to exist or has evidence for the existence of” (Jackson, 2011b, p.28)383. This is the 
form of ontology most commonly discussed in the political science literature. It refers to 
“political being, to what is politically, to what exists politically and to the units of political 
inquiry” [emphasis in original] (Hay, 2006, p.81)384. Scientific ontology is more closely 
related to precise areas of inquiry than philosophical ontology and addresses more 
specific questions concerning, for example, the key units or actors of analysis in a 
                                                          
382 Rather than necessarily what does exist. Questions of what does exist pertain more to the realm 
of scientific ontology. 
383 Hay (2006, p.80) suggests that this second notion of ontology refers to a “set of assumptions 
made about the nature, essence, characteristics (in short, the reality) of an object or set of objects of 
analytical inquiry”. 
384 In terms of practical examples, philosophical ontology relates to questions such as whether 
researchers can be said to exist independently of the reality they seek to investigate or whether one 
can know of anything more than that which one can directly observe. 
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particular instance of politics or whether and how material factors take precedence over 
ideas in a given case of socio-political interaction (or vice versa).  
PHILOSOPHICAL ONTOLOGY: CRITICAL REALISM AS A BASIS FOR ECLECTICISM AND 
INTERDISCIPLINARITY 
 
The analytical framework utilised in this thesis is ultimately based on a critical realist 
philosophy of social science. Critical realism provides a pragmatic philosophical 
ontological approach to research that encourages interparadigmatic theorising and 
through its broader, Aristotelian understanding of cause, allows for an accommodation of 
material and ideational factors in analysis. Indeed, a critical realist position provides a 
solid underpinning for interparadigmatic eclecticism, analysis of agents and their complex 
interwoven relations with their respective structural contexts and the impact of ideational 
and material sources of cause in explaining outcomes. Such a position is logically capable 
of supporting the eclectic type of framework outlined below.  
As a philosophy of science, critical realism is committed to a number of core philosophical 
tenets that facilitate a certain degree of pragmatism in research. Firstly, a critical realist 
viewpoint denotes “mind-world dualism” (Jackson, 2010b, p.92). That is to say critical 
realists are ontologically realist and thus hold that there is a reality that exists 
independently of our (individual) minds (Patomaki & Wight, 2000, p.225; Kurki, 2008, 
p.206). This does not mean, however, that an independent reality necessarily exists 
outside of all minds, in the sense that critical realism accepts that intersubjective 
understandings between individuals can have causal impact on the world385. However, it is 
to state that reality is not just a subjective product of our individual minds. Secondly, 
critical realism is epistemologically relativist stressing that all scientific knowledge about 
the independent world is socially produced and thus inherently bound up in the subjective 
                                                          
385 Indeed, Patomaki and Wight argue that the “intersubjective represents merely one important 
and necessary part of the social” (2000, p.225). 
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social and political context in which research takes place (including the subjective 
perceptions of the researcher) (Patomaki & Wight, 2000, p.225). However, importantly, 
critical realism is also judgementally rationalist, arguing that despite the inherent 
subjectivities of research, researchers can still get close to understanding the real world as 
it is possible to give justifiable, logical grounds as to why one set of ideas should be 
preferred over another (Patomaki & Wight, 2000, p.225). These three tenets together 
embody a certain pragmatism in research amounting to a position where a researcher 
accepts that there is a reality that exists independent to them, that they are nonetheless 
affected by a degree of subjectivity in their own attempts to understand that reality, but 
that they should aim to be systematic and exercise judgement in seeking to reduce their 
biases and get ‘closer’ to the truth (Kurki, 2006, p.203)386.  
The mode of theoretical inquiry in critical realism is not inductive inference (moving from 
particular observation to general claims) or deductive inference (moving from general 
claims to confirming or falsifying these claims in particular instances) but rather 
abduction. Abduction works by producing plausible claims for particular instances based 
on the available data (Jackson, 2010b, p.82). As Jackson notes (2010b, p.83), the purpose 
of abduction is “to posit, or conjecture, the existence of some process, entity or property 
that accounts for the observational data”. These explanations may be related to 
configurations between observable data, but crucially in the case of critical realism they 
can also relate to unobservable, but nonetheless causal, factors387.  
Abductive theorising involves outlining the important causal mechanisms that contribute 
to particular observed outcomes. Kurki (2006, p.) highlights that critical realism takes a 
broader, view of causality than other philosophies of social science (particularly neo-
positivism) and consequently opens up the possibility for different types of cause to have 
                                                          
386 Put more pithily - there is an independent truth, we can probably never be certain that we have 
reached it, but we should try our hardest to do so. 
387 Nuomena in Kantian terminology.   
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causal impact, including both material and ideational factors. This wider, Aristotelian view 
of cause is based on an understanding that social systems are ‘open’ rather than ‘closed’ 
and thus areas where “multiple causes interact and counteract each other in complex and, 
importantly, unpredictable ways” (Kurki, 2006, p.202). Kurki thus states that “the central 
focus of causal analysis is not the analysis of isolated independent variables (through 
statistical methods), but rather understanding the complex interaction of a variety of 
different kinds of causal factors (through the building of conceptual frameworks)” (2006, 
p.202)388. This wide understanding of cause opens up the possibility of developing 
theoretical frameworks that incorporate both a number of different factors, actors and 
processes as causally important (as the theoretical frameworks highlighted in chapter two 
seek to do). 
The open and multi-causal nature of social systems requires an eclectic interparadigmatic 
approach to research (Patomaki & Wight, 2000, p.226). According to Patomaki & Wight 
(2000, p.226), all competing theories must contain some degree of commensurability 
otherwise it would be impossible for them to discuss the same phenomena. Indeed, it is in 
the logic of explanation and in the identification of the causal phenomena that different 
paradigmatic approaches in the social sciences differ and clash. However, the wider 
understanding of causality inherent to critical realism weakens (but does not necessarily 
always resolve) these dichotomies and allows for investigation of how different causal 
factors employed by different paradigms interact in given instances. Critical realism thus 
directs attention to the ontological overlap between different theories, and crucially, the 
potential for their possible fusion (Patomaki & Wight, 2000, p.226). In this sense, critical 
realism allows development of the non-reductive, eclectic analytical frameworks 
necessary for investigation of EU upstream energy cooperation in the Caspian. 
                                                          
388 Kurki outlines four types of causality (2006, p.206). Material causes refer to the material factors 
that contribute to a particular outcome. Formal causes refer to the ideas that shape how something 
comes about. Efficient causes refer to the factors by which something is brought about and final 
causes refer to the objectives or the reasons for which something is brought about (Kurki, 2006, 
p.206). 
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SCIENTIFIC ONTOLOGY, ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS AND HEURISTIC THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORKS 
 
Moving beyond philosophical ontology, scientific ontology serves a fundamental role in 
International Relations (as all social scientific inquiry) as it forms the basis of the 
analytical frameworks from which theoretical models or explanations are derived (see 
fig.8). Scientific ontology and analytical frameworks are in a sense one and the same thing 
with analytical frameworks representing a select series of scientific ontological axioms 
systematically ordered to facilitate investigation of a particular issue. As Stanley (2012b, 
p.475) argues, ontological assumptions “make possible explanations”. In determining 
beliefs about nature of the constituent units of political affairs and their interrelationships, 
scientific ontologies and the analytical frameworks they underpin “help categorise and 
reduce [the world’s] inherent complexity” (Stanley, 2012b, p.476). As a result, ontologies 
in political science are always simplifying to a certain extent and thus do not necessarily 
provide specific explanations themselves, but rather allow for specific frameworks, 
theoretical models and explanations to be developed (Stanley, 2012b, p.476).  
 
Fig. 8: The hierarchy of ontologies, frameworks and theories. Source: Own elaboration. 
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Unlike wider scientific ontology, specific theoretical explanations or models relate directly 
to certain aspects of ‘reality’389 and while still abstractions, intend to explain particular 
instances of human affairs. These of course may take numerous forms (heuristic models, 
hypothetico-deductive claims or Weberian ideal types390 for example). However in all 
cases they are (indeed must be) based on and concurrent with the ontological axioms that 
make up broader analytical frameworks. It is in this sense that scientific ontological 
assumptions, whether explicit and stated, implicit and unstated or unreflexively-held, 
condition the potential theoretical explanations of reality. The full details of the scientific 
ontological positions of this thesis are outlined in chapter two. 
It is also necessary to outline the heuristic model form of theorisation utilised in this thesis 
(Clarke & Primo, 2007; Humphreys, 2010) – see chapter two. Such an approach entails the 
elaboration of conceptual devices that are “useful for particular purposes” in the study of 
Eurasian energy politics (Clarke & Primo, 2007, p.742). Related more directly to the issues 
under investigation than an analytical framework (from which it necessarily derives) a 
heuristic model outlines the sort of explanations required, provides conceptual categories 
to organise empirical material and indicates the actors, mechanisms and background 
conditions that need to be examined in a specific given instance (Humphreys, 2010, 
p.263). As Clarke and Primo suggest (2007, p.742), such models in political science are 
conceptual ‘maps’391 and should be judged on their ability to usefully explain the world 
rather than exactly correspond to it. In this sense one should not seek to ascertain whether 
such models are strictly true or false per se, but rather whether the logic inherent to the 
model explains the inherent logic of the part of the subsystem of human affairs that it 
seeks to explain (Clarke & Primo, 2007, p.742).  
                                                          
389 For discussions of the difference between mind-world monist and mind-world dualist 
approaches to research see Jackson (2011b, chapter two). 
390 These are intrinsically related to the philosophical ontologies adopted as we see here the link 
between methodology and method – see Jackson (2011b).   
391 Clarke and Primo give the example of a subway line that does not correspond accurately to 
reality but rather provides a model that is nonetheless highly useful (Clarke & Primo, 2007, p.742). 
This is because while a map does not correspond to reality in a descriptive sense, it does in a logical 
sense (in the form of necessary logic for the purposes of using the map). 
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